ML20207K130
| ML20207K130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1986 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Ignatonis A, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207K098 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-86-15, 50-366-86-15, NUDOCS 8607290343 | |
| Download: ML20207K130 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1986015
Text
e -
UNITED STATES
/ j .5E2 9'o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
v
0
[
REGION li
p
g
j
101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
~t
ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
\\...../
-
Report Nos.:
50-321/86-15 and 50-366/86-15
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
-
ATTN: Mr. J. H. Miller
President, Power Supply
P.O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366
~
License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
-
Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2
Inspection Dates: April 26 - May 30, 1986
Inspectors:
M N.
mb
S[7(/Pl
HolmesMay, S pior Resident Inspector
D~ ate signed
.
C. G. e- /~ 4;a.
ihtIn
h. M. Nejfel%', Resiepht Insnector
Date Mgned
Approved by:
8d
a ,.D
4 /,2df4
A. J. Egnat(p'is,Thlgff, Project Section 3B
Dite Sig~ned
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the' areas 'of
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification,
Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveillance Observation,
Reportable Occurrences, and Reactor Startup after Refueling Outage.
Results: One violation was identified - failure _to recognize an inoperable
hydraulic snubber.
g720343860630
~
G
DOCK 05000321
.
6
%
"-
- - _ ,
3
,
-
-
p
-
-
.
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
-
Licensee Employees
- H. C. Nix, Site General Manager
T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager
- H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager
T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager
- T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager
R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- 0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Acting)
C. T. Moore, Training Manager
- S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 3,1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above, and on June 24, 1986, with J.
D.
Heidt of the corporate office.
The licensee did not identi fy as
proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors
during this inspection.
One unresolved item * and a violation were
identified.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-321/86-15-01 - Unit 1 "1A" Standby Gas Treatment
System charcoal filter was found to be degraded and declared inoperable due
to being wet (paragraph 8).
(0 pen) Violation 50-366/86-15-02 - Failure to recognize an inoperable
i
hydraulic snubber (paragraph 8).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Violation 50-321/85-32-01 - Failure to report pipe crack within
four hours to NRC. GPC letters of January 13, 1986 and April 2, 1986, were
reviewed.
In both letters GPC denied the violation, but agreed that the
event was reportable as a Licensee Event Report. After a careful review of
GPC responses primarily based on the interpretation taken with regard-to
10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements published in the Federal Register 39042,
j
.
\\
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
-
4
-y
v
v
m
w.
ee
,-~e--
.
e
-
-n-
~g
-
.,.,--......e--
.,n
-
.,y
w.-.-
> x --
-
-
-
.
2
Volume 48, No. 168 dated August 29, 1983, the NRC agreed with GPC that a
four hour verbal report was not required for this case; hence, the violation
was witndrawn. The licensee's corrective actions with regard to the pipe
crack and have been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by the
inspector.
(Closed) Violation 50-321/85-34-01 - Backseated valve closure time exceeded
TS Table 3.7-1 limit. GPC letter of February 17, 1986 was reviewed and was
determined to be acceptable by the inspector verifying the licensee's
response. Valves that were electrical backseated, after implementation of
the corrective actions, were reviewed to ensure Engineering Department
involvement.
No discrepancies were noted.
(Closed) Deficiency 50-366/79-21-03 - Failure to retain records as required
by TS 6.10.1.d.
Georgia Power Company (GPC) letter of August 14, 1979, for
this deficiency was reviewed and was determined to be acceptable by the
inspector verifying the licensee's response. No discrepancies were noted.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the
plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control
room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings,
status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and
i
switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for opera-
tion, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet
entries, control room manning, and access controls.
This inspection
activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their
supervisors.
Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature
(ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by
verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply
breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrica-
tion, cooling, and general condition.
.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions
'
of the Control Building, Turbine Building, Reactor Building and outside
'
areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-
tions, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant
conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress,
radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification
systems, and containment isolation.
In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a
review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of
various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
activities to include: protected and vital access controls; searching of
personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of
visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the Resident
.
-
- .---- .---------E-
- - - - . _ , - - . - - - . _ , . - -
. - - - -
-
-
_ _ _ _ . - - - - - , _ . _ - , - - - - - - - - _ - - - _ . - - , _ _ , - - . _ _ - _ _ _ - - - - - - -
c
.
-
3
Inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas
barrier integrity and verified an interface between the security organiza-
tion and operations or maintenance. On May 22, 1986, the Resident Inspector
visited the central and secondary alarm stations.
5.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance
activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for
adequacy, adherence to procedures, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical
Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and
adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
Plant housckeeping needs to be improved, after work is conducted in an area.
During this report period, tools, scrap sheet metal, empty plastic bags, and
electrical extensions were found in the Unit-1 and Unit-2 Reactor Buildings.
Otherwise, the housekeeping in these areas was very good.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Modification and Surveillance Testing Observations (37700 & 61726)
The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances and plant
modification Design Change Requests (DCRs).
The observation included a
review of the procedure and/or DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to
j
Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration,
1
observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service
and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of
the data for acceptability based epon the acceptance criteria.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and
breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both
locally end in the control room to verify that the lineups were in accord-
ance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material
conditions.
During the inspection period the inspectors conducted a
complete walkdown, in the accessible areas, of the Unit-1 High Pressure
Coolant Injection (HPCI) System.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were
also
reviewed as they occurred to determine that the Technical
-
-
-
-
.
4
Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of
utmost consideration. The follow LERs are considered closed: (A* indicates
an in-depth review was performed).
Unit-1: 86-07 , 85-14 , 86-15, and 86-16.
Unit-2: 86-06 , 86-14 .
'
LER 50-321, 366/86-14 Unit 1 TS 4.7. A.2.f and Unit 2 TS 4.6.1.2.d require
Type
"C"
Containment Isolation Valve Local Testing at an interval not
greater than two years. The following Post Accident Sampling (PASS) return
,
lines installed by Design Change Request (DCR)79-475 for Unit 1 and by DCR
79-476 for Unit 2 were not tested within the required two year period:
1821-F111,1821-F112,1E41-F121, and 1E41-F122 for Unit 1 were last tested
February 13,1983; and 2B21-F111, 2821-F112, 2E41-F121, and 2E41-F122 for
Unit 2 were not tested since initial installation tests. Unit I valves were
tested on 4/17/86 and Unit 2 valves will be tested during the upcoming
i
refueling scheduled for September 1986.
The licensee is conducting an
engineering review to ensure no other valves were omitted and changing the
leak test procedure to incorporate the proper valves.
Since the TS
violation was identified by the licensee and meets the five criteria of
10 CFR 2 Appendix C for licensee sel f-identi fication and correction, a
Notice of Violation will not be issued.
The inspector will continue to
review licensee action in this area to ensure the corrective action is
adequate to prevent recurrence.
LER 50-321/86-07 Unit 1 TS 3.7.B.1.a requires both Unit 1 SBGT system trains
be operable at all times when Unit 1 secondary containment is required.
Unit 1 TS 3.7.C.1.b requires Unit 1 secondary containment be maintained with
Unit 2 in operational conditions 1, 2, 3, and 5.
Contrary to the above, on
March 11, 1986, with Unit 2 in Operatiunal Condition 1, the Unit 1 "1A" SBGT
charcoal filter train was found to be degraded and declared inoperable
during the performance of the once per operating cycle surveillance test
procedure 42SV-T46-003-1, Revision 0 because the charcoal filter was wet.
The charcoal filter bed apparently became wet from a leaking fire protection
deluge valve, IT43-F032A on or before November 24, 1985.
Leakage from a
fire protection deluge drip check valve, which represented a leaking SBGT
'
deluge valve, was not recognized as a condition requiring verification of
,
the SBGT operability. The fire protection deluge water supply valve was
closed on November 24, 1985, when IT43-F032A was found leaking.
This is
identified as an unresolved item pending further investigation by the
'
inspector in determining the significance of the event (UNR 50-321/86-15-01).
LER 50-366/86-06 Unit 2 TS 4.7.4.b, Amendment No. 51, which became in effect
on August 5, 1985 requires that a snubber be declared inoperable if visible
signs of leakage are present. Contrary to the above, on February 26, 1986,
hydraulic snubber 2E11-RHR-R90 was found leaking but was not declared
Procedure 52SV-SUV-001-2, Revision 0,
which was effective
August 7,1985, failed to include the visual inspection acceptance criteria
I
of TS Amendment 51.
TS Amendment No. 51 which was implemented by the
- -
-
- -
-
-
e
. . . .
5
licensee on September 4,1986, changed the snubber inspection criteria in
order to conform with the Standard Tecienical Specifications. The snubber
was repaired on March 18, 1986.
This is a recurring problem which was
'
previously discussed in LER 50-321/1985-028 and LER 50-366/1985-028 and
constitutes a violation (50-366/86-15-02).
9.
Reactor Startup After Refueling Outage (61707 and 71711)
During this reporting interval, the inspector verified that the Unit-1
shutdown margin demonstration for the unit startup was performed in accord-
ance with procedure, 42FH-ENG-019-1, Revision
0.
Also, i.he inspector
witnessed the performance of individual rod scram testing. The strip chart
recordings that were obtained from this testing were reviewed using proce-
dure 42FH-ENG-020-1S, Revision 1, to ensure Unit-1 Technical Specification , 3.3.C.2 scram insertion time compliance.
>
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
1
i
- - - -
-
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
- - - - -
- -