ML20138C265
| ML20138C265 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1986 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Ignatonis A, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138C251 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-86-03, 50-321-86-3, 50-366-86-03, 50-366-86-3, NUDOCS 8604020441 | |
| Download: ML20138C265 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1986003
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: .50-321/86-03 and 50-366/86-03
- Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
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Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366
License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Facility Name: Hatch I and.2
Inspection Co-d cted: January 18 - February 21, 1986
Inspectors: [
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PeteNr' Holme's Ray, SenioAr R sident Inspector
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G."M. Hijfelt, Resident Inspector
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Approved by-
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A. J . Ignatoriis,(Acting Section Chief,
Dat'e Sisned
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Division of Reaclor Projects
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SUMMARY
Scope: This inspection involved 204 inspection-hours on site in the areas of
Technical Specification. compliance, operator performance, overall plant opera-
tions, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices,
corrective and preventive ' maintenance activities, site security procedures,
radiation control activities, refueling-(Unit 1), and surveillance activities.
Results:
Three violations were identified - (1) failure to maintain Unit I
secondary containment integrity;. (2) failure to follow a test procedure; and (3)
failure to provide adequate procedures for instrument calibration and a temporary
modification.
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
License Employees Contacted
- H. C. Nix, Site General Manager
T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager
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- H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager
- T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager
- T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager
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R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- P. E. Fornel, Site Q.A. Manager
- S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
- C. T. Moore, Manager of Training
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force raembers, and office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 20, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
During the reporting period
frequent discussions were held with the General Manager and/or his
assistants concerning inspection findings. Three violations described below
were identified during this inspection and were discussed in detail during
the exit meeting.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no
exception. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material
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provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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(0 pen) Violation 50-321/86-03-01, Failure to maintain Unit 1 secondary
containment integrity (Paragraph 4).
(0 pen) Violation 50-321/86-03-02, Failure to properly implement a safety
related test procedure (Paragraph 6).
(0 pen) Violation 50-321,366/86-03-03, Failure to adequately prepare two
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safety related procedures (Paragraph 6).
3.
Licensee Action On Previous Enforcement Matters and Open Items
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(Closed) Open Item 366/79-20-01, The licensee committed to revise
administrative requirements to include procedural contro's over timely
implementation of Technical Specifications (TS).
Current plant procedures
contain instructions for timely incorporation of TS changes.
This item is
closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 321/85-05-08, Failure to Perform Diesel Generator
Maintenance Items.
The licensee has revised the applicable procedures to
include the diesel generator water test,-camshaft inspection and holddown
bolt check. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 366/85-16-01, Improper Testing of Molded Case Circuit
Breakers. By. letter dated July 22, 1985, the. licensee committed to revise
TS to incorporate the National Electrical Manufactures Association standard
molded case circuit breaker testing method.
The inspector verified this
action complete.
This item is closed.
(Closed) . Violation 366/85-22-01, Failure to Reinstall RHR System Valve
Internals. By letter dated September 13, 1985, the licensee stated that the
Administrative Control Procedure for the Maintenance Program was revised to
require a Maintenance Work Order (MWO) for all plant related maintenance
activities.
The inspector verified this action complete.
This item is
closed.
4.
Plant Tours (Units 1 & 2)
The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically. during the inspection
interval to serify that monitoring equipment was recording as required,
equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant
conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors
also determined that appropriate ' radiation controls were
properly
established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with
procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible
material and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours the
inspectors looked -for 'the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibra-
tions, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker
positions, equipment danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire
fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were
conducted on backshifts and weekends.
The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of Emergency Core Cooling
Systems (ECCS).
Valve and breaker / switch- lineups and equipment conditions
are randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
During this
inspection period the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the
accessible areas of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system
to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for
operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
On January 29, 1986, at approximately 3:30 p.m., the inspector observed that
the secondary containment doors between the Turbine Building and the Unit 1
Reactor Building on the 130' elevation were simultaneously opened for
several seconds.
This unplanned breach of secondary. containment . occurred
when approximately seven workers were routinely filing out from the Reactor
Building. The interlocks to prevent both doors beii.g open at the same time
appeared to be defeated; and the worker who opened the second door in the
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airlock, failed to observe the red interlock light which prcvides indication
for one not to open the door.
The inspector informed the On Shift
Operational Supervisor (OSOS).
Section 8.15 of administrative controls
procedure - 30AC-0PS-003-0S,
Revision No. O,
delineates the secondary
containment controls through the use of air lock systems whenever secondary
containment integrity is required. Step 8.15.2 of the procedure states that
no more than one door may be open at any time in each Reactor Building air
lock.
Step 8.15.3 of the procedure states that the air lock indicating
lights that allow access through the air lock shall be adhered to at all
times. And, Step 8.15.4 of the' procedure states that whenever a violation
of secondary containment is suspected, the Shift Supervisor of the affected
unit shall be notified. During the time of the above described inspection
finding, Unit 2 was in operation, and per TS 3.7.c.1.b, Unit I secondary
containment integrity was required. Unit I secondary containment integrity
was not maintained as a result of the licensee's failure to follow the
requirements of procedure.30AC-0PS-003-OS, Revision No. O, which constitutes
a violation (50-321/86-03-01).
In addition, there have been three licensee
identified breaches of Unit 1 secondary containment, since January 15, 1986,
which are summarized below:
Date
Description of Incident
01-15-86
Both personnel airlock doors between the Reactor
Building and the satellite dress-out area were
simultaneously open.
01-21-86
Hot machine shop door going to Unit-1 railroad
airlock was inoperable and the inner double door
was opened at the same time.
02-17-86
Security personnel opened the outside railroad
airlock to the Unit-1 Reactor Building, while the
inside railroad airlock door was opened.
5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift
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logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and
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records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs
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ar.d auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing - orders, jumper logs and
equipment tagout records.
The inspectors
routinely cbserved operator
alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
During normal events, operator
performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.
The
inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting
interval to assure that operations and security remained at acceptable
levels. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in
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accordance with approved licensee procedures.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with
selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) and results of selected
surveillance tests.
These
verifications were accomplished by direct
observation of monitoring instrumentation,
valve
positions,
switch
positions, and the review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's
compliance with selected LC0 action statements were reviewed ' on selected
o'ccurrences as they happened.
On January 28, 1986, while performing safety related procedure, 42IT-TET-
001-0S, Revision 1, to pneumatically test a newly installed section of
Analog Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) tubing from the Reactor Building 130'
elevation to the drywell pressure transmitters located on the Reactor
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Building 158' elevation, the tubing was pressurized from the 130' elevation
prior to the completion of the system lineup for the test on the 158'
elevation.
This was personnel error caused by not following the procedure
steps in the required order. As a result, an unplanned artificially high
drywell pressure signal was initiated and the following Engineering Safety
Features (ESF). equipment actuated: 1A, 1B, and IC diesel generators and the
Control Room ventilation system which shifted to its pressurization mode.
The residual heat removal (RHR) and core spray (CS) pumps did not start,
because these pumps were tagged out for maintenance. Another contributor to
this event was poor radio communication practice that is typically used for
testing and maintenance activities.
The failure to follow safety-related
procedure, 421T-TET-001-05, constitutes a violation (50-321/86-03-02).
On . February 13, 1986, during the calibration of the Unit-2 High Pressure
Coolant Injection (HPCI) transmitter, 2E41-N057B; in accordance
with
procedure, 57SV-E41-003-2, Revision 0, an unplanned ESF isolation of the
HPCI steam supply isolation valve, 2E41-F003, occurred. No other system
actuation occurred.
Cause of this ESF actuation was due to an inadequate
procedure.
The licensee determined that elementary drawing used in
preparing the procedure was incorrectly updated by As-Built-Notice (ABN)
84-148T, page 103 of 239; link, JJ-32, needed to isolate the HPCI turbine
high differential pressure trip has been omitted. The second unplanned ESF
actuation also occurred on February 13, 1986, while performing a temporary
modification to the Unit 1.
Per the Jumper and Lifted Wire (J&LW) Sheet,
1-86-016, links BB-14 and BB-15 were identified to be opened, between the
reactor water. low level instrument and the system trip cards. As a result,
during use of the subject procedure, the trip cards sent a signal to actuate
the ESF relays, as designed, when a loss of current occurred. This resulted
.in the start of IB diesel generator and the opening of RHR discharge valves,
IEll-F017A and 1 Ell-F0178. The-1A and 1C diesel generators, CS, RHR, HPC1,
and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) pumps did not start because they
were tagged out for maintenance.
The intent of the procedure while
performing temporary modification, was not met, in that it should have been
designed to prevent the signal from being sent to the ECCS equipment.
The failure to adequately prepared procedures for the above described
safety-related activities constitutes a violation (50-321,366/86-03-03).
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7.
Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting
interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-
tion of the security force. The establishment and maintenance of gates,
doors and isolation zones in proper condition, that access control and
badging was proper, and procedures were followed.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Licensee Event Reports Review
TI'e following. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were
also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technica. Specifications
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-were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost
consideration.
The following LERs are considered closed:
linit 1: 83-109, 84-09, 84-27, 85-11, 85-16, 85-44*
t, M t 2 : 83-123, 85-05, 85-11, 85-15,'85-19, 85-24*, 85-25
- In-depth review performed
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9.
Refueling (Unit 1)
During this reporting interval the inspectors verified by observation,
interviews and procedure review that the refueling was being conducted in
accordance with regulations.
Areas inspected incTuded adequacy of
procedures,
Technical
Specification ' compliance and refueling floor
housekeeping.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Inspector Followup
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 366/85-32-03, Dropped !!ew Fuel Bundle.
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During this inspection period the recovered bundle was disassembled and the
fuel rods shipped to the vendor.
No further action is planned on this item.
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