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May 19 1964 s
Q , } 01 Mr. C. C. Whelchel Vice-President Pacific Cas and F.Iactric Company 245 Market Street San Francisco, California
Dear Mr. h 1chel:
h ACRS auf Regulatory Staff review 'of the Pacific Gas and Electric Coapany's application to construct a power reactor at l Bodega Bead was not completed at the conclusion of the last ACES meeting. , h ACES plans to consider the matter further at a later saeting.
Additional definitits information is requested in respect. to the particular iteses set- forth below. h ee~ items'have been developed in discussions between mecsers of our sesff and of the ACRS, and !
although there may be some overlap between some of the items, it would be helpful if you would respond to each as comprehensively as is feasible.
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- 1. h Company's amendment #7 of March 31, 1964, indicates
' ) that designs will occa===adate a few' inches of shear movement in the foundation. h r'- t further states that offsets up to 2 feet would damage the building but voeld not impair containment.
It is not clear to us from the information submitted how your desfgn plan would achieve this objactive.
h record in this case includes a report from the Geological Survey dated December 1963 (TEI-844) in which it is stated that
" displacement on the order of a few feet, either horizontally or vertically, should be anticipated." A primary question concerns the ability of the plant, located appramri==tely a thousand feet west of the edge of the San Andreas fault zone, to withstand as much as a few feet of sheer displacammar without undue hasard to the health and safety of the public. Assuming, for two different cases, total shear displacement of as much as (a) 2 feet, (b) 3 ' feet, including both horisontal and vertical 8709210179 851217 -
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j C. C. h ichel eemposents,'along any lina and in any direction in the foundation. I would the plant, as designed or as you may propose to modify the' design,'be constructed so thats (1) the structure and leak tightness of the containment building would not be impaired?
(ii) the ability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in the shut down condition would 1 not be impaired?
(iii) primary system would remain intact? and l (iv) supply of power to the facility would not 3 he interrupted! '
If so, please describe the specific means and arrangements, includ- !
ing any modifications in the designs you have heretofore submitted, j to acessplish this.
7 Under the displacement assumptions stated above, what measures are-proposed to assure that the reactor could be maintained safely in a ]
shut down eendition' indefinitely if all vital connections te the remeter heilding were' severed? Additional related questions include the following:
- a. What are the arrangements (pumpe, power sources, connecting lines) which give confidence that the reactor could still be shut down by normal or by ;
siternative systemet '
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- b. For what direction or directions of ground slippage are vital internal components most vulnerable in 1 case of damage to the building? How would vital safety components inside the building bn protected against damage if the building were damaged by slippaget
- c. We and where are the vital components of emergency electrical power sources! What equipment would they serve and on what time schedules?.
- d. What are the alternative sources of emergency. cooling?
Where are their vital components and what assurance is there' that these would not be inactivated by any ;
accident'which might inactivate the primary cooling rystemt What are their capacities and time schedules of effectiveness l-l i
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If the Company considers .that assumptions, criteria, or design .
objectives different fress those stated in the questions contained under icosa 1 above could be used and provide adequate protection, please describe these and explain how they would be met.
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- 2. If deanssa should. exceed all expectations ind' actual core meltdown appeared immutamot, or if decay heat from released fission products was causing pressuro buildup which threatened the integrity
, of the containment, what actions might be taken to prevent the melt-down? What devices and preparations could be made in advance?
h t time schedules would be involved?' j
- 3. h t is the degree of damage to the reactor building and I the reactor to be expected from shear displacement along any line crossing the reactor building shaft! This analysis should not assume s'aise of displacement. h t is desired is damsgo as a function.of displacement. h t displacement leads to fracture of the concrete structuret ht displacessest would rupture the containment? ht displa*==aat would lead to rupture of the primary reactor system 7 !
It is vital that these judgments be based on features of the system as it is to be built, and met be supported only in general terms, h effects of both shear and tensile strains should be considered. I L
- 4. We wish to be sure we understand the specific methods the l Campany proposes to use to analyse the ability of the structures to I withstand earthquake oscillations. Some usw features of the analysis l were introduced at the last ACES meeting. Does the company propose I to modify the frequency spectrum previously proposed (based on El Centre, 1940) to take into account the rock foundation at the Bodega site?
- 5. he measures would be taken to protect against tena==is greater in eine than the breakwater at Bodega Bay would suppress?
Copies to: Sincerely, Chairman Seaborg Commissioner Ramey , .
Commissioner Palfrey ( Sl9d'C ' . . 'l L. I'.ica Commissioner Tape General Manager Barold L. Price Dr. Pittman DRD Directer of Regulation Pub. Doc. Room,- Wash & SAN ACRS Secretary Public Information - SAN Newmark
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'tr. C. C. Whelchel (
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a Pacific Gas and Elect ic Company 245 Market Street \
[s '- San Francisco, California
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Dear Mr. Whelchel:
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As you know from our previ us discussions, our safety valua-
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tion of the proposed reacto . facility at Bodega Head as not .
completed at the conclusion f the last ACRS meetin . We, and the ACRS, will consider the matter furpher at a la er meeting.
More definitive information 1 needed from you i . respect to the particular items set forth bel v. These items ve been developed in discussions between members of our staff and the ACRS,.and although there may be some ove lap between some 4 of the items, we believe it would be helpful if ou yould respond to each in.as comprehensive a manner as is fe sible.
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- 1. Your amendment #7 3 indicates that' designs will accommodate a few inches of shear movenient in.the/oundation. On this basis j e.et would damage the building you have said that offsets up to i but would not impair containment.A e record in this case. includes a report from the Geological Su ' dated December.1963 (TEI-844) in which it is stated that " displacement in the order of a few feet, either ho,rizontal or vertical, should be anticipated."
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nra -raneidered-oredd.b-le-by some of our advisers , ans d primary question concerns the ability of the plant to withstand sush a h [ '
7 displacement public.
()without undue hazard to the health and safety of the f Assuming, for two different cases,, shear displacement of.as much
. as (a) 2 feet, (b) 3 feet, includihg both horizontal and vertical-(
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components, along any line and in any' direction in the foundation, 1 can the plant, as designed or as you may propose to modify the design, j be constructed with confidence that: )
(i) the structure and leak tightness of the contain-ment building would not be impaired?
(ii) the ability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in the shut down condition would not be impaired?
(iii)_ primary system would remain intact? and (iv) supply of power to the facility would not be interrupted? .
wUL Do you consider it necessary to meetg thes# conditions or do you plan alternative designs to protect against earthquake damage? If you pro-pose to design and build to meet these conditions, please include the specific meano and arrangements, and the specific modifications in the designs you have heretofore submitted to accomplish this.
t If you do not propose to design and build to protect against each of !
l the items (i)-(iv) above, please describe the alternatives and explain your reasons in each case. In this event under the *"^ d' il e-_ -
assumptions stated above, how would you plan to shut the reactor down and maintain it in the shut down condition? Would the interior water, l power, and related systems continue to function? "- ;1:in In other words, if you believe that criteria or design objectives different from those in (i) through (iv) above could be used and still provide adequate l l protection, please state these and similarly show how they would be met. J
- 2. What is the degree of damage to the reactor building and the l- reactor to be expected from shear displacement along any line crossing the reactor building shaft? This analysis should not assume a size of displacement. What is desired is damage as a function of displacement.
What displacement leads to fracture of the concrete structure? What displacement would rupture the containment? What displacement would lead to rupture of the. primary reactor system? It is vital that these judgments be based on features of the system as it is to be built, and not be supported only in general terms. The effects of both shear and tensile strains should be considered.
- 3. What measures are proposed to assure that the reactor can be maintained safely in a shut down condition indefinitely if all vital ;
lines to the reactor building are severed? '
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- a. Wat are the arrangements (pumps, power sources, connecting lines) which give confidence that the reactor can still be shut down by normal or by alternative systems?
- b. Wat is the most vulnerable damage location to the building integrity and internal components from t,round slippage of various orientations? How will vital safety components inside the building be protected against damage if the building itself were damaged by slippage?
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- c. Wat and where are the vital components of emergency electrical power sources? Wat equipment can they serve and on what time schedules?
- d. What are the alternative sources of emergency cooling?
Where are their vital components and what assurance is there that these would not be inactivated by any accident which might inactivate the primary cooling system? What are their capacities and time schedules of effectiveness? l l
A , If damage should exceed all-expectations and actual core l meltdown appeared imminent, or if decay heat from released '
fission products was causing pressure buildt p which threatened the integrity of the containment building, what actions might be taken to avert this? What devices and preparations could be made in advance? Wat time schedules would be involved?
- 4. We wish to be sure we understand the specific methods you pro-pose to use to analyze the ability of your structures to withstand earthquake oscillations. Some new features of the analysis were intro-duced at the last ACRS meeting. Do you propose to modify the frequency spectrum you previously proposed (based on El Centro, 1940) to take into account the rock foundation at the Bodega site?
- 5. What measures will be taken to protect against tsunamis greater in size than the breakwater at Bodega Bay would suppress?
It should be understood that your answers to the foregoing questions will not prC udide'your right to disagree with the assumptions stated above. It should be equally understood that these questions do not
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1 prejudice any position which the-Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-' )
guards or the Commission's Regulatory Staff may take as to 'the suit-ability of the site. for the' plant design you have proposed or as you-may decide to modify it. j Sincerely, j 1
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- Harold L. Price .i Director of Regulation l 1
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UNITED STATES d
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l Mr. C. C. Whelchel Vice-President
. Pacific Gas and Electric Company 245 Market' Street San Francisco, California
Dear Mr. Whelchel:
-- n an tennu from our n u v4nna A 4 c e"4 = t ^~ , our safety evaluation of the proposed reactor facility at Bodega Head was not completed l at the conclusion of the last ACRS meeting. W, -~*3he ACRS ,
will consider the matter further at a later meeting.
More definitive information is needed frem-you in respect to the particular items set forth below. These items have been developed in discussions between members of our staff and of the ACRS, and although there may be some overlap between some of the items, e L;11;.; it would be helpful 1f you would respond to each in as comprehensive a manne as.is feasible.
It should be unders ood hat your answers to the following questio /s will not prejudic your r ght to disagree h the assumptions st ted below. It shoul be equal understoo hat th e questions do ot prejudice any p ition whic the Adv ory Committe on Re. actor afe-guards or the mmission's R gulato Staff may take s to t suit-ability of th site for the p ant esign you have propo or as you may decide t modify it.
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,. 1. Your amendment #7 of March 31, 1964, indicates that designs will accommodate a few inches of shear movement in the foundation.
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,. on_t.his basis 7ou have said,that offsets up to 2 feet would damage N
the building but would not impair containment. It is not clear to
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us from information submitted how your design plan would achieve 6 this objective.
" .;he..= d he record in this case includes a report from the Geological Sur'vey dated December 1963 (TEI-844) in which it is stated that " displacement on the order of a few feet, either hori-zonta11y or vertically, should be anticipated." A primary question O
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Mr. C. C. Whelchel i Vice-President- .
,;.;, f Pacific Gas and Electric Company .,.l 245 Market Street ' 'i San Francisco, California j y ?l
Dear Mr. Whelchel:
f ly l l As you know from our previous discussions, our safety evaluation +.
of the proposed reactor facility at Bodega Head was not completed attheconclusionofthelastACRSmeeting.Q4ey-andMheACRSg f will consider the matter further at a later meeting. I More definitive information is neededhom-youjin respect to the /
particular items set forth below. These items have been developed in discussions between members of our staff and of the ACRS, and although there may be some overlap between some of the items, we believe it would be helpful if you would respond to each in as >
comprehensive a manner as is feasible.
- 1. Your amendment #7 of March 31, 1964, indicates that designs will accommodate a few inches of shear movement in the foundation. .
n-this..basia you-have-eat that offsets up to 2 feet would damage
- y /phetbuilding but would notmp It is no clear to e i pWp us from information submitted gir containment.t4Gk yourachieve design plan , ,t# '
this objective.
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r' M Furthermore, the record in this case includes a report from the Geological Survey dated December 1963 (TEI-844){in which it is state 4 that " disp 1peement dn the order of a few' feet, either hori-
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E~7 f-zontalthevertical?,$shouldbeanti / ""Af ^f concernstheabilityoftheplant',cipated."dn[A' to with't a ew rima eet'of y stion shear displacement without undue hazard to the. ealtfl and safety of the ~ "Lf~
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public. Assuming, for two differpnt cases, total shear displacement '
of as much as (a) 2 feet, (b) 3 fpet, including both horizontal and 4,, vertical components, along any line and in any direction in the N ;
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foundation, -oen the - plant, ' as desi d or as you may propose to -
modify the design, be constructed- '
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(i) the. structure and leak tightness.of the contain-ment building would not be impaired?
(ii) the' ability to shut down the reactor and maintain , .. .<
it in the shut down condition would not.be impaired?
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(iii) primary system would remain intact? 'and 4
(iv) supply of power to the facility would not be .
interrupted?
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pu If h-ir,alter.. ;;,~ ;.i;;-- d .ip. i.bprdettc agaw. . .a'rttrquaky"' damage?
. ted;.-i;;; : d - L ild- o mett-'tae - .d us, please.
/o4*U d abled: the specific means and arrangements, - e M i; modi-l l '
fications in the designs you have heretofo're submitted) to accomplish this. ,
If you do not pr se to desigdn,d build to ===4==* n)ea*--*R -- ' a'
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&ha items (i)-(iv) ve
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-- r-elated -syste that criteri or design objectives d n t-inue""to-funct ?M wordagif you believe
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(iv) bov rent from those in (i) through ould be used and still provi .
state t se and e' *1 1, show how they wou adequate -
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protection, please W at is the degree of damage to the reactor building and the. ,
the reactorbebuilding reactor to expected from shear' displacement along'any line crossing shaft? This analysis should not' assume a size i
of displacement.
ment. What is desired is damage as a function of displace-Wat displacement leads to fracture of the concrete structure?
Wat displacement would rupture the containment? ' What displacement would lead to rupture of the primary reactor system? It is vital d that these judgments be based on features of.the system as it is to T.
be tbuilt, and not be support.ed only in general terms. The effects - .,
of both shear and tensile strains should be considered, - . .
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at raeasure6 are proposed to assure r that the reactor can be D & >
mainta d safely in a shut down condition-indefinitely'if all. vital' f
--ttnea tc the reactor building are . severed?
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,Cy C..Whelchel .~~3-Additional related questions include the following: -
- a. . Wat are the arrangements (pumps, power sources, connecting lines) which give confidence that the reactor can still be shut down by.noammb-or by alternative systems?
- b. W at is the most vulnerable damage location to the building integrity and internal components from -
ground slippage of various orientations? How will
,.- vital safety components inside the building be protected l
against damage if the building itself were damaged by_ '
sifppage? .
, c. Wat _ and where are the vital components of emergency-electrical power sources? Wat equipment can they serve and on what time schedules?
- d. . Wat are the alternativ'e sources of emergency cooling?
Were are their vital components and what assurance is there that these would not be inactivated by any accident which might inactivate the primary cooling system? Wat are their capacities and time schedules of effectiveness?
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j,ff p If damage should exceed all e e6tations and actual core meltdown appeared imminent, r if decay heat from released .f ,
fission products was causin pressure buildup which '
threatened the integrity o the contairenent building, what eg;. this? Wat devices and actions mightcould preparations be taken toj in advance? Wat time schedules be made would be involved?-
- 4. We wish to be sure we understand the specific methods you propose to use to analyze the ability of your structures to with- ,
y, stand earthquake oscillations. Some new features of the analysis were introduced at the last ACRS meeting. Do you propose to modify the frequency spectrum you$ previously proposed (based on El Centro, '
J 1940) to take into account the rock foundation at the Bodega site? 'd
- 5. What measures will be taken to protect against tsunamis ~~ ~
greater in size 'than the breakwater at Bodega Bay would - - .
s It should be undjrs'tood tpat p ut M s to the ' .& , suppress?
, questions-will'not prejudice your ight to disagre -the asum
$4ne,ebeve- t' hould'be equ {1y unders,t,ood' teat thes's' ' ns"do p iB"n's"~notN,, stat,ed i
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prejudice any position which the Advisory Conunittee on Reactor Safe-guards or the Connaission!.a s Regulatory # ff ma take as to the suit-ability..of the sit,e-for thehpjant. des,ign y ave o M s you '
- may decide to. modify it.
. Sincerely, i
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Harold L. Price Director of Regulation t
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- components, along any line and in any direction in the foundation, will the plant, as designed or as you may propose to modify the design, be construc.ed so that: .
(i) ' the structure and leak tightness of the containment building would not be impaired?
i (ii) the ability.to shut down the reactor and o maintain it in the shut down condition would not be impaired?
(iii) primary system would remain intact?~and (iv) supply of power to the facility would not be interrupted?
If so, please describe the specific means and arrangements, including any modifications in the designs you have heretofore submitted, to accomplish this. ;lg 9 3. . . }, Me i If the Company considers that assumpti s, criteria, or design objectives different from those stated bove could be used and l' provide adequate protection, please d cribe' these and explain how they would be met.
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d above, what measures are j
Under proposedthe to displacement assure that theassumptions reactor een g be maintained safely in a '
shut down condit d reactorbuilding^gindefinitelyiia11vitalconnectionstothe mee severed? Additional related questions include -
the following:
- a. What are the arrangements (pumps, power sources, connectin ines) which give confidence that the reacto .
still be shut down by normal or by alterna ve systemst ,
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C. C. Whelchel c. What and where are the vital components of emer ency electrical power sources? What equipment ' ey 6-serve and on what time schedules? /k
- d. What are the alternative sources of emergency cooling?
Where are their vital components and what assurance is there that these would not be inactivated by any j accident which might inactivate the primary cooling '
system? What are their capacities and time schedules i of effectiveness?
- 2. If damage should exceed all expectations and actual core meltdown appeared imminent, or if decay heat from released fission ,
products was causing pressure buildup which threatened the integrity I of the containment, what actions might be taken to prevent the melt- l down? What devices and preparations could be made in advance? ';
What time schedules would be involved?
l~ 3 What is the degree of damage to the reactor building and l the reactor to be expected from shear displacement along any line l crossing the reactor building shaft? This analysis should not assume a size of displacement. What is desired is damage as a function of, ,
displacement. What displacement leads to fracture of the concrete '
structure? What displacement would rupture the containment? Whar displacement would lead to rupture of the primary reactor system?
It is vital that these judgments be based on features of the system as it is to be built, and not be supported only in general terms.
The effects of both shear and tensile strains should be considered.
- 4. We wish to be sure we understand the specific methods the Company proposes to use to analyze the ability of the structures to withstand earthquake oscillations. Some new features of the analysis were introduced at the last ACRS meeting. Does the Company propose to modify the frequency spectrum previously proposed (based on El Centro, 1940) to take into account the rock foundation at the Bodega site?
5.
wnh What measures as&& 4 be taken to protect against tsunamis greater in size than the breakwater at Bodega Bay would suppress?
Sincerely, Harold L. Price Director of Regulation l
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' 245 Market Street San Francisco, California /g
Dear Mr. Whelchel:
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wr tM m g ----- ' ' ~?ityatBodega[Headwasnotcomleted at the conclusion of the last ACRS meeting. The ACRS con- *? 4 sider the matter further at a later meeting.
QL : 6 pg ad*. A~
.4*ee definitive information is needed in respect to the particular ite d set forth below. These items ha\re been developed in discus-sions between members of our staff and of the ACRS, and although there may be some overlap between some of the items, ^ 5 :h. 3' -
it would be helpful if you would respond to each W a@s comprehensive
- y .mu d as is feasible. ' '
" It should be understood tha our newers to the following quest a will not prejudi g ypu ght to d agree with the assumpti stated below. It shouldT ' eqas%y underst d that these ques ns do not prejudice any tion which the Advis ry Committee guards or Reactor Safe-Commission's Regulatory S ff may e as to the suit-abilit ma thesitefortheplantdesignho ave proposed or as you
- ecide to modify,it.
7/a - f+
- 1. amenament #7 of March 31, 1964, indicates that designs will accommodate a few inches of shear movement in the foundation.
The amendment further states that offsets up to 2 feet would damage the bu ding but would not impair containment. It is not clear to us fr formation submitted how your design plan would achieve this ob ective.
-Prthe =rdhe record in this case includes a report from the Geological Survey dated December 1963 (TEI-844) in which it is stated that "di'splacement on the order of a few feet, either hori- ,
zonta11y or vertically, should be anticipated." A primary question l
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( Nr C. C. Whelchel 1 l
concerns the ability of the plant, located approximately a thousand feet west of the edge of the San Andreas fault zone, to withstand as much as a few feet of shear displacement without undue hazard to the health and safety of the public. Assuming, for two different cases, total shear displacement of as much as (a) 2 feet, (b) 3 feet, including both horizontal and vertical components, along any line and in any direction in the foundation, M the plant, as designed or as ]
you may propose to modify the design, be constructed so that ,
1 (i) the structure and leak tightness of the contain-ment building would not be impaired?
(ii) the ability to shut down the reactor and maintain l l it in the shut down condition would not be impaired?
l (iii) primary system would remain intact? and j l
(iv) supply of power to the facility would not be interrupted? k '
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, th:;; condititm4 If so, please describe the specific means and arrangements', including any modifications in the designs you have heretofye submitted, to accomplish this.
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- -- we ;; , 2 - ,g h > ..i that zerite or design objectives P'f y different from tose in 'D.-;h - (44)]a 'oYe, ould be used a '
W provide' adequate prltectio'n 1, ease s "' ese 5.nd ow
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g- 3. What is the degree of damage to the reactor building and the reactor to be expected from shear displacement along any line p/ g crossing the reactor building shaft? This analysis should not l assume a size of displacement. What is desired is damage as a function of displacement. What displacement leads to fracture of the concrete structure? What displacement would rupture the contain-ment? What displacement would lead to rupture of the primary reactor
, system? It is vital that these judgments be based on features of l the system as It is to be built, and not be supported only in general terms. 'The effects of both shear and tensile strains should be considered.
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M M ,ZL~ n j,j g.3plia measures re proposed to assure that the reactor can
, - be maintain safely in'a shut down condition indefinitely if all
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vital Lines to the reactor building are severed? -)
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Additional related questions include ~the following: q 1
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- a. W at are the arrangements (pumps, power sources,. _] '
1 connecting lines) which give confidence that the reactor can still' be shut down by.comal--er-by. M J
alternative systems? y
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- b. What is the most vulnerable damage location to the building integrity and internal components from -)
ground slippage of various orientations 7. How will i
, vital safety components inside the building be _j l protected against damage if the building itself $
were damsged by slippage?
- c. Wat and where are the vital components of emergency electrical power sources? What equipment can they I serve and on what time schedules?
- d. What are the alternative sources of emergency cooling?
l . Where are their vital components and what assurance is l ~
there that these would not be' inactivated by any q accident which might inactivate the primary cooling j
i
, system? What are their capacities and time schedules
- of effectiveness?
h ' 2 , e If damage should exceed all expectations and actual core meltdown appeared imminent, or if decay heat from released i fission products was causing pressure buildup which threat- '
ened the integrity of the containment oHdeegt b what actions T might be taken to prevent the meltdown?"W1iat devices and - , ,j 4' preparations gould be made in advance? What time schedules would be involved?
I ?
l 4. We wish to be sure we understand e specific methods yeu-% ' '
propose $ to use to analyze the ability of structures to with-stand earthquake oscillations. -Some new featgres of the analysis were introduced at the last ACRS meeting. Do' propose to modify ;
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. i af the frequency spectrum.ajou previously proposed (based on El Centro, ,
,., 1940) to take into account the rock foundation at the Bodega site? )
- 5. What measures will be'taken to protect against tsunamis 1 greater in size than the breakwater at Bodega Bay would suppress?. '
l Sincerely, !
1 1
. j Harold'L.' Price Director of Regulatio'n I
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