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| {{Adams | | {{Adams |
| | number = ML20245C834 | | | number = ML20247Q378 |
| | issue date = 04/13/1989 | | | issue date = 06/01/1989 |
| | title = Insp Rept 50-267/89-03 on 890201-0318.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Reserve Shutdown Matl Removal, Operational Safety Verification,Radiological Controls, Monthly Surveillance Observation & Maint Observation | | | title = Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp 50-267/89-03 |
| | author name = Westerman T | | | author name = Callan L |
| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) | | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = Williams R |
| | addressee affiliation = | | | addressee affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| | docket = 05000267 | | | docket = 05000267 |
| | license number = | | | license number = |
| | contact person = | | | contact person = |
| | document report number = 50-267-89-03, 50-267-89-3, NUDOCS 8904270410 | | | document report number = NUDOCS 8906060413 |
| | package number = ML20245C810 | | | title reference date = 05-12-1989 |
| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | page count = 17 | | | page count = 2 |
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| ' APPENDIX B
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| LU.S. NUCLEhR REGULATORY COMMISSION H REGION IV?
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| NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/89-03- Operating License: DPR-34
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| 7 Docket: 50-267
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| 'Licenseei Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
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| P.O. Box 840 v,.. ,
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| Denver, Colorado . 80210-0840:
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| .. Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)
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| Inspection At: FSV, Platteville, Colorado
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| ,. .. Inspection Conducted: LFebruary .1 through March 18, 1989 >
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| , Inspectors: lR. E. Farrell, Senior Resident' Inspector (SRI)
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| P. W. Michaud,' Resident Inspector (RI)
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| LApproved: *
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| M/3[ff T. F. Westerman,. Chief, Project Section 8 Datfe Division of Reactor Projects
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| Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 19through March 18, 1989 (Report 50-267/89-03)
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| Areas Inspected: Routine,: unannounced inspection of onsite. followup of licensee event reports-(LERs),_ reserve' shutdown material removal, operational-safety verification, radiological controls,. monthly surveillance observation,
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| -monthly maintenance observation, and a coastdown and defueling' meetin Results: The licensee completed.the reserve shutdown material removal during this inspection period. Several equipment malfunctions resulted in various delays _during this effort, but support by all licensee organizations
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| . contributed to the' completion of_this effort in as timely a manner as possibl Numerous abnormal or first-time operations and configurations existed during
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| 'this. inspection period. An appropriate-level of training, pre-job briefing,-
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| and monitoring contributed to-the. licensee's success in recovering from the
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| : inadvertent actuation of the reserve' shutdown system and the high moisture
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| levels in the primary coolan One' violation was identified by the NRC resident inspectors (paragraph 6),
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| which involved incorrectly posted radiological boundaries. The licensee's health' physics organization performed in an effective manner in support of-numerous evolutions which included radiological. concerns, with the exception of this: violatio J414
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| PDR ADOCK 05000267
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| O PNU | | JLN I 519 In Reply Refer To: |
| | Docket: 50-267/89-03 Public Service Company of Colorado ATTN: Robert 0. Williams, Jr., Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 840 Denver,' Colorado 80201-0840 Gentlemen: |
| | Thank you for your letter of May 12, 1989, in response to our letter and Notice of Violation dated April 14, 1989. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintaine |
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| | Sincerely, Original Signed By, f T Baker L. J. Callan, Director Division of Reactor Projects cc: |
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| | Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station ATTN: C. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production Division 16805 WCR 191 Platteville, Colorado 80651 Fort'St. Vrain Nuclear Station ATTN: P. Tomlinson, Manager Quality Assurance Division 16805 WCR 191 Platteville, Colorado 80651 Colorado Public Utilities Commission < |
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| | ATTN: Ralph Teague, Logan Street OL1 Denver, Colorado 80203 Colorado Radiation Control Program Director g _ |
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| | RIV:DRP/B C:DRP/B r :D P RPMullikin;df TFWesterman LJCallan ' |
| . . | | 5/zN 89 5/31/89 ff/ / /89 8906060413 890601 t \ |
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| | {DR ADOCK 05000267 Pf0C |
| . .s The licensee's preventive maintenance program.was reviewed and found to contain some improvements, but is still not existing at a level which is desirable. | |
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| -3-DETAILS Persons Contacted D.' Alps, Supervisor, Security
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| * Block, System Engineering Manager
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| *L. Brey,' Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Resources
| | . bectoDMB(IE01[w/ licensee 1t ' |
| * Coppello, Central Planning and Scheduling Manager R. Craun, Nuclear Site Engineering Manager
| | ' bec distrib : by: RIV w/ licensee..ltr: ' |
| , *D. Evans, Operations Manager
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| *M. Ferris, QA Operations Manager
| | . R.sD.' Martin, RA |
| *C. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production
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| *B. Gares, Executive Secretary to Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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| *J. Gramling, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations M. Holmes, Nuclear Licensing Manager
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| | LSectionChief(DRP/B)' w , . ~ Project Engineer (DRP/B) |
| *R. Hooper,' Nuclear Technical Training Supervisor i
| | Lisa~Shea,RM/ALF |
| *J. Johns, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Engineering 'j M. Niehoff, Nuclear Design Manager '
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| F. Novachek, Nuclear Support Manager
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| *H. O'Hagan,' Outage Manager q
| | , ' MIS System .. , RSTS Operator: |
| *J. Reesy, Nuclear Support Engineering Manager i
| | K.Heitner,NRRProjectManager(MSi 13-D-18)' |
| *D. Rodgers, Nuclear Computer Services Manager
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| *R. Sargent, Assistant to Vice President, Nuclear Operations
| | RIV File DRS' ' |
| *L.. Scott, QA Services Manager
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| *V. Snyder, Maintenance Dept. Manager
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| *P. Tomlinson, Manager, Quality Assurance
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| *D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering R. Williams, Jr. , Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations l The N9C inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspectio * Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted March 21, 198 . Plant Status The reactor remained shut down throughout this inspection period. The licensee's efforts were directed towards recovery from the unplanned ;
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| actuation of the reserve shutdown material and the removal of moisture from the reactor coolant syste The reserve shutdown material removal effort was hampered with equipment malfunctions, but was completed satisfactorily on March 2, 198 Moisture removal from the reactor coolant system was being accomplished by an. evacuation of the prestressed concrete reactor vessel (PCRV) at the end of the report period.
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| -4-3. Onsite Followup of Licen*ee Event Reports (LERs) (92700)
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| The NRC inspectors reviewed selected LERs to determine whether corrective actions as stated in the LERs are appropriate to correct the cause of the event and to verify these corrective actions have been implemente LER 87-15 reported a Loop 1 shutdown (ESF actuation) when the interlock
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| ;- sequence switch (ISS)lwas moved from " Low Power" to " Power." The loop shutdown was caused by an improper wiring configuration which provided a trip signal to both "A"' and "B" Helium Circulator's logic circuitry when the ISS was placed in the " Power" position. The improper wiring was a result of incorrect electrical drawings which showed certain cables to be determinate and some used as spares that actually were not. These incorrect drawings were used to ground spare ccaductors to reduce electrical noise during corrective actions in response to LER 86-28- The licensee's investigation of the discrepancy between electrical drawings and the as-found configuration concluded the cables in question should have been, but apparently were not, determinate during original plant construction. Corrective actions included determinating the two conductors, which corrected the discrepancy with the electrical drawings and also removed the false trip signal from the'"A" and "B" Helium Circulator's logic circuitr A special test (T-360) was also performed prior to startup to ensure the plant protective system (PPS) had no abnormal trip signals. These actions are acceptable to close this LE LER 87-22 reported a. loop shutdown (ESF actuation) with the reactor shut dow This occurred during a surveillance test due to the failure of an
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| ; electronic logic chip. The failed chip placed one logic channel in a trip l condition. When a technician tripped another channel as part of the surveillance test, the 2-of-3 logic was satisfied and caused a loop shutdown. The failed logic chip was replaced and the surveillance test was subsequently completed satisfactorily. The component failure resulted in a conservative (trip) condition as designed, and thus did not present an unanalyzed configuration. The licensee's corrective actions are considered suffkient to close this LE LER 87-28 described a loss of offsite electrical power event during performance of a postmaintenance test with the reactor shut down. The postmaintenance test was to be performed on the reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) firewater deluge control relay. Part of the test procedure included lifting leads so the RAT would not actually trip. The procedure incorrectly epecified the leads to be lifted, and when the RAT deluge system was actuated per the test procedure, the RAT breakers tripped. The root cause of'this event was identified as personnel error by the licensee, in that the test preparer specified incorrect leads to disable the RAT trip function as intended. Additionally, administrative !
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| procedures did not require an independent review of postmaintenance test '
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| procedures. The licensee corrected the deficient test procedure and reperformed it satisfactorily. The engineer involved was counseled on the accuracy required of test procedures and the need to ensure erroneous results of this sort are preclude The licensee's Administrative
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| Procedure SMAP-23, " Post Maintenance Testing,"; Issue 6, includes !
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| I Step 3.3.4, which requires an independent review for accurac These actions provide a sufficient basis to close this LE LER 88-04 reported a manual reactor scram from 74 percent power due.to an upset on the offsite electrical power grid. This grid disturbance caused ,
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| L several western power plants;ta shut down. The reactor operator manuallyJ scrammed the reactor just "; the turbine automatically tripped due to load swing The plant subse b .1tly experienced an unplanned radioactive gas release from the core support floor vent system, and a Notification of Unusual Event was declare The velease occurred when a safety valve in the core support floor vent system lifted due to flow restrictions in the'
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| downstream' piping. The total activity released was approximately 15 percent of technical specification (TS) limits and resulted in a total dose of 3.67 E-5 rem at 'the exclu: ion area boundary. The licensee performed a special test (T-383), on the core support floor vent system after cleaning strainers and replacing downstream filte,s. The results of this test indicated the relief valve setpoint (5 psig) sas too low, and that it should be changed to 10 psig. This setpoint '.nange was reviewed by the NRC inspectors and verified to be acceptable, both for protecting the-system from overpressurization and to provide a margin against unplanned releases. -The new setpoint has been verified to be successful in preventing unplanned releases from this path during subsequent reactor shutdowns. Additionally, wiring deficiencies found in the turbine control circuitry following this event have been corrected. This LER is close LER 88 2 06 reported a manual scram actuation from 71 percent power when all circulating water flow was lost. The loss of circulating water was due t an expansion joint failure on the "1A" Circulating Water Pump which flooded the circulating water pump pit. The expansion joint failed due to its age of approximately 15 years. The service life of these joints is approximately 10 years. The root cause of this event was the lack of a preventive maintenance program for rubber expansion joints. As a result of 'this event, all eight expansion joints in the circulating water pump pit were replaced. In addition, the licensee inspected and evaluated the condition of all expansion joints in the plan A number of expansion joints have been replaced as a result of these inspections, including those on tne condenser water boxes, diesel generator heat exchangers, and condensate pumps. The licensee has developed and implemented a preventive maintenance program for the inspection and periodic replacement of expansion joints throughout the plant. These actions are sufficient to close this LE . Reserve Shutdown (RSD) Material Removal (6071(
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| The seven-region group of the RSD system was inadvertently inserted into the reactor on January 19, 1989. The NRC inspectors closely monitored the licensee's preparation and implementation of activities to remove the RSD material'from the cor . . - _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _
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| | Company of Colorado P.O. Box S40 Denver, CO 80201 084o R.O. WILLIAMS, J sENtoR VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS May 12, 1989 . |
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| ^ | | P-89176 ]L11{ll@@]M@ |
| !Thehotservicefacility(HSF)wouldnormallyhavebeenutilizedtosetup
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| ,' the reserve shutdown vacuum too However, the HSF was configured for control rod drive' refurbishment. Since it was' desirable to leave the HSF '
| | U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .b w ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington D.'C. 20555 Docket No. 50-267 SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 89-03 REFERENCE: NRC Letter, Callan to Williams, dated April 14, 1989 (G-89134) |
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| .in.this configuration ,and with the fact that it would have taken 2 weeks v .to' reconfigure the HSF, the licensee' decided to utilize the new fuel .
| | This letter is in response to the Notice of Violation received as a result of the NRC inspection conducted by Messrs. R. E. Farrell and W. Michaud during the period of February 1 through March 18, 1989 (see Reference). The following response to the item contained in the Notice of Violation is hereby submitte Failure to Establish and Control Radiological Areas Licensee Technical Specification AC 7.4.d requires, in part, that procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20, and shall be approved, maintained, and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposur Licensee Procedure HPP-9, Issue 8, " Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas," implements the requirement of 10 CFR 20. Step 5.3.5 of HPP-9 states, in part, that a suitable contamination survey raeter be set up at the step-off pad or nearest " low background" area whenever an individual is required to work in the controlled area. |
| , loading' port (NFLP) to set up the RSD vacuum tool. A new Procedure,.
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| ! !MPF-1074, Issue 1, "In-Core Removal of RSD Material /NFLP," was written to perform this evolution. . The'NRC inspectors reviewed this procedure and found that it contained. adequate precautions and instructions.to ensure
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| the, reactor was maintaird 'n refueling conditions and to specify responsibilities of personnel involved in its use. Cetailed steps were-
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| # ' provided:to' move,sset.up, and tu t equipment. The licensee provided | |
| , in-depth training on this procedure, as well as other procedures, and the overall-scheme of the RSD removal operation The NRC inspectors attended two of these training'sessiont and found them to be well organized and
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| informativ The' vacuum tool consists of a 400 Hz motor attached to a vacuum impeller, a hopper to collect the RSD material, and a suction probe to be inserted into the RSD channel; all of which are housed inside the auxiliary transfer cask'-(ATC). The ATC provides shielding for personnel and a radiological boundary to handle control rod ~ drive and orifice assemblies and the~ reserve shutdown vacuum tool. An external motor generator provides' the 400 Hz power to the vacuum motor, and is connected via wiring inside the ATC. . Because of the configuration, the. Vacuum motor has minimal heat removal characteristics, and as such is limited to a 4 minute duty' cycle which must be followed by a minimum 2 hour cooldown perio The general sequence of activities to remove the RSD material for each of the'seven affected regions was: Perform a shutdown margin verification in accordance with Procedure SR 4.1.6.c/d-x, '" Shutdown Margin Evaluation. for In-Core Maintenance."
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| b.- Retract the control rods and insert a rewind tool to hold them after power is remove Install a reacter isolation valve (RIV). Remove the control rod drive and orifice assembly (CRD0A) using the AT l Transf er and store the CRD0A in an equipment storage wel Assemble the vacuum. tool, test, and place inside the AT Move the ATC to the RIV, open the RIV and vacuum the RSD material ;
| | l Any individual entering the contaminated area shall perform a whole l body frisk upon exiting the are . |
| ' from the region. This operation consists of lowering the vacuun
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| probe until it contacts the_ RSD material (as indicated by a loss of weight"from the ATC grapple), then energizing the vacuum motor and slowly. lowering the probe into the RSD channel. When the end of the probe-is approximately 6' inches from the bottom of the RSD channel, a
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| -7-mechanical stop prevents' further travel, and the probe is withdrawn into the AT h. . . Move the ATC to the NFLP, and extend and disconnect the probe and vacuum too Empty the vacuum tool hopper and weigh the RSD material to verify all the material was remove j.- Install a refurbished CRDOA.into the region using the AT The NRC~ inspectors attended shift briefings and observed good
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| informational exchanges and overall coordination. Key personnel were interviewed to ensure their understanding of their responsibilities, and knowledge of procedures, administrative requirements, and actions to be taken under unexpected or abnormal conditions. Management involvement was observed throughout thisieffort. Overall, the RSD removal effort went well, despite problems which occurred at various stage Following ex-core testing, the first attempt to vacuum RSD material on February 5, 1989, was unsuccessful. Procedure MPF-1074 specified the starting. current for the vacuum motor should decrease to less than 40 amps within approximately 40 seconds. When it did not do so after 45 seconds, the motor was deenergized. Investigation of the problem found wiring damaged on the pigtail between the ATC grapple head and the vacuum moto In addition, external wiring on the ATC was.found to be damaged. This wiring was repaired on February 9. ,As part of the troubleshooting to determine the cause of the wiring damage, the 400 Hz motor generator was tested separately and found to be defectiv A new 400 Hz generator was obtained, installed, and tested satisfactorily on February 1 On February 14, the vacuuming effort was partially successful, but the l probe stopped approximately 2 feet before it should have.' An
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| investigation discovered the vacuum tool hopper / canister had a restriction which prevented movement of the probe for the last 2 feet. This restriction was relieved and the RSD material from Regions 5 and 22 l was removed on February 1 Regions 3 and 34 were successfully vacuumed j on February 1 On February 19, while vacuuming RSD material from Region 28, the 400 Hz-vacuum motor failed. The motor was disassembled and sent out for repair on February 22. Alternate means of removing RSD material had been under 1 consideration from the outset. An auger was developed which was fairly successful in shop tests, but which tended to grind the RSD balls together, creating dust and other concerns. An external blower scheme was also
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| developed which was similar to the existing vacuum tool, but utilizing an external blower rather than a motor lowered into the reactor. This external blower appeared to be a viable option and was reviewed by the NRC
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| l Controlled Work Procedure (CWP) 89-050, "In-Core Removal of Reserve l
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| Shutdown Material with Roots Blower" was developed by the license The I i
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| NRClinspectorsreviewedCWP89-050andtheassociated'designinformation and safety evaluation. Concerns with this proposed method were discussed with the licensee and resolved. However, the 400 Hz vacuum motor was rebuilt and returned to the site before this alternate meth3d was implemente The existing vacuum tool was ceassembied and all.RSD material was removed from the core on March A visual examination was made on the RSD material removed from each of the seven regions. A sample from one high and one low boron concentration material was sent offsite to be chemically analyzed for leachable boron content, in accordance with TS 4.1.9 D.4. A visual inspection of one RSD hopper was also performe Verification that'all RSD material had been removed from each of the seven regions was accomplished by weighing the removed material and comparing it to records of the weight of material which had been installed. A tolerance of plus or minus 1 pound of material was developed and documented in licensee Memo PPS-89-0433, dated February 3, 198 The 1 pound tolerance was based on consideration of: The accuracy and calibration of the scale used to weigh the material Uncertainty over the accuracy of the original weights from records Verification that sufficient material was inserted to fill the RSD channel above the height of the active core The amount of material which could be left in the core with no significant effects on reactivity Any effects on axial or radial power distribution that any material left in the core would have Assurance that a subsequent discharge of RSD material into the same region would not overfill the RSD channel The NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's calculations and evaluation of the 1 pound tolerance and found them acceptabl The RSD material removal from six of the seven regions met this acceptance criteri However, the. material removed from Region 25 weighed 5 pounds l more than that recorded as being loaded in 1985. Nonconformance Report
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| '' (NCR) 89-050 was written to' address this discrepancy. The licensee's evaluation and disposition of this NCR concluded that an error must have been made during the loading in 1985 since there is no possible pathway for RSD material to migrate from one region to another. The NRC I-inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in response to this NCR and l found them acceptabl l l
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| | P-89176 -2- May 12, 1989 Contrary to 'the above -on February 17, 1989, the south stairway between Levels 10 and 11 of the Reactor Building was . utilized. by potentially contaminated individuals prior to performing a whole body frisk and was simultaneously. utilized by individuals exiting the area after friskin This was due to a contamination survey meter being established in the wrong locatio This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement ID) (267/8903-01). |
| _ h No violations or. deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
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| t 5. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
| | The Reason for the Violation if Admitted-The violation is' admitted. The contamination survey meter had been moved to a low background area due to high background at the immediate exit of the contaminated area. The path from the-contaminated area to the contamination survey meter was not modified as a result of moving the survey meter nor were appropriate controls established to prevent the potential for contamination spread in an area frequented by non-contaminated personne No spread of contamination occurred due to the inappropriate control The Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved The control area boundaries were immediately modified to separate the egress path from the contaminated area and that of non-contaminated area No further incidences of potentially contaminated personnel traversing the same areas as non-contaminated personnel have been identified, and no spread of contamination due to inadequate contamination controls have been noted at Fort S Vrain since the event noted abov Corrective Steps Which Wi_11 be Taken to Avoid Further Violations Public Service Company has identified this as an isolated incident due to the unusual work being performed. The Health Physics staff has been instructed in the proper establishment of Control Areas to l- |
| The NRC. inspectors made daily tours of the control room during normal working hours and at least once per week during backshift hours. Control room staffing was verified to be at the proper level for the plant conditions at all times. Control room operators were observed to be | | ' |
| :) attentive and aware of plant status and reasons why annunciators were lit.
| | control the potential for the spread of contamination. No additional corrective steps are deemed necessar The Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved L |
| | | Full compliance was achieved when the control areas were modified on |
| ; The.NRC inspectors observed the operators using and adhering to approved
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| procedures in the performance of their duties. A sampling of these procedures by the NRC inspectors verified current revisions and legible copies. During control room tours, the NRC inspectors verified that the required number of nuclear instrumentation and plant protective system channels.were operable. The operability of emergency AC and DC electrical power, meteorological, and fire protection systems was also verified by the NRC inspectors. The reactor operators and shift supervisor logs were reviewed daily, along with the TS compliance log, clearance. log, operations deviation report (0DR) log, temporary configuration report (TCR) log, end operations order book. Shift turnovers were observed at least once per week by the NRC inspectors. Information flow was consistently good, with the shift supervisors soliciting comments or concerns from the reactor operators, equipment operators, auxiliary tenders,.and health physics' technicians. The licensee's station manager, operations manager, and superintendent of operations were observed to make j routine tours of the control roo l The NRC inspectors made tours of all accessible areas of the plant to j assess the overall conditions and verify the adequacy of plant equipment, radiciogical controls, and security. During these tours, particular 1 atter. tion was paid to the licensee's fire protection program, including j fire extinguishers, fire fighting equipment, fire barriers, control of I flammable materials, and other fire hazard l l
| | February 17, 1969, the date of the occurrenc ! |
| A walkdown of the purge vacuum system, reactor building ventilation system, reactor building area radiation monitoring system, control room ventilation system, 480 VAC essential power distribution system, and portions of the firewater system was performed by the NRC inspector I These systems were selected because of their relation to work performed j during various portions of the reserve shutdown material retrieval and '
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| l moisture removal efforts. Valve and breaker positions were verified, where possible. When affected by a clearance, the valves or breakers were
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| , verified to be positioned in accordance with the clearance requirement Power supplies for components in these systems were verified, but were also subject to clearances in some cases. During these system walkdowns, the NRC inspectors verified the operability of standby or backup equipment when components or portions of systems were inoperable due to clearance The NRC' inspectors reviewed seseral TCRs which were used to install equipment in support of the outage recovery efforts. Proper reviews and i | |
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| | .- P-89176; -3- May 12, 1989 |
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| approvals were verified for each TCR. Three of then TCRs were
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| independently verified by the NRC inspectors:
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| TCR 89-01-01 installed a manometer on the refueling f;oor to read reactor pressure under refueling conditions (subatmospheric),
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| t TCR 89-01-04 supplied power to the reserve shutdown vacuum motor l generator from a spare breaker on Reactor Motor Control Center l
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| | If. you have any questions, please. contact Mr. M. H. Holmes at 480-6960. |
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| TCR 89-03-02 deenergized. rod position. indications so that oxidation j of electrical connections for rods which were removed from the core
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| would be minimize No discrepancies were noted during these walkdown The licensee estimated that approximately 250 gallons of water' entered the reactor coolant system through a leaking core support floor cooling water tube. This tube was known to have a leak and was inadvertently left unisolated during the reserve shutdown removal effort. The licensee determined it would take approximately 2 months to remove this amount of water through the purification system. In an effort to shorten the time to remove the water, and the associated dates for criticality and unrestricted operation, the licensee devised a setup to evacuate the PCR This evacuation to as-close-to-full-vacuum-as-achievable, was calculated to remove the water in approximately 1 to 2 weeks rather than 2 months using the normal purification system lineu The system for evacuating the PCRV was designed and approved under Change Notice (CN) 2916. The NRC inspectors reviewed this CN and the associated safety evaluation in detail. The PCRV was designed for a vacuum pressure of -12 psig as documented in FSAR Appendix E, Design Criteria DC-11- Evacuation of the PCRV was previously accomplished ~in 1976 and 198 CN-2916 included temporary.and permanent modifications to evacuate the PCRV through a refueling penetration, a cold trap to remove moisture, and the installed purge vacuum pumps The discharge of the purge vacuum pumps
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| 'was directed to the reactor building ventilation system which flows through the reactor plant exhaust filters before exhausting through the plant stack. An additional flowpath from another refueling penetration to the reactor building ventilation system was used to initially draw a vacuum on the PCRV, via a commercial blower, at a faster rate than possible with the purge vacuum pumps. In addition, a separate cold trap and vacuum pump was used to evacuate the core support floor (CSF) in order to minimize the differential pressure between the CSF internals and the PCR The NRC inspectors examined the licensee's design and analysis of the PCRV evacuation process, paying particular attention to radiological concerns, structural integrity concerns, instrumentation and monitoring issues, and the potential effects of moisture saturated coolant on core component .;
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| The radiological concerns are addressed in paragraph 6 of this repor _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
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| The ~ structural effects of the' evacuation on the core support floor p , concrete,. steel, vent system, and cooling water system were analyzed and
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| " documented. The effects on the'PCRV steel liner, primary closure, helium qcirculator shutdown seals, PCRV rupture discs, and region isolation valve '
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| seals were also documented in the design analysi . .The design analysis for CN-2916 also considered'the effects of moisture on--
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| control' rod drive-(CRD) and RSD system operability. With the PCRV at a
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| , vacuum, purge flow-to the.CRDs had to be secured. The analysis considered lthe' effects of: saturated vapor conditions on.these components for the 7 L days during which the PCRV was evacuate c The:11censee reviewed plant drawings and operating procedures, then walked down systems which could have possibly been damaged.from evacuation of the, PCRV to establish boundaries to isolate all affected instrumentation. All piping subject to a vacuum was double isolated, and all critical
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| instrumentation had process lines removed or vented in case of failure of
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| .the double valve isolation. The isolation' valves were positioned and restored on an eight part clearance, which provided a means to return essential equipment'to_ service more easily should,an emergency have
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| occurred. The NRC~ inspectors reviewed l portions of these clearances and found no' discrepancie The NRC inspectors also reviewed CWP 89-38, which provided instructions for.the installation and removal of equipment to perform the PCRV
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| evacuation. Temporary tie-ins for process flows, cooling water, and -
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| drains ^were described for the installed. purge. vacuum pumps, the core support floor vacuum pump, and the commercial blower. The CWP was found to contain sufficient steps,-adequate detail, and provisions for QC
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| ' involvement, where required; On March 12, 1989, the licensee entered a loss of forced circulation, with
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| # a calculated allowable time of,193.8 hours before forced circulation of primary coolant.was- required. This provided a sufficient window in which to perform the PCRV evacuation. The NRC. inspectors witnessed the initial phase'of the evacuation, and subsequently' monitored its status. The PCRV
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| , evacuation proceeded smoothly, with approximately 180. gallons of wate removed from the PCRV at the end of this inspection period. The NRC s .< - ' inspectors will monitor the licensee's activities in completing the evacuation'and restoring from it.
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| The NRC inspectors. randomly verified that the number of armed security officers required by the security plan were present. A lead security y '
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| officer was on duty to direct security activities on each shif The NRC inspectors verifled that search equipment, including an x-ray machine,
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| . explosive detector, and metal detector,'was operational or a 100 percent hands-on search was conducte The protected area barrier was surveyed by the NRC inspectors to ensure it
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| .was not compromised by erosion or other objects. The NRC inspectors
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| , t observed that vital area barriers were well maintained and not '
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| . 8-12-compromise The NRC inspectors also observed that persons granted access to the site were badged and visitors were properly escorte . Radiological Controls (71707)
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| The NRC resident inspectors observed health physics technicians performing surveys and checking air samplers and area radiation monitor Contamination levels and exposure rates were posted at entrances to radiologically controlled areas and in other appropriate areas and were verified to be up-to-date by the NRC inspectors. Health physics technicians were present to provide assistance when workers were required to enter radiologically controlled area The NRC inspectors observed workers following the instructions on radiation work permits concerning protective clothing and dosimetry, and observed workers using proper procedures for contamination control including proper removal of protective clothing and whole body frisking upon exiting a radiologically controlled are During this report period, the licensee was involved in a number of evolutions with radiological concerns. This provided the NRC inspectnrs with an opportunity to observe the licensee's health physics department dealing with moderately high contamination and radiation levels, which is not a usual occurrence at Fort St. Vrai Work performed in support of the reserve shutdown material removal and the evacuation of the PCRV involved direct communication with reactor internals, with associated high radiation levels and handling of contaminated equipmen The NRC inspectors observed thorough involvement and preparations by the health physics department in all phases of these evolutions. All personnel' involved were observed to adhere to requirements of radiation work permits (RWPs). ' The NRC inspectors reviewed several RWPs to assess their adequacy in relation to the area involved and the work to be performed. These included:
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| RWP 10571 - Reserve Shutdown Work in the New Fuel Loading Port
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| .RWP 10576 - Maintenance in the Auxiliary Transfer Cask RWP 10577 - Control Rod Drive Work in the Hot Service Facility RWP 10578 - Decontaminate / Modify Refueling Sleeve The overall radiological controls in support of evolutions during this report period were good, though one instance of noncompliance was found by the NRC resident inspectors. During the reserve shutdown removal effort, the refueling floor (Level 11) was made a radiologically controlled area (RCA), in order to control access. The entry point was established on Level 10 at the south stairway to Level 1 Because of relatively high background radiation levels and the licensee's desire to monitor for ;
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| potential contamination at the refueling floor, friskers were located at the top of the stairs on Level 1 Personnel leaving the refueling floor i
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| . -13-l frisked clean on Level'11, then walked down to Level 10', where they signed out and exited the RCA. This arrangement was acceptable'but for the fact that the NFLP access was located in the area between the access point on Level 10 and the frisking station on Level 11. The NFLP was utilized for emptying the reserva shutdown vacuum tool after removal of material from the reactor. As such, the NFLP was a high contamination / airborne activity area and was controlled under a separate RWP. Due to the high background radiation levels at the access.to the NTLP, a'frisker could not be ;ocated ther Thus, personnel exiting the NFLP. removed their protective clothing at a step-off pad located at the NFLP access, then climbed the stairs to Level 11 to use the friskers located there. The result was that potentially contaminated individuals were traversing the same area which i personnel who had frisked themselves clean were'using to exit the RC This was brought to the licensee's attention and was corrected by locating i the RCA access point at the north stairway between Levels 10 and 11. The licensee was informed that the failure to' adequately establish and control access to radiological contrcl areas and contaminated areas is an apparent violation of NRC regulations (267/8903-01). > Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726J The NRC resident inspectors observed portions of surveillance testing in support of the reserve shutdown material removal effor The selected surveillance procedures were reviewed for conformance with TS ,
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| requirements, in terms of LCOs and acceptability of result ;
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| Administrative approvals and clearances when required were verified by the NRC inspectors prior to test. initiation. Test equipment was erified to be within its calibration cycle. Testing was performed by qualified personnel in all cases. Portions of the following surveillance procedures were observed by the NRC inspectors:
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| SR-MA-11-RX, Issue 1, " Reserve Shutdown Material Sample and Hopper Inspection" SR-RE-48-X, Issue 6, " Refueling - CRD Penetration Leakage Test" SR-4.1.3.C-X, Issue 2, " Control Rod Drive and Orifice Operability" SR-4.1.6.C/D-X, Issue 2, " Shutdown Margin Evaluation for In-Core Maintenance" i
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| SR-4.1.9.D.3-RX, Issue 1, " Refueling Penetrations Piping Examination" SR-4.1.9.D.4-RX, Issue 2, " Reserve Shutdown Hopper Functional Test" SR-5.2.15-A, Issue 16, "PCRV Penetration Interspace Pressure Calibration" SR-5.2.28-62-R, Issue 6, "Holddown Plate Bolting Examination" i
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| No violations or devii ..os-were identified in the review of this j-program are j l
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| l Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) 1 l
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| The NRC inspectors observed portions of numerous safety related maintenance activities during this inspection period. Most of these activities were related to the RSD material removal effort. During observation of maintenance activities, the NRC inspectors verified the licensee was at all times in compliance with TS LCOs and that redundant components were operable as required. Activities were accomplished by qualified personnel. utilizing approved procedure ,
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| The activities observed and reviewert by the NRC inspectors included:
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| Operation of the reactor building crane in' accordance with Procedure M0P-1001, Issue 5. <This crane was used' extensively in support of the RSD removal effort. The procedure provides guidelines for reoperation inspections in accordance wii.n ANSI B30.2 and NUREG 0612 as well as for operations involving heavy loads on the refueling floo Operation of the auxiliary transfer cask'(ATC) in at cordance with Procedure M0P-1006, Issue 1. The ATC provides shieldirg for personnel and a radiological boundary to handle controi rod drive and orifice assemblies and the reserve shutdown' vacuum tool. The procedure provides precautions and instructions for handling of various components, including expected weights of eac Use and inspection of rigging' equipment in accordance with Procedure M0P-1007, Issue Removal and replacement of equipment storage well covers in accordance with Procedure MPF-1100, Issue 1.
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| Removal and installation of control rod drive and orificing assemblies (CRD0As) in accordance with Procedure MPF-1056, Issue This procedure provides instructions for moving a CRD0A with the ATC between the PCRV, equipment storage wells, ar.d the hot service facilit Installation and renoval of shielding adapters in accordance with Procedure MPF-1065. Issue Shielding adapters provide personnel shielding and a platform to mount the ATC on an equipment storage well, hot service facility port, or the new fuel loading por Removal and insta)lation of reactor isolation valves (RIVs) in accordance with Procedure MPF-1067, Issue 1, cnd operation of RIVs in accordance with Procedure M0P-1009, Issue 1. RIVs provide personnel shielding and a platform for mounting the ATC, fuel handling machine, and primary seal cleaning equipment on the PCRV. These procedures
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| -15- i provide prerequisites, precautions, and instructions for handling, installation, removal, and operation of RIV Removal and installation of PCRV top head holddown plates in accordance with Procedure MPF-1091, Issue Removal and installation of' reactor penetration covers (secondary i closures) in accordance with Procedure MPF-1094, Issue Removal and installation of helium purification train covers in accordance with Procedure MPF-1095, Issue These activities were monitored by the NRC inspectors on a random basis during this report period. Quality control and health physics involvement in all phases of'these activities were observed by the NRC inspectors. No discrepancies were noted during observations of the above activitie During routine annual preventive maintenance on the "B" Diesel Generator, the licensee discovered three cylinders on one engine (K-9206-X) with less
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| than~ nominal, th'ough acceptable, characteristic On'Febfuary 27, 1989, the licensee began maintenance on this engine under Station Service Request (SSR) 89500737. During disassembly, a metal piec'e,.later determined to be a coolant flow director, was found in the-engine coolant outlet plenum. An examination was made of the cylinder
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| . heads which had been removed for maintenance, and two coolant flow directors were found to be missing. These coolant flow directors channel flow to the center of a cylinder head to provide even heat removal characteristics. Two nonconformance reports (NCRs) were written as a result of these findings: NCRs 89-44 and 89-45. Because the type of heads involved could not be distinguished from other installed heads, the licensee decided to replace all 24 heads on all 4 diesel generator engines. New heads were obtained for the "B" Diesel Generator's engines and were installed and tested satisfactorily on March 13, 198 Replacement of the heads on tae "A" Diesel Generator's engines was in process at the end of this report period and will be covered in a future inspection repor On March 15, 1989, the NRC inspector met with the licensee's maintenance manager to review the licensee's preventive maintenant program. The preventive maintenance program is described in Proce 9 e MAP-1, "FSV Preventive Maintenance Program Description." The devc 3pment of specific preventiva maintenance requirements is described in Procedure SMAP-27,
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| " Preventive and Corrective Maintenance Equipment Review." The NRC j inspector reviewed the focus of these procedures with the licensee's :
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| maintenance manager. The development of maintenance procedures for larger activities and standardized station service requests with controlled work procedures for smaller activities was discussed in some detai Weaknesses in the maintenance procedures were attributed in many cases to the inconsistencies inherent in having different individuals developing varicus procedure The preventive maintenance program has resulted in an
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| L overall: increase in the quality of maintenance procedures and consequently the work product. Improvements in the. licensee's ability to complete J
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| , preventive maintenance as scheduled suggest the program is having some success in shifting maintenance activities from a corrective focus to s preventive progra There are still some indications, however, that-the licensee's maintenance program is not yet where it should be. One example of this was the failure of Pressure Control Valve PCV-4256, which supplies a backup source of cooling water from the firewater system to the emergency diese'
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| generators' engine and room coolers, as well as other components. i'is valve had been leaking for over 2 years, causing the dow.1 stream relief valve (V-4599) to weep whenever the firewater header was pressurize On March 16, 1989, PCV-4256' finally failed during performance of SR-5.2.10.A.1-M, monthly firewater pump and instrumentation functional tes The failure of PCV-4256 caused relief valve V-4599 to cycle
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| ' rapidly, which caused repeated water hammer vibrations in the turb building firewater header. .These' vibrations resulted in the failure of the turbine lube oil reservoir room firevater deluge valve (HV-4507). The vibrations caused the disc of HV-4507 to fail, spraying firewater into the turbine lube oil reservoir room to a depth of approximately 6 inches before the header was isolated. The licensee subsequently repaired Deluge Valve HV-4507 and Pressure Control Valve PCV-425 No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are . Coastdown and Defueling Meeting (94702)
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| A meeting was held on March 7,1989 to discuss final coastdown operations and defueling of Fort St. Vrai This meeting was attended by the licensee and their consultants, NRR, and Region IV. Coastdown issues which were discussed included consideration of TS and FSAR limitations and criteria, reactivity effects, and power peaking issues. The licensee concluded operation during coastdown will be within the existing FSAR analyses and TS limitations, and will present no unreviewed safety questions. The licensee is scheduled to submit a coastdown safety j analysis report to the NRC by May. 31, 198 '
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| Various defueling plans and sequences were discussed, with emphasis on reactivity control and monitoring, accident and safety analysis, and computer modelin The licensee has decided to defuel by regions in the l reactor after considering the alternatives. This will include replacement !
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| of removed regions of fuel with boronated " dummy blocks" to maintain ]
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| structural integrity of the core during defuelin The defueling plan is l scheduled to be submitted to the NRC by May 31, 1989. This plan will include the defueling action plan, safety analysis report, and technical specifications.
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| | Sincerely, hsstnwka |
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| | R. 0. Williams, J l Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations Fort St..Vrain Nuclear Generating Station R0W:WEW/bhb' |
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| | cc: Regional Administrator, Region IV ATTN: Mr. T. F. Westerman, Chief Projects Section B Mr. Robert Farrell Senior Resident Inspector Fort St. Vrain |
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| s.17 J A 10. ' Exit Meeting (30703)
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| An exit meeting was conducted'on March 21, 1989, attended by those
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| . identified in paragraph 1. At this meeting, the NRC inspectors reviewed 2the scoperand findings of the inspectio . c. ,
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20205G8771999-03-26026 March 1999
Forwards Copy of Cover Page from Fort St-Vrain Welding Manual,Which Had Been Listed as Encl on Page 4 of 990325 Reply to EA 98-081.Cover Page Had Been Inadvertently Left Out with Original Reply
ML20197H8811998-12-0101 December 1998
Forwards Proposed Change to Fsv ISFSI Physical Protection Plan in Which Commitment Is Made to Provide Feature to Security Posture for Facility
ML20236R9191998-07-20020 July 1998
Ltr Contract:Mod 4 to Task Order 27, Task Area No 4 of Basic Contract - Fort St Vrain Insp Under Contract NRC-02-95-003
ML20199H8141997-11-21021 November 1997
Responds to Requesting Clarification as to Whether Increase in Tritium & Iron-55 Contamination Limits That Were Approved for Plant Apply to All Licensees
ML20198K1931997-10-10010 October 1997
Provides Supplemental Info in Support of Util Proposed Rev to Physical Security Plan for Plant Plant Isfsi.Plan Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) & 10CFR73.21
ML20198H5601997-09-16016 September 1997
Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Documents Listed in App a Being Released in Entirety
ML20141F3521997-05-14014 May 1997
Forwards Proposed Issue 4 of Physical Security Plan for Fort St Vrain ISFSI for Review & Approval.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d)
ML20141C8611997-05-0909 May 1997
Informs of Approval of Fsv Final Survey Rept & Effluent Pathway Survey Plan & Supporting Analysis
ML20141K9881997-05-0505 May 1997
Forwards Amend 89 to License DPR-34 & Supporting Safety Evaluation.Amend Designates All Elements of Approved Decommissioning Plan as License Termination Plan
ML20138G2701997-04-28028 April 1997
Provides Response to NRC Comments Re Proposed Sampling & Survey Plan for Fsv Effluent Pathway.Response Documents Fsv Liquid Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Are Acceptable for Release for Unrestricted Use IAW Draft NUREG/CR-5849
ML20148D4651997-04-24024 April 1997
Forwards Revised Interim Ltr Rept Which Describes Procedures & Results of Confirmatory Survey of Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas at Fsv Station
NUREG/CR-5849, Requests That Licensee Provide Evidence That Average Contamination Levels in Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Meet Averaging Criteria in Draft NUREG/CR-58491997-04-23023 April 1997
Requests That Licensee Provide Evidence That Average Contamination Levels in Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Meet Averaging Criteria in Draft NUREG/CR-5849
ML20138B0511997-04-22022 April 1997
Forwards Copy of Proposed Amend to Fsv NPDES Permit, Wastewater Discharge Permit CO-0001121 Requested to Support Repowering Activities,Iaw Section 3.2.d of Fsv Non-Radiological Ts,App B to License DPR-34
ML20140E1061997-04-10010 April 1997
Forwards Confirmatory Survey of Group Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas for Fsv Nuclear Station,Platteville,Co
ML20137S4481997-04-0808 April 1997
Informs That Decommissioning Activities at Fsv Are Complete & NRC Issued Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w) in .Property Damage Insurance Policy Is Maintaned to Protect Fsv balance-of-plant Assets
ML20137S0821997-04-0707 April 1997
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/97-01 on 970310-11.No Violations Noted
ML20137S1691997-04-0707 April 1997
Fifth Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Documents Listed in App K
ML20137S5421997-04-0707 April 1997
Forwards Final Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Affecting Decommissioning of Fort St Vrain Nuclear Station
ML20148D5951997-04-0404 April 1997
Forwards Confirmatory Survey for Fsv Nuclear Station, Psc,Platteville,Co, Final Rept
ML20137R6921997-04-0404 April 1997
Informs of Approval for Request for Addl 45 Days to Remedy Deficiencies Identified in NRC Re Financial Assurance Mechanism for Fsv Decommissioning Costs
ML20137J8051997-03-31031 March 1997
Third Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Records in App F Encl & Will Be Available in Pdr.App G & H Records Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemptions 5 & 7)
ML20148D5811997-03-26026 March 1997
Forwards Confirmatory Survey Plan for Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas at Fsv Nuclear Station, Covered in Final Survey Rept,Vol 6
ML20137G7361997-03-25025 March 1997
Requests Addl Time for Util to Respond to NRC Comments in Re Financial Assurance Mechanism for Fort St Vrain Decommissioning Costs
ML20137G9521997-03-24024 March 1997
Forwards Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept for Period 961201-970228 Re Changes,Tests & Experiments for Fort St Vrain Decommissioning
ML20137H1131997-03-24024 March 1997
Second Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Documents Listed in App D.Documents Also Available in Pdr.Documents Listed in App E Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemption 6)
ML20137C0181997-03-18018 March 1997
Documents That No Personnel Has Received Radiation Exposure at Fsv in 1997 or at Any Time Subsequent to
ML20137C0061997-03-18018 March 1997
Documents That There Have Been No Activities Involving Release of Radioactive Matls from Fsv Nuclear Station That Potentially Could Have Affected Environ,Subsequent to Previous Radiological Envion Operating Rept
ML20136G1201997-03-11011 March 1997
Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan- Dec 1996 & Jan-Mar 1997. All Effluent Releases Completed as of 960703.Repts on Activities After 960703 Reflect Disposal of Solid Waste
ML20136B1331997-02-28028 February 1997
First Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Documents Listed in App a Already Available in Pdr.Forwards App B Documents.App C Documents Being Withheld in Entirety (Ref FOIA Exemption 5)
ML20135D7891997-02-27027 February 1997
Forwards Responses to Comments Re Fort St Vrain Final Survey Rept
ML20135D9531997-02-27027 February 1997
Forwards Copy of Amend to Util Npdes,Wastewater Discharge Permit CO-0001121,which Clarifies That Monitoring of Farm Pond Outlet Required When Industrial Wastewater Being Discharged Through Upstream Goosequill Ditch
ML20135A8711997-02-14014 February 1997
Requests That Encl Deficiencies Identified in Financial Assurance Mechanism for Fort St Vrain Decommissioning Cost Be Addressed within 45 Days
ML20134D1551997-01-31031 January 1997
Forwards Util Responses to NRC Comments Provided in NRC Ltr Re Sampling & Survey Plan Used for Final Radiological Survey of Liquid Effluent Pathway at Ft St Vrain
ML20134C8481997-01-30030 January 1997
Forwards Draft Confirmatory Survey Rept for Fsv Nuclear Station,Psc,Platteville,Co Providing Info on Essap Activities on 960930-1003
ML20133L4961997-01-0707 January 1997
Forwards Comments That Need to Be Resolved Before Final Approval of Util Submittal Entitled, Proposed Sampling & Survey Plan for Effluent Pathway,Ft St Vrain Final Survey Program
ML20133E0481997-01-0202 January 1997
Forwards Comments to Fsv Nuclear Station, Decommissioning Project Final Survey Rept (Volumes 4-11), for Consideration
ML20132G0421996-12-23023 December 1996
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/96-05 on 961203-05.No Violations Noted
ML20132F2841996-12-19019 December 1996
Forwards Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Affecting Decommissioning of Plant,Covering Period of 960901-1130
ML20133A8591996-12-16016 December 1996
Forwards Original & Copy Transcripts of Public Hearing,Held on 961203 in Platteville,Co Re Decommissioning & License Termination of Util Ft Saint Vrain Nuclear Generating Station
ML20133N0011996-12-0404 December 1996
Recommends That NRC Require License to Modify Submission of Unexecuted Draft Trust Agreement Remaining Decommissioning Costs for Ft St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station in Listed Ways
ML20135B3861996-11-25025 November 1996
Informs That NRC Reviewed Util 961114 Submittal (P-96096) Entitled, Fort St Vrain Final Emergency Response Plan, & Meets Requirements of 10CFR50.54(q)
ML20135A5861996-11-25025 November 1996
Submits Suppl Info Re Annual Environ Rept for 1995 Operation of Fsv ISFSI
ML20135A6361996-11-20020 November 1996
Submits Copy of Describing Discharge Practices for Groundwater Seeping Into Fsv'S Reactor Building Sump
ML20134L4721996-11-14014 November 1996
Notifies NRC That Util Adopted Fsv ISFSI Emergency Response Plan to Direct Emergency Response for Radiological Accidents Occuring at Site,Until 10CFR50 License Is Terminated
ML20134F4351996-10-30030 October 1996
Forwards Sections 1,2,6 & 8 from Survey Packages F0015, F0039 & F0126 & Sections 1,2 & 6 from Survey Package F0115 to Support on-site NRC Insp
ML20134G5991996-10-30030 October 1996
Forwards Volumes 1-12 to Final Survey Rept for Groups A,B,C Rev 1,D Rev 1,E,F Rev 1 & G-J for NRC Approval in Support of Forthcoming Request for Termination of Fsv 10CFR50 License
ML20133D7691996-10-22022 October 1996
Forwards Preliminary Rept Re Orise Support of NRC License Insp at Fsv on 960930-1003
ML20136B1411996-10-15015 October 1996
FOIA Request for Documents Re NOV Addressed to Scientific Ecology Group Re NRC Insp Rept 50-267/94-03 & OI Investigation Repts 4-94-010 & 4-95-015
ML20128M6181996-10-0404 October 1996
Forwards Ltr from PSC to Co Dept of Public Health & Environ Describing Monitoring Practices at Plant
ML20128G8041996-10-0101 October 1996
Forwards Fsv Decommissioning Fire Protection Plan Update
1999-03-26
[Table view]
Category:NRC TO UTILITY
MONTHYEARML20058J0121990-11-16016 November 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-20 on 901029-1102.Violations Noted But Not Cited
IR 05000267/19900161990-10-30030 October 1990
Discusses Insp Rept 50-267/90-16 on 900928 & 901018 Enforcement Conference & Forwards Notice of Violation
ML20062B3971990-10-15015 October 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-14 on 900801-0930.No Violations or Deviations Noted
ML20058A0941990-10-12012 October 1990
Confirms 901018 Enforcement Conference in Region IV Ofc Re Violations & Radiation Program Weakness Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/90-16.Proposed Agenda Encl
ML20059N8231990-10-0303 October 1990
Forwards FEMA Final Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Rept, for 891115 Exercise.One Deficiency & Several Areas Requiring Corrective Actions Identified
ML20059C1381990-08-24024 August 1990
Forwards Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amend to License DPR-34 & Opportunity for Hearing Re 900605 Application,For Info
ML20056B4021990-08-20020 August 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-11 on 900601-0728.No Violations or Deviations Noted
ML20058M8681990-08-0808 August 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-13 on 900709-13.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Licensee Commitment to Revise Manual Dose Assessment Procedure to Incorporate Appropriate Unit Conversion Factor,Noted
ML20055J3951990-07-31031 July 1990
Ack Receipt of 900713 Request for Exemption from FY90 Annual Fee Requirements of 10CFR171.Annual Fee Will Not Be Billed
ML20056A3601990-07-31031 July 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-10 on 900611-15.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Actions Taken Re Previously Identified Insp Findings & Status Examined
ML20059D1281990-07-30030 July 1990
Ack Receipt of 900713 Request for Full Exemption from FY90 Annual Fee Requirements of 10CFR171 for Plant.Annual Fee Will Not Be Billed While Request Under Review
ML20055G5921990-07-19019 July 1990
Agrees W/Removal of B Helium Circulator,Per Requesting NRC Concurrence.Solution to Correct Leakage Problem by Removal of Circulator Acceptable
ML20055D2031990-06-26026 June 1990
Ack Receipt of 900525 Response to 900402 Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept & 900427 Notice of Violation
ML20055C8021990-06-18018 June 1990
Concludes That Financial Info Forwarded by Meets Requirements of 10CFR140.21
ML20248H7751989-10-0303 October 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-19 on 890821-26 & 29-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted
IR 05000267/19890171989-10-0202 October 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-17. Implementation of Corrective Actions Will Be Examined During Future Insps
IR 05000267/19890081989-10-0202 October 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-08. Understands That Revised Flow Test Surveillance Procedures Performed on 890821 & 0921 & cross-connect Valves Stroked
ML20248B2971989-09-26026 September 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-16 on 890716-0831 & Notice of Violation
IR 05000267/19890121989-09-22022 September 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-12
ML20247L1381989-09-19019 September 1989
Advises That Request to Delete Requirement to Provide Status Repts on Performance Enhancement Program Approved.Updated List of Commitments Encl
ML20247K7741989-09-15015 September 1989
Informs That Partial Review of 890125 & 0320 Submittals Re Helium Circulators complete.Ten-yr Insp Recently Conducted on Circulator C-2105.Insp Revealed No Defects or Unacceptable Conditions
ML20247K4141989-09-15015 September 1989
Advises That Tech Specs Re Upgrade Program,Requested in NRC ,Must Be Approved by NRC Before Defueling
ML20247D4691989-09-11011 September 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-15
ML20247H3431989-09-0808 September 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Status of Security Sys Upgrades
ML20247H2891989-09-0606 September 1989
Concurs W/Util 890714 Request for Changes to Basis for Limiting Condition for Operation 4.2.2 of Facility Tech Specs Re Statement About Automatic Initiation of Backup Bearing Water Sys
ML20247B2661989-08-30030 August 1989
Forwards Summary of Region Iv/Senior Util Executives Meeting on 890818 in Arlington,Tx.Topics Discussed Included, Improving Communications,Salp Process in Region IV & Enforcement.List of Attendees & Agenda Encl
ML20246J2911989-08-30030 August 1989
Forwards Amend 72 to License DPR-34 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Imposes Early Shutdown by Limiting Reactor Power to 2% of Full Power After 900630
ML20246E5941989-08-21021 August 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-14 on 890710-14 & Notice of Violation.Two Separate Findings of Missing Info in Semiannual Effluent Rept,Resulting in Failure to Satisfy Tech Spec Administrative Requirements Identified
ML20246A2651989-08-16016 August 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-13 on 890626-30.Violations Noted But No Citation Issued.Expresses Concern About Status of Model FSV-1 & FSV-1A Shipping Casks
ML20245J3511989-08-14014 August 1989
Forwards Amend 71 to License DPR-34 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Revises Provisions in Tech Specs Re Radiological Effluents
ML20246A6841989-08-14014 August 1989
Forwards Exam Rept 50-267/OL 89-02 Administered During Wk of 890710
ML20245J5651989-08-10010 August 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-17 on 890717-21 & Notice of Violation
ML20245H3891989-08-0808 August 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-12 on 890601-0715 & Notice of Violation
ML20245J4421989-08-0808 August 1989
Forwards Safety Evaluation,Responding to Issues Re Tech Spec Upgrade Program & Defueling of Plant.Requests That Tech Spec Changes Be Requested within 30 Days of Ltr Date
ML20248E0041989-08-0303 August 1989
Forwards Team Insp Rept 50-267/89-08 on 890522-26 & Notice of Violation.Response Should Include Corrective Actions Taken or Planned to Ensure That Reactor Water Cooling Sys 46 Operated as Designed
IR 05000267/19890071989-07-28028 July 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-07
ML20247N7581989-07-26026 July 1989
Discusses Licensee 890616 Request Re Changes to Previous Commitments Concerning Plans to Shut Down Plant.Commitment 2c to Be Subj of Separate Correspondence.Commitment 7 to Be Considered Not Applicable.W/Revised Summary of Commitments
ML20247M4281989-07-25025 July 1989
Responds to 890120 & 0616 Requests for Relief from Requirements of Fuel Surveillance Program.Nrc Considers Util Obligations Under Fuel Surveillance Program Will Terminate W/Planned Shutdown of Reactor by 900630
ML20247M4521989-07-25025 July 1989
Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Reactor Defueling.Info Needed within 30 Days of Ltr Date
ML20247L9801989-07-14014 July 1989
Discusses 890711 Meeting in Region IV Ofc Re Introduction of AC Crawford & Future Plans for Facility.Slides Presented at Meeting & List of Attendees Encl
ML20247L5971989-07-14014 July 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-15 on 890623-27 & Notice of Violation.Response Should Describe Corrective Actions to Assure That safety-related Changes Introduced by Other Parts of Organization Are Properly Incorporated Into Procedures
ML20246M6941989-07-11011 July 1989
Forwards Agenda for 890808 Meeting of Senior Util Executives Sponsored by Region IV at Univ of Texas.Map to Facilitate Access to Meeting Room Also Encl
ML20246F4851989-07-10010 July 1989
Discusses Util Re Alternative Compensatory Measures Instituted,Per Fire Protection Operability Requirement-16.Proposed Guidance Adequate
ML20246J2791989-07-0707 July 1989
Forwards Safety Evaluation Concluding That Operators Role in Mitigating High Energy Line Break at Facility Acceptable. Technical Evaluation Rept Also Encl
ML20245G4491989-06-22022 June 1989
Forwards Exam Rept 50-267/OL-89-01 Administered During Wk of 890523
ML20245G4831989-06-20020 June 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-06
ML20245F8161989-06-20020 June 1989
Proposes Meeting in Region IV to Discuss SALP Process in Region Iv,Improving Communication W/Licensee Mgt,Region IV Enforcement Philosophy,How to Improve Safety Performance & Topics Util Wishes to Discuss
ML20245A2201989-06-15015 June 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-10 on 890501-31.No Violations or Deviations Noted
ML20244C1221989-06-0808 June 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-07 on 890319-0430 & Notice of Violation
ML20248B8741989-06-0505 June 1989
Forwards Draft Reg Guide, Assuring Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors, Task CE 025-4,for Use in Preparing Preliminary Decommissioning Plan for Plant
1990-08-08
[Table view]
Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20236R9191998-07-20020 July 1998
Ltr Contract:Mod 4 to Task Order 27, Task Area No 4 of Basic Contract - Fort St Vrain Insp Under Contract NRC-02-95-003
ML20199H8141997-11-21021 November 1997
Responds to Requesting Clarification as to Whether Increase in Tritium & Iron-55 Contamination Limits That Were Approved for Plant Apply to All Licensees
ML20198H5601997-09-16016 September 1997
Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Documents Listed in App a Being Released in Entirety
ML20141C8611997-05-0909 May 1997
Informs of Approval of Fsv Final Survey Rept & Effluent Pathway Survey Plan & Supporting Analysis
ML20141K9881997-05-0505 May 1997
Forwards Amend 89 to License DPR-34 & Supporting Safety Evaluation.Amend Designates All Elements of Approved Decommissioning Plan as License Termination Plan
NUREG/CR-5849, Requests That Licensee Provide Evidence That Average Contamination Levels in Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Meet Averaging Criteria in Draft NUREG/CR-58491997-04-23023 April 1997
Requests That Licensee Provide Evidence That Average Contamination Levels in Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Meet Averaging Criteria in Draft NUREG/CR-5849
ML20137S1691997-04-0707 April 1997
Fifth Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Documents Listed in App K
ML20137S0821997-04-0707 April 1997
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/97-01 on 970310-11.No Violations Noted
ML20137R6921997-04-0404 April 1997
Informs of Approval for Request for Addl 45 Days to Remedy Deficiencies Identified in NRC Re Financial Assurance Mechanism for Fsv Decommissioning Costs
ML20137J8051997-03-31031 March 1997
Third Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Records in App F Encl & Will Be Available in Pdr.App G & H Records Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemptions 5 & 7)
ML20137H1131997-03-24024 March 1997
Second Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Documents Listed in App D.Documents Also Available in Pdr.Documents Listed in App E Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemption 6)
ML20136B1331997-02-28028 February 1997
First Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Documents Listed in App a Already Available in Pdr.Forwards App B Documents.App C Documents Being Withheld in Entirety (Ref FOIA Exemption 5)
ML20135A8711997-02-14014 February 1997
Requests That Encl Deficiencies Identified in Financial Assurance Mechanism for Fort St Vrain Decommissioning Cost Be Addressed within 45 Days
ML20133L4961997-01-0707 January 1997
Forwards Comments That Need to Be Resolved Before Final Approval of Util Submittal Entitled, Proposed Sampling & Survey Plan for Effluent Pathway,Ft St Vrain Final Survey Program
ML20132G0421996-12-23023 December 1996
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/96-05 on 961203-05.No Violations Noted
ML20135B3861996-11-25025 November 1996
Informs That NRC Reviewed Util 961114 Submittal (P-96096) Entitled, Fort St Vrain Final Emergency Response Plan, & Meets Requirements of 10CFR50.54(q)
ML20128G1421996-09-25025 September 1996
Advises NRC Approved Decommissioning Plan, Impact Of... Fsv Final Decommissioning, Satisfies All Elements of License Termination Plan as Required by Rev to Reactor Decommissioning Rule 10CFR50.82(a)(9)
ML20136B2561996-04-0202 April 1996
Informs That NOV Issued on 951030 Revised to Reflect NRC Reanalysis of Info Re Falsification of Radiation Survey Records.Revised NOV Encl
ML20136B2731996-04-0202 April 1996
Informs That NOV Issued on 951030 Revised to Reflect NRC Reanalysis of Info Re Util Failure to Assure Compliance w/10CFR50.9 Concerning Accuracy of Radiation Survey Records. Revised NOV Encl
ML20136B3241996-04-0202 April 1996
Informs That NRC Will Be Withdrawing NOV ,based on Reevaluation of Evidence Provided & Response to NOV
ML20058G9671993-12-0707 December 1993
Ack Receipt of Ltrs of 931110,responding to Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Issued on 931013
IR 05000267/19930021993-09-0303 September 1993
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Deviations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/93-02. Deficiency Determined to Have Contributed to 930527 Crane Overload Event
IR 05000267/19930011993-09-0303 September 1993
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/93-01
ML20056G0041993-06-25025 June 1993
Submits Info Re Implementation of Training Rule 10CFR50.120 for Licensees of Plant in Decommissioning Process
ML20128D6931992-12-0101 December 1992
Forwards Exemption from Requirement in 10CFR50,app E,Section IV.F.2 to Change to Biennial Emergency Plan Exercise Rather than Annual Following Completion of Next Scheduled Exercise. EA & SE Also Encl
ML20198C7511991-06-25025 June 1991
Suggests That Region Iv/Senior Util Executive Conference Be Held During Month of Sept 1991 in Arlington,Tx to Provide Open Forum for Candid Discussions Limited to Topics of General Interest & Not Pertain to Plant Specific Issues
ML20058K0231990-11-30030 November 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-17 on 901001-1109.No Violations or Deviations Noted
ML20062H8131990-11-29029 November 1990
Forwards Partially Withheld Insp Rept 50-267/90-18 on 901022-26 & Notice of Violation
ML20062H2041990-11-21021 November 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-19 on 901015-19.No Violations or Deviations Noted
ML20058J0121990-11-16016 November 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-20 on 901029-1102.Violations Noted But Not Cited
IR 05000267/19900161990-10-30030 October 1990
Discusses Insp Rept 50-267/90-16 on 900928 & 901018 Enforcement Conference & Forwards Notice of Violation
ML20062B3971990-10-15015 October 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-14 on 900801-0930.No Violations or Deviations Noted
ML20058A0941990-10-12012 October 1990
Confirms 901018 Enforcement Conference in Region IV Ofc Re Violations & Radiation Program Weakness Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/90-16.Proposed Agenda Encl
ML20059N8231990-10-0303 October 1990
Forwards FEMA Final Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Rept, for 891115 Exercise.One Deficiency & Several Areas Requiring Corrective Actions Identified
ML20059C1381990-08-24024 August 1990
Forwards Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amend to License DPR-34 & Opportunity for Hearing Re 900605 Application,For Info
ML20056B4021990-08-20020 August 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-11 on 900601-0728.No Violations or Deviations Noted
ML20058M8681990-08-0808 August 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-13 on 900709-13.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Licensee Commitment to Revise Manual Dose Assessment Procedure to Incorporate Appropriate Unit Conversion Factor,Noted
ML20056A3601990-07-31031 July 1990
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/90-10 on 900611-15.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Actions Taken Re Previously Identified Insp Findings & Status Examined
ML20055J3951990-07-31031 July 1990
Ack Receipt of 900713 Request for Exemption from FY90 Annual Fee Requirements of 10CFR171.Annual Fee Will Not Be Billed
ML20059D1281990-07-30030 July 1990
Ack Receipt of 900713 Request for Full Exemption from FY90 Annual Fee Requirements of 10CFR171 for Plant.Annual Fee Will Not Be Billed While Request Under Review
ML20055G5921990-07-19019 July 1990
Agrees W/Removal of B Helium Circulator,Per Requesting NRC Concurrence.Solution to Correct Leakage Problem by Removal of Circulator Acceptable
ML20055D2031990-06-26026 June 1990
Ack Receipt of 900525 Response to 900402 Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept & 900427 Notice of Violation
ML20055C8021990-06-18018 June 1990
Concludes That Financial Info Forwarded by Meets Requirements of 10CFR140.21
ML20248H7751989-10-0303 October 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-19 on 890821-26 & 29-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted
IR 05000267/19890081989-10-0202 October 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-08. Understands That Revised Flow Test Surveillance Procedures Performed on 890821 & 0921 & cross-connect Valves Stroked
IR 05000267/19890171989-10-0202 October 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-17. Implementation of Corrective Actions Will Be Examined During Future Insps
ML20248B2971989-09-26026 September 1989
Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/89-16 on 890716-0831 & Notice of Violation
IR 05000267/19890121989-09-22022 September 1989
Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-12
ML20247K9051989-09-19019 September 1989
Advises That 890726 Request for Approval of Route to Transport Spent Reactor Fuel Approved.Route,From Facility to DOE Inel in Idaho,Encl
ML20247L1381989-09-19019 September 1989
Advises That Request to Delete Requirement to Provide Status Repts on Performance Enhancement Program Approved.Updated List of Commitments Encl
1998-07-20
[Table view] |
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JLN I 519 In Reply Refer To:
Docket: 50-267/89-03 Public Service Company of Colorado ATTN: Robert 0. Williams, Jr., Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 840 Denver,' Colorado 80201-0840 Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of May 12, 1989, in response to our letter and Notice of Violation dated April 14, 1989. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintaine
Sincerely, Original Signed By, f T Baker L. J. Callan, Director Division of Reactor Projects cc:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station ATTN: C. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production Division 16805 WCR 191 Platteville, Colorado 80651 Fort'St. Vrain Nuclear Station ATTN: P. Tomlinson, Manager Quality Assurance Division 16805 WCR 191 Platteville, Colorado 80651 Colorado Public Utilities Commission <
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Company of Colorado P.O. Box S40 Denver, CO 80201 084o R.O. WILLIAMS, J sENtoR VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS May 12, 1989 .
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .b w ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington D.'C. 20555 Docket No. 50-267 SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 89-03 REFERENCE: NRC Letter, Callan to Williams, dated April 14, 1989 (G-89134)
Gentlemen:
This letter is in response to the Notice of Violation received as a result of the NRC inspection conducted by Messrs. R. E. Farrell and W. Michaud during the period of February 1 through March 18, 1989 (see Reference). The following response to the item contained in the Notice of Violation is hereby submitte Failure to Establish and Control Radiological Areas Licensee Technical Specification AC 7.4.d requires, in part, that procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20, and shall be approved, maintained, and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposur Licensee Procedure HPP-9, Issue 8, " Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas," implements the requirement of 10 CFR 20. Step 5.3.5 of HPP-9 states, in part, that a suitable contamination survey raeter be set up at the step-off pad or nearest " low background" area whenever an individual is required to work in the controlled area.
l Any individual entering the contaminated area shall perform a whole l body frisk upon exiting the are .
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P-89176 -2- May 12, 1989 Contrary to 'the above -on February 17, 1989, the south stairway between Levels 10 and 11 of the Reactor Building was . utilized. by potentially contaminated individuals prior to performing a whole body frisk and was simultaneously. utilized by individuals exiting the area after friskin This was due to a contamination survey meter being established in the wrong locatio This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement ID) (267/8903-01).
The Reason for the Violation if Admitted-The violation is' admitted. The contamination survey meter had been moved to a low background area due to high background at the immediate exit of the contaminated area. The path from the-contaminated area to the contamination survey meter was not modified as a result of moving the survey meter nor were appropriate controls established to prevent the potential for contamination spread in an area frequented by non-contaminated personne No spread of contamination occurred due to the inappropriate control The Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved The control area boundaries were immediately modified to separate the egress path from the contaminated area and that of non-contaminated area No further incidences of potentially contaminated personnel traversing the same areas as non-contaminated personnel have been identified, and no spread of contamination due to inadequate contamination controls have been noted at Fort S Vrain since the event noted abov Corrective Steps Which Wi_11 be Taken to Avoid Further Violations Public Service Company has identified this as an isolated incident due to the unusual work being performed. The Health Physics staff has been instructed in the proper establishment of Control Areas to l-
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control the potential for the spread of contamination. No additional corrective steps are deemed necessar The Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved L
Full compliance was achieved when the control areas were modified on
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February 17, 1969, the date of the occurrenc !
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If. you have any questions, please. contact Mr. M. H. Holmes at 480-6960.
l
Sincerely, hsstnwka
R. 0. Williams, J l Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations Fort St..Vrain Nuclear Generating Station R0W:WEW/bhb'
cc: Regional Administrator, Region IV ATTN: Mr. T. F. Westerman, Chief Projects Section B Mr. Robert Farrell Senior Resident Inspector Fort St. Vrain
,
.,
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