IR 05000369/1985033

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Insp Repts 50-369/85-33 & 50-370/85-34 on 851007-10.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise
ML20198E180
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/05/1985
From: Decker T, Sartor W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198E167 List:
References
50-369-85-33, 50-370-85-34, NUDOCS 8511130197
Download: ML20198E180 (10)


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UNITEJ STATES

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A o NUCLEAR EE".ULAT*.RY COMMISSION y" ~', REGION il g 101 MARIETTA STREET. * , *j ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 3 k, *

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..... NOV 0 51985'

Renort Nos.: 50-369/85-33 and 50-370/85-34 Licensee: Duke Power Company

'422 South Church Street *

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Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 s

Inspection Conducted: October 7 - 10,- 1985 Inspector: ///[/8[

W. M. Sartor, Jr. // , .. - Date Signed oh Accompanying Personnel: J. Kreh K. Clark

  • D. Schultz A. Loposer

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.. G. Wehmann

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T. R. Decker, Section Chief

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Division of Radia*,1on Safety and Safeguards

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SUMMARY-T

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Scope: .This routine, announced inspection involved 168 inspector-hours onsite in the area of an emergency preparedness exercise., ,

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Results: Of the areas inspected, no viciations or deviations were icentifie .

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • G.-Merritt, Crisis Management Representative
  • M. McIntosh, General Manager, Nuclear Support
  • J. Crumpler, Associate Engineer
  • S. Rose,-0EMA Engineer-
  • Haller, Manager,-Tech Service
  • G. Hallman, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
  • R. Clark, Senior Engineer
  • B. Dolan, Design & Construction Representative
  • D. Savage, Crisis News Group

M. Derbick, Crisis News Group

  • M. Cartwright, Crisis News Groups
  • H. Tucker, Public Spokesman

-*G. Hudson, Design Representative

  • Bolch, Catawba Station Emergency Planner
  • C. Jennings, Oconee Station Emergency Planner
  • E. Shirley, QA Auditor
  • Coren, QA Auditor
  • D. Bullins, QA Audit Representative
  • J. Standridge, QA Audit Representative
  • W. Deal, Health Physicist
  • C. Graves,- Jr., Operations Services
  • J. Osborne, Vice President's Staff of NPD
  • J. Hartwell, Safety Representative
  • J. Almond, Safety Representative
  • R. Smith, Vice President Mill Power
  • S. Kessler, Mill Power Purchasing Representative
  • T. McConnell, NPD Representative
  • R. Trants, Operations Representative
  • L. Haynes, Health Physicist
  • Martinec, Health Physicist
  • Carney, Operations Representative
  • McKendrick, Operations Representative
  • Deskevick, Maintenance Representative
  • Leonard, Compliance Engineer
  • McCraw, Compliance Engineer
  • Harris, System Emergency Planner
  • G. Vaughn, NPD Representative Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, security force members, and office personne .

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Other Organizations

  • A. Joyner, State Exercise Chief Controller, NC Div. of Emergency Management NRC Resident Inspectors
  • Orders R. Pierson
  • Attended exit interview Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 10, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as . proprietary any <> f the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92700)

This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, state and local emergency plans and organizations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The-scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on several occasion While no major problems with the scenario were identified during the review, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise. These inconsistencies failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organizatio Scenario problems were discussed with aanagement representa-tives during the exercise critique on October 10, 198 No violations or deviations were identifie . Drills (82301)

Limited drills conducted on October 8,1985, included a medical emergency, fire, and post-accident samplin Medical and Public Health Support This area was observed to determine that arrangements were made for emergency medical services for contaminated injured individuals as i

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l required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12),10 CFR 50, Appen tix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria defined in NUREG 0654,Section I The medical drill involved simulated injury of two plant personnel who were radiologically contaminated. The licensee's Medical Emergency

' Response Team was promptly dispatched to the accident scene. The injured persons were transported to Charlotte Memorial Hospital by the local rescue squad . and local emergency medical technician / service grou Priority was given to administration of first aid and life-saving measures. General contamination control techniques and radio-logical surveillance support was adequat The staff at Charlotte Memorial Hospital appeared knowledgeable of contamination control and. personnel decontamination techniques. The facilities appeared adequate to accommodate the simulated injured persons treatment need Fire Drill The scenario for the fire drill was revie"ed for adequacy and the simulated fire was observed to assess the status of training of the licensee pursuant to paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 and specific criteria defined in Section II.N of NUREG 065 The scenario developed for the fire drill was detailed and provided for the participation of the licensee's fire brigade and the offsite support of Gilead and Cornelius Volunteer Fire Department Performance was adequate; however, an exercise artificiality was observed in that the licensee's fire brigade was not aggressive in demonstrating its ability to contain and extinguish the fire until the offsite support agencies had been processed through security and were available to assist. An exercise weakness was noted when the offsite firefighters' response was delayed for training on the type of self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) provided by the license The licensee acknoweldged this concern and agreed to investigate to determine if corrective actions are neces sar (50-369/85-33-01, 50-370/85-34-01). PASS Drill The licensee's ability to obtain samples using the Post-Accident Liquid Sampling System and the Post-Accident Containment Atmosphere Sampling System were observed pursuant to specific criteria defined in Section II.N of NUREG 065 An inspector observed that the collection of post-accident air and liquid samples was adequate and consistent with licensee procedures.

, At the conclusion of the air sampling drill, a vacuum pump failed because of a blown fuse. This mode of failure occurred on a previous occasion and the licensee immediately initiated corrective maintenance.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors verified that the licensee made specific assignments to the emergency organization. The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and Crisis Management Center. At each of these centers, the assignment of responsibility and staffing appeared to be consistent with the licensee's approved procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response had been unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, para-graph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors determined that the licensee's onsite emergency organization was effective in dealing with the simulated emergency. Adequate staffing of the emergency response facilities was provided for the initial accident response and the interfaces between the insite organization and offsite support agencies appeared to be adequat No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency

.0perations Facility had been made, and that otner organizations capable of augmenting the planned response had been identified as required by-10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I State and local . staff could have been accommodated at the Crisis Management Cente Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt and assistance resources from various agencies were prepared to assist in the simulated emergency.

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No violt.tions or deviations were identifie . Emergency. Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10. CFR 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I An' inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Eme gency Plan and in the Implementing Proce-dures. The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the-simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simuisted emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie . Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,-

paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I An inspector observed- that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizatio The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting tra public within the plume exposure pathway was in place and operational. The system was activated during this exercise to simulate warning the public of significant

. events occurring at the reactor rit No violations or deviations were identifie . Emsrgency Communications This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications - among the principal response organization and emergency

- personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.57(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities appeared to be adequate in most case The exception to this was a licensee identified issue which p

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m focused f on the confusion regarding the frequency and content of n . followup messages provided by the CMC to the offsite authoritie No violations or deviations were identifie . Public Education and Information

.This area was observed to determine that information. concerning -the

-simulated emergency had been made available for dissemination 'to the public asi required., by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, '

and. specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I ~

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i ~ Information was _ provided to the media and the public in' advance of the exerci se'. .The information included ~ details on how the public would be notified and what initial. actions they should take in an emergency. A rumcr control program was in place. An Emergency News Center -(ENC) was esta-lblished and was well equipped and coordinate ,

<No. violations or deviations were identifie .1 Emergency Facilities and' Equipment (82301)

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This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and Jequipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as

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required by-10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and

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specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.H.

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p 'The-inspectors, observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency

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. response n facilities and evaluated equipment provided .for emergency use during the exercise. . A routine. observer . finding .which warrants the p' licensee's. attention is.the lack of access control'to'the control room,- TSC -

and .0SC areas beyond that which is. maintained for normal operations. . The- '

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licensee acknowledged this finding and agreed to investigate for. possible

corrective action. This .is identified-as an . exercise weakness and will be.

?' ' reviewed'during subsequent inspections (50-369/85-33-02, 50-370/85-34-02). Control Room - An inspector observed that control' room personne* acted-1 promptly to initiate emergency' response to the simulated emergenc ;

LEmergency procedures were readily available and the response was prompt ,

and' effectiv ; Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and staffed

. promptly~ upon. notification by the Einergency Coordinator of -the j" . simulated emergency conditions le'ading to an . Alert emergency classifi-cation. The -TSC staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their

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[ emergency responsibilities and TSC . operations proceeded in accordance

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that the' emergency coordinator conducted. frequent update-briefings with his: staff using an-effective public-address syste ;

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7 Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was staffed promptly- upon activation- by the Emergency Coordinator. An inspector observed that teams were formed promptly, briefed, and dispatched efficiently. When plant conditions necessitated the relocation of the OSC to the control room it was expeditiously accomplishe Crisis Management Center (CMC) - The -CMC was promptly staffed and activities were directed by the Recovery Manager. The Recovery Manager maintained contact with the Site Emergency Coordinator via an open telephone line. The Recovery Manager was also supported by CMC manage-ment personnel responsible for radiological protection, engineering and construction, technical support, administration and logistics, and news disseminatio Overall support for the CMC operation appeared adequat No-violations'or deviations were identifie . Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite conse-

.quences of a radiological emergency conditions were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the acciden During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations

.to 'the Site Emergency Coordinator concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials and to terminate the emergency conditio Radiological assessment activities are spread over several groups. A group in the TSC was effectively estimating the radiological impact in the plant based on inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Radio-logical effluent data was received in the TSC. The Offsite Radio-logical Support Group (0RSG) in the CMC routinely performed dose projections- and maintained good radio communication with the offsite monitoring team . Protective Responses' (82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required - by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I l

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A personnel- accountability drill was held as part of the exercise. Initial accountability was accomplished in approximately 30 minute An inspector verified the licensee had and Lsed emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the 10 mile EPZ. The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteria and notifications were made to the approp*iate offsite authorities within the 15 minute criteri No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, were established and implemented for emergency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing emergency workers supplemental dosimeters. Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions and

- adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used as appropriat No violations or deviations were identifie . Recovery and Reentry Planning (82301)

This area was not tested during this annual-emergency exercis . Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR .50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I A formal licensee critique of the emergency exercise was held on October 10, 1985, with exercise controllers, key exercise participants, licensee manage-ment, and NRC personnel in attendanc Weaknesses in the emergency

. preparedness: program, identified as a result of this exercise were presente Followup of corrective actions taken by the licensee on identified weaknesses will be accomplished through subsequent NRC inspection No violations or deviations were identifie , ..

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20. Inspector Followup (92701) (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/83-43-01, ,

50-370/83-50-01: Shift supervisor should delegate responsibilities during an emergency. An inspector observed that the shift supervisor-delegated responsibilities during the simulated emergenc b .' '(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/83-43-02, 50-370/83-50-02: Provide prompt accurate notifications to offsite-authorities. Prompt and accurate notifications to offsite authorities

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were~ provided by the licensee's emergency response organizations throughout the exercis (Closed) Inspector Followup item (IFI) 50-369/83-43-03, 50-370/83-50-03: Improve organization and direction and control of CMC

dose assessment group. . An inspector observed that the Offsite Radio-logical Support Group in the CMC was well organized and the staff was adequately directed and controlle (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/84-31-01, 50-370/84-28-01
Training of control room : support' technician in

' implementing prompt notification and documentation of notification message form. An inspector observed that the shift-technical assistant assigned the responsibility to . make notification of an emergency classification was familiar with the message form and performed the notification task expeditiousl (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/84-31-03, 50-370/84-28-03: Required improvement in communications between OSC and.TSC; improvement in management of offsite RAD monitoring team Communications between the OSC and TSC were well maintained and adequate. An inspector also observed that TSC dose. assessment group adequately managed the offsite radiation monitoring teams before transfer of this responsibility to the CM (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) _50-369/84-31-04, 50-370/84-28-04: Total ~1ack of management and administrative controls required to effectively operate the OSC. The OSC coordinator main-tained good control and adequately implemented OSC functions during the exercise.

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