ML20246K075
| ML20246K075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1989 |
| From: | Brady J, Jenison K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246K035 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-89-09, 50-327-89-9, 50-328-89-09, 50-328-89-9, GL-81-07, GL-81-7, GL-88-07, GL-88-7, IEB-88-011, IEB-88-11, NUDOCS 8905170237 | |
| Download: ML20246K075 (23) | |
See also: IR 05000327/1989009
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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$* d
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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' Report Nos.:
50-327/89-09, 50-328/89-09
Licensee: . Tennessee Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101. Market Square
Chattanooga,,TN 37402-2801
. Docket Nos.:
50-327_ and.50-328
License Nos.:
Fa'cility .Name: .Sequoyah Units 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: ' March 5,1989' thru ' April 5,1989
Inspectors:
%
k
h/
K. Jenison, Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
Inspectors:
P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Humphrey, Resident Inspector
D. Loveless, Resident Inspector
Accompanying Personnel:
P. Balmain, Reactor Engineer
Approvbd by: -1 A d 4
MJ49'
J 8Brady, . Actf/ig Chief, Project Section 1
Date Signed
TVA Projects Divi.sion
Sum: nary
Scope:
This routine n:onthly inspectica by the Resident Inspectors was in the
area of operational
safety verification including operations
performance, system lineups, radiction protection, safeguards, and
housekeeping inspections. Other areas inspected included maintenance
observations,
surveillance
testing
observations,
' refueling
activities, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up - of .
events, review of licensee identified items, and review of inspector
follow-up items.
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Results: The licensee's performance in the areas of operational safety
verification, and maintenance and surveillance obser:ations was
generally adequate, except as noted below, and was fully capable of
supporting plant operations. Management participation in the outage
was positive. The area of vendor manual control and validation is of
concern. The radiation protection and security areas were adequate.
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s905170237 890509
ADOCK 05000327
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The licensee had on three occasions failed to establish, implement
and/or maintain procedures.
These examples, described below, were
identified as violation 50-327 328/89-09-03.
Failure to establish an adequate slave relay performance testing
procedure which resulted in inadvertent initiation of reactor
trip signals (paragraph 12.a).
Failure to establish adequate procedures to control the
activities affecting the operability and configuration of
tornado dampers resulting in an inadvertent entry into an LCO.
(paragraph 13.b).
Failure to follow procedures relative to maintaining vendor
manuals in a technically adequate status (paragraph 14.b).
]
Two Non-cited vilations were identified:
Erroneous Response Time Test procedure (paragraph 4).
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Introduction of argon gas into the hydraulic actuator bladder
of an UHI valve (paragraph 5.b).
Two unresolved items were identified:
Operability of fan motors for certain ECCS room coolers
(paragraph 2.a).
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Operability
of
UHI valve with scaffolding
interference
(paragraph 5.5).
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power Production
- J.
LaPoint, Site Director
- S. Smith, Plant Manager
T. Arney, Quality Assurance Manager
R- Beecken, Maintenance Superintendent
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- M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager
D. Craven, Plant Support Superintendent
S. Crowe, Site Quality Manager
R. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor
- J. Holland, Corrective Action Program Manager
J. Patrick, Operations Superintendent
R. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
M. Burzynski, Site Licensing Staff Manager
- A. Ritter, Engineering Assurance Engineer
- R. Rogers, Plant Support Superintendent
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- M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Superintendent
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S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer
- P. Trudel, Project Engineer
C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer
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NRC Attendees
- J. Brady, Acting Chief, Projects Section 1, TVA Projects Division
" Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are listed in the last
paragraph.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Plant Tours
lhe inspecto"s observed control room operations and reviewed
applicable logs including the shift logs, night order book, clearance
hold order book, configuration log and TACF log.
No issues were
identified with these specific logs.
The inspectors also conducted discussions with control
room
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operators, verified that proper control room staffing was maintained,
observed shift turnovers, and confirmed operability of instruments-
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tion. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency
systems, and verified compliance with TS LCOs.
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Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, ERCW and turbine
buildings, were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential
fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive
vibrations and plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions.
The plant
was observed to be clean and in adequate condition, The inspectors
verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required
and that followup activities and prioritization of work was
accomplished by the licensee.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following
safety-related systems on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify operability and
proper valve alignment:
Containment Spray (Unit 1)
Emergency Gas Treatment System (Units 1 & 2)
Upper Head Injection (Units 1 & 2)
Chemical and Volume Control (Unit 1, Train A)
Residual Heat Removal System (Unit 2)
On March 7,
1989 the licensee determined that 13 fan motors from
ECCS room coolers had not been lubricated in accordance with the
licensee's Qualified Maintenance Program approved for meeting the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
The program required lubrication
schedules for the motors to be performed by August 19, 1988.
On
August 19, 1988, DNE issued a memorandum to plant maintenance
allowing an extension of these dates by three months.
Thi s
extension expired for all motors by Decenser 16, 1988.
On March 10, 1989 DNE issued a second tremorandum extending the duc
date for all motors to April 15, 1989. This memo and the associated
review meet the requirements of GL 88-07.
The operability of the
motors from the end cf the original extension until the March 10
memo, along with the timeliness of the DNE analysis, will be reviewed
by NRR/ Headquarters EQ group. These items are considered unresolved
and will be tracked as URI 327,328/89-09-01, Motor Lubrication.
No deviations or violations were identified.
b.
Safeguards Inspection
In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a
review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance
of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct
of daily activities including: protected and vital area access
controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors;
badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, and
protected and vital area barrier integrity. The inspectors verified
interfaces between the security organization and both operations and
maintenance.
Specifically, the Resident Inspectors:
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interviewed individuals with security concerns
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inspected security during outages
3.
visited central and secondary alarm stations
4.
verified protection of Safeguards Information
5.
verified onsite/offsite communication capabilities
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Radiation Protection
The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation
of radiation protection controls.
On a regular basis, RWPs were
reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure that
the activities were conducted in accordance with the applicable RWPs.
Selected radiation protection instruments were verified operable and
calibration frequencies were reviewed and found acceptable.
The
following RWPs and RIR reports were reviewed in detail:
(1) Radiological Work Permits
RWP 89 20250 00 00 Timesheet 25, U-2 Aux. Bldg. pipechases,
charge pump rooms, HX Reoms, Penetration Rooms and UHI.
RWP 89 00108 00 00 Timesheet 3, NRC inspection, all areas,
(2) Radiological Incident Reports
(a) Tne inspector reviewed R. irs 89-20,31,& 33, which documented
an occurrence on February 24, 1989 that involved three
individuals that were found in a C-Zone area and had failed
to sign in on the RWP.
However, the individuals were
dressed in the proper protective clothing as required by
the RWP.
Immediate corrective actions were taken and the
individuals were removed from the area and disciplinary
actions are pending.
The individuals involved were laborers that were hired by
the licensee for the outage work.
Each had received the
General Employee Training designed to inform workers of the
plant rules and safety requirements, specifically those in
area of radiation protection. The incident was attributed
to a failure to follow procedure.
The inspector observed the on scene prompt and adequate
corrective actions taken by the licensee and had no
further questions pertaining to this issue.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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No trends were identified in the operational safety verification area. The
licensee continued to perform plant operations in an adequate manner.
General conditions in the plant were acceptable and conditions identified
by the NRC were promptly resolved by the licensee. Radiation protection
and security are adequate to continue two unit operations.
3.
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
The inspector verified operability of the Emergency Gas Treatment System
on Units 1 and 2 by completing a walkdown of the systems. Minor drawing
errors were noted and discussed with the licensee.
Additionally, the
inspector noted discrepancies between the SOI configuration and the flow
diagram configuration.
These were reviewed by the licensee and
corrections to the checklist and drawings will be accomplished.
4.
Surveillance Observations and Review (61726)
Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that
surveillance
of safety-related systems and components were being
conducted in accordance with TS requirements.
The inspectors verified that: testing was performed in accordance with
adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met;
test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by
personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were
identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the
testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and
system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector
verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by
qualified individuals.
The following activities were observed / reviewed with no deficiencies
identified except as noted:
SI-60, Automatic Transfer of 6.9 ks Unit Boards With Unit on
Backfeed.
As per SI-94.5 Reactor Trip Instrumentation Refueling Outage Channel
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Calibration (S/G Feedwater Flows), the inspector re/iewed actf vities
in progress, the calibration of the reactor trip instrumentation.
During the process, the inspector noted that precaution 3.1 stated
that "Only one protection set can be functionally tested at any one
time.
All other protection set cebinet doors shall be closed."
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However, the inspector noted that in addition to the Protection Set I
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cabinet doors being open, the Protection Set II cabinet door was also
open and efforts associated with SI-247.2.921A, Response Time Test,
Containment Sump Level Channel II, were in progress.
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The inspector questioned the technicians and was told that it was
acceptable to have.more than one set of cabinet doors open at a time
while in Mode 6.
The test procedure was erroneous in that the pre-
caution was applicable only while the plant was in Mode 1-5 and not
in Mode 6 as mentioned in the procedure.
The procedure has been
updated.
This item will be tracked as NCV 327,328/89-09-04.
The
resolution was . deemed by the inspector to be adequate and the
violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in
Section V.G. of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components
were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance
with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards,
and in conformance with T.S.
The following items were considered during this . review:
LCOs were met
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while components or systems were removed from service; redundant
components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the
activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair
records accurately reflected the activities; functional testing and/or
calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to
service; QC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;
radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points were established
where required and were observed; fire prevention controls were
implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in
accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively
pursued,
a.
Temporary Alterations (TACFs)
The following TACFs were reviewed:
TACF 82-97-87
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Work Requests
The following work requests were reviewed:
WR B283321 SIS Accumulator Tank #2
WR B783822 MS drair. high level
WR B237670 Lower Compartment Moisture High
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WR B797907 Letdown Relief to th'e PRT
WR B238391 Pressurizer Spray' Temperature
WR B775052 UHI Isolation Valve Accumulator Nitrogen Leak
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On . March 16, 1989, the inspector witnessed licensee efforts to-
identify a nitrogen leak on the Unit 1 UHI isolation valve-
1-FCV-87-24 accumulator.
This WR was written to replace either the
whole . accumulator and bladder assembly or the Schrader valve. At-
approximately 9:30 a.m.
the licensee determined that nitrogen was
leaking from the accumulator Schrader valve and made the decision to
replace only.the Schrader valve.
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At .10:00
a.m.,
nitrogen was bled from the accumulator and UHI
isolation valve 1-FCV-87-24 was declared inoperable with the valve
open'
Consequently, Unit 1 entered TS LC0 3.5.1.2 action statement
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"a".
The existing Schrader valve was removed _ at 10:12 a.m.
and
replaced with a new Schader valve at 10:14 a.m.
At approximately
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10:15 a.m., precharging of the 1-FCV-87-24 was initiated using a gas
cylinder and precharging rig which had been placed in the Unit 1 UHI
room prior to working WR B-775052. This gas cylinder charged the
1-FCV-87-24 accumulator to approximately 1300 psig and not 1467 psig
-as required'
At approximately 10:30
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the licensee's test
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director ordered additional nitrogen cylinders be brought to complete
precharging. During this time the inspector noted that gas cylinder
No. ICC-3A2015, which was used to precharge the accumulator, was
labeled as argon and not nitrogen as specified. The inspector asked
the licensee's test director why argon had been used instead of
nitrogen. The test director was unaware that argon had been used and
immediately ordered the maintenance team to bieed the argon from the
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Technical
Specification (TS) 6.S.I.a requires that procedures
recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision
2, February 1978, be established, implemented, and maintained. This
includes procedures for performing maintenance The requirements of
TS 6.8.1.a are implemented in part by procedures included as work
instructions within work request WR No. B-775052, "UHI isolation
valve accumulator nitrogen leak."
WR No. B-775052, work instruction step 9,
required that after
1-FCV-87 24 isolation valve accumulator repair or Schrader valve
installation, a nitrogen (N2) precharge (to 1467 psi) must be
established,
Failure to precharge the 1-FCV-87-24 isolation valve accumulator with
nitrogen as specified in WR B-775052 is a violation of the above
requirements. The licensee reviewed the incident as documented in
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PQIR-NE-MTB-SQP MM - 89 011 R0, Possible' ' Ef fect of ' Inadvertent
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Introduction of Argon Gas into the Hydraulic Actuator Bladder of
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UHI Valve 1-FCV-87-24.
The' calculations showed that the valve
would respond similarly with an Argon charge as it would with
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a Nitrogen charge. Therefore, it would be categorized as an issue
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with low safety significance.
This item will be tracked as NCV
327,328/89-09-05.
This violation is not being cited because the
criteria specified in Section V.G. of the Enforcement Policy were
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All maintenance work as specified in WR B-775052 with the exception
of post maintenance testing was completed at approximately 11:26 a.m.
The licensee test director then informed the control room to make
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preparations to perform SI-166.6 to verify the operability of
1-FCV-87-24.
. Prior to performing SI-166.6, a member of the
maintenance team informed;the test director that a temporary tubular
scaffolding support was installed through the yoke of isolation valve
1-FCV-87-24. in such a way that the shaft to valve stem coupling would
have impinged on the scaffolding support before the valve stroked
fully closed. The test director instructed the maintenance workers to
disassemble the scaffolding and remove the tubu'ar support.
The
inspector questioned how long this situation had existed and whether
the valve had been operable during that period of . time.
After
removal of the scaffolding the control room was informed-. that
1-FCV-87-24 was clear and SI-166.6 was performed successfully. -At
12:27 p.m. 1-FCV-87-24 was declared operable.
This event is currantly under licensee and vendor review. Following
this review a decision will be made as to the operability of the
valve whfle the scaffolding was attached to it.
This item is
unresolved and is identified as URI 327,328/89-09-02.
c.
Hold Orchrs
The inspectors reviewed the following H0s to verify compliance with
AI-3, Revision 38, Clearance Procedure, and that the H0s contained
adequate information to properly isolate the affected portions of the
sy: tem being tagged. Additionally the inspectors verified that the
required tags were installed on the affe:ted equipment.
Hold Order
Equipment
H0 2-89-416
2RCW Pump Motor, 6.9 KV Shutdown
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Board, 28-B C/8.
H0-1-89-150
1-FCV-1-16, Loop 4 Steam Supply to
TDAFW Pump
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Management Activities in Support of Plant Operations
TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the NRC
inspectors.
Resident inspectors observed that planning, scheduling, work
control and other management meetings were effective in controlling plant
activities.
First line supervisors appear to be knowledgeable and
involved in the day to day activities of the plant.
Management response
to those plant activities and events that occurred during this inspection
period appeared timely and effective. An example of this management action
was the professional and conservative approach to resolution of the
leaking flux thimbles and management response 'to the NRC in plant and
refueling initiatives.
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7.
NRC Inspector Follow-up Items, URIs, Violations (92701, 92702)
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(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-44-02, Failure to Follow IncoN Pmbe Work
Instructions
On September 9,
1988, the licensee reported an incident .. volving the
accidental removal of a Unit 1 incore flux detector from the core during
the performance of troubleshooting and repair activities per WR B296449.
The incident was determined to have resulted from an inadequate
instruction and failure to follow the precautions listed in the
instruction.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions implemented to
prevent reoccurrence of the incident which consisted of a new procedure,
MI-13.3.8, Incore Flux Detectors Removal and Installation. The specific
purpose was to provide detailed instruction and precautions for the incore
work activity.
The licensee's corrective actions were determined to be acceptable. This
violation is closed.
(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-29-04,
Inadequate Weld and Valve Testing
Procedures
The violation identified two examples of inadequate procedures. The first
example involved the adequacy of TVA general construction specification
G-29, Radiographic Examination on Welded Joints.
The second example
involved the adequacy of Technical
Instruction
TI-89,
Inservice
Inspection.
Corrective actions in the first example included the documentation of weld
thickness measurements in the individual work packages in accordance with
procedure SQM-17, General Requirements for Welding, Heat Treatment and
Allied Field Operations at Sequoyah and the performance of inspections on
ten similar welds.
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Corrective actions on the second example included the revision of TI-89
and the verification that testing was actually performed under work plans
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WP 6813-01 and WP 12309 for Units 1 and 2 respectively.
The inspector reviewed appropriate portions of the above procedures, work
plans, and test results and had no further questions.
The licensee's
corrective actions appear to be adequate.
This violation is closed.
8.
Licensee Event heport Followup (92700)
UNIT 1
(Closed) LER 327/87012 Loss of Decay Heat Removal Resulting from False
Indications of RCS Level in Sight Glass Due to Debris Accumulation.
This LER described the event of January 28, 1987, during which RHR
suction was lost for a period of 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> while the RCS was partially
drained for Steam Generator tube repairs.
Operators were maintaining
level in the RCS at elevation 695 feet-6 inches by a sight glass indicator
with remote video monitor displayed in the control room.
was running in the cold leg recirculation mode with very low decay heat
rates due to the extended shutdown. The RCS level was verified and logged
at 30 minute intervals by the UO. At 1:30 a.m., the VO observed level out
of sight high and directed an AVO to go to containment to verify actual
level in the sightglass.
The AVO reported that level was indicating 696
feet-6 inches, 12 inches above normal.
The UO began lowering level back
to 695 feet-6 inches at a rate of 30 gpm at 3:30 a.m.
At 6:20 a.m., the
running RHR pump began exhibiting signs of cavitating and lost suction.
The pump was immediately stopped and the level was checked, At the time,
level was at 696 feet-4 inches by the sight glass, a change of only 2
inches from the initial level.
The UO entered ADI-14, Loss cf RHR
Shutdown Cooling, and began to raise level back up in the PCS.
At 7:14
a.m. , maintenance personnel in containment reported to the VO that water
was rising in the S.G. bowl as observed through the open manways. The UO
stopped filling the RCS but the level continued to the point of spillover
from the S.G manways.
The water spilled from the manways for
approximately 10 minutes, and was later estimated to be a spill of
approximately 500 gallons.
At 7:50 a.m., the 1B-B RHR pump was started and the
loss of RHR event terminated.
After regaining RHR shutdown cooling, operators flushed the sight glass
connection and saw some suspended solid-type debris flushed from the
connection. RCS water level was then raised and lowered to verify correct
operation of the sight giass.
Although 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> elapsed before RHR cooling was reestablished, RCS
temperature increased only 20 degrees, from 95 to 115 degrees.
The root
cause of this event was determined to be a partially plugged sight glass
connection which caused the UO to change level resulting in both the loss
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of suction to the RHR pump, and the subsequent spill when he tried to
recover.
No equipment damage, loss of shutdown margin, or personnel
contamination or injury resulted from this event. The licensee instituted
corrective action to add a redundant level indicator in the form of c
Tygon hose connected to another RCS loop,
and will
also periodically
flush the indicator connections. In addition, procedures were revised to
add details of the elevation of pertinent design features, and the approx-
imate gallons per inch between those features. The corrective actions are
considered adequate to krevent recurrence of this event.
This LER is closed.
9.
NRC Bulletins and Generic Letters (92703)
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IEBs and GLs are documents issued by the NRC which require certain specific
actions of the addressee. The inspector has reviewed the actions taken by
the licensee as a response to the IEB and GL listed below. The inspector
verified that: the licensee had performed the specific actions required by
the
bulletin;
corrective
actions
appeared appropriate;
generic
applicability had been considered; licensee had reviewed the event and
that appropriate plant personnel were knowledgeable; no unreviewed safety
questions were involved; and that violations of regulations or TS
conditions did not appear to occur.
(Closed) Generic Letter 81-07, Control of Heavy Loads.
The inspector
reviewed Generic Letter 81-07 and discussed the issues with Mr. K. Sang
of NRR.
Based on the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated March 26, 1985,
" Control of Heavy Loads," the NRC staff has concluded that the issue as
it relates to the Sequoyah is closed.
(0 pen) IEB 88-11, Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification. On March
3,1989 the inspector observed inspections of the pressurizer surge line
performed by the licensee under SMI-0-68-4, Examination of the Reactor
Coolant System Pressurizer Surge Lines.
Additionally, the inspector
independently verified certain measurements taken as a result of the
bulletin.
The inspector did not identify any deficiencies.
NRR review
of the licensee's submittal on this bulletin remains open.
10.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
Through several inspection periods, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's
program of protective measures for extreme cold weather as proceduralized
in GOI-6, Freeze Protection.
The inspector verified that the licensee
was inspecting systems susceptible to freezing to ensure the presence of
heat tracing, space heaters, and/or insulation; the proper setting of
thermostats; and that the heat tracing and space heating circuits have
been energized. These inspections were performed by the licensee on a
weekly basis throughout periods of freezing temperatures.
L____----_--_____------
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,
.
,
1
3
,
.
11
No violations or deviations were noted.
This inspection activity is
closed and will be performed again at the onset of freezing temperatures.
11. Temporary Instructions
(Closed) TI 2515/94, Inspection for Verification of Licensee Changes Made
to Comply with PWR Moderator Dilution Requirements, Multi-Plant Action
Item B-03.
The inspector reviewed this item and determined that it was not applicable
to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
This item is closed.
12.
Event Follow-up (93702)
a.
The inspector reviewed two incidents that occurred on March 25, 1989,
at Unit 2 while it was in cold shutdown for refueling which resulted
in an SI/ Reactor trip signal initiation during the performance of
IMI-99, RT-601A, Rev.
6,
Response Time Testing Engineered Safety
Features Actuation Slave Relays (K601, K620, K-621). Both incidents
resulted from the failure to reset permissives P-11 and P-12 when
returning the SSPS to normal upon completion of the response time
testing.
The first incident occurred when the SSPS was returned to
service after Seing taken out for the test and a trip signal was made
up through a pressurizer low pressure. The second signal was initi-
ated as a result of a low Tave and an indicated high steam flow. The
high steam flow signal was initiated when the bistable for one steam
transmitter was tripped for backfilling and a second steam flow
transmitter drif ted upward and indicated a high steam flow.
The
upward drif t was caused by the changing conditions in the system.
During a review of the prccedure RT-601A, it was determined that no
requirement for resetting the permissives existed and this resulted
in the two trip signal initiations.
T.S.
6.8.1,
Procedures and
Programs, requires that written procedures be established, imple-
mented and maintained for certain activities including maintainenance
l
and testing.
Contrary to this requirement, the procedure used in
performance of the testing of the slave relays, IMI-99, RT-601A,
Rev. 6 was inadequate as evidenced by the initiation of the reactor
trip signals as descrf bed above.
This issue is identified as an
example of VIO 327,328/89-09-03 for failure to nave an adequate test
procedure.
b.
During turbine generator maintenance activities, the licensee
identified indentations on some of the turbine blades and suspected
it to be erosion-induced porosity. The vendor was contacted through
a technical response request and after analyzing the blades, made
the determination that -the indentations were casting markings and
that the blades were acceptable to use-as-is.
The licensee's actions appear to be adequate.
-
_ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ . - . - - _
- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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c.
During the refueling outage for Unit 2, the incore flux thimbles were
inspected by an eddy current technique. As a result, 16 thimbles
were replaced.
Following replacement, new high pressure seals were
installed by the vendor..
When the RCS .was refilled, leaks were
identified on six of the new seals.
Plant management decided to
drain down the RCS and inspect the new seals rather than re-torque as
recommended by the vendor.
The inspection revealed minor scratches
and other physical indications at the seal areas of each of the six
leaking thimbles.
These indications were removed and new seals
installed.
After refilling the RCS, the seals were hydrostatically
tested to approximately 400 psig without any indication of leaks.
The licensee's actions to resolve the problem appeared to be both
prudent and conservative.
13.
Refueling Activities (60710)
,
a.
.The inspector continued to monitor the . Unit 2, cycle 3 outage
activities.
Plant management was involved in the day to day plant
activities. Management was observed to be technically ' competent and
their decisions did not sacrifice quality to meet schedules. Based on
those activities. reviewed,
the inspector. judged management's
participation in the outage to be very positive. In addition,
management was found to be very responsive to NRC initiatives.
j
Surveillance activities were reviewed on a regular basis and were
,
.found to be in compliance with TS requirements. Of those reviewed,
strict procedure compliance was observed in all instances' except as
noted in NCV 327,328/89-09-04.
However, based on the number of
'
surveillance
observed, overall performance was determined to be
acceptable.
The inspector witnessed day to day involvement by the Quality Control
personnel in various plant activities and reviewed documented
!
inspection results and their dispositions to verify that the quality
assurance program was effective. It was concluded that these programs
were properly implemented and were effective.
Fuel handling was reviewed and was determined to be weak in the
area of refueling operation. The handling equipment appeared to be
marginally adequate for the operation and various interlocks were
l
by passed.
This also contributed to the incident during which the
i
fuel transfer cart was bent in the upender and the issuance of
I
327,328/89-07-01.
However,
during
core
loading,
the
inspector verified that continuity was maintained between the fuel
and excore monitors, communication with the control room was
maintained, fuel accountability methods were established, and TS
requirements implemented and that this part of the operation was
performed in an acceptable manner.
-__ _ _ _ _ -__-_-____ _ _ _ __- - __ - - _____--_-__-__________--___- - -_-- _ ___ _ _ __-_ _
_-
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p
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.
.
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e
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4
13
j.
In general, radiation contamination was kept to a minimum with work
!
areas and personnel being closely monitored. Radiological controls
were in place for the various activities and measures were imple-
mented to insure compliance. However, some problems were experienced
,
'
with airborne radiation resulting from improper installation of air
eductors to the RCS and the use of portable vacuum systems with
missing filters. These problems were identified and were corrected
early in the outage and resulted in the improvement of airborne
contamination conditions.
>
Radiation protection was determined to ' be carried out in an
acceptable manner.
Housekeeping was sufficiently maintained in the thoroughfare areas.
However, work areas, specifically the RHR pump and heat exchanger
rooms, were not maintained at the same high standard during the
outage.
This was brought to the attention of the maintenance
superintendent and immediate corrective actions were taken.
Overall
housekeeping conditions improved to an acceptable level in these
areas.
The inspector determined that the training and staffing of plant
personnel was adequate for the outage activities.
In summary, refueling activities were determined to be adequately
performed. Management appeared knowledgeable of the plant status at
all times and activities were conducted in a safe and responsible
manner.
b.
The inspector reviewed the incident involving closure of the two
tornado dampers that occurred on March 20, 1989, which placed the
plant in a Limited Condition of Operation for a period of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and
20 minutes without the condition being recognized by the operating
personnel. The dampers were closed to accommodate replacemer;t of
,
smoke detectors 0-XS-31A-3 and 0-XS-31A-4 that are located in the
ducts that supply suction for the ccntrol building pressurizing fans.
Operations personnel did not realize that closing the tornado dampers
rendered both trains of the control room emergency ventilation system
With both trains inoperable. the action statement for
LCO 3.7.7 could not be met and therefore LCO 3.0.3 was applicabic.
The dampers were closed at 8:30 a.m. on March 20, 1989. The condi-
tion was discoverec' and the dampers were reopened at 2:50 p.m. on the
same day. The time limits for LCO 3.0.3 would have been exceeded if
the condition had continued for an additional 40 minutes.
The craft workers related the problem of replacing the smoke
detectors with high air flow in the ducts.
The ASOS reviewed the
applicable ventilation drawings and determined that the suction to
the duct could be isolated by closing the tornado dampers. Handswitch
_ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- - - - - _
_
-_
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. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
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14
0-HS-31A-180A, which would be utilized to close and isolate the duct,
identified that power to the switch was supplied from vent board
1Al-1. Upon reviewing the vent board, a placard was found on the door
of the tornado damper control transformer whi:h stated; " breaker
normally open per 501-30.7 reference SCR SQNIIG86136."
The ASOS
reviewed S01-30.7, Onsite Electrical Power Systems Board Rooms
Heating, Venting, anr.' Cooling , and found nothi ng related to the
dampers to prevent their closure. In cddition, 50I-30.1, Control
Building and Control Room Heating, Air Conditioning and Ventilation
System, was reviewed which required the normal breaker position to be
open. Review of the SOI revealed that no warnings were included to
prevent breaker closure to allow operation of the handswitch and
closure of the dampers.
1
At that time, the AS0S closed the dampers which resulted in isolating
the suction of the control room pressurizing fans.
This was not
realized until 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes later and the plant was in
This issue resulted from inadequate procedures, S0I-30.1 and
S01-30.7, that failed to address the necessary precautions to prevent
the incident stated above.
T.S. 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs,
requires that written procedures be established, implemented and
maintained for certain activities including maintenance. Contrary to
this requirement, procedures to control the activities affecting the
operability and configuration of the tornado dampers
were not
adequate as evidenced by the inadvertent entry into LCO 3.0.3. This
is identified as a second example of VIO 327,328/89-09-03 for failure
to have an adequate procedure.
c.
An RCS water spill of approximately 45 gallons from the number 3
steam gent:rator plenum was experienced during the Unit 2 Cycle 3
Outage. This resulted from the failure of the sump pumps placed in
the S/G plenums to operate and remove the leakage emitted from the
nozzle dams during S/G tube testing. The pump failures arose from a
cross wiring problem that resulted in starting the hot leg sump pump
when the cold leg plenum reached a high level and vice versa.
A
functional test of this equipment, supplied by the Westinghouse
Company, failed to expose the problem since all visual inspections
indicated the control box to be normal.
Immediate corrective actions were taken by the licensee to clean the
spill and to correct the wiring problem.
The inspectors were
notified and the incident was reviewed.
Based on the immediate
response of the licensee and the low degree of safety significance,
the inspector had no further questions.
- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _ - _ - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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15
14.
Plant Startup from Refueling (71711)
a.
The inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Residual
Heat Removal System during the Unit 2, cycle 3 refueling outage to
determine the adequacy of flow diagram drawing, 1,2,47W810-1, to
evaluate the licensee's configuration control, and to determine the
overall condition of the system. Results of the walkdown revealed
certain drawing discrepancies.
Instruments shown to be physically
located in the RHR pump rooms were actually outside the rooms. Also,
valve leak-off lines, associated with valves74-524,526,527, and 529
located inside the RHR heat exchanger rooms, returned to the piping
system at a location other than that shown on the drawing. These
drawing deficiencies were of minor
safety significance.
However,
the licensee is reviewing these drawings to make the necessary
corrections.
Some housekeeping deficiencies were identified in the RHR pump rooms
at a time when plant outage cleanup was in progress. This item was
brought to the attention of the licensee. In particular, the pump
rooms were dirty, equipment had been left in the rooms, a rubber hose
was left lying on the floor, and water was found running across the
floor from the cooler. This information was given to the licensee and
immediate corrective actions were taken. The area was again reviewed
by the inspector and was found to be clean,
b.
A review of the historical activities on Residual Heat Removal valve,
2-FCV-74-2 (14" Copes-Vulcan gate valve with Limitorque Operator) was
performed
during
this
inspection
period
to
determine
the
acceptability of this valve for its intended function.
Work
requests and surveillance
initiated during the past two years
accounted for a major portion of the review.
The work requests
reviewed included those that had been completed and those that remain
outstanding and are listed as follows:
!
Date
Number
Initiated
Status
Subject
8210787
12-23-86
Closed
Clean boron and adjust
i
packing
B217092
12-22-86
Closed
Replace electrical splices
B217532
12-22-86
Closed
Replace splice for cable
B210784
1-30-87
Closed
stud bolts
B219733
1-27-87
Closed
Replace in line splices
B211064
4-27-87
Closed
Clean boron from valve
external
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
. _ - _ _ _
- - _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ -
_ _ _ _ _ - -
-_ __
. _ _ _ . .
_
. _ _ _
_
<
e
,-
,.
,
e-
,
.+
16
B203732
10-03-87
Closed
Clean exterior valve surface
of boron
B288251
11-03-87
Open
Disassemble and repair
B203736'
8-16-88
0 pen-
Repair or replace backseat
No entries were found in ' the trending program relative to valve
2-FCV-74-2. ~However, the inspector determined that on four separate
occasions, work orders were generated to have boron residue cleaned
from this valve during a 10 month time frame.
Once the valve was
disassembled to replace packing, it was determined that the cause of
the leaks was a result of a gouge in the stem. This issue was
reviewed with the system engineer who was of the opinion that valve
cleaning work requests should not be a part of the trending program.
The inspector asked that the issue be reconsidered to which the
licensee agreed.
WR package, B288251, was lost during the administrative review cycle
by the licensee and therefore created a problem in the work
verification process. WR B203736 was initiated to substantiate
acceptability of work performed under the lost WR package and to
repair backseating problems with the valve.
However, work on the
replacement WR was not performed until approximately one year later
and at that time the valve and bonnet were replaced because the valve
mating surface to the bonnet was less than the standard size.
The inspector noted that the work request instructions for the valve
operator did not totally agree with those published in the controlled
copy of the vendor's manual. The lubrication materials specified in
the manual were not correct.
The plant controlled vendor's manual for this valve specified a
requirement to lubricate the valve drive sleeve top bearing every six
months.
The plant schedule was to lubricate this area during each
!-
refueling outage (eighteen months).
Further review into this area
revealed that the maintenance schedule had been implemented from a
different vendor manual.
However, this different vendor manual had
not been included in the controlled copy of the vendor manual
utilized for the subject valve.
Sequoyah Engineering Procedure, SQEP-39, Review and Approval of
Vender Manuals / Revisions, was established by the licensee to control
vendor input and insure that vendor manuals reflected complete
information for the equipment specified.
Section 3.1 requires the
Discipline Lead Engineer to provide the technical review of new
vendor manuals and vendor proposed revisions to ensure applicability
to the component level where appropriate and verify vendor manual
completeness.
Two areas in specific to be utilized in
the guide-
line for vendor manual review are periodic testing schedules
L_____ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _
___
___._______________o
-_
_
_
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_ _ - _ _ - _ - _
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17
and lubrication requirements.
Contrary to SQEP-39, Work Package WP
B203736 specified a lubrication, Neo Lube Dag 156, which was not on
the approved lubrication listed in Copes-Vulcan Vandor Manual for the
subject valve. The licensee stated that the Limitorque manual
supplied as part of the vendor's manual for the 2-FCV-74-2 valve was
a 1971 edition and a 1983 version of the Limitorque manual,
SQN-VTD-W120-3620, is used by the work control group to assemble the
work packages for valves with Limitorque operators.
T.S.
6.8.1,
Procedures and Programs,
requires that
written
procedures be established, implemented and maintained for activities
including maintenance and testing.
Failure to maintain the
2-FCV-74-2 vendor manual in a technically adequate status is
contrary to section 3.1 of SQEP-39 and is identified as a thira
example of VIO 327,328/89-09-03 for failure to follow procedures.
This violation is similar to URI 327,328/88-50-07 which was also
associated with vendor manual control and validation problems.
These issues collectively may be indicative of a programmatic
deficiency in the licensee's vendor manual control and validation
process.
c.
A review of the historical activities on essential raw cooling water
pump M-B (0-PMP-067-0444 - Johnston Pump Co. Vertical Turbine Pump
Serial No. 1221-1228) was performed during this inspection period to
determine the acceptability of this pump for its intended function.
Work requests and surveillance
initiated during the past two years
accounted for a major portion of the review.
The work requests
reviewed included those that had been completed and those that remain
outstanding and are listed as follows:
B 283562 -
Reduce ptcking leak off to proper amount on ERCW pump
M-B.
ERCW pump M-B pump packing needs adjusting and/or
B 132009
-
replaced.
B 209677 -
Adjust ERCW pump M-B packing to stop excessive
leakage.
B 295193 -
ERCW pump M-B, Adjust packing.
-
-
Lubricate packing box on ERCW pumps.
The licensee's controlled vendor manual for this pump was reviewed
and determined to be the most recent revision. No deficiencies were
noted during this review.
1
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_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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18
15.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 5,1989, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The Senior Resident Inspector
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection
findings listed below. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings
and did not identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the
inspectors during the inspection.
Inspector Findings:
(0 pen)
URI 327,328/89-09-01, " Motor Lubrication"
(0 pen)
URI, 327,328/89-09-02, "UHI Valve Operability with Scaffolding
Interference"
(0 pen)
Violation 327,328/89-09-03, " Failure to Establish, Implement
and/or Maintain Procedures"
(Closed) NCV 327,328/89-09-04, " Response Time Test Procedure"
(Closed) NCV 327,328/89-09-05, " Introduction of Argon instead of Nitrogen
into Hydraulic Actuator Bladder of UHI Valve"
(Closed) Violation 327,328/88-44-02, " Failure to Follow Incore Probe Work
Instructions"
(Closed) Violation 327,328/88-29-04, " Inadequate Weld and Valve Testing
Procedures
(Closed) TI 2515/94, " Inspection for Verification of Licensee Changes
Made to Comply with PWR Moderator Dilution Requirements,
Multi-Plant Action Item B-03"
(Closed)
LER 327/87-012, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal"
(Closed) GL81-07, " Control of Heavy Loads"
(0 pen)
IEB 88-11, " Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification"
During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Site
Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection findings.
16.
List of Acronyms and Initialisms
-
Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System
Auxiliary Building Isolation
ABI
-
Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure
l
-
-
AI
-
Administrative Instruction
AGI
-
Abnormal Operating Instruction
Auxiliary Unit Operator
AVO
-
,
Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor
l
ASOS
-
-
American Society of Testing and Materials
<
Boron Injection Tank
BIT
-
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
-
C&A
-
Control and Auxiliary Buildings
CAQR
-
Conditions Adverse to Quality Report
-
Component Cooling Water System
Centrifugal Charging Pump
-
t
___
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _
l-
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/3,=
,
t
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19
CCTS
-
Corporate Commitment Tracking System
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
-
COPS
Cold Overpressure Protection System
-
-
CSSC
-
Critical Structures, Systems and Components
Chemical and Volume Control System
CVC3
-
Containment Ventilation Isolation
-
-
Direct Current
DCN
Design Change Notice
-
Diesel Generator
-
Division of Nucleer Engineering
-
Engineering Change Notice
-
-
-
-
Emergency Gas Treatment System
EI
-
Emergency Instructions
-
Emergency Notification System
Emergency Operating Procedure
E0P
-
-
Emergency Operating Instruction
Essential Raw Cooling Water
-
-
Engineered Safety Feature
Flow Control Valve
-
-
Final Safety Analysis Report
GDC
-
General Design Criteria
G01
General Operating Instruction
-
GL
Generic Letter
-
-
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
Hand-operated Indicating Controller
-
H0
-
Hold Order
-
Health Physics
ICF
Instruction Change Form
-
Independent Design Inspection
IDI
-
,
'
IN
-
NRC Information Notice
IFI
-
Inspector Followup Item
IM
-
Instrument Maintenance
IMI
-
Instrument Maintenance Instruction
IR
-
Inspection Report
i
Kilovolt-Amp
KVA
-
KW
-
Kilowatt
j
KV
-
Kilovolt
!
Licensee Event Report
l
LER
-
Limiting Condition for Operation
l
LCO
-
Loss of Coolant Accident
-
-
Mair. Control Room
MI
-
Maintenance Instruction
Maintenance Report
-
-
NB
-
NRC Bulletin
_ _ _- - _ - _-_ -_ _ __-_.
_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
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a
20
Non-cited Violations
-
NQAM
-
Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
NRC
-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Section Letter - Administrative
OSLA
-
Operations Section Letter - Training
OSLT
-
Precautions, Limitations, and Setpoints
Pl S
-
-
Preventive Maintenance
Parts Per Million
-
-
Post Modification Test
Plant Operations Review Committee
-
PORS
-
Plant Operation Review Staff
PRO
-
Potentially Reportable Occurrence
-
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
-
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
-
Reactor Coolant Pump
-
-
Regulatory Guide
-
-
-
Radiological Incident Report
-
Radiation Monitor
-
Reactor Operator
-
Rod Position Indication
-
Revolutions Per Minute
-
Resistivity Temperature Device Detector
-
Radiation Work Permit
-
Refueling Water Storage Tank
-
Safety Evaluation Report
-
-
Surveillance Instruction
SMI
-
Special Maintenance Instruction
l
501
-
System Operating Instructions
i
SOS
-
Shift Operating Supervisor
SQM
-
Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance
Seismic Qualification Review Team
SQRT
-
,
SR
-
Surveillance Requirements
!
-
Senior Reactor Operator
-
Safety Systems Outage Modification Inspection
SSQE
-
Safety System Quality Evaluation
.
Solid State Protection System
]
SSPS
-
i
-
Special Test Instruction
-
TACF
-
Temporary Alteration Control Form
>
Average Reactor Coolant Temperature
I
TAVE
-
-
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Time Delay Relay
-
TI
-
Technical Instruction
TREF
-
Reference Temperature
TROI
-
Tracking Open Items
j
l
_
_
--- --
._ - - _ _-
.
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r
.+
.
21
TS
-
Technical Specifications
-
Tenr.essee Valley Authority
Upper Head Injection
UHI
-
Unit Operator
)
UD
-
Unresolved Item
'
-
USQD
-
Unreviewed Safety Question Determination
Volts Direct Current
VDC
-
Volts Alternating Current
VAC
-
WCG
-
Work Control Group
Work Plan
WP
-
-
Work Request
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ - - - - - _