ML20235A435

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Requests Response to Listed Questions,In Support of Clarification of Certain Points in 640721 Amend 8 to Application to Construct Power Reactor at Bodega Head
ML20235A435
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Bodega Bay
Issue date: 08/26/1964
From: Doan R
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: Whelchel C
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
Shared Package
ML20234A767 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-85-665 NUDOCS 8709230303
Download: ML20235A435 (4)


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dJ dug 2619 50 -MS Mr. C. C. Whelchel Vice President Facific Oas & glectric Company 245 Market street San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Whelchel:

The Regulatory Staff and the ACR8 are conti= tag their review of the Pacific Gas and glectric C - Myas application to construct a power reactor at Bodega Head.

To clarify certain points.in your Amendment No. B filed on July 21,.1964, answers to the following questions are requested:

1. The amendment states on p p e 24 that 'a' detailed.

dynamic analysis will be made for certain vital pieces of equipment. The acceleration to be used for this analysis'should be described fully. Although it is recognised that, as discussed in the ==andment, the layer of sand beneath the reactor building would affect the transmission of horizontal forces to its base, various considerations suggest that the design of equip-ment vital to safety inside the remotor building should, movertheless, take into account accelerations of the maximum intensity postulated'in my letter to you of July 8, 1964. On this basis, a motion of the base of the roastor building having merimum transient hori-santal components correspmMag to a maximum transient acceleration of 13, a mawimum transient velocity of 2-1/2 ft/see and a maximum transient displacement of 3 ft, and vertical maxima of 2/3 of the preceding should be considered. With regard to the analysis of vital equipment, your response should indicate what margins against failure to function properly would exist in.this equipment at various levels of deceleration up to 1.0s, especially for those items of equipment for which factors other than yielding, fracture, or structural failure govern (e.g. olean nes, displacement,  ;

4_ acceleration, etc.).

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g Mr. C. C. Ilhelohol - 2 - AUG 2 61964 R. The design of vital piping connections to the reactor building, including the main steam piping, involves the dual requirement of flexibility to resist relative' motions sortesponding to a fault motion of up to 3 feet, and strength to resist the forces accompanying the dynamie response to the earthquake vibration.._It has not been elearly shown in the amendment how the non-flicting design requirements for these two sources of strain will be achieved. Ilhat methods are proposed to be used to avoid overstress in the piping, or if yielding is to be permitted, what significance will the yielding have on the performance of the piping, any isolation or other valves in the piping, the pipe anchors, and other features of the piping design.

libat arrangements will be made to prevent shearing or )

other failure of the main steam piping and other vital connections to the remotor building eaused by the fault motion, specifically by contact of concrete walls, rock, earth, etc. against the piping in the course of either the fault motion or the earthquake vibration.

3.. since faulting may occur at other locations than l at the resetor contaimaant strusture, what previsions 4

- will be made in the design of vital piping sannections other than these to the remoter building to insure the integrity of these connootions in the event of fault motion up to-3 feet ooourring in any location ca the plant site.

Sincerely yours, m': ?i

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J Richtrd!.L. Doan Director Division of Reactor Licensing Distribution:

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., L Docket.No. 50-205 Mr. C. C. Whelchel

, Vice President Pacific Gas and Electric. Company j l '

245 Market Street ]

San Francisco, California 1 l

1 Dear Mr. Whelchels )

'l The Regulatory Staff and the ACRS are' continuing.their review .

of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's application to construct l

a power reactor at Bodess Head. To clarify certain points in your Amendment No. 8 answers to the fonoring guestione are requested:

1.. The amenesent states on page 24 that "a' detailed dynamic analysis vill be made" for certain vital pieces of equipment.

The acceleration to be used for this analysis should be described fully. Although it is zwcognized that, 'as discussed in the amend-ment, the layer of sand beneath the reactor building would affect the transmission of horisontal forces to its base, various con-siderations'suggest that the design of equipment vital to safety.

inside the reactor building should,' nevertheless, take into account.

accelerations of the maximum intensity postulated in 'agr letter to you of July 8,1964 On this basis, a motion' of the base of the  ;

reactor building having maximum transient horizontal components I corresponding to a mad =n= transient acceleration of Ig, a maximum transiaat velocity of 2-1/2 ft/see and a mad =im transient displacement of 3 ft, and vertical maxima of 2/3 of the preceding should be considered. With regard to the analysis 'of vital equipment, your response should indicate what margins against failure to function properly would exist in this equipment at various levels of acceleration up to 1.0s, especially for those-items of equipment for which factors 'other than yielding, fracture',

or structural failure governs (e.g. elearance, displacement, acceleration,etc.).

2. The design $ of vital piping connections to the remotor building, including the main steam piping, &pvolves the dual requirement of flexibility to resist relative dations corresponding to a fanit motion of up to 3 feet, and strength to resist the forces OfTICE > ,,,,

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Mr. C. C. Whalchel neocupanying the dynanie response to the earthquake vibration.

It has not been elearly shown in the amendment how the eenflicting design maquirements. for these two soaroes of strain will be. )

achieved. What methods are proposed to be,used to avoid over- 1 stress in the piping, or if yielding is to be permitted, what  !

significance vill the yieldias have..en the performance of the ~ ]

piping, any isoistion or other valves in the piping, the pipe  !

- anehors, and other features of the piping destas.

What arrangn==ats will be made to prevent shearing or other failure of the main stona piping and other vital eenaections to the reactor bai141ag caused by the fault motion,.specifteelly i by eenteet of eenerete walls, reek, earth, etc. agatast the l

piping in the course of either h fault motica or the earth-quake vibration. ] '

3. Since faulting may occur at other locations th'anrat the reactor ecatainment structure, what provisions .will be made in j the design of vital piping eennecticas other than those.to the 1 remotor building to insure the integrity of these connections in the event of fault metica up to 3 feet occurring in any loestica cm the plant site. f 1

Sincerely yours, Harold L. Price Director of Regulation Distribution formal Pub Doc Rms (DC, LA, SNI)

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