IR 05000344/1993014
| ML20059A146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1993 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059A132 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-93-14, NUDOCS 9312300034 | |
| Download: ML20059A146 (8) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:lso > r U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY = COMMISSION . t
REGION V
' Report No.
50-344/93-14 Docket No.
50-344 , License No.
NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S._W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Nuclear Plant , Inspection At: Rainier, Oregon Inspection Conducted: September 30 - November 12, 1993 j Inspector: J. F. Melfi, Resident Inspector j Approved By: 'Ikb/C m P. H./Jphnson, Chief Date Signed '3 Reactde' Projects Section 1
Summary: .a Inspection on September 30 - November 12.1993 (Inspection Report No.
50-344/93-14) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced, resident inspection of operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, and follow-up of previously ' identified items. -Inspection procedures 60710, 61726, 62703, 71707, 92701,
and 90712 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspection.
Safety Issues Manaaement System (SIMS) Items: None Results: - General Conclusions and Specific Findinas: $ The licensee continued to adjust plant procedures and programs as appropriate to the shutdown condition of the plant. The plant's programs'and licensed staff appeared adequate for the work activities performed.
' Sionificant Safety Matters: None Summary of Violations and Deviations: One violation was identified involving a potential for improper draining of . the spent fuel pool (paragraph 7). The licensee's actions were reviewed by l the inspector and no written response to the Notice of Violation is required.
., i 9312300034 931215-DR ADOCM 05000344 ' PDR l
4, b-
. DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted .; a.
Portland General Electric
J. E. Cross, 'Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer l S. M. Quennoz, Plant General Manager
- D. L. Nordstrom, General Manager, Nuclear Oversight
' T. D. Walt, General Manager, Technical Functions !
- C. P. Yundt, Project Manager, Special Projects
- H. K. Chernoff, Manager, Licensing
- L. K. Houghtby, General Manager, Plant. Support
- M. B. Lackey, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE)
- J. P. Sullivan, Nuclear Plant Engineering Manager
- J. M. Mihelich, Manager, Technical Services T. O. Meek, Manager, Personnel Protection i
J. A. Vingerud, Electrical Maintenance Manager J. D. Westvold, Manager, Quality Assurance
- S. A. Schneider, Manager, Operations
.e
- J. A. Kirkebo, Assistant General Manager, NPE y
C. M. Dieterle, Supervisor, Individual Plant Examination .;
- B. M. Hugo, Compliance Engineer
- M. H. Megehee, Licensing Engineer
-
b.
Orecon Department of Enerav A.
Bless, Resident Safety Manager l V.
Sarte, Resident Inspector -! ' The inspector also talked with other licensee employees during the inspection. These included shift managere, certified fuel handlers and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and
engineers, and quality assurance personne'
- Denotes those attending the exit intervi.
f.
. 2.
Plant Status The plant remained in a defueled status throughout the inspection. The licensee continued to deenergize plant systems. Operators maintained the i spent fuel pool (SFP) temperature and level within Technical _ , Specifications limits.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71702 ' During this inspection period, the inspector observed and' examined plant ( activities to verify the safety of the licensee's facility. The- '! inspector observed these activities on a daily, weekly or biweekly basis.
! The inspector observed control room activities daily to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescrioed
in the facility Technical Specifications. The inspector examined logs, , instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records to obtain
2
[[z-2- . . ~ information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the inspector observed turnover of plant information to verify that on-shift certified fuel handlers and operators relayed pertinent information to oncoming shift personnel.
Each week the inspector toured accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items: General plant and equipment condition . Maintenance requests and repairs e Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment e
Ignition sources and flammable material control Conduct of activities according to the licensee's administrative e controls. and approved procedures Plant housekeeping and cleanliness
Radioactive waste systems e Proper storage of compressed gas bottles e Each week the inspector conversed with operators in the control room, and - with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training and other topics related to in progress work activities.
The inspector periodically observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee had implemented these practices ~in confor-mance with facility policies and procedures and according to regulatory.
requirements. The inspector verified that health physics supervisors and technicians conducted plant tours to observe activities in progress and , were aware of significant plant activities, p-rticularly those related to radiological conditions and/or challenges. liARA considerations were found to be an integral part of each RWP (radiation work permit).
The inspector conducted routine inspections of selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program. During inspection activities and periodic tours of plant areas, the inspector verified proper use of personnel monitoring equipment, observed individuals leaving the radiation controlled area and signing out on appropriate RWP's, and ' observed the posting of radiation areas and contaminated areas. The , inyolvement of health physics supervisors and engineers and their ' awareness of significant plant activities were assessed through conversations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Future Licensee Actions i The following is a synopsis of pending licensing actions, proposed future staffing levels, and contemplated decommissioning activities.
i a.
Pendino Licensina Actions The licensee has received many license waivers or exemptions, based j on their permanent shutdown. As of the end of the inspection ' i
i
. _3_ ~ ' reporting period, the licensee had submitted and was-awaiting NRC . approval of the following: Property. Insurance Exemption (10 CFR 50.54(w)). o ' Price Anderson Insurance Exemption (10 CFR 140) . Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications e Exemption to proposed Training Rule e Radiological / Environmental Technical Specifications o b.
Plant Staffina The licensee informed the inspector that the following table shows their projected staffing levels.
Department Jan. 1, 1994 Jan. 1, 1995 Jan 1, 1996 Management
10
Professional
45
Clerical
17
Operations
26
Maintenance
30
Security
30
TOTAL 209 158 146 c.
Proposed Decommissionina Activities The lice see is considering various options for the decommissioning of Troja: At the conclusion of the inspection reporting period, no formal di ision had been made regarding whether to leave major components in place for future decommissioning or to proceed with decommissioning. The licensee was evaluating several bid proposals to remove the steam generators and pressurizer from containment for permanent burial. The licensee is currently considering this option, in part, because of lower current burial rates for radioactive components. The licensee expects to make a decision within the next three months.
The licensee is also considering an integrated spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) for the spent fuel, with design of an ISFSI in the conceptual stage. Preliminary plans indicated that the ISFSI would be passive and air-cooled.
If the licensee completes an ISFSI, they could then deactivate spent fuel pool support systems (e.g.,theservicewaterandcomponentcoolingwatersystems).
. Af ter ISFSI completion, the required plant staff could be reduced.
A licensee decision regarding an ISFSI was still pending, but would apparently consider these possible cost reductions and the uncertain opening date for a national high-level waste repository.
No violations or deviations were identifie _ ,- . . . . ,h f-4- ' v , 5.
Maintenance (62703) ' The inspector observed portions of the licensee's investigation 'in'to a i plugged cooling water line to the C service water (SW) pump per_ Mainte-
nance Request (MR) 93-1185. The licensee found that clams.had plugged j the line to the C SW pump. The licensee tried and was unsuccessful at backflushing the line. At the conclusion of the inspection, the licensee- ! was still evaluating what corrective actions needed to be' taken for this ' pump.
, The observed portions of this maintenance were done in accordance with
MR 93-1185 instructions, and were accomplished by qualified personnel-. No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance (61726) The inspector observed the licensee perform inservice tests on-valves in ! the emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start system and fuel oil ' system. The licensee performed Periodic Operating Test (PDT) 24-3C, " Weekly Operation Routine for Air Receiver," and POT 13-1, " Train A or B Quarterly Time Testing and Valve Exercising.". Qualified personnel satisfactorily completed these tests, following the written instructions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
I 7.
Event Follow-up (93702, 62703. 92701) i Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Skimmer pump Hose ! During a tour of the SFP area on November 12, 1993, the inspector noticed ! that the 1 -inch skimmer pump _ suction consisted of a long flexible hose - connected to a floating basket assembly. This_ assembly, which is hooked onto the side of the pool, allows the basket to move vertically over a range of about two feet. Further inspection revealed that this assembly - could become detached during a seismic event. The inspector questioned ' whether, during a seismic event, this.line could go below the level of_- the siphon breakers (83 feet,11 inches). The licensee confirmed that. , this line could extend below 83 feet 11 inches by 21' inches. The licenseeissuedCorrectiveActionRequest(CAR) 93-0088'to resolve and document the resolution of this issue. The licensee also identified that; , operators did not isolate the skimmer system when not in use, as required , by Operations Instruction 4-6, " Spent Fuel Pool Purification, Skimmer and.
, Demineralizer Operation." The licensee issued CAR 93-089 to determine why the operators did.not follow 01 4-6.
> l The facility's design basis, as referenced in Technical Specification -) 5.6.2, provides that the spent fuel storage pool be maintained with
siphon breakers in the piping extending into the pool to prevent ' inadvertent draining of the. pool below elevation 83 feet,11 inches.-__ . Since the skimmer system was not isolated when not in operation,'a ! potential siphon path usually. existed. Criterion III of 10 CFR 50,- l Appendix B, states that measures shall be established to assure that ' applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for structures, i
,
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.. : -5- . . systems, and components to which the appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.- However, Detailed Construction Package DCP 1 associated with Request' for ! Design Change (RDC) 78-103, installed in the facility in May 1980, did , not correctly translate the design basis into the specifications, y drawings, procedures, and instructions which implemented this design change. As a result, the modified spent fuel pool skimmer pump suction , piping was not maintained in a configuration to prevent draining of the l pool below 83 feet,11 inches. This is a violation (50-344/93-14-01).
Oriainal System Descriotion The SFP skimmer system was installed to remove dust, etc., from the top of the SFP. However, the original design did not use the skimmer basket , assembly. The original design allowed water to flow over.a weir into a trough around the periphery of the SFP and through various drain holes'in the trough into the skimmer pump suction. From the pump, the water went-into a filter and back into the pool. During initial operation, the licensee found that the original design was not effective in removing t dust from the SFP. To temporarily resolve this situation, the licensee designed a skimmer basket assembly. The licensee manufactured three basket assemblies under MR 78-4431. These basket assemblies hook onto , the SFP trough and are designed to permit the strainer basket to' move up + or down in the assembly as SFP water level changes, up to [wo feet.
Skimmer System Modification
Since these skimmer assemblies worked well, the licensee completed the ! as-built drawings for the temporary system and added permanent connec-tions with a Request for Design Change (RDC).
RDC 78-103 seal-welded a many of the drain holes in the overflow trough, and welded (some
connection piping stands around the SFP, cask load pit, *uel transfer-t canal and refueling cavity. The connection piping stands Save a. pipe, . isolation valve and a quick disconnect fitting. MR 80-1225 implemented l RDC 78-103, but did not provide any quantitative guidance for the' length j of the SFP hose. The only guidance provided was step 3 of MR 80-1225, which said to "... attach 2" SS quick disconnects to skimmers already in > fuel pool by cutting hoses (as directed) and using SS hose clamps." The ' system has remained in intermittent use since 1980.
Safety Sionificance For this system, the limiting accident analyzed _in the Defueled Safety l Analysis Report (DSAR) is a seismic event which ruptures all non-seismic ? piping going into the SFP. The analysis further assumes the decay heat , load from the fuel at 40 weeks after shutdown of the plant. With the assumed scenario, the SFP level would decline rapidly to 83 feet,11 , inches, where the siphon breakers in the piping would disable the suction ' path.
In addition, the analysis assumes a one-time failure of the seals between the SFP and the fuel transfer canal (FTC) and the cask' load pit (CLP), which removes some additional water. The DSAR estimated that the i time for the SFP level to reach five feet above the fuel assemblies was i 98 hours, which allows time for compensatory actions. This SFP level provides sufficient shielding for personnel.
. _.
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,_ -- ~ .. .. -6- . .. The licensee reanalyzed this accident with. the skimmer pump suction hose ~ extending below 83 feet,11 inches. The skimmer suction hose could remove some additional water in the pool, which would decrease the time to reach five feet above the fuel assemblies.
In their reanalysis,. the licensee found.an unnecessary non-conservatism in their original calculation, which changed the time to reach five feet above,the. fuel assemblies from 98 to 102 hours. The licensee reanalyzed this minimum time, using a number of= assumed leakrates 'out of the spent fuel pool into the fuel transfer canal and cask load pit. With no leakage, the_ time was about 200 hours. - At high leakrates (greater than 300 gpm), the effect' of the skimmer pump suction hose was not important, and the' time to. reach five feet above the fuel assemblies remained at or above 102 hours. For an.. intermediate range of leakrates, the skimmer suction hose did have an effect. The licensee calculated that the minimum time to reach five feet above the fuel assemblies was about 95 hours with about a 40 gpm SFP door leakrate into the CLP or the FTC. This' timeframe still allows enough time for the licensee to take corrective actions.
! i Although the time to boiling in the SFP did decrease, the time was about ' four days, which is the same as the DSAR analysis.
Further, the CLP has
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been full of water since permanent plant closure. Water in the CLP increases the time for the SFP level to reach 5 feet above the fuel assemblies, since additional water would be available to boil. Allowing t ' for a full CLP, the licensee calculated the time to reach five feet above the fuel assemblies to be 129.4 hours with a 24 gpm door leakrate.
- Licensee Corrective Actions The licensee concluded that this situation occurred due to an inadequate design. change in 1980. The licensee committed to shorten the hose by December 9,1993, and to note on the affected drawings the maximum length of the skimmer pump hose. ' The licensee also committed to isolate the skimmer basket from the skimmer pump until the line is shortened. -These action _s should prohibit a recurrence af this problem. The inspector concluded that there was minimal safety significance.to this event-and that the licensee's corrective actions were adequate. Therefore, no licensee response is required and this violation is closed.
One violation was identified.
8.
Follow-up of Licensee Event Reports (90712) The inspector reviewed the following LERs associated with reported events. Based on the information provided.in each report it was con - cluded that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions' were appropriate. The inspector closed the following LERs based on in-office review:. LER 92-26, Revision 5 " Fire Barrier Deficiencies Identified as Result of Ongoing Fire Barrier Surveillance Program" LER 93-04, Revision 0 " Deficient Calibration Method for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Instrument causes-Condi-tion Prohibited by the Technical Specifications"
re-- ~ ' - - . '" - fi j .-7-i ,.. . - . No violations or deviations were identified.- } 9.
Follow-up of Open items (92701) ! s Follow-up Item 93-09-01 (Closed). " CAR Initiation Threshold" ' ' The inspector opened this-item due to a low corrective action. request-(CAR) initiation rate. The Quality Assurance (QA) organization had the same concern and-performed an audit to assess whether there was a reluctance to initiate CARS.
. The inspector _ reviewed the licensee's audit. This audit looked at' main-tenance requests, logs,_ etc., and discussed CAR initiation.with selected si personnel. -The audit did not identify any reluctance to initiate CARS or : any activities' that should have been but were not addressed by a CAR.
, .i The licensee has continued to initiate CARS.. Based on the decline in plant activity, fewer CARS should be anticipated.
This item is closed.
10. Exit Interview (30703) The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in para- ! graph 1) on November 10, 1993, and with licensee management.throughout the inspection period. During these meetings the inspector summarized - the scope and findings of the inspection activities. - The licensee acknowledged;the inspector's findings.
. ' The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of-the information reviewed by or discussed with the inspector during the inspection.
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