IR 05000369/1985013

Insp Repts 50-369/85-13 & 50-370/85-12 on 850304-08.No Noncompliance or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint Activities,Licensed & Nonlicensed Employee Training & Licensed Operator Requalification Training

ML20127E426
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	04/26/1985
From:	Debs B, Julian C, Mccoy F, Modenos L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127E409	List: IR 05000369/1985013 ML20127E407
References
50-369-85-13-01, 50-369-85-13-1, 50-370-85-12, NUDOCS 8505200073
Download: ML20127E426 (11)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll

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g Ij 101 MARIETTA STREET. * 2 ATt.ANTA, G EORGI A 30323

'+ , . . . . . ,o-Report Nos.: 50-369/85-13 and 50-370/85-12 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire-1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 4-8, 19 5 Inspectors: W sfI. T. D s

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/Dat4 Si ned F. R. McC6y ( ./ Fundamental Training, Fundamental Shop Skills Training, Station-Familiarization Training,; Advanced Shop Skills Training,. Special Shop

- Skills Training, Periodic Retraining, and Supervisory . Training. The-Training and Safety.Section/ Training Unit provides annual requalifica-tions on GET. The Training . Unit keeps track of the _ annual .- GET-

.requalification program on a computerized program. The inspector

. selected several employees and verified that their personnel retraining records agreed with the computer printouts, i The maintenance personnel receive on-the-job training to improve their knowledge and skills to perform assigned job functions. The licensee stated that on-the-job training is given by each department but does not have a structured program to assure that all maintenance personnel receive such training. The licensee has recognized this, and'they are

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planning , to implement the Employee Training. and Qualification System l: (ETQS) as a continuing training program for Mechanical and I&E maintenance personne Until the ETQS program is established. and implemented, this will be identified as an Inspector Followup Item

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(50-369/85-13-06; 50-370/85-12-06). The inspector reviewed Shift Technical Advisor (STA) training for licensee STAS assigned to shifts "A" through "E" and one acting relief L STA. Of the training records reviewed, the inspector found that the STAS had received an engineering or related science degree, hold a .

L senior reactor operator license, and had . received the ~ requisite STA-

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training which the licensee has incorporated into the senior reactor

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operator training progra While reviewing the STA training records, the inspector noticed some apparent irregularities associated with the NRC license application, NRC Form ; 398, for one senior operato Section 12.1 " Nuclear Fundamentals" of this NRC Form 398 indicates 17 weeks of the fundamen-u

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tal trainin A review of examination score documentation for the l- licensee's Nuclear Fundamentals Module indicated that the aforemen-

!' 'tioned SRO/STA completed the individual module segment examinations but apparently was exempted along with four other candidates from taking

' the comprehensive examination. ' Although the ' candidate was issued an NRC licensee on March 31, 1984, a letter dated May 9, 1984 has been placed in the operators' training folder exempting the above individu-als from " Systems and Components General and Specific" training based on their past work experience. This letter did not provide justifica-tion for exempting the candidate from the comprehensive examinatio Discussion with licensee management indicated that prior revisions of the-Nuclear Production Department Training Plan allowed candidates to

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. % bypass sections of the operator training program on a case by case basis. The purpose of the letter which had been later placed in the training folders was to provide documented justification for allowing select candidates to bypass certain fundamental training based on

[ technical educatior, or power plant work experienc According to . Duke - Power Company's Nuclear Production Training Plan, s ~

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Revision 1, dated 7/9/84, Section 10.6.3 "all modules, except Nuclear s

y Fundamentals, may be bypassed by appropriately experienced personnel."

Licensee management indicated that prior revisions of the corporate training plan, in effect at the time of the aforementioned candidate's training, provided vague guidance for exemption. Such exemption were admittedly not well documented. This fact, was, in part,- responsible for the current specific requirements concerning training exemptio Regarding NRC Form 398 section 12.3 Simulator Operations, the inspec-W tor's review indicated that there were 11 weeks of documented 7 attendance opposed to the 12 weeks indicated on the applicatio Licensee representatives indicated that this error was made due to calculating the time by subtracting the end dates from the start dates of this training as opposed to computing the actual attendance of the candidate. This error in conjunction with the licensee's projection of training completion when the license application was submitted (prior to training completion) resulted in the licensee committing to 25 weeks of SRO training in section 12.4 of the application. In fact, it appears that an actual training duration of only 22.8 weeks took place. During subsequent telephone conversations between NRC Region II personnel and Duke Power Company Technical Training Center personnel, the licensee indicated that the difference between the calculated actual duration and the duration committed to on the NRC Form 398 may be attributed to holidays occuring during this time frame and to not accounting for stress training administered to the group of SRO's during this time frame. The NRC will review documentation supporting this information during a future inspection. Pending completion of this review, this item will be identified and carried as an unresolved item (URI -

50-369/85-13-07,50-370/85-12-07).

The inspector also observed that the subject senior operator had failed a Simulator Audit Examination administered by the licensee prior to nominating the candidate for a license. Training management indicated that, although no specific documentation is available, weak areas demonstrated on the examination are reviewed by the training staff with

the candidate before nominatio . Maintenance Program (62702)

An inspection was performed in the area of planning for corrective mainte-nance. The program for this phase of maintenance activities was determined to be adequat .

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The inspectors followed up on the preventive and corrective maintenance aspects of a recent diesel generator failur During an Engineered Safety Features (ESF) test on diesel generator (D/G) 2A on January 31, 1985, a valid failure was experienced by the D/G due to low lube oil pressure. Inspections were made to determine the cause for low lube oil pressure. Troubleshooting was conducted on various electrical and mechanical components of the diese Also, calibrations on lube oil pressure switches were checked and were found to meet design specification Upon inspection of the strainer, foreign material (subsequently determined to be babbit flakes a bearing component) were found. The strainer was cleaned and the babbit material was discarded. After 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> of troubleshooting, the cause of the low lube oil pressure had not been determined. A decision was made to run D/G 2A, unloaded, to do additional troubleshooting. On i February 1, 1985, operators attempted to start D/G 2A; however, the diesel tripped on low crankcase vacuum in 20 second When the diesel was re-started', the A & B lube oil pumps started cycling and an abnormal vibration of the engine was audibly detecte The test run was terminated and the engine declared inoperabl Inspection of the crankcase covers was performed and bronze and babbit material were found along the ledges of the inspection covers indi-cating bearing damage had occurre The bearings liners are made of 0.5 inch steel which is bonded to an approximately 0.015 inch thick layer of bronze and then an approxi-

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mately 0.004 inch thick layer of babbit. There are 10 main bearings in D/G 2 An inspection of all main bearings following the incident showed that the bronze and babbit on bearings numbered 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 had been worn off and the steel layers were exposed. Cavitational erosion

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(pitting) and extrusion of steel was visible on those bearings. Main bearings 1, 2, 3 and 10 had heavy scratching of the babbit layer but it was not deep enough to penetrate into the bronze layer. The babbit on main bearing 4 was worn off and the bronze layer was visibl The bearing failures appeared to be due to mechanical damage caused by

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scoring of the crankshaft surface and the bearin It has not been

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determined what initiated the scoring.

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Investigations as .to the cause of the main bearing failures, revealed that the base plate of D/G was misaligned with the engine rail which the diesel sits on. The engines' base was twisted causing possible over loading of the main bearing The engine failure may be attributed to this misalignment, however, at this time it can not be determined how much contribution the misalignment had on the failur The inspector reviewed the following construction documentation and verified the diesel and rail installations:

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Construction Procedure 329, dated 9/3/75 " Diesel Generator Align-ment and Inspection Requirements" D/G Unit Alignment Record, dated 8/26/77 Structural Grouting Inspection, dated 11/16/76 DWG No. MC-1231-10 Rev. 12, dated 7/2/82 " Diesel Generator Building - Unit 2 Sections and Details" DWG No. 8221-0058 dated 4/3/70 " Engine Rail Assembly" During the installation of the D/G on the engine rail there were no tight tolerance requirements to assure proper alignment provided at that time by the D/G manufacturer. The manufacturer was present during

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1 installation and Construction Procedure 329 requirements were met at that tim After the event, the D/G manufacturer provided tight tolerance requirements between the D/G and the engine rail to the licensee. The licensee has now met these new tolerances for D/G 2A and will assure the other D/Gs also meet these new tolerance No violations or deviations were identifie The licensee has developed a lubrication oil removal, replacement and analysis program for the D/Gs. The details of this program appear in local procedure MP/0/A/7300/02 which was approved April 2,1984. The procedure is employed by the license as a generic procedure for safety-related equipmen Under the provisions of the aforementioned procedure, lubrication oil samples were drawn from the licensee's emergency diesel generators as follows:

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Diesel Generator Date Sample Drawn c 1A 11/14/83 i 5/26/84 l IB 11/14/83

. 5/26/84 2A 5/26/84 9/25/84 l 2B 5/26/84 These samples were sent to a lubricant vendor for analysis. The inspector noted that the lubrication oil sampling procedure does not provide specific qualitative acceptance criteria for evaluation of the oil. - Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that the l

. licensee had not provided the vendor with oil analyses acceptance

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criteria. As a result, the vendor returned the analysis results to the licensee indicating that the values reported were normal. The vendor laboratory, however, made this determination based on street engine standard The inspector reviewed the analysis results for the . licensee's four emergency diesel generators. Regarding the 2A diesel which catastroph-ically failed in January 1985, the inspector noted that over the approximate four months between samples, the concentration of specific metal contaminants (indicative of engine wear) increased by a factor of 33 times for chromium, and 4 times for lead and aluminu Licensee Maintenance Management Procedure 5.1 (Revision 0), " Periodic Examinations / Adjustments" states, "Many plant components exhibit evidence of impending failure through readily identifiable symptom Recognization of these symptoms through inspections by knowledgeable observers is necessary to prevent equipment damage." Although the aforementioned procedure eludes to the necessity of tracking and trending, emergency diesel lubricating oil is not trended either in procedure MP/0/A/7300/02 or other maintenance procedure The inspector stated to licensee management that although no specific regulatory requirement exists to track and trend lubrication oil analyses results, trending of the 2A emergency diesel lubrication oil might have alerted the licensee of impending failure of the diese Licensee management acknowledged the inspector's comments. No viola-tions or deviations were note .

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