ML20138A206

Ack Receipt of FEMA & Final Exercise Evaluation of 850611-12 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Exercise Involving State of Il & Ogle County.No Deficiencies Identified

ML20138A206
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	10/03/1985
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Reed C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 8510080479
Download: ML20138A206 (2)

Text

e OCT 0 3g Dociet No. 50-454 Docket No. 50-455 Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:

We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter dated August 29, 1985, and associated final exercise evaluations on the offsite emergency preparedness exercise conducted on June 11-12, 1985.

This was a full-participation exercise for the Ogle County and a partial-participation exercise for the State of Illinois. This final exercise evaluation lists several recommendations (which are referred to in the FEMA letter and attachments as other deficiencies or recommendations) regarding the offsite emergency response plans for the area around the Byron Nuclear Generating Station.

Based on the performance of the offsite agencies during the exercise, FEMA did not identify any deficiencies affecting public health and safety in the event of an accident at the Byron Nuclear Generating Station, as a result, the approval under FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 will remain in effect.

We fully recognize that the recomendations to be implemented may involve actions by other parties and political institutions which are not under your direct control. Nonetheless, we would expect the subject of offsite preparedness for the area around the Byron Nuclear Generating Station to be addressed by you as well as others.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Comission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Docunent Room.

Sincerely,

" Original signed by W.D. Shafer" W. D. Shafer, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Dranch

Enclosure:

As stated See Attached List For Distribution

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7 3 0510000479 851003 b DR ADOCK O 4y4 i I \

Coranonwealth Edison Company 2 UCI O 3g Distribution cc w/ enclosure:

D. L. Farrar, Director of Nuclear Licensing V. I. Schlosser, Project Manager Gunner Sorensen, Site Project Superintendent R. E. Querio, Plant Manager DCS/RSB(RIDS)

Licensing Fee Managenent Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Byron Resident Inspector, RIII Braidwood Phyllis Dunton, Attorney General's Office, Environmental Control Division D. W. Cassel , Jr. , Esq.

Diane Chavez, DAARE/ SAFE W. Paton, ELD L. 01shan, NRR LPM H. S. Taylor, Quality Assurance Division RII, o RI Rill RIII Plokd/p Phi hs or ey S e 10/02/85

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!' 4 Federal Emergency Management Agency

) te O f Washington, D.C. 20472 l'C 2 9 p p MEMORANDtM FOR: Edwa rd L. Jordan Di rector

• Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcenent U.S Nuclear Re ulatory Conmission FROM: . inW '

/

Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report of the June 11-12, 1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Byron Nuclear Power Station Attached are two copies of the Exercise Report of the June 11-12,1985, joint exercise of the of fsite radiological energency preparedness plans for the

., Byron Nuclear Power Station. This exercise was partial participation for the

! , State of Illinois and full-participation for Ogle County. The report dated July 23,1985, was prepared by Region V of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FIMA).

1 Although there were Category B deficiencies observed at the exercise, they i did not seriously detract fran the demonstrated capability to protect the health and safety of the public. The State is preparing a schedule of corrective actions. As soon as they are received, we will send you a copy.

However, since there were no identified serious impediments to protecting the f public during the exercise, the approval under FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 will renain in ef fect.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.

Attachments i As Stated l

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e' BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY JOINT EXERCISE Facility Locations Located in.the State of Illinois, Ogle County, near the City of Byron Illinois.

Exercise Date: June 11-12. 1985 Date of Report July 23, 1985

Participants:

State of. Illinois (partial), Ogle County ( full) and .

Commonwealth Edison Company (full).

Fede ral Emergency Management Agency Region V Natural and Technological llazards Division 300 South k'acker Drive Chicago. Illincts 60606 1 -l, f, f l

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1ABLE OF CONTENTS 1 .

.._ TABLE OF CONTENTS page 2 EXECUTIVE SUKMARY page 3 State of Illinois page 3 . .

Dale County page 4 3

. EXERCISE REPORT page 6

. introduction page 6

,. 1. Exercise Background page 6 *

2. Participating and Non-Participating State -

and Local Covernments page 6 l 3. List of Evaluators page 7

4. Evaluation Criteria , page 7 l 5. Exercise Objectives page 7 1 6. Summary of Scenario page 9 l 7. State and Local Resource. Planned To Be Used in the Exercise page 11

8. Deficiencies Noted in Past Esercises page 11 *

9. Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively -

A'chieved . page 12 Narrativa page 14

1. State of Illinois page 14

2. Ogle County page 18 l

SwdMARY LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES page 22 State of Illinois page 23 Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety page 23 i Other Deficiencies page 24 Recommendations page 25 Ogle County page 26 Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety page 26 Other Deficiencies page 27 Recommendations page 28 l

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. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

State of Illinois This was a partial participation exercise for the State of Illinois. The Illinais Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (E'DA) and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) participated only to the extent necessary to support Lhe local response effort. Staff mobilization and

. activation of facilities have been evaluated and successfully demonstrated .

.on numerous occasione during previous exercises within the State of Illinois. For this esercise, all of the desi nated E emergency response functions were staf fed and the. personnel who did participate in the exercise at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) capably supported the local governmental units who were participating fully in the exercise.

The State of Illinois demonstrated the ability to mobilize staf f and activate facilities at the state EOC in Springfield. Illinois but did not mobillie the Joint Public Inf ormation Center (JPIC) staf f. For this exercise, the EOC was staffed with representatives from IDNS, the Illinois bepartment of Transportation, the Illinois State police, the Illinois National Guard, the Illinois Department of Conservation, the American Red .

Cross and ESDA. Staf f mobilization was accomplished by an ESDA dispatcher through the use of an up-to-date call list. While staffing was initiated upon receipt of the Alert notification, it was not ecapleted until almost two and one-half houra. later due to the late errival of the Illinois Depart' ment of Conservation representative. Both EKDA and IDMS dispatched representatives to the utility's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) to facilitate the timely exchange of information.

The Operations Of ficer was ef fectively in charge, hold briefings and kept the staff fully apprised of events as they occurred. The staff participated in the decision making process as appropriate. The series of site specific plans and operating procedures were available and referred to as necessary.

Message logs were kept and messages were distributed to EOC staff. Message handling was efficient.

The State EOC is f unctional f or directing emergency operations.

Accomodations are present to house operations personnel for an extended period. Emergency classification 1cvels were posted. Status boards were kept current and have high visibility. The appropriate maps and other displays were available in the EOC.

Communications between the State EOC and other points were ef fective and efficient. Telephone was the principal means of establishing the exchange of information. When the Nucluar Accident Reporting Systen (NARS) malfunctioned early in the evening, backup communications systems were ,

effectively utill ed. The backup telephone system provides conferencing '

between the btate, utility and County facilities. The ability to identify the need for, request and obtain Federal assistance was denanstrated by the State of Illinois through teletype message t raf fic with FEMA.

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The State demonstrated the ability to project dosage to the public at the REAC. Protective action recommendations from the utility were reviewed and

discussed by the State agencies in the State EOC before making i

. recommendations to the Governor. The State properly recommended to the County that the outdoor warning system and EBS be activated to provide J pertinent emergency information to the public on the shelter and evacuation

protective action recommendations. Policy and procedures were developed j between the REAC and the State EOC staf f to allow reentry to Jthe evacuated

. area. Relaxation ofs.protectiwe actions were based on monitor data ,

• indicating safe levels of radiation and were promptly relayed to the .

response organisatierts.14ewevez,. recommended safety precautione should be' .. t

, explained to the County. since the.1DMS. ataf f at the County EOC reported no contamination in the affected area. ,

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Because this was a partial participation exercise for'the State of Illinois, the personnel assigned sa EOF.11asons were also designated to serve as

• • Public Information Officers (PIO) at the JPIC. There is work space set aside for the State PIO's which is shared jointly with utility personnel.

The JPIC facility itself is small and unsuitable to function as a media briefing center. The State F10's demonstrated the ability to brief the

, media in a clear, accurate and timely manner. News releases were . J l coordinated and prepared at the State EOC, transmitted to the JpIC and l released to the media. Effective rumor control was not demonstrated during the exercise. Although a recovery,and Twentry briefing was prepared at the 1

State EOC, the,4PIC; operation *was terminated before this information could J

A be pro,vided to,.the media.

• 2 A separarte med;ical, drill was conducted on July 18-19, 1945 for ambulisnce I'

and hospital f acilities and personnel. Evalvetion of this medical drill way t conducted by the Public Health. Service. representative of the Regioral '

! Assistance Committee. The invaluation repart 'for the medical drill will be -

processed as an independent document. -

Ogle County The Ogle 00enty EOC in Oreton was promptly activated after receipt and verification f the Site Area Emergency notification. The Sheriff's j Dispatcher staff mobilised the EOC staff utilising as up-to-date call list.

,. Full staffing, except for Rochelle mutual aid, was acceeplished within .

approximately one hour after receipt of the notification. Around the clock staffing capability was demonstrated by double staffing the emergency response positions. A representative was dispatched to the EOF /JP!C facility to serve as the Ogle County liason.

The Ogle County ESDA Coordinator was offectively in charge of the emergency response effort. There were frequent staff briefings, effielent sessage handling procedures, classification levels posted, up-to-date status boards and appropriate maps and displays within the EOC. There was a demonstration of the timely reconfiguration of the training room in the basement of the Sheriff's Department into a functional EOC.

With the enception of the technical dif ficulties esperienced with the NARS, the communication network at the EOC was ef fective and ef ficiently operated. Conferencing via a con.mercial telephane was ef fectively utill ed

, as a backup to the malfunctioning NAR$. Comrnunications with the State, Winnebago County, municipal E00's, EBS, County agencies, JPIC, EOF and the utility were demonstrated.

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The EOC staf f demonstrated the procedures for timely public alerting and l notification. The sounding of sirens and activation of tone alert radios were simulated. Squad cars were dispatched to the affected sectors to verify siren activation and perform supplemental route alerting. The public instructions that were released by the ESDA Coordinator was based on

, prescripted messages. These public instructions were broadcast by the local EBS stations, tone alert radios, aquad car public address systems and local CB radios.

I Evacuation and access control were simulated during this exercise. However, l the decision making and procedures to implement these functions were i demonstrated by the EOC staff. There would be sufficient resources I available for these functions by supplementing Ogle County resources through mutual aid agreements. Unique and realistic situations were introduced as free play items during the exercise to test the EOC staff's capability to respond to problems which could arise during an incident at the nuclear power station.

As noted above, Ogle County dispatched a representative to the JPIC. This individual provided input at the media briefings as to the response activities of the County and municipal governments. The text of the EBS messages released by the County was read to the media at the JPIC. Since rumor control was not demonstrated by the State, the County was unable to demonstrate its role in responding to inquiries received from the hotline.

A tabl,etop discussion of recovery and reentry activities occurred at the EOC following notification by the State. Each organlaation's representative l discussed the actions that would be initiated for safe reentry to the evacuated area. Although the EOC staff recognized the need to provide the public with this information, an EBS message was not formulated.

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, $XERCISE REPORT Introduction i

1. Exercise Background l This was the second joint exercise for the State of Illinois and Ogle I County resulting from a simulated accident at the Byron Nuclear Power Station. The first joint exercise was on November 15, 1983 and .

involved full parti .ipation by both the State of Illinois and Ogle l County. This report addresses the most recent joint exercise for the Byron Nuclear Power Station which was conducted on June 11-12, 1985.  ;

The Byron Nuclear Power Station medical drill was conducted independently on July 18-19, 1985 and will be evaluated in a separate report.

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In accordance with FEMA rule 44 CFR 350, a participants critique was conducted by TEMA on June 13, 1985 at the Byron High School in Byron, l Illinois. Representatives of State and local government, volunteer

! organizations and the utility attended this session. A public and media briefing was conducted by FEMA and NRC at the same facility immediately following the critique. Representatives of the media and members of the public as well as representatives of State and local government, volunteer organisations and the utility attended this briefing. No written comment concerning the exercise has been received a,a a result of these meetings.

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2. Participating and Non participating State and Local Governments The plume exposure EPZ of the Byron Nuclear Power Station impacts on Ogle and Winnebago Counties and the cities of Byron, Oregon, Stillman Valley, Mt. Morris, Leaf River and Davis Junction in the State of Illinois. The affected portion of Winnebago County is einimall therefore, there is a planning arrangement with Ogle County for the coordinated care of the small number of residents in Winnebago County.

Winnebago County was represented in the Ogle County EOC during this l exercise. The six municipalities noted above did participate in the exercise, however, their activities were not observed for evaluation in .

l this exercise report.

l The ingestion pathway EpZ of the Byron Nuclear Power Station impacts on

( an additional nineteen Counties in three States. These counties are l Stephenson, Boone, McHenry, Jo Davies, Kane. DeKalb, Carroll, Whiteside. Lee, Kendall, LaSalle, Bureau and Henry in the State of j Illinois t Clinton and Jackson in the State of Iowal and Rock, Walworth, Green and Lafayette in the State of Wisconsin. It was beyond the scope of the scenario for these Counties to participate in this exercise.

i This was a partial participation exercise for the $ tate of Illinois and j a f ull participat ion exercise for Ogle County. This exercise was an .

off hours exercise which was initiated between the hours of 6:00 p.m. l and midnight. I e i 6 ,

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, 3. List of Evaluators For this exercise, there was a total of five (5) Federal evaluators observing off-site exercise activities. On-site activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Of the off-site evaluators, four, including the off-site Exercise Evaluation Team Director, were FEMA Region V staff and one was a contract evaluator from the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). The evaluator assignments were as follows: .

Off-site Exercise Evaluation Team Director Wallace Weaver, FEMA State of Illinois Evaluation Team Woodie Curtis, Team Leader, FEMA, State EOC Ray Kellogg, FEMA, JPIC 1

Ogle County Evaluation Team l

Robert Shapiro, Team Leader, FEMA, County EOC '

Sue Ann Curtis, ANL, County EOC Ray Kellogg, FEMA, JPIC

4. Evaluation Criteria The plans being evaluated by this exercise were developed using the

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency R'esponse Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1). Therefore, these criteria and the exercrit based on these criteria, " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation" dated June 1983, were used for exercise evaluation.

5. Exercise Objectives Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the thirty-five (35) standard objectives listed in Tab "M" of the " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations" dated June 1983. The objective numbers listed below correlate to Tab "M".

The State of Illinois selected the following fourteen (14) objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise and during the medical drill on July 19, 1985.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

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. 10. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAGs, available shelters, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public with the 10-mile EPZ, and j disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

j 14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate -

instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

30. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals. (July 18-19, 1985 medical drill)

31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for

, handling contaminated individuals. (July 18-19, 1985 medical drill)

32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request and obtain 2

Federal assistance.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate

measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Ogle County selected the following eleven (11) objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

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2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain 24-hour j staffing.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

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4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

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5. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate

locations, organizations and field personnel.

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13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public with the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

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14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ. .

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

6. Summary of Scenario INITI AL CONDITIONS T = 0 (1900)

Byron Unit One is operating at full power with a normal at power electrical lineup. The Unit One positive displacement charging pump is out-of-service for repair of the hydraulic coupling. The carbon dioxide discharge valve supplying fire suppression capability to the 1 A diesel generator room is out-of-service for repair of the valve disc.

T'he 2 A diesel generator is available to provide reserve feed to Unit One vital bus 141, and thereby constitutes a second, alternate source of emergency power to the Unit One motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump as required by Technical Specifications. At the onset of the exercise, the 2A diesel generator is out-of-service for a cylinder liner replacement with approximately eight hours of repair work remaining.

UNUSUAL EVENT T = 15 (1915)

At or about 1915, sustained wind speeds, as measured at the site, have increased to greater than 60 miles per hour. Unit One continues full power operation but implements a defensive posture for the condition.

Subsequently, surveillance testing of the reactor protection system and the receipt inspection of Unit Two new fuel assemblies are terminated.

ALERT T = 45 (1945)

At 1945, a tornado strikes the southern perimeter of the switchyard destroying the three remaining 345 kilovolt transmission lines connecting the site with the Commonwealth Edison electric grid. Unit One reactor trips on undervoltage to the reactor coolant pumps. A turbine trip and main generator trip follow. The plant automatically responds with a start of the two Unit One diesel generators and a sequence start of the necessary plant safe shutdown equipment.

Operators verify the automatic starting of . shutdown equipment and take actions to promote natural circulation cooling of the reactor core.

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By 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />, stable conditions are established with Unit One reactor core decay heat being steamed to the atmosphere through the four steam generator pressure operated relief valves. The natural circulation cooling proceeds nominally until 2020 hours0.0234 days <br />0.561 hours <br />0.00334 weeks <br />7.6861e-4 months <br />, at which time there occurs a lA diesel generator turbocharger failure which deenergizes vital bus 141 and one-half of the safe shutdown equipment. Missiles from the failure then penetrate the diesel's associated fuel oil day tank and set fire in the vicinity. Off-site assistance is required to deal with this IA diesel generator room fire and upon arrival, the Byron Fire .

Department quickly gains control of the situation.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY T = 120 (2100)

At 2045, with stable shutdown cooling of the reactor decay heat in progress, the Control Room observes indications of major loss of coolant accident. Train "B" emergency core cooling system automatically starts. Core cooling is, established by pumping water from the 450,000 gallon reactor water storage tank (RWST) to reactor core. Conditions proceed nominally and at 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br /> the containment sump is full and the RWST low - low level alarm is received. The operators manually switch over from the injection phase of protection to the recirculation phase of protection. Only Train "B" valves are energized and are available for the transition.

GENERAL EMERGENCY T = 240 (2300)

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At 2245 hours0.026 days <br />0.624 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.542225e-4 months <br />, the Train "B" residual heat removal pump trips on electrical fault. This results in the other emergency core cooling pumps losing water suction. This leaves the damaged reactor coolant system without any source of water makeup. Reactor decay heat increases the temperature of the remaining fluid inventory, therefore venting steam to the containment atmosphere. The upper core rapidly uncovers the topmost fuel rod gas plenums. Containment hydrogen concentration and pressure increases. At this time, the control room detects a containment hydrogen explosion.

Status monitor lights indicate the 48 inch diamater containment purge supply valves are not fully seated. By 2350 field monitoring teams detect an unmonitored release by the facility. One of the damaged purge supply valves is manually forced closed following removal of the attached remote operator. This allows for the release path to be isolated. At 0010 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, maintenance returns the 2A diesel generator to operable status and the vital bus 141 is provided with reserve power. The Train "A" emergency core cooling systems begin to inject into the reactor coolant system and reflood the damaged core. With containment integrity reestablished and renewed core cooling in progress, detailed, long-term recovery steps are formulated and implemented.

RECOVERY / REENTRY T = 360 (0100)

At 0101, recovery and reentry is initiated. The exercise is terminated at 0200.

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The actual exercise events followed the pre-exercise scenario. The Unusual Event was declared at 1917, the Alert at 2003, the Site Area Emergency at 2108 and the General Emergency at 2309. The initiation of recovery and reentry activities occured at 0101. The simulated accident at the Byron Nuclear Power Station resulted in both sheltering and evacuation protective action recommendations from the utility; shelter at 2310 and shelter and evacuate at 2332. The simulated emergency was downgraded to Site Area Emergency at 1255.

7. State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise The State of Illinois planned to staff and demonstrate the facilities at the State EOC in Springfield, the REAC in Springfield, the State Forward Command Post in Dixon and the JPIC in Dixon. The also planned to use the necessary communications systems to conduct emergency operations.

Ogle County planned to demonstrate its EOC facilities, emergency response staff and communications systems. The County also chose to demonstrate its capability (simulated) to activate the prompt alert and notification system, access control and evacuation of a part of the plume EPZ. The communities of Byron, Oregon, Stillman Valley, Mt.

Morris, Leaf River and Davis Junction activated their EOC facilities, emergency response staff and communications systems in support of the Ogle County emergency response.

8. D'eficiencies Noted in Past Exercises There were no deficiencies affecting public health and safety (category A) identified during the evaluation of the November 15, 1983 joint exercise for the Byron Nuclear Power Station. However, there were five other deficiencies (category B) identified during that exercise. These five deficiencies were reviewed during this exercise evaluation and the earlier State of Illinois full participation exercise evaluation at Quad Cities ( August 1984) to determine that the appropriate corrective actions have been implemented. The results of this review are discussed below.

NUREG item K: The field monitoring team did not have respirators as part of the protective equipment.

The State of Illinois field monitoring team and their equipment )

were evaluated at the Quad Cities full participation exercise in August 1984. This deficiency was corrected during that exercise.

NUREG item C.3.a : The press briefings were not conducted in a timely manner and, in most cases, the briefings presented information that was old. The technical spokesperson provided at the Media News Center was not effective in his briefings.

The JPIC utility and IDNS technical spokespersons were evaluated during this Byron exercise. Their presentations and responses ^to questions were accurate and effective. The press briefings which were conducted at the JPIC were timely.

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NUREG item M.) : Policy / procedures were not developed on allowing entry to evacuated areas for essential services, e.g., to milk dairy cows.

State procedures for unrestr'icted reentry, restricted reentry and no reentry were demonstrated during this Byron exercise.

Specifically, the issue of essential services was demonstrated by Ogle County. '

NUREC item M: Arrangements were not made to provide the public with information on safety precautions during recovery, possible health effects on low level exposure and availability of compensation for financial loss sustained.

Appropriate information to be provided to the public was prepared at the State EOC during the Byron exercise. However, because the JPIC terminated operations before this information was released to the media for dissemination to the public, a category B deficiency is identified later in this report. Thus, this deficiency was only partially corrected.

NUREG item K.5.b: The capability to decontaminate equipment and vehicles was not demonstrated.

The proposed corrective action for this deficiency is to demonstrate decontamination at the next Byron exercise with full participation by the State of Illinois. Thus, this category B deficiency is carried over in this exercise report.

9. Exercise Objectives Still to be Effectively Achieved Because of the deficiencies noted elsewhere in this report, the following exercise objectives were not completely demonstrated.

Appropriate action will be required to correct the exercise deficiencies and these objectives must be successfully demonstrated during the next radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the

. Byron Nuclear Power Station.

The State of Illinois did not completely demonstrate the following three objectives:

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a cocrdinated f ashion. '

Ogle County did not completely demonstrate the following exercise objective:

35. Demonstrate ability to determine,and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

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The following three exercise objectives have not yet been demonstrated in the current exercise cycle:

23. Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel. (not applicable to offsite authorities)

29. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for.

decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

(Illinois and Ogle County) -

33. Demonstrate ability to relocate to and operate the alternate EOC. (Ogle County) 9 13

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N'arrative

1. State of Illinois Activation and Staffing The June 11-12, 1985 exercise of the Byron Nuclear Power Station was the second such exercise in which the State of Illinois participated.

This was a partial participation exercise for the State of Illinois. -

The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) activated and staffed facilities sufficient to support the emergency response being demonstrated by Ogle County.

The NARS system serves as a direct communications link between ESDA and the Byron Nuclear Power Station. This link is monitored around the clock seven days a week. The EOC was activated upon receipt of the Alert notification from the plant. The call was verified by the EOC dispatcher by means of a telephone call back to the utility. Staff mobilization was demonstrated by the EOC dispatchers using an up-to-date, written call list. The staffing of the EOC began after verification of the Alert notification and was completed approximately two and one-half hours later. This was due to the late arrival of the representative of the Illinois Department of Conservation.

F,or the purpose of their partial participation in the exercise, the State EOC was staffed by representatives of the IDNS, Illinois Department of Transportation, Illinois State Police, Illinois National Guard, Illinois Department of Conservation, American Red Cross and ESDA. The staff displayed adequate training and knowledge of their respective responsibilities. ESDA and IDNS dispatched representatives to the utility's EOF to assist in the coordination and dispatch of information from the utility to the State and Ogle County.

Deficiencv: A.I.e. Staffing of the State EOC required approximately two and one-half hours to complete.

Recommendation: The State of Illinois should determine the reason for the delay in fully staffing the State EOC, review staffing procedures to ensure timely activation of the State EOC and demonstrate full EOC staffing and activation at the next full participation exercise involving the State of Illinois.

Emergency Operations Management Emergency operations management was satisfactory for the level of participation. The Chief of Operations was ef fectively in charge of the overall emergency response effort of the EOC staff. Briefings were held to update staff on the plant and offsite situation. The staff was involved in decision making with major decisions being made by the Chief of Operations. The staf f had written procedures that pertained to their respective responsibilities, with copies of the plans available for use. Message logs were kept. Incoming and outgoing messages were reproduced and distributed to EOC staff as necessary.

The ressage handling and distribution procedures were efficient.

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v Access to the EOC is effectively controlled by the ESDA dispatchers through the use of a buzzer and identification system, which is o

installed in the Dispatch Communications Center.

ESDA requested that FEMA establish a liaison team at the State EOC and the Forward Command Post at Dixon. ESDA also requested that FEMA l dispatch their mobile communications van to the State Forward Command Post to augment State resources and provide Federal and State interface.

The Unusual Event classification was received at 1926, the Alert at

. 2008, the Site Area Emergency at 2110 and the General Emergency at

, 2310. Protective action (shelter in place) was ordered at 2310 and upgraded (evacuate) at 2333. The recommendation to activate the prompt alert and notification system was made using the backup NARS at 2316 and again at 2346. The IDNS simulated the activation of the

, radiological field monitoring teams at 2135. ESDA simulated the activation of reception and congregate care centers at midnight.

Facilities The State EOC is functional for directing emergency operations.

Furniture, space, lighting and communications equipment are exceptional. Outside noise presents no problem. Accomodations are

present to house operations personnel for an extended period.

Emergency power capability is present but was not activated during this e,xercise. Emergency classification levels were posted. Status boards were kept current and have high visibility. The required maps are present and are used during full participation exercises.

The function of the REAC was being simulated during this exercise and the facilities were not fully activated and staffed. Adequacy of the REAC facilities has been demonstrated and evaluated in conjunction with previous full participation exercises within the State of Illinois.

Communications Communications between the State EOC and other points were effective and efficient. Commercial telephone was the principal means of exchanging information as the NARS telephone malfunctioned during the exercise.

This backup telephone system provided conferencing between the State, utility and the County. Conferencing was used to receive information from the EOF and in the development of media releases at the JPIC.

Hard copy capability exists between the EOC and the JPIC. Information exchange between ESDA and FEMA Region V was by teletype.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation i As noted earlier in the report, the function of the REAC was being simulated during the exercise. Actions taken were based on the pre-

, exercise scenario and the protective action recommendations of the utility. Recommendations for protective actions for the State of Illinois were accomplished in a timely fashion, always within fifteen

minutes of the receipt of the utililty recommendations.

15

Public Alerting and Instruction The role of the State EOC is to disseminate protective action recommendations from the REAC to local governments for implementation.

Further, the State EOC recommends the activation of the prompt alert and notification system by local governments. During this exercise, activation of the system was accomplished by use of the backup NARS for the sheltering recommendation at 2316 and the evacuation recommendation at 2346. -

News releases were developed by the State after consultation as necessary with Ogle County, the State Forward Command Post and the JPIC. .The releases were then data faxed to the JPIC (with copies to the County, etc.) for release to the media. The messages were clear and appropriate to the situation. They included guidance on sheltering methods (e.g., close windows, put cloth over mouth when outside, etc.),

and instructions for transients without shelter.

Protective Action The protective action recommendations from the utility were reviewed and discussed by the State agencies represented in the State EOC before making recommendations to the Governor's office. Evacuation activities such as activation of reception centers, congregate care facilities, relocation of special needs individuals and access control are the responsibility of local governments. Ingestion pathway protective a'ction was not an objective for the State of Illinois during this exercise.

Radiological Exposure Control Since the Springfield EOC, the Dixon Forward Command Post and the REAC are not within the 10-mile EPZ and the radiological field monitoring teams were not activated, radiological exposure control was not an objective for the State of Illinois during the exercise.

Media Relations There were no media briefings conducted at the State EOC. The JPIC facility, colocated with the EOF in Dixon, was activated for this exercise. Because of sudden illness to the ESDA PIO, the ESDA EOF liason also served as a technical spokesperson at the JPIC. It is recommended that the EOF liason and the JPIC PIO position be staffed individually at future exercises and that IDNS designate a technical spokesperson to be present whenever the JPIC is activated.

There is work space set aside for the State PIO's which is shared jointly with utility personnel. This room is located across the EOF from the ESDA and IDNS EOF liasons. The copier and telefax capability is lo:ated in a separate room in the EOF. The JPIC facility itself is small and unsuitable to function as a media briefing center. The media briefing room and the adjacent media work room are not large enough to accomodate the number of media representatives which could be expected in the event of an incident at the Byron Nuclear Power Station.

16

Deficiency: G.3.a. The JPIC facility at the EOF in Dixon is

~

unsuitable to function as a media briefing center.

Recommendation: The State of-Illinois should work with the utility to develop a suitable location for the JPIC.

Ti e primary communication system between the JPIC staf f and the State EOC, the REAC, the State Forward Command Post and Ogle County was land lines. These were used for both oral and hard copy transmission. .

Secondary communications systems were not observed. The backup communications systems available in the JPIC should be demonstrated at the next joint exercise for the Byron Nuclear Power Station.

Both utility and Illinois media kits were available at the JPIC. They contain information on the utility, the local area, radiation, nuclear power plants and emergency response. Informational releases were coordinated and prepared at the State EOC. The releases were then transmitted to the JPIC via data fax, reproduced and made available to the media. Media releases, in addition to being sequencially numbered, should also indicate the date and time of release.

Emergency public instructions were not drafted at the JPIC. But emergency information was provided to the media by the PIO's. The shsltering instruction was clear as to closing windows, shut off ventilation etc, and transient population was addressed. Briefings by the State were timely, accurate, complete and avoided technical jargon. A simplified depiction of the reactor and associated systems and a general map of the 10-mile EPZ vere in the media briefing room.

The map and display were used during the briefings. Additional maps in the JPIC showing evacuation routes and perhaps shelter areas and traffic control points would be helpful. The utility, County and State PIO's discussed the content of their briefings and coordinated their  ;

activities prior to the media briefings.

While an effort was made to monitor radio and TV, neither the State nor the utility included a rumor control phone number in their printed media releases. This number was not announced in the media briefing room. Thus, effective rumor control was not demonstrated at either the JPIC or the State EOC.

Deficiency: G.4.c. Rumor control was not demonstrated during the exercise.

Recommendation: Effective procedures for a coordinated rumor control should be demonstrated at the next Byron Nuclear Power Station joint exercise.

Activity was ended too soon to fully demonstrate recovery and reentry procedures at the JPIC. The last State media release availabe at the JPIC indicated that, although the release of radioactivity had been terminated, protective actions remained in effect. A recovery and reentry press release was prepared at the State EOC but was not released at the JPIC.

17

Deficiency: G.4.b. Recovery and reentry information was not released at the JPIC for dissemination to the general public.

Recommendation: At future exercises which include a recovery and reentry objective, the JPIC operation should not be terminated until this activity has been fully demonstrated. Recovery and reentry should be demonstrated at the next Byron Nuclear Power Station joint exercise.

Recovery and Reentry Recovery and reentry operations were implemented by the State of Illinois at C101. Policy and procedures were developed on allowing reentry to the evacuated areas and removing milk producing animals from stored feed. The following pre-cautionary measures were recommended by the Governor: destroy all exposed food, wrapped, canned or packaged foods are safe for human consumption; dispose of all milk; and thoroughly vacuum the interior of all homes, business and other shelters.

Arrangements were made to also provide the public with information on possible health effects of low level radiation and recovery of financial losses. Relaxation of protective actions were based on data indicating safe levels of radiation. Recovery and reentry decisions were communicated to all response organizations except the JPIC as noted above. It is recommended that the local response organizations b'e provided with the rationale for precautionary recovery and reentry measures as the IDNS liason in the County EOC is reporting no contamination in the evacuated area.

Scenario The scenario was sufficient to initiate emergency response by the State organizations and to evaluate the capability of these emergency response organizations. Further, the scenario allowed for the full demonstration of the objcetives selected for this exercise by the State of Illinois.

2. Ogle County Activation and Staffing The EOC was promotly activated after notification and verification of a Site Area Emergency classification. The notification call was received over the conference telephone by the Ogle County Sheriff's Telecommunications Division. The Division's dispatch staff contacted the ESDA Coordinator and his two assistants as well as the Winnebago County Sheriff, municipal offices and the Illinois State Police. The Division's clerical staff carried out the notification of EOC staff using an up-to-date call list. Notification to all EOC County officials was completed by 2150 and staffing was complete in the EOC by 2227, with the exception of the Rochelle mutual aid. The call-up system that was demonstrated has 24-hour capability.

18

During this exercise, eleven organizations participated and the representatives were knowlegeable in their normal agency missions. The staff members were professional in carrying out their assignments and were willing to consider procedures for increasing the effectiveness of the EOC operation. Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by the presence of alternate staff who participated in the exercise for training purposes.

The EOC Coordinator dispatched a staff member to the EOF /JPIC. This -

person's duties included JPIC response on County issues and notification of EOF staff on the content of County EBS messages.

Emergency Operations Management The Ogle County Sheriff is also the Ogle County ESDA Coordinator and was effectively in charge of the emergency response procedures. He conducted frequent status briefings and requested that individual organizational representatives provide updates as well. This is an effective procedure, in that it ensures that the entire staff has a good prospective of the entire emergency response. In this way they are better prepared to provide sound and timely contributions to the response. The staff was also kept informed of the emergency through the timely changes on the status board and efficient distribution of messtgen. Written checklists were available to the staff members to ensure that all emergency responses were accomplished as planned.

Facilities The Ogle County EOC is located in the basement of the County Sheriff's Department. The training room, which is used for all emergencies requiring the activation of an EOC, was converted into the EOC configuration in real time during this exercise. Telephones, maps, SOP's, copy machines and other supplies necessary to the operation were readily available enabling a timely reconfiguration of this room into an EOC. Backup power is available to this facility which would faciliate continued operations should a loss of commercial power be experienced.

Communications With the exception of the technical dif ficulties experienced with the NARS communications system, the communications network at the EOC was ef fective and operated ef ficiently. Commercial phone was used as backup to the malfunctioning NARS system. The EOC communications network available in the telecommunications center consisted of a series of high and low band police and fire radios. A total of fourteen dif ferent communication systems were observed in this center in addition to the NARS dedicated phone. The center was linked with the EOC by telephone and intercom. Within the EOC facility, the primary communications was the land-line with radio backup.

Communications with the State, Winnebago County, Municipal E0C's, EBS, County Agencies, JPIC/ EOF and the utility were demonstrated.

19

• e In the telecommunications center, the quality of the transmissions was clear and the various systems operated effectively. The telephone lines and procedures for radio access for the EOC staff were sufficient within the EOC facility. -

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Dose assessment and protective action recommendation are functions of the State and therefore not evaluated at Ogle County. -

Public Alerting and Instruction The EOC staf f performed public alerting and instruction. Public alerting was initiated at 2325 following a backup NARS message recommending sheltering in selected sectors. Sounding of sirens and activation of tone alert radios were simulated. Squad cars, dispatched to the sectors requiring protective actions, performed siren verification and supplemental route alerting. Following siren verification by the squad cars, the ESDA Coordinator released a prescripted message to the EBS. The time interval between the siren verification and release of the EBS message was estimated be approximately five minutes. This alerting procedure was repeated at 2354 following a limited evacuation recommendation from the State.

The public instructions that were released by the ESDA Coordinator were based on prescripted messages included in the County plan. These messages were edited to reflect the specific conditions of the scenario and free play incidents. Familiar landmarks were referenced in released messages and appropriate SOP's for sheltering and evacuation were included. Public instructions were transmitted over a number of different media including local EBS stations, tone alert radios, squad car public address systems and local CB radios. The EBS messages were repeated at a minimum of every fifteen minutes. Other systems were also used to repeat messages.

Protective Action Although evacuation and manning access control points were simulated during this exercise, the decisions to carry out these functions were formulated by the EOC staff. According to the Sheriff, there would be sufficient resources available to complete these tasks through mutual aid agreements with the State Police and surrounding County and municipal law enforcement agencies. Unique and realistic situations were introduced during the exercise to test the staff's capability to respond to additional problems which could arise when responding to a nuclear power plant emergency. The school system simulated the ability to provide school buses to support the evacuation process by placing drivers and buses on standby.

Radiological Exposure Control Radiological exposure control was not an exercise objective for Ogle County and therefore not evaluated. It was noted that high range dosimeters and TLD's (simulated and real) were issued to EOC staff and visitors.

20

's .',

Media Relations Protective action messages (EBS) as prepared by the County were transmitted to the JPIC. These messages were read at media briefings by the County liason but hard copy was never made available to the media. Hard copy of County EBS messages should be made available to the media at the JPIC as these messages often contain useful and important information not found in the State media releases.

Since it was a County objective to demonstrate rumor control procedures, it would have been appropriate for the county to have been more involved in this function. However, since the State did not demonstrate effective rumor control procedures, it was not possible for the County to do so. It is recommended that the County staff at the EOC and the JPIC be called upon during the next exercise to respond to rumors received over the hotline.

Recovery and Reentry Recovery and reentry activities were carried out by the EOC staff following notification by the State. A table top discussion occurred among the appropriate staff at each of these phases. Following the notification for reentry, the EOC Coordinator requested that each participating organization brief the staff on their actions under the existing scenario. Each organizational representative discussed the a,rrangements that had been initiated for safe reentry and recovery under conditions of no contamination reported by the IDNS. However, no EBS message was f ormula ted . Procedures were also noted for allowing

. entry into evacuated areas for essential services. There was some confusion on the information to be given to the local population. The IDNS reported no contamination, but the message from the Covernor's office included recommendations for managing contaminated foodstuffs.

Deficiency: M.I. Although the EOC staff recognized the need to provide the public with recovery and reentry information, an EBS message was not formulated.

Recommendation: The County should more fully demonstrate the recovery and reentry procedures described by their S0P's and issue necessary messages to the public during the next joint exercise for the Byron Nuclear Power Station.

Scenario Unique and realistic situations were introduced as free play items during the exercise to test the EOC staff's capability to respond to problems which could arise during an incident at the nuclear power  !

station. The scenario, combined with the special problems, provided sufficient activity to allow Ogle County to effectively demonstrate their emergency response capability and the objectives selected for this exercise.

. 1 1

21 1

e -. a,__ - aa . ~ . - -.  %

e e

k 9 s

e 5

SUMMARY

LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES e

22

UTILITY: Byron Nucler.r Power Stcticn -

Sumsiary Listing of Deficiencies <

Illinois June Il-12,'1985 (State) (Date)

Illinois -

(Community)

A. Deficiencies Af fecting Public Health and Safety NUREC Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficlency , Progosed ,,

Date Date None f

23 e

e m 3-UTILITY: Byron Nuclect Power Stction ' -

Summary Listing of Deficiencies '

Illinois June 11-12,'1985.

(State) (Date)

Illinois .

(Community)

B. Other Deficiencies NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency __, Proposed Date _Date A.I.e. Staffing of the State EOC required approximately two and one-half hours to complete.

G.3.a. The JPIC facility at the EOF in Dixon is unsuitable to function as a media briefing center.

G.4.b. Recovery and reentry information was not released at the JPIC for d issemination to the general public.

G.4.c . Rumor control was not demonstrated during the exercise.

24 9

C___._____.______ _ . _ _ -

s =

r.

UTILITY: Byron Nucloor Pow 2r Station .

Summary Listing of Deficiencies e" Illinois June 11-12,'1985, (State) (Date)

Illinois ,

(Community)

C. Recommendations

1. It is recommended that the EOF liason and the JPIC PIO positions be staffed individually at future exercises and that IDNS designate a technical spokesperson to be present whenever the JPIC is activated.

2. Additional maps in the JPIC showing evacuation routes and perhaps shelter areas and traffic control points would be helpful.

3. The backup communications systems available in the JPIC should be demonstrated at the next joint exercise for the Byron Nuclear Power Station.

4. Med ia releases, in addition to being sequencially numbered, should also indicate the date and time of release.

5. It is recommended that the local response organizations be provided with the rationale for precautionary recovery and reentry measures as the IDNS liason in the County EOC is reporting no contamination in the evacuate areas.

25

1 e..,.*

UTILITY: Byron Nue12cr Power Stctica . , ,

Summary Listing of Deficiencies 111inois June 11-12, 1985.

(State) (Date) os le County -

( Commun i ty)

.A.. Deficiencies Af fecting Public Health and Safety NUREC Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency _ Proposed Date Date None 26 e

1 UTILITY: Byren Nuciner Powar Stetion

• Summary Listing of Deficiencies .

Illinois June 11-12, 1985.

(State) (Date)

Ogle County . .

(Community)

B. Other Deficienties NUREC Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date K.5.b. The capability to decontaminate equipment and vehicles was not demonstrated. (This deficiency is carried over from the incomplete demonstrat ion during the November 15, 1983 joint exercise.)

M.l. Although the EOC staff recognized ,

the need to provide the public with recovery and reentry information, an EBS message was not formulated.

27

7 e .,*.'

. =

UTILITY: Byron Nuclse.r Power Statien .

Summary Listing of Deficiencies s'

• Illinois June 11-12,' 1985 *

(State) (Date)

Ogle County ,

(Community)

C. Recommendations 1.- Hard copy of County EBS messages should be made available to the media at the JPIC as these messages of ten contain useful and important information not found in the State media releases.

2. It is recommended the County staff at the EOC and the JPIC be called upon during the next exercise to respond to rumors received over the hotline.

28

.