IR 05000321/1986003

Insp Repts 50-321/86-03 & 50-366/86-03 on 860118-0221. Violations Noted:Failure to Maintain Unit 1 Secondary Containment Integrity,Failure to Follow Test Procedure & Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Calibr

ML20138C265
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	03/24/1986
From:	Holmesray P, Ignatonis A, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138C251	List: ML20138C247 ML20138C252 ML20138C265
References
50-321-86-03, 50-321-86-3, 50-366-86-03, 50-366-86-3, NUDOCS 8604020441
Download: ML20138C265 (6)

Text

,j p rt!v UNITED STATES

, ,, 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y". ", REGION il

.y ,, j 101 MARIETTA STREET, *5 t ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: .50-321/86-03 and 50-366/86-03

• Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545

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Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch I an Inspection Co-d cted: January 18 - February 21, 1986 Inspectors: [ rt k h Al Date' Signed i

PeteNr' 6k Holme's Ray, G."M. Hijfelt, Resident Inspector GSenioAr R sident slaInspector In Dhte Signed Approved by- 0 n )% 4 A. J . Ignatoriis,(Acting Section Chief,

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3/2/!K4'

Dat'e Sisned Division of Reaclor Projects

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SUMMARY Scope: This inspection involved 204 inspection-hours on site in the areas of Technical Specification. compliance, operator performance, overall plant opera-tions, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive ' maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, refueling-(Unit 1), and surveillance activitie Results: Three violations were identified - (1) failure to maintain Unit I secondary containment integrity;. (2) failure to follow a test procedure; and (3)

failure to provide adequate procedures for instrument calibration and a temporary modificatio ~

8604020441 860326 gDR ADOCK 05000321 PDR

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REPORT DETAILS

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4 License Employees Contacted

• H. C. Nix, Site General Manager

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T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager

• H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager

• T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager

, *T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

• P. E. Fornel, Site Q.A. Manager

• S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance

• C. T. Moore, Manager of Training Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force raembers, and office personnel.

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• Attended exit interview

! Exit Interview l

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 20, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. During the reporting period frequent discussions were held with the General Manager and/or his assistants concerning inspection findings. Three violations described below were identified during this inspection and were discussed in detail during the exit meetin The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no

, exception. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

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(0 pen) Violation 50-321/86-03-01, Failure to maintain Unit 1 secondary containment integrity (Paragraph 4).

(0 pen) Violation 50-321/86-03-02, Failure to properly implement a safety related test procedure (Paragraph 6).

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(0 pen) Violation 50-321,366/86-03-03, Failure to adequately prepare two

{ safety related procedures (Paragraph 6). Licensee Action On Previous Enforcement Matters and Open Items I

(Closed) Open Item 366/79-20-01, The licensee committed to revise administrative requirements to include procedural contro's over timely implementation of Technical Specifications (TS). Current plant procedures contain instructions for timely incorporation of TS change This item is closed.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item 321/85-05-08, Failure to Perform Diesel Generator Maintenance Items. The licensee has revised the applicable procedures to include the diesel generator water test,-camshaft inspection and holddown bolt check. This item is close (Closed) Violation 366/85-16-01, Improper Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers. By. letter dated July 22, 1985, the. licensee committed to revise TS to incorporate the National Electrical Manufactures Association standard molded case circuit breaker testing metho The inspector verified this action complet This item is close (Closed) . Violation 366/85-22-01, Failure to Reinstall RHR System Valve Internals. By letter dated September 13, 1985, the licensee stated that the Administrative Control Procedure for the Maintenance Program was revised to require a Maintenance Work Order (MWO) for all plant related maintenance activitie The inspector verified this action complet This item is close . Plant Tours (Units 1 & 2)

The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically. during the inspection interval to serify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors also determined that appropriate ' radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiousl During tours the inspectors looked -for 'the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibra-tions, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts and weekend The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). Valve and breaker / switch- lineups and equipment conditions are randomly verified both locally and in the control room. During this inspection period the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the accessible areas of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactor On January 29, 1986, at approximately 3:30 p.m., the inspector observed that the secondary containment doors between the Turbine Building and the Unit 1 Reactor Building on the 130' elevation were simultaneously opened for several second This unplanned breach of secondary. containment . occurred when approximately seven workers were routinely filing out from the Reactor Building. The interlocks to prevent both doors beii.g open at the same time appeared to be defeated; and the worker who opened the second door in the

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airlock, failed to observe the red interlock light which prcvides indication for one not to open the doo The inspector informed the On Shift Operational Supervisor (OSOS). Section 8.15 of administrative controls procedure - 30AC-0PS-003-0S, Revision No. O, delineates the secondary containment controls through the use of air lock systems whenever secondary containment integrity is required. Step 8.15.2 of the procedure states that no more than one door may be open at any time in each Reactor Building air lock. Step 8.15.3 of the procedure states that the air lock indicating lights that allow access through the air lock shall be adhered to at all times. And, Step 8.15.4 of the' procedure states that whenever a violation of secondary containment is suspected, the Shift Supervisor of the affected unit shall be notified. During the time of the above described inspection finding, Unit 2 was in operation, and per TS 3.7.c.1.b, Unit I secondary containment integrity was required. Unit I secondary containment integrity was not maintained as a result of the licensee's failure to follow the requirements of procedure.30AC-0PS-003-OS, Revision No. O, which constitutes a violation (50-321/86-03-01). In addition, there have been three licensee identified breaches of Unit 1 secondary containment, since January 15, 1986, which are summarized below:

Date Description of Incident 01-15-86 Both personnel airlock doors between the Reactor Building and the satellite dress-out area were simultaneously ope Hot machine shop door going to Unit-1 railroad airlock was inoperable and the inner double door was opened at the same tim Security personnel opened the outside railroad airlock to the Unit-1 Reactor Building, while the inside railroad airlock door was opene . Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

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The inspectors periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and l records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs

! ar.d auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing - orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout record The inspectors routinely cbserved operator alertness and demeanor during plant tour During normal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The

inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at acceptable

. levels. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in l accordance with approved licensee procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie _ _ _ ~ . _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ , _ _ _ . _ . . , _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ , , _ _ _ . . _ _ - _ - _

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6. Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)

During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance test These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and the review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LC0 action statements were reviewed ' on selected o'ccurrences as they happene I On January 28, 1986, while performing safety related procedure, 42IT-TET-001-0S, Revision 1, to pneumatically test a newly installed section of Analog Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) tubing from the Reactor Building 130'

elevation to the drywell pressure transmitters located on the Reactor .

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Building 158' elevation, the tubing was pressurized from the 130' elevation prior to the completion of the system lineup for the test on the 158'

elevatio This was personnel error caused by not following the procedure steps in the required order. As a result, an unplanned artificially high drywell pressure signal was initiated and the following Engineering Safety Features (ESF). equipment actuated: 1A, 1B, and IC diesel generators and the Control Room ventilation system which shifted to its pressurization mod The residual heat removal (RHR) and core spray (CS) pumps did not start, because these pumps were tagged out for maintenance. Another contributor to this event was poor radio communication practice that is typically used for testing and maintenance activities. The failure to follow safety-related procedure, 421T-TET-001-05, constitutes a violation (50-321/86-03-02).

On . February 13, 1986, during the calibration of the Unit-2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) transmitter, 2E41-N057B; in accordance with procedure, 57SV-E41-003-2, Revision 0, an unplanned ESF isolation of the HPCI steam supply isolation valve, 2E41-F003, occurred. No other system actuation occurred. Cause of this ESF actuation was due to an inadequate procedur The licensee determined that elementary drawing used in preparing the procedure was incorrectly updated by As-Built-Notice (ABN)

84-148T, page 103 of 239; link, JJ-32, needed to isolate the HPCI turbine high differential pressure trip has been omitted. The second unplanned ESF actuation also occurred on February 13, 1986, while performing a temporary modification to the Unit 1. Per the Jumper and Lifted Wire (J&LW) Sheet, 1-86-016, links BB-14 and BB-15 were identified to be opened, between the reactor water. low level instrument and the system trip cards. As a result, during use of the subject procedure, the trip cards sent a signal to actuate the ESF relays, as designed, when a loss of current occurred. This resulted

.in the start of IB diesel generator and the opening of RHR discharge valves, IEll-F017A and 1 Ell-F0178. The-1A and 1C diesel generators, CS, RHR, HPC1, and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) pumps did not start because they were tagged out for maintenance. The intent of the procedure while performing temporary modification, was not met, in that it should have been designed to prevent the signal from being sent to the ECCS equipmen The failure to adequately prepared procedures for the above described safety-related activities constitutes a violation (50-321,366/86-03-03).

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5 Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-tion of the security force. The establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followe Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports Review TI'e following. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technica. Specifications '

-were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideratio The following LERs are considered closed:

linit 1: 83-109, 84-09, 84-27, 85-11, 85-16, 85-44*

t, M t 2 : 83-123, 85-05, 85-11, 85-15,'85-19, 85-24*, 85-25

• In-depth review performed s

' Refueling (Unit 1)

During this reporting interval the inspectors verified by observation, interviews and procedure review that the refueling was being conducted in accordance with regulation Areas inspected incTuded adequacy of procedures, Technical Specification ' compliance and refueling floor housekeepin Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identifie . Inspector Followup i

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 366/85-32-03, Dropped !!ew Fuel Bundl ~

During this inspection period the recovered bundle was disassembled and the fuel rods shipped to the vendor. No further action is planned on this item.

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