IR 05000321/1986015

Insp Repts 50-321/86-15 & 50-366/86-15 on 860426-0530. Violation Noted:Failure to Recognize Inoperable Hydraulic Snubber

ML20207K130
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	06/26/1986
From:	Holmesray P, Ignatonis A, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207K098	List: ML20207K093 ML20207K109 ML20207K130
References
50-321-86-15, 50-366-86-15, NUDOCS 8607290343
Download: ML20207K130 (6)

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v 0 UNITED STATES

/ j .5E2 9'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ p REGION li g j 101 MARIETTA STREET. * ~t ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-321/86-15 and 50-366/86-15 Licensee: Georgia Power Company -

ATTN: Mr. J. H. Miller President, Power Supply P.O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366

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License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 -

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates: April 26 - May 30, 1986 Inspectors:

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M mb HolmesMay, S pior Resident Inspector S[7(/Pl D~ ate signed C. e- /~ 4; ihtIn h. M. Nejfel%', Resiepht Insnector Date Mgned Approved by: 8d a ,.D 4 /,2df4 A. J. Egnat(p'is,Thlgff, Project Section 3B Dite Sig~ned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the' areas 'of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveillance Observation, Reportable Occurrences, and Reactor Startup after Refueling Outag Results: One violation was identified - failure _to recognize an inoperable hydraulic snubbe g720343860630

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted -

Licensee Employees

• H. C. Nix, Site General Manager T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager

• H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager

• T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

• 0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Acting)

C. T. Moore, Training Manager

• S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 3,1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above, and on June 24, 1986, with Heidt of the corporate office. The licensee did not identi fy as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio One unresolved item * and a violation were identifie The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exceptio (0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-321/86-15-01 - Unit 1 "1A" Standby Gas Treatment System charcoal filter was found to be degraded and declared inoperable due to being wet (paragraph 8).

l (0 pen) Violation 50-366/86-15-02 - Failure to recognize an inoperable i hydraulic snubber (paragraph 8). Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 50-321/85-32-01 - Failure to report pipe crack within four hours to NRC. GPC letters of January 13, 1986 and April 2, 1986, were reviewed. In both letters GPC denied the violation, but agreed that the event was reportable as a Licensee Event Report. After a careful review of GPC responses primarily based on the interpretation taken with regard-to 10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements published in the Federal Register 39042, j

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• An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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Volume 48, No. 168 dated August 29, 1983, the NRC agreed with GPC that a four hour verbal report was not required for this case; hence, the violation was witndrawn. The licensee's corrective actions with regard to the pipe crack and have been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by the inspecto (Closed) Violation 50-321/85-34-01 - Backseated valve closure time exceeded TS Table 3.7-1 limit. GPC letter of February 17, 1986 was reviewed and was determined to be acceptable by the inspector verifying the licensee's response. Valves that were electrical backseated, after implementation of the corrective actions, were reviewed to ensure Engineering Department involvemen No discrepancies were note (Closed) Deficiency 50-366/79-21-03 - Failure to retain records as required by TS 6.10. Georgia Power Company (GPC) letter of August 14, 1979, for this deficiency was reviewed and was determined to be acceptable by the inspector verifying the licensee's response. No discrepancies were note . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operation Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and i switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for opera-tion, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access control This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisor Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrica-tion, cooling, and general conditio .

General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions '

of the Control Building, Turbine Building, Reactor Building and outside '

areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-tions, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification systems, and containment isolatio !

In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory post In addition, the Resident

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Inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity and verified an interface between the security organiza-tion and operations or maintenance. On May 22, 1986, the Resident Inspector visited the central and secondary alarm station . Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedures, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality control ;

Plant housckeeping needs to be improved, after work is conducted in an are During this report period, tools, scrap sheet metal, empty plastic bags, and I

electrical extensions were found in the Unit-1 and Unit-2 Reactor Building Otherwise, the housekeeping in these areas was very goo l No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Modification and Surveillance Testing Observations (37700 & 61726) !

The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances and plant modification Design Change Requests (DCRs). The observation included a l review of the procedure and/or DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to j Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, 1 observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service !

and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based epon the acceptance criteri No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally end in the control room to verify that the lineups were in accord-ance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions. During the inspection period the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown, in the accessible areas, of the Unit-1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Syste Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie ! Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that the Technical

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Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideration. The follow LERs are considered closed: (A* indicates an in-depth review was performed).  !

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Unit-1: 86-07 , 85-14 , 86-15, and 86-1 * *

Unit-2: 86-06 , 86-14 . '

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LER 50-321, 366/86-14 Unit 1 TS 4.7. A.2.f and Unit 2 TS 4.6.1.2.d require Type "C" Containment Isolation Valve Local Testing at an interval not greater than two years. The following Post Accident Sampling (PASS) return ,

lines installed by Design Change Request (DCR)79-475 for Unit 1 and by DCR l 79-476 for Unit 2 were not tested within the required two year period:

1821-F111,1821-F112,1E41-F121, and 1E41-F122 for Unit 1 were last tested l February 13,1983; and 2B21-F111, 2821-F112, 2E41-F121, and 2E41-F122 for Unit 2 were not tested since initial installation tests. Unit I valves were tested on 4/17/86 and Unit 2 valves will be tested during the upcoming i refueling scheduled for September 198 The licensee is conducting an l engineering review to ensure no other valves were omitted and changing the leak test procedure to incorporate the proper valves. Since the TS l violation was identified by the licensee and meets the five criteria of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C for licensee sel f-identi fication and correction, a Notice of Violation will not be issue The inspector will continue to review licensee action in this area to ensure the corrective action is adequate to prevent recurrenc LER 50-321/86-07 Unit 1 TS 3.7.B.1.a requires both Unit 1 SBGT system trains be operable at all times when Unit 1 secondary containment is require Unit 1 TS 3.7.C.1.b requires Unit 1 secondary containment be maintained with Unit 2 in operational conditions 1, 2, 3, and 5. Contrary to the above, on March 11, 1986, with Unit 2 in Operatiunal Condition 1, the Unit 1 "1A" SBGT charcoal filter train was found to be degraded and declared inoperable during the performance of the once per operating cycle surveillance test procedure 42SV-T46-003-1, Revision 0 because the charcoal filter was we The charcoal filter bed apparently became wet from a leaking fire protection deluge valve, IT43-F032A on or before November 24, 1985. Leakage from a ;

fire protection deluge drip check valve, which represented a leaking SBGT '

deluge valve, was not recognized as a condition requiring verification of ,

the SBGT operability. The fire protection deluge water supply valve was I closed on November 24, 1985, when IT43-F032A was found leakin This is l identified as an unresolved item pending further investigation by the '

inspector in determining the significance of the event (UNR 50-321/86-15-01).

LER 50-366/86-06 Unit 2 TS 4.7.4.b, Amendment No. 51, which became in effect on August 5, 1985 requires that a snubber be declared inoperable if visible l signs of leakage are present. Contrary to the above, on February 26, 1986, hydraulic snubber 2E11-RHR-R90 was found leaking but was not declared inoperable. Procedure 52SV-SUV-001-2, Revision 0, which was effective !

August 7,1985, failed to include the visual inspection acceptance criteria I of TS Amendment 5 TS Amendment No. 51 which was implemented by the

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l licensee on September 4,1986, changed the snubber inspection criteria in order to conform with the Standard Tecienical Specifications. The snubber  ;

was repaired on March 18, 1986. This is a recurring problem which was '

previously discussed in LER 50-321/1985-028 and LER 50-366/1985-028 and constitutes a violation (50-366/86-15-02).

9. Reactor Startup After Refueling Outage (61707 and 71711)  ;

During this reporting interval, the inspector verified that the Unit-1 shutdown margin demonstration for the unit startup was performed in accord-ance with procedure, 42FH-ENG-019-1, Revision 0. Also, i.he inspector witnessed the performance of individual rod scram testing. The strip chart recordings that were obtained from this testing were reviewed using proce-dure 42FH-ENG-020-1S, Revision 1, to ensure Unit-1 Technical Specification , 3.3.C.2 scram insertion time complianc >

Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identifie l

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