ML20211M161

Discusses 990527 Meeting with Comed Re Safety Culture & Overtime Control at Byron Nuclear Plant from Videoconference Location at NRC Headquarters.Requests That Aggressive Actions Be Taken to Ensure That Comed Meets Expectations

ML20211M161
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	05/28/1999
From:	Lochbaum D UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC)
To:	Dyer J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20211M141	List: ML20211M137 ML20211M161 ML20211M178
References
NUDOCS 9909090052
Download: ML20211M161 (4)

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Enclosure 1 l

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS May 28,1999 Mr. James Dyer, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351

SUBJECT:

SAFETY CULTURE AND OVERTTME CONTROL AT DYRON

Dear Mr. Dyer:

I observed the May 27,1999. NRC public meeting with Commonwealth Edison (Comed) regarding safety culture and overtime control at the Byron nuclear plant from the videooonference location at NRC headquarters. The meeting did little to allay my concems about these important safety issues.

In your opening remarks, you stated that while the NRC was concemed about the safety culture and evertime control at Bryon, these matters were not in enforcement space. The subsequent discussions made it abundantly clear that the NRC is not in enforcement space because the agency has essentially exercised enforcement discretion regarding violations at the plant. For example, you stated that an audit in or around 1996 revealed that approximately 10 percent of_the authorizations to exceed the overtime guidance in Byron's technical specifications were made afterwards instead of prior to the work as required by Comed's procedures. You further stated that a more recent audit revealed that these overtime authorhation procedure violations have been reduced to about 2.5 percent. The NRC could, in fact, cite Comed for these repetitive procedure violations since Bryon's operating license and federal regulations

, require procedures to be followed. 'Ihus, the NRC is not in enforcement space because you have exercised enforcement disdetion for these and other violations.

In your concluding remarks and in your statements to the press, you placed considerabic weight on Comed's alleged demonstration that worker fatigue has not played a role in event oocurrence at Byron. I examined the company's submittals and listened to their presentation, but failed to see how you arrived

.at that position. It may very well be true that the events did not occur during a period of heavy overtime.

Yet Comed went to great length to explain that much of the overtime worked by licensed operators was not on the boards in the control room but performing tasks like training and surveillance test reviews. A fatigued worker can fail to absorb key safety information during training or fail to adequately review test results. The consequences from these performance impairments can contribute to events weeks or months later. In addition, Mr. perry of Comed stated that Nuclear Ovenight found overtime levels by other departments at Byron to be comparable to that from the Operations department. In purportedly showing no link between overtime and events at Byron, Comed only presented data on operator evertime. I know from personal experience as a reactor engineer at operating nuclear plants that the Washington Offica: 1s16 P Street NW Sune 310 . Washin0 ton DC 20036-1495 202 332 0900 . FAX: 202 332 0905 Cambridge Headquarters: Two Bratfje Square . Cambridge MA 02238 9105 61M47 5552 . FAK; 617 664 9405 Cahfomia OfGce: 2397 Snativok Avenue Suite 203 . Derkeley CA 94704 1567 . S10-643-1872 . FAX: 510-843-3785 9909090052 990902 PDR ADOCK 05000454 0 PDR

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May 28.1999 Page 2 of 4 i

l heavy overtime periods for many plant departments is not necessarily concurrent with outage times. '

Reactor engincen and others work long hours supporting the restart of a plant from an outage. Other workers put in long hours preparing for an upcoming outage. it is conceivable that fatigue on the

! a worker other than a licensed operator could have contributed to a Byron event. Thus, Comed's, superficial presentation on this subject was by no means conclusive and should not,be used to excuse i their overtime control practices.

Funhermore, your acceptance of Comed's position on the link between overtime and safety contradicts the sound argument raised by Mr. Grobe of your staff regarding the " chilling effect" of Comed's sa culture investigation technique. Mr. Orobe maintained that having Comed's lawyers interview Byron L workers under oath and with transcribed testimony may have prevented these workers from open and free responses to questions. Mr. Orobe pointed out that licensed operatom are required by the terms of their licenses to raise safety concems and their careers might be compromised by stating, under oath

' before the company's lawyers, a teluctance to do so. By the very same token, Comed's license to op

' Byron contains terms which require them to use workers who are free from impainnent by drugs, alcohol, fatigue, and other causes. Thus, Comed could not find a link between overtime and potential unsafe operation of the fhollity without providingprimafsets evidence that it had violated the tenns of Byron's opemting license. It's not clear why the NRC is wonied about workers being hesitant to speak Avely pressuse.

but is not wonied aboct Comed being hesitant when both are faced with the same intimidating It is also unclear why Comed and the NRC placed such importance on the link between overtime and safety. De NRC's fitness-for-duty requirements contained in 10 CFR Part 26 must be followed by all  ;

workers and plant owners at all times - not just when worken are performing safety related duties. To my knowledge, there has never been an attempt by any plant owner or the NRC to dismiss / downplay drug or alcohol abuse on the basis that it did not correlate to events at a plant. Yet, that approach was taken by Comed regarding fatigue at Byron and is being entertained by NRC.

De approach taken by Comed to address overtune at Byron was disappointing. De guidance on evertime provided in NRC Generic letter 82-12 and essentially duptiosted in Bryon's technical i

specifications apply to individual workers, yet Comed relied almost exclusively on average overtime worked. The strength of a chain is dictated by its average link but by its weakest link. It matters little if  !

99 out of 100 links are incredibly strong and durable if the remaining link is terribly weak. Likewise, the fitness-for duty requirements would be worthless if applied on an average basis - the 0.04 blood-alcohol content limit would be tumed into ajoke if a company applied it on an average worker basis. nat would permit four totally drunken worken to be balanced by ninety-six tectotalers. Ofcourse, the NRC does not tolerate such shenanigans. But, the agency appears poised to allow ComBd to get away with mathematical magic when it comes to ovenime at Byron.

It is equally baffling why Comed places so much emphasis on the amount of overtime worked during outages i~iry-red to that worked when the plant is operating. ne safety concem associated with 1

cvertime is worker fatigue. %e need for overtime increases when a nuclear plant shuts down because '

there so much maintenanoe, tests, and inspections is pehmed on safety equipment then because it cannot be conducted when the plant is running. It is just as important that safety-related work be 1 performed by workers free from fatigue-impairment during outages as during operation. Vidually all circraft maintenance is perfonned when the plane is on the ground. ne fact that the plane is not in the cir at the time does not allow the FAA or airline companies to condone drunken or fatigued maintenance

' crews. Nor does the fact that a nuclear plant is shut down obviate the need for maintenance tests and

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May 28.1999 Page 3 of 4 inspections of safety equipment to be perfo:Tned by capable workers free from the effects of fatigue De lessening of overtime controls during nuclear plant outages also contradicts other established NR requirements. For example, the fitness-for-duty requirements contained in 10 CFR Part 26 apply uniformly at all times not more so when the plant is running. ne NRC would not tolerate any licensee l

bringing a beer truck up to the front gate and passing six-packs out to workers entering the fa an outage. Yet, the agency appears ready to allow Comed to set aside overtime controls during outage hese actions have virtually the same effect. Numemus safety studies have consistently demonstmted 1 that fatigue impairs human performance very much like alcohol.  !

j Comed's presentation on the safety culture was equally disturbing. I wholeheartedly agree with man the conoems expressed by numerous NRC staffers during the meeting about the survey conducte Comed's "indvad~it" team. Hat safety culture s'urvey was a travesty. De team's conduct reflected a very clear bias against finding a safety culture problem at the plant. For example, the team leader stated, that appmximately 20 percent of the persons interviewod voiced some level of reluctance to write a Problem Identification Form (PIF). fie stated fhrther that the team followed up on this observation by  !

reviewmg the PIF database and determining that these ' reluctant' workers were indeed writing PIFs. He  !

summarily discounted the importance of this survey result based on the team's followup work. Yet, it is I not apparent that the team performed comparable followup work relative to the 80 percent of the people who expressed no reluctance to write PIFs. Does the PIF d*h- confirm that these people are in fact  ;

writing PIPS? Mr. Stanley semi-addressed this question when he stated that some workers never write PIFs because their supervison write them instead. Hat statement appears unsupported by the data gathered by the survey, although it may very well be true. In any case, it is apparent that the "iPet" team started with the premise that a good safety culture existed at Byron. De team apparently accepted data which supported this position on faith and selectively chose to refute only that data which challenged this position.

Finally, in your closing remarks you gave Comed credit for corrective actions taken or planned to

' enhance' the safety culture at Byron. You specifically cited Comed's changes to the PIF procedure which provides better fadhw+ to the PIF initiators. I wtfidly request that you consider comparable changes to your own policies and preced- for treating nuclear workers who bring sincere safety  ;

concerns to the NRC. By oyerlooking Comed's violations and allowing the company to ' enhance' its safety culture and overtime contmis at Bymn, you may be improving safety levels at the facility but it comes at a very high price. By emphasizing future compliance rather than past non-compliance, you are de-valuing the role of dedicated nuclear professionals who bring issues like these to your agency. But for the actions of these nuclear workers - who have risked their careers -it is highly unlikely that Comed would be now taking these corrective measures. Mose issues were first mised to Comed long ago, but the company handled them improperly. %ese issues were then raised to NRC. De NRC's interest is only now inducing the company to fix the problems. It is just as imped.ut for the NRC to provide complete and scourate feedback to people raaking allegations as it is for ComBd to provide that feedback to workers initiating PIFs. The consequence of failing to do so is identical- workers stop writing PIFs end people stop submitting allegations to.the NRC. %e NRC's extreme reluctance to cite nuclear plant cwners for violations identified via the allegation pmoess is a " chilling effect" that dissuades future allegations. I can attest to this from my own personal experience before and since joining UCS.

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1 i May 28,1999 i Page 4 of 4 To be fair, the encouraging aspect of the meeting was the many probing questions asked of Comed's repre..ntatives by you, members of your staff, and members of the NRC headquarters staffin Rockville It appeared that the NRC did not simply rely on Comed's assurances of better future performance, expects to see tangible evidence ofimprovement. I hope that you will ensure the NRC takes aggressive !

actions to ensure that Comed meets these expectetions. j Sincerely, David A. Loch um Nuclear Safety Engineer l

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