IR 05000344/1993015
| ML20059A394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1993 |
| From: | Pate R, Qualls P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059A389 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-93-15, NUDOCS 9312300143 | |
| Download: ML20059A394 (3) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
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Report No.
50-344/93-15
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Docket No.
50-344 License No.
NPF-1 Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:
Trojan Inspection at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection Conducted:
November 15-18, 1993 Inspector:
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P. M. Qualls, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Other Inspectors: D. M. Barss, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR/DRSS/PEPB Approved by:
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Robert J. Pate, ' Chief '
Date. Signed Safeguards, Emergency Preparedness, and Non-Power Reactor Branch SUMMARY:
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Inspection on November 15-18. 1993 (ReDort No. 50-344/93-15)
er_qits Inspected:. Announced, routine inspection to address the Operational-t Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program and of the annual Emergency.
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Preparedness Exercise.
Inspection procedures 82701, 82301, and 82302.were used as guidance.
Results: No violations of NRC requirements were identified during this
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inspection. The licensee appeared to adequately implement the recently approved Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan. No significant strengths or
weaknesses were identified during this inspection.
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9312300143 931214 PDR ADOCK 05000344
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel
- J. Cooper, Manager, Emergency Preparedness (EP)
- T. Walt,. General Manager, Technical Functions
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- F. Jones, Emergency Planning Specialist -
- S. Schneider, Operations Manager
- L. Houghtby, General Manager, Plant -Support
- J. Thale, Emergency Planning Engineer
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- H. McQuiston, CAR Supervisor-
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- T. Meek, Radiation Protection Manager
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- S. Quennoz, General Manager, Trojan Plant
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- H. Gatlin, Nuclear Security Manager
- B. Hugo, Compliance Engineer
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- D. Nordstrom, General Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- H. Lackey, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering
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- J. Mihelich, Technical Services Manager
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H. Caballero, Hazardous Materials Coordinator
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Other Personnel
- Personnel in attendance at the November 18, 1993, exit interview.-
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Doerational Status of the Emeroency PreDaredness Proaram (Inspection
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Procedure 82701)
a.
Oroanization and Manaaement Control
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This area of the licensee's program was ' addressed to determine-whether the staffing met the requirements of the Permanently:
Defueled Emergency Plan and that the emergency response
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organization (ERO) could be staffed as required-in.the allocated
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time. The inspector found that the licensee's organization met j
plan requirements. The inspectors also verified that the onsite i
staff was in accordance with plan requirements and that the ERO
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could be staffed as required.
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b.
Chanaes to' the Emeroency Plan and'Implementino Procedures'
The licensee. implemented a NRC.revieued ~a'nd approved Permanently
Defueled Emergency Plan,on September 30,'1993..Since the plan was j
so recently approved the inspectors verified that'the implementing '
procedures appeared adequate to: implement plan requirements. The
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inspectors reviewed. a representative sample 'of the' licensee's
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Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP's) and found that i
they appeared to adequately implement plan requirements.
'l Subsequent to the onsite inspection, the licensee provided to the-
inspector additional information concerning an accountability procedure.
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c.
Trainino l
This part of the inspection was conducted to determine whether the licensee was implementing its EP training program in accordance with emergency plan and procedural requirements and_ had trained the ERO concerning the defueled emergency plan. To accomplish this, the inspector discussed the EP training program with the emergency planning staff and reviewed training records and lesson plans. _ The inspector concluded that EP training was being conducted in accordance with NRC guidelines and licensee procedures and that key personnel had received adequate training about the revised emergency plan. During the exercise, the inspectors noted that the operators responding to the site of.a fuel oil spill and subsequent fire in a radiologically controlled area did not arrive with radiological monitoring instrumentation.
The radiation protection training of the onsite operators, which respond to an event in the absence of health physics support on backshift, will be reviewed during a later inspection (50-344/93-15-01 OPEN).
d.
Tour of Emeroency Response Facility (ERF)
This area was inspected to verify that the ERF and associated equipment were adequate to support an activation of the emergency plan. To accomplish this, the inspector to toared the Control Room (CR). During the tour, the inspector noted that the CR-appeared to be well maintained and ready for activation. The inspectors did note during the exercise that maps of the exclusion area and surrounding areas were not readily available in the CR.
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e.
Corrective Action List The inspector reviewed the Corrective Action List which is maintained by the Emergency Preparedness Manager. This list is the licensee's tracking method for improvement items identified-during drills, exercises, and audits. The list appeared to be at approximately the proper level of detail and contained only 2 items that were open at the time of the inspection.
The list appeared to be kept curt W.
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f.
Quality Assurance Audit The inspector reviewed the 1993 QA audit report, report number DLN-177-93. The audit identified areas where improvement was needed and corrective actions were taken and tracked for audit items.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exercise Plannino (responsibility. scenario /ob.iectives develooment.
control of scenario)
j The Manager, Emergency Planning (EP) has the overall respons'ibility for l
developing, conducting and evaluating the annual emergency preparedness exercise. The EP staff developed the scenario with the assistance of licensee staff from other organizations possessing appropriate' expertise
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(e.g. health physics, maintenance, etc.). _ In an effort to maintain -
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strict security over the scenario, individuals who had been involved in
the-exercise scenario development were not participants in the exercise;
onsite. The exercise document was adequately. controlled before the.
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exercise. Advance copies.of the exercise document.were provided-to the
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NRC evaluators and other persons having a specific need.-'.'The players
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did not have access to the exercise document or information on scenario
events. This exercise was intended.to' meet the requirements' of the-licensee's approved emergency plan.
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4.
Exercise Scenario
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The exercise scenario started with an event classified as. an Unusual
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Event and was later escalated to'an Alert and remained at that level.
The opening event in the exercise involved a fork. lift damaging the fuel l
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oil tank for a large truck, which was loaded with a.radwaste. shipment,-
i in the radwaste building. An Unusual Event was declared as 'a' result.of
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the fuel oil spill. -The fuel oil later caught-fire. engulfing the
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radwaste building and the propane tank on the forklift exploded
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breaching the building. ~ The fire caused a release of_ radioactive material affe'cting facility operations resulting in an Alert.being declared.
The exercise was terminated when exercise objectives had been
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demonstrated to the licensee-controllers.
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5.
Federal-Observers
Two NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response to the. scenario-The inspectors were stationed in the Control Room (CR)'and at the. scene _
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of the fire.
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6.
Exercise Observations (82301)
l The following. are observations made. by the inspectors during th'e ti exercise. Where appropriate the licensee may consider these
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observations-for ideas to imp' rove the emergency preparedness, program.-.
Control Room'(CR)
The following aspects of.CR operations were observed during the:
exerciser detection and classification of emergency events, notification, frequent use of emergency procedures, and: innovative.-
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attempts to mitigate the accident. The following are observations by
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the NRC inspector in the CR and while at the scene of. the fire, j
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The Emergency Coordinator held regular briefings with his staff.
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These briefings provided an opportunity for all key individuals to
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be informed of current status and ongoing actions to ensure a coordinated response effort.
b.
The Control Room appeared to provide adequate space and communication capabilities for the scenario conditions.
There was
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limited availabilities of maps and other visual aids in the
facility.
A radiological control point was not established at the control c.
room entrance as required by EPIP 3, " Response Organization Checklists", Attachment 7, " Health Physics Representative Checklist". The procedural requirement for the establishment of this control point appears to be overly conservative for the postulated _ scenario events. The license should evaluate the necessity of the procedural requirements and allow for discretion under existing circumstances.
d.
The hazardous material spill was not immediately announced over the plant PA system. The licensee followed established procedural guidance for dealing with a hazardous spill by sending the fire brigade to the scene. The fire brigade was dispatched to the scene via individual telephone calls. As a result, as the licensee noted in their critique, and as noted below, there did not appear to be anyone in charge at the spill scene.
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Event declarations were timely and accurate.
f.
Offsite notifications were started within 15 minutes of event declarations.
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The RP Coordinator did a good job in determining potential release
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quantities and doses based upon previous calculations which had been for a worst case study of a fire in the radwaste building.
On Scene Observations
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Two operators showed up promptly to investigate the situation and a.
remained at the scene to provide assistance as necessary.
b.
The Hazardous Materials Coordinator and Manager of Personnel Protection reported to the scene to evaluate the situation. The Hazardous Materials Coordinator remained at the scene and provide'
t direction as needed.
The Manager of Personnel Protection asked for a copy of the c.
shipping papers for the simulated shipment. Drill controllers did not have available prepared shipping papers, but were able to provide the source term information which was neede..
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d.
Fire Brigade personnel responded to the scene and quickly assessed the need for and obtained the hazmat response cart.
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Although it was not obvious who was in charge at the spill scene, there was good discussion and coordination.between the fire brigade, operators, and Hazardous Materials Coordinator as to what-actions should be taken. These actions were effectively implemented to mitigate the situation within the constraints of the scenario, f.
Health Physics support was slow to respond to the scene and did not remain at the scene once they arrived. More health physics support would have been useful. The (simulated) Rainier Fire Chief asked immediately for radiological information on arrival at the fire scene. This information was not available until the HP technician returned to the scene about five minutes later.
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g.
Actions were taken to shut off power to the affected area.
Barriers were established (simulated) to _ isolate the scene.
Personnel were stationed to monitor for possible runoff of
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potentially contaminated fire fighting water.
h.
Though not dersonstrated, health physics personnel did discuss with-on scene responders action to be taken to control' the spread of contamination and monitoring of personnel and equipment before leaving the scene.
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On scene personnel maintained good communication with the control room to keep the Emergency Coordinator informed of the current
status of response efforts.
Other observations a.
Emergency dosimetry is issued to emergency response personnel coming on site from offsite agencies at the Industrial Area
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Boundary using Procedure RP 202, "TLD Receipt, Shipment, and Preparation For Issue", Attachment 6, "RERP Emergency TLD Issue Instructions *. The procedure seemed adequate, though somewhat-cumbersome for use during expedited site entry conditions for responders such as fire fighters and ambulance personnel. The l
procedure still makes references to some emergency response facilities which the licensee no longer maintains, the procedure
should be reviewed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Critioue The inspectors observed the licensee's critique which immediately-followed conclusion of the exercise. The critique appeared to be in i
depth and successful in self identification of drill problems.
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8.
Exit Interview.
On November 18, 1993, at the conclusion of the site. visit, the inspectors met with the licensee representatives identified in Paragraph I to summarize the scope and the preliminary resulte of this inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary ar.y of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the-
inspection.
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