IR 05000267/1985026

Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/85-26 on 850819-28.No Violation Noted.Nrc Will Conduct Followup Insps to Address Items Identified as Potential Enforcement Actions

ML20136J114
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	11/04/1985
From:	Martin L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Lee O PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO
References
NUDOCS 8511250283
Download: ML20136J114 (2)

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NOV 0 41985

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 -In Reply Refer To:
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Docket:- 50-267/85-26

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Public Serv' ice ~ Company of Colorado

 : ATTN: 0. R.l Lee, Vice President-
  . Electric Production; m  IP. O. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201-0840
:t Gentlemen: ,

This refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs. L.- L.' Wheeler, J. E. Dyer,

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and L. E.4 Whitney of the NRC's 0ffice of. Inspection and Enforcement during the

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 :- period . August 19-28,,1985, of. activities authorized by NRC Operating License DPR-34 for the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, and to discussion of our findings with Mr. J. Gahm and other members .of your staff at

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the conclusion of.the inspection.

, Arease$amined'duringthe.inspectionincludedplantoperations,surveilla~nce l _ program, and maintenance. .Within these areas, the inspection consisted of-zselective' examination of procedures and representative records,' interviews

,  with personnel', and observations by.the inspectors. These-findings ~are documented in the enclosed inspection' repor ~ As a result of this Linspection, Region IV willi con' duct- followup inspections to
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address those: items identified as potential enforcement actions, identified as unresolved items, and~as open. items, s y An unresolved item is an item about which more information is needed in. order L to determine if the item is_ a1 violation,' a deviatio_n, or acceptabl .

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  - Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to' discuss'them with yo 

Sincerely, -

     " Original Signed By!
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L E. MARTIN" L. E. Martin, Acting Chief

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Reactor Projects Branch

  - Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 50-267/85-26 cc w/ enclosure: J. .W. Gahm, Manager, . Nuclear Production Division '

  - Fort St. Vrain3 Nuclear-Station 16805 WCR 191 -

Platteville, Colorado 80651 _

  - L. Singleton. Managert Quality Assurance Division '

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  'RPB   R. P. Denise, DRSP
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R. D. Martin, RA Section Chief (RPB/A) . RSB SectionChief(RSB/ES);.'

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. .. OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF INSPECTION PROGRAMS PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SECTION (PAS) Report: 50-267/85-26 Docket: 50-267 Licensee No DPR-34 Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC) P. O. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201 Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Fort St. Vrain (FSV) Site, Platteville, Colorado Inspection Conducted: August 19-28, 1985 Inspectors: -

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L. L. Wheeler, ORPB, iE, Team Leader Date GV /0 -2 - BC' J. E. Ofer, ORPB, IE Date

 $W)    /0 -1,-6 L. E. Whitn p RPB, IE   Date Approved by: / 4 -/[ N Jh  /c-y JT g. F. McKee, Chief, Operating Peactors  Date Programs Branch Inspection Summary Areas Inspected: This routine safety inspection involved 152 inspection hours on site in the areas of plant operations, sur-veillance programs, and maintenanc Results: Three potential enforcement findings, referred to as un-resolved items in the report and three open items were identified during the inspection. These items will be followed up by the NRC Region IV office, fiffD f I

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.. DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee B. Barta, Nuclear Engineer

*F. Borst, Manager, Support Services
*B. Burchfield, Superintendent, Nuclear Betterment Engineering 0. Clayton, Technical Services Engineer
* Craine, Maintenance Superintendent D. Decatoire, Plant Operations T. Dice, Plant Operations
*D. Evans, Operations Superintendent
* Farris, QA Operations Manager W. Franek, Plant Scheduling and Stores Superintendent
*C. Fuller, Station Manager
*J. Gahm, Nuclear Production Manager
*J. Gramling, Nuclear Licensing R. Heller, Senior Plant Engineer D. Horshan, Plant Scheduling and Stores J. Jackson, QA/QC Supervisor C. Kasten, QA Computer Specialist R. Kevan, Plant Operations S. Koleski, Plant Operations J. McCauley, Results Engineering Supervisor
*F. Novachek, Technical / Administrative Services Manager J. Petera, Maintenance Supervisor G. Redmond, QC Supervisor C. Schmidt, Results Supervisor
*L. Singleton, QA Manager H. Starner, Nuclear Site Construction Coordinator J. Vandyke, Plant Operations
*D. Warembourg, Nuclear Engineering Manager R. Webb, Maintenance Supervisor J. Weller, Plant Operations J. Wojtisek, Technical Services Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included technician, operators, and office personne NRC R. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector
*M. Skow, Region IV Project Inspector
* Attended exit intervie .,
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5 s iReview of Plant Operations

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[[ Operational Safety' Verification The control room was inspected daily to verify compliance with minimum

! staffing requirements, access control, adherence to approved operating i . procedures, and compliance with limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), i_ Reviews were made of logs, tagging requests, night orders, bypass logs,

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s and incident reports. Two shift turnovers were also observe . General housekeeping'and professional demeanor in the control room were satisfactory. Normal background noise levels did not appear to have ansadverse effect on operator performance. There were no unnecessary pers'onnel ods9rved in the control roo .A , a The following concerns were identified: ~ aq 9 -(1) The licensee's equipment control procedures did not comply - s - with +he requirements of TMI Item I.C.6. Procedure P-2, Equipment Clearances and Operation Deviations, Issue 13, did

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not require a second qualified person to verify the correct I implementation of tagging activitie On May 22, 1985, NRC Region IV had requested a response within 120 days to a similar finding that had been discussed at a Management

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l ,, Conferenceonpovember 14, 1984. Clearance control form

  , revisions were noted to be in progress during this inspec-
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tion. The lfcensee's compliance with the requirements of TMI Item I.C.6 will remain an open item pending Region IV acceptance of the licensee's response to their finding

 ,  (50-267/85-26-01).

. (2) Procedure P-1, Plant Operatiores, did not provide adequate ' control of temporary plant modification Specifically,

   .' Section 4.9, Control of Temporary Configuration, contained no provisions for ensuring the temporary nature of modifi-

! cations made under that procedure. At the time of the i

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inspection, 37 Temporary Configuration Requests (TCR) were > open.from two to nine years. The licensee had initiated - permanent design change notices (DCN) for several of these TCRs, however at least 11 of these DCNs had been in prepara-

tion for over 2 year This lack of control of temporary changes resulted in permanent changes being made to the

station without the necessary reviews being conducted. The 4 failure to establish and implement procedures to adequately control temporary plant modifications was discussed with the licensee and will be incorporated into unresolved item 50-267/85-26-02 for followup by the Region IV Office.

Corrective Action Systems

> The system for performing trend analyses and management review of l' Corrective Action Requests (CARS) was considered a strength. Cor-

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3-I rective Action Effectiveness Summary Reports were issued monthly with trend analyses and a current review of CARS by type (failure to follow procedures, lack of training, etc.). Monthly reports are also issued to responsible departments identifying responses due in _the near future and overdue response Overdue responses received adequate management attentio Station Tours The inspectors toured accessible areas of the plant. During d,ese tours, observations were made of equipment condition, fire and safety hazards,.use of procedures, radiological controls and conditions, housekeeping, and surveillance activitie It was evident that a significant effort had been made to upgrade the general housekeeping conditions of the plant. Several major portions of the plant were clean and free of clutter, debris, et ' Maintenance personnel were observed making a deliberate effort to clean up the work site after performing repairs. The licensee had developed an extensive list of insulation repair requirement However, several safety hazards and basic housekeeping deficiencies , were noted. These included a fire hazard from oil in overhead cable trays, poor lighting in some areas, an open door on the back of an electrical cabinet, graffitti on the walls, some plant components in need of cleaning and repainting, a valve leaking onto exposed insulation repair work in progress, damaged operating instructions posted on an ammonia injection tank, chains for operating overhead valves hanging down into passageways, and a safety seal missing from a relief valv Some of these deficiencies had been identified in past Region IV inspection reports. The region had made housekeeping an open item twice in previous inspection reports (8325-03 and 8415-03), and the latest SALP report (May 7, 1985) noted that housekeeping had

- continued to be a proble Procedure SMAP-13, General Housekeeping Program, specified inspection requirements, assigned responsibility ,

for designated plant zones, and provided directions for reporting deficiencies. However, the procedure had no provisions for tracking , specific deficiencies to ensure appropriate corrective action and I management review. The apparent failure to develop and implement adequate procedures for correcting housekeeping deficiencies will

_ remain an open item pending followup by Region IV (50-267/85-26-03). System Walkdown

- The. inspector conducted a walkdown and performed a valve lineup of the "B" diesel generator to observe equipment conditions and system

- lineups. No valves were found in improper positions, but one valve was not in accordance with the lineup sheet due to maintenance.

Deficiencies were noted in that the lineup procedure did not include

- ' verification of the position of the following: diesel engine cooling water. temperature control valves (TCVs), air valves on the TCV i- - regulators, lube oil' drain valves, and lube oil drain plugs. The , misposition of these items had the potential for causing damage to , the diesel engines to the extent that they could fail to operate.

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  -4-The lube oil heater inlet and outlet valves were not on the lineup sheets, and they were not labeled. The failure to provide adequate procedures to ensure the operability of the diesel generators will remain an open item pending followup by Region IV (50-267/85-26-04).

3. Surveillance Activities The inspectors reviewed recent surveillance test results for the station and power plant systems (PPS) batteries, and the recently issued interim Technical Specifications (TS) for reactivity contro The following documents, tests and records were reviewed: Document Number Topic SR 4.1.1.B. 1/2-W Control Rod Operability through 4.1.1.F.lb-R SR 4.1.2.A.3-W RodPositionindicationSystems-through 4.1.2.c x Operation . SR 4.1.3.B-R Rod Position Indication Systems-through 4.1.3.D-W/R Shutdown SR 4.1.4.A-W/ Shutdown Margin SR 4.1.4-B-P-X SR 4.1.6.C/D-X Control Rod Position Requirements-Shutdown SR 4.1.8.A/B-W Reserve Shutdown System-Operation through 4.1.8.D-A SR 4.1.9.A/B-W Reserve Shutdown System-Shutdown through 4.1.9.D.1-R SR 5.4.5-M PCRV Cooling Water Flow Scan Functional Test SR 5.4.1.3.2.b-M Feedwater Flow Test SR 5.6.2a-W, Issue 23 Station and PPS Battery Check for weeks #29, 30, 31 (Weekly) SR 5.6.2b-M, Issue 1, Station and PPS Battery Check for week #27 (Monthly) SR 5.6.2b-Q, Issue 20, Station and PPS Battery Check for week #31 (Quarterly) SR 5.6.2c-A, Issue 17, Station and PPS Battery Check for week #9 (Annual) TCR 85-04-01 Request to jumper cell 35 out of < Battery 1A (N9242)

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  -5-Change Notice (CN) 1391 Replace Station Batteries 1A and 1 Replace PPS Battery 1 The inspectors found that the interim TS for reactivity control appeared to have been properly implemented by the surveillance procedure The surveillance procedures for the feedwater flow test and control rod operability also appeared adequat Procedure SR 5.4.5-M allowed the potential for errors in PCRV Cooling Water Flow alarm setpoint restoration. The licensee had previously identified this deficiency and was processing a procedure change to correct this weaknes The inspector reviewed the TS compliance log maintained by control room personnel and the daily surveillance status printouts provided by the licensee's scheduling organization. These documents appeared thorough, concise and effectiv No missed surveillances were identified in this revie The licensee failed to establish procedures that complied with TS requirements in the following instances:
(1) The weekly battery surveillance test, 5.6.2a-W, did not measure the temperature of cells adjacent to the pilot cell as required by TS 5.6.2 (2) Neither the monthly nor quarterly surveillance tests, SR 5.6.2b-M and SR 5.G.2b-Q, measured the height of the electrolyte in the sampled cells as required by TS 5.6.2 SR 5.6.2b-M verified that all cell electrolyte levels were within the vendor specified operating band, but this was recorded by a single check mark on the data sheet and there were no cell measurements taken or recorde (3) The licensee modified the configuration of a station battery and returned the battery to an operable status without adequa-tely considering whether the modified battery would meet the requirements of TS 5.6.2c. The annual discharge test of battery 1B conducted in April 1985 was performed with a spare cell connected to the battery (59 cells total). On the basis of the performance of this 59 cell battery during the discharge, the licensee determined that battery capacity was acceptable in accordance with TS 5.6.2c and the battery was operabl Subsequently, the spare cell was removed from battery 1B, but there was apparently no discharge test or evaluation conducted to determine that the resulting 58 cell battery would meet t.he necessary operability requirements of the T The apparent failure by the licensee to develop procedures to ade-quately implement TS surveillance requirements for determining battery operability was discussed with the licensee and will be

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   -6-incorporated into unresolved item 50-267/85-26-02 for followup by ;

the NRC Region IV Offic TS 4.6.1 requires that the station and ' PPS batteries be operable before the reactor is operated at powe The surveillance test results reviewed by the inspectors were for a period when the reactor was shutdown and therefore the violation of a limiting condition for operation (LCO) was not involve The licensee failed to follow procedure SR 5.6.2c-A for the annual battery partial discharge tes The results from this discharge test satisfied the TS 5.6.2c requirements, however, the following implementation deficiencies were identified:

 (1) Procedure Deviation Request (PDR) 85-1032 revised the procedure to discharge the station batteries (1A, IB) at 85 amps for 24 hours and the PPS battery at 79 amps for 12 hrs or until the battery terminal voltage reached 101.5 volts. Battery 1B was discharged at 35 amps for only 19.2 hrs and the PPS battery was discharged at 79 amps for only 9.6 hours without either battery reaching its minimum terminal voltage. Interviews revealed that these discharges were terminated by the personnel performing the tests without prior management approva (2) The end of discharge specific gravities for each cell of battery 1A and IB were all recorded at 1.100 and 1.160, respectively. In-terviews with maintenance personnel revealed that these readings were the minimum detectable values of the hydrometers used to record the end of discharge data. The actual battery cell specific gravities were lower than the recorded values and this information was not recorded on the surveillance data shee (3) Alt. hough cell 35 was jumpered from battery 1A and did not participate in the discharge test, the final individual cell voltage ICV and specific gravity readings decreased from 2.07 VDC to 1.88 VDC and 1.210 to 1.100, respectively. These post discharge readings were indicative of the cell participating in the battery discharge tes The apparent failure by the licensee to follow procedure SR 5.6.2c-A for the annual discharge test of the station and PPS batteries was discussed with the licensee and will be incorporated into unresolved item 50-267/85-26-02 for followup by the NRC Region IV Offic . ' Maintenance Activities The inspectors observed the material condition of and reviewed completed maintenance actions and procedures for batteries and motor operated valves (MOV). The helium circulator turbine steam inlet isolation valves (HV-2245, HV-2246, HV-2247, HV-2248) were the MOVs of interest during this inspection. Additionally, replacement parts used for safety-related maintenance actions were traced to their origin to determine their acceptability. The following documents were reviewed:

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  -7-Document Number   Topic Station Operating Procedure Electrical Distribution - AC System (SOP) 92-06, Issue 7 Station Service Request (SSR) Replace Frequency Meter for Battery 84500238 P.O. 53476  1C Inveter SSR 84500283/287,  Rebuild Snubbers P.O. N4585 SSR 84501102  Repair Motor For HV-2248 NCR 85-563 EMP 45,   Disconnecting, Reconnecting and Issue 1   Testing of Limitorque or Rotork Values MP 39.3,   Maintenance and Repair of Rotork Issue 3   Valve Controllers PM 92.10,   Inspection and Preventive Main-Issue 24   tenance of Caterpillar Diesel -

Emergency Generator Units SMAP-21, Post Maintenanry Testing Require-Issues 1 ments in Maintt unce Related Procedures P-5, Material Control Issue 8 Q-4, Procurement Document Control Issue 6 91-M-1-28-5 Rotork Instruction Handbook for Synchroset Electric Valve Actuators The inspectors reviewed three safety-related station service requests (SSR) to determine the suitability of replacement parts being used for maintenance. Deficiencies were identified with each SSR as identified below:

(1) The safety-related frequency meter replaced by SSR 84500238 was procured under a non-safety related purchase order without any of the required certifications and no attempt was made to qualify the meter for safety related us The installation of this meter was approved by Maintenance Quality Control (MQC).

(2) Safety-related snubber 0-Rings, replaced by SSR 84500283/287, were purchased via a parts distributor from a manufacturer not on the qualified vendors lis A certification of conforraance was provided from the parts distributor to the licensee without supporting documentation from the manufacture This document

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  -8-was used as the basis for the receipt inspection acceptance, even though the certificate was not traceable to the original manufacturer and the original manufacturer did not have an approved QA progra (3) The motor installed on valve HV-2248 by SSR 84501102 was rewound by a vendor not on the approved vendors list. The licensee identified this deficiency with NCR 85-563 and had performed a component qualification test to upgrade the motor for safety-related applications. The qualification test consisted of meggering the motor windings to confirm proper electrical refurbishment and a post installation vibration test to verify correct bearing installatio The only documentation of test performance was the statement " Valve test eks okay: Valve is electrically okay". There was no record of the measured test results or the instruments utilized to obtain the vibration and resistance measurement The licensee did not review the vendor's process or materials used for rewinding the moto The inspectors concluded that the tests and documentation were inadequate to ensure that the replacement motor was equal to or better than the original construction phase componen (4) Gearcase oil used for MOV applications differed from that recommended by the vendor manual and may not have been suitable for the environment of all plant MOVs. Procedure MP 39-3 and the vendor. manual specify the use of SAE 80 EP oil in the gearcase of motor operated valves. Discussions with maintenance personnel revealed that Mobil 629 oil was being used for all MOV applications. The licensee had not performed an engineering evaluation to determine that the Mobil 629 oil was suitable for all MOV applications or compatible with residual oil that may have been in the gearcase The inspector also noted that SAE 80 EP oil was rated for operation only to 180 F and this was significantly below the 737 F helium circulator inlet steam temperature listed in the updated FSAR, Fig 10.2-3, for 100% power operations. During the inspection, the licensee measured the gearcase temperature
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of HV-2247 at approximately 140*F with lower temperature steam being supplied from the auxiliary boiler The suitability of both Mobil 629 and SAE 80 EP oil under.these high temperature operating conditions is questionabl The Ft. St. Vrain Quality Assurance (QA) Plan, Appendix B to the FSAR, requires that safety-related items be purchased from approved suppliers, receipt inspected and, if procured sole source, procured to standards that will assure an equal to or better than original conditio The apparent failure to procure safety-related replacement items in accordance with their QA Plan was discussed with the licensee and will remain unresolved pending followup by the NRC Region IV Office (50-267/85-26-05).

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b. -The inspectors reviewed the material condition of the four helium circulator turbine inlet steam isolation valves (HV-2245, HV-2246, HV-2247 and HV-2248). In addition to the improperly qualified motor installed in HV-2248 (see section 4.a.(3) of this report), valves HV-2247 and HV-2248 were leaking oil from their gearcue, -and valves HV-2246 and HV-2248 local position indicators differed from their remote indication. Both valves indicated in the mid position locally, while valve HV-2246 indicated shut remotely and valve

HV-2248 indicated open remotely. The licensee verified the remote

. positions to be correc Contributing to these material deficien-cies were the following procedure and implementation problems with

< the MOV maintenance program:

 (1) The electrical maintenance procedure for MOV motor installation,

, testing and documentation was inadequat Procedure EMP 45 i

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provided for verifying proper motor rotation by momentarily touching the motor leads to an energized terminal and jogging the motor in the closed direction. This appears contrary to the vendor manual which directs that the motor be energized from the operating switch to verify rotatio Paragraph 3.9 of procedure EMP-45 provided general guidance for documenting the as found/as left condition of the valve but i there was no requirement to record the torque or limit switch settings when adjusting these setpoints. A review of two com- . pleted SSR packages revealed that these setpoint values were not recorde The post installation testing for MOV motors consisted of cycling the valve to verify proper operation, circuit integrity and posi-i tion indication. However, there were no quantitative acceptance

criteria for determining proper valve operation even though nominal valve operating speeds were provided in the vendor manual. MQC was not required to observe the test and the determination of proper valve operation was left to the judgement of the workman performing tne maintenance.

, (2) The torque values listed for use in the MOV mechanical repair i procedure had an inadequate technical basis and their use was

optional. -Procedure MP 39-3 had a table of MOV torque values that were based on bolt size. The table was identical to one in procedure PM 92.10 for diesel generator maintenance and was

 - based on values in the diesel generator vendor manual. Addi-tionally, a note at the bottom of the table made torque wrench use optional by stating that:

i An average man on a 12 inch wrench can develop about i 100 ft. lb. of torqu Therefore, if a torque wrench i is not available, or cannot be used, use the following wrench-bolt combinations: .

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Bolt Sizes, Inches 1/2 9/16 5/8 3/4 7/8 1-1/8 Wrench Sizes, Inches 6 9 12 18 24 36 For larger bolting where specific torque values are not stated and/or configuration precludes the use of torque equipment, standard striking wrenches may be used by qualified mechanics working to industrial journeyman standard The technical basis for this note was a vendor valve manual notation aoplying to stud n'uts and cap screws. The licensee had applied the torque values for diesel generators and other valves to MOVs without any apparent engineering justificatio (3) The post maintenance testing of valve HV-2246 was signed off by MQC as being complete when plant conditions would not support the operational test. Procedure MP 39.3, section 6.1, stated that the post maintenance testing acceptance criteria was " Valve Stroke and limit switch settings are acceptable for system re-quirements at operating pressure and temperature". There were no quantitative acceptance limits provided in the procedure to determine this acceptability and MQC signed off this part of the procedure on February 23, 1985 for SSR 84500240. At this time the reactor was shutdown and steam was being supplied to the helium circulators from the auxiliary boilers which are not capable of producing steam at operating temperatures and pressure There was no outstanding action item to test this valve when the plant was at normal operating temperatures and pressures. The licensee had no assurance that this valve would operate as designed under expected operation condition c. Station battery maintenance and surveillance procedures were incon-sistent with the guidance provided by the battery verJor manua The following inconsistencies were identified:

(1) The battery ventilation low flow monitor was alarming in the control room and exhaust air flow from battery rooms IA and 18 appeared to be insufficient to meet the vendor manual recommen-dations for removing hydrogen gas during charging evolution (2) The upper temperature limit specified on the surveillance procedures for a battery receiving a float charge was 110 This was contrary to the vendor manual which recommended maximum allowable battery tempera',ures of 110 F during equalizing charge evolutions and only 90*F for float charge conditions. The inspector observed a pilot cell temperature of 92 F in battery 1A on August 22, 1985. The battery vendor manual stated that continued operation at this el_evated tem-perature could degrade the battery capacity and lif (3) Battery specific gravity and individual cell voltage (ICV)

measurements were not analyzed to determine whether an equali-zing charge should be performed. The battery vendor manual

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recommended that an equalizing charge be conducted when the specific gravity of any cell dropped .010 from an initial standard value or any cell ICV was below 2.13 VDC. Instead, the licensee performed an equalizing charge monthly in accor-dance with S0P 92-06. There was no in progress monitoring of these charges and the end of charge parameters were not measured to verify improved battery condition (4) There were no procedures for periodically checking battery intercell resistances and connector tightness, adding water to individual cells, or cleaning the battery with approved solvent The apparent failure to establish, implement and maintain adequate battery, and MOV maintenance and testing procedures was discussed with the licensee and will be incorporated into unresolved item 50-267/85-26-02 for followup by the NRC Region IV Offic . Post-Modification Testing The licensee did not ensure that all required post-modification tests were developed as part of modification work packages. The NRC inspector reviewed Change Notices (CN's) 1798 and 1798-A and their associated Controlled Work Procedures (CWP's) 84-92, 84-93, 84-94, 84-95 and 85-560 which replaced Emergency Water Booster Pumps (Fire Water Booster Pumps) P-2109 and P-2110 with pumps having a higher output head. These pumps could be used to drive the helium circulator turbine to achieve adequate core cooling in the event of the failure of three feedwater pumps. The CWP's for this modification did not contain post-installation flow tests for the new emergency water booster pumps. The failure to develop adequate controls to ensure that all required post-modification testing was conducted was discussed with the licensee and will remain an unresolved item pending review by Region IV (50-267/85-26-06).

6. Unresolved and Open Items: Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether it is an acceptable item, a deviation, or a violatio A open item is a matter that requires further review and evaluation by the inspectors. The following unresolved and open items will be followed by the NRC Region IV offic (50-267/85-26-01) (0 pen Item) Tha revision of equipment control procedures to establish compliance with TMI Item I.C.6. This item will remain open pending NRC Region IV acceptance of the revised procedures (Item 2.a(1)).

(50-267/85-26-02) (Unresolved) The failure to establish adequate procedures for control of temporary plant modifications, station battery maintenance and surveillance tests, and motor operated valve maintenance. Also, the apparent failure to comply with procedures for battery surveillances and motor operated valve maintenance (Items 2.a(2), 3b, 3c, 4b, and 4c).

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(50-267/85-16-03) (0 pen Item) The revision of housekeeping procedures to provide a means for ensuring specific deficiencies are correcte This item will remain open pending NRC Region IV acceptance of the revised procedures (Item 2.c).

(50-267/85-16-04) (0 pen Item) The adequacy of the diesel generator valve lineup procedure to ensure the availability of the system. The item will remain open pending NRC Region IV followup of potential weaknesses in the lineup procedure (Item 2.d).

(50-267/85-26-05) (Unresolved) The failure to procure safety-related replacement items in accordance with the QA plan requirements (Item 4.a).

(50-267/85-26-06) (Unresolved) The failure to establish adequate controls to ensure the performance of required post-modification testing (Item 5).

7. The findings of this inspection were discussed with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 on August 29, 198 _ _ . . _

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