ML20247G215
| ML20247G215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1989 |
| From: | Rebecca Barr, Mendonca M, Suh G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247G201 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-89-01, 50-344-89-1, NUDOCS 8904040162 | |
| Download: ML20247G215 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000344/1989001
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
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Report No. 50-344/89-01
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Docket No. 50-344
License No. NPF-1
Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company
-121 S. W. Salmon' Street
Portland, Oregon 97204
Facility Name: Trojan Nuclear Plant
Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon
Inspection conducted: January 1 - February 11, 1989
Inspectors:
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R. C. Barr
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Date Signed
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Senior Resident Inspector
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G. Y. Suh
Date Signed
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Resident Inspector
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Approved By:
M. M. Mendonca, Chief
Date Signed
Reactor ProjectsSection I
Sumary:
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Inspection on January 1 - February 11, 1989 (Report 50-344/89-01)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification,
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-maintenance, surveillance, event follow-up, and follow-up on previously
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' identified items.
Inspection procedures 30702, 30703, 35502, 61726, 62703,
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<71707, 90712, 92700, 92701, 92702 and 93702 were used as guidance during the
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conduct of the inspection.
Results:
Paragraph 5 discusses instances of procedural non-compliance during
the performance of routine channel functional testing. Continued management ~
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attention appears to be warranted, particularly with instrument and control
technicians.
Paragraph 5 discusses the performance of an inadequate quality control-
observation of work activities. Recent inspection findings'and a-previously
identified violation in this area appear to indicate the need for improvements
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in quality control effectiveness.
8904040162 890315
ADOCK 05000344
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Paragraph 7 discusses the failure to provide accurate information in a
Licensee' Event Report, and a missed surveillance that resulted from the
failure to comply with procedures and having procedures inappropriate for the
circumstance.
Paragraphs 6 and 7 relate the result of operatir.g with inter-office memorandum
vice changing operating procedures.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- D.
W. Cockfield, Vice President, Nuclear
- C. A. Olmstead, Plant General Manager
L. W. Erickson, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance
- R. P.-Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance
D. W. Swan,' Manager, Technical Services
M. J. Singh, Manager, Plant Modifications
J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services
- J. W. Lentsch, Manager, Personnel Protection
- J. M. Anderson, Manager, Material Services
- R. E. Susee, Manager, Planning and Scheduling
D. F. Levin, Supervisor, Plant Modifications
E. A. Curtis, Procurement Supervisor
- P. A. Morton, Branch Manager, Plant Systems Engineering
R. L. Russell, Operations Supervisor
R. H. Budzeck, Assistant Operations Supervisor
D. L. Bennett, Maintenance Supervisor
R. A. Reinart, Instrument and Control Supervisor
T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor
_R.
W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor
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C. H. Brown, Operations Branch Manager, Quality Assurance
- D. L. Nordstrom, Nuclear Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Regulation
The inspectors. also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees
during the course of the inspection.
These included shift supervisors,
reactor and auxi'liary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians
and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Plant Status
The Trojan facility operated at 100% power throughout this reporting
period.
The main condenser experienced a minor intermittent circulating
water leak throughout the reporting period; however, the leakage was
within the cleanup capacity of the condensate demineralizers and did not
significantly impact plant operation.
On February 1, 1989, after
approximately two weeks of intermittent alarming, the
"C" Reactor Coolant
Pump (RCP) lower bearing oil reservoir high level alarm " locked in".
The
licensee, as a precautionary measure, has since continuously monitored
the "C" RCP bearing temperatures.
The bearing temperatures are normal.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 35502)
During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined
activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a
daily, weekly or biweekly basis.
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Daily, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify the
licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed
in the facility Technical Specifications.
Logs, instrumentation,
recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain
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information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of
information on plant status was observed to determine that' pertinent
information was relayed to the oncoming shift personnel.
Each week the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to
observe the following items:
(a) General plant and equipment conditions.
(b) Maintenance requests and repairs.
(c) Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
(d)
Ignition sources and flammable material control.
(e) Cnnduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's
administrative controls and approved procedures.
(f) Interiors of electrical and control panels.
(g) Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
(h) Radiation protection controls.
(i) Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
(j) Radioactive waste systems.
(k) Proper storage of compressed gas bottles.
Weekly, the inspectors examined the licensee's equipment clearance
control with respect to removal of equipment from service to determine
that the licensee complied with technical specification limiting
conditions for operation.
Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure
that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance
evolutions.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution and test tags were
examined by the inspectors.
Each week the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room,
and with other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent
topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security,
training and other topics related to in progress work activities.
The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCRs) to
confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Routine inspections of the licensee's physical security program were
performed in the areas of access control, organization and staffing, and
detection and assessment systems.
The inspectors observed the access
control measures used at the entrance to the protected area, verified the
integrity of portions of the protected area barrier and vital area
barriers, and observed in several instances the implementation of
compensatory measures upon breach of vital area barriers.
Portions of
the isolation zone were verified to be free of obstructions.
Functioning
of central and secondary alarm stations (including the use of CCTV
monitors) was observed.
On a sampling basis, the inspectors verified
that the required minimum number of armed guards and individuals
authorized to direct security activities were on site.
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The inspectors conducted routine inspections of selected activities of.
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the licensee's' radiological protection program.
A sampling of radiation
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work permits (RWP) was-reviewed for completeness and adequacy of
information. . During the course of inspection activities and periodic
tours of plant areas, the. inspectors verified proper use of personnel
monitoring equipment, observed individuals leaving the radiation
controlled area and signing out on appropriate RWP's, and observed the
posting of radiation areas and contaminated areas.
Posted. radiation
levels at locations ~within the fuel and auxiliary buildings were verified
using both NRC and licensee portable survey meters.
The involvement of
health physics supervisors and engineers and their awareness of
significant plant activities was assessed through conversations and
review of RWP sign-in records.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety ,
features.
This was done by direct visual verification of the correct
position of valves,. availability of power, cooling water' supply, system
integrity and general condition of. equipment, as applicable.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Maintenance (62703)
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he inspectors observed ongoing fuel repair. activities being conducted in-
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the spent fuel pool area.
Eighteen fuel assemblies damaged primarily
from the baffle gap jetting phenomena and removed from the reactor vessel
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after Cycle 4 were being repaired either by transferrin'g fuel rods to new
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fuel assembly skeletons or by replacing damaged fuel rods with stainless
steel rods.
The inspectors observed the transfer of several fuel rods in
the reassembly of fuel assembly F18.
The work was being performed by a
vendor field crew. The inspectors observed continuous radiation
protection coverage as required by radiological work permit RWP 89-26.
The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation for the conduct of fuel
repair activities.
Observed work in progress was found to be consistent
with the safety evaluation.
In addition, technical specification
requirements with regard to the spent fuel pool ventilation system were
verified to be met.
Applicable work procedures were on hand at the work
site with inspection hold points being observed.
The inspectors
discussed various aspects of the work activities with cognizant
engineers.
The inspectors understood that seventeen of the fuel
assemblies would be used in upcoming Cycle 12 and verified that the
licensee had applied for NRC review and approval of the use of these fuel
assemblies in License Change Application LCA-161.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance (61726, 92701)
The inspectors observed the performance of channel functional tests for
steam generator level instrumentation.
Communication was observed
between the test personnel and control room operator, including the
establishment of constant communication when protection cabinet doors
were opened and when bistables were tripped.
The inspectors verified
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calibration of test instruments to be current and observed the
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restoration of the instrumentation channels to service.
The work was
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performed by two instrumentation and control technicians. A quality
control inspector performed a work observation during the testing of
steam generator level channels 519 and 549.
The channel functional tests were controlled by the following procedures:
Periodic Instrument and Control Test (PICT) 5-1, Revision 9, titled
" Steam Generator Level, Protection Set
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for steam generator water
level channels 529 and 539; PICT-5-2, Revision 12, titled " Steam
Generator Level, Protection Set II," for channels 519 and 549; PICT-5-3,
Revision 10, titled " Steam Generator Level, Protection Set III," for
channels 518, 528, 538, and 548; PICT 5-4, Revision 11, titled " Steam
Generator Level, Protection Set IV," for channels 517, 527, 537, and 547.
The inspectors reviewed the procedures and verified that the operability
of the trip functions associated with the instrumentation channels were
being demonstrated.
Review of a sample of recently completed data sheets
indicated that the surveillance tests were being performed in a timely
manner.
In the testing of trip functions, a simulated signal from a ramp
generator was injected into the instrument channel at the input test
jack.
The setpoints were determined through the use of a comparator
logic tester.
The test procedures required that a simulated signal
initially set at five volts be decreased to one volt with each bistable
action being recorded, and then increased to record each bistable action
on an increasing signal.
Multiple photocells of the comparator logic
tester were ta be connected to lights associated with each bistable which
performed a trip function.
The inspectors observed apparent procedural violations in the performance
of PICT-5-1, PICT-5-2, PICT-5-3, and PICT-5-4, in that the test personnel
ramped the test input down and up as necessary to observe the bistable
actions and used only one photocell which was moved to the bistable light
which was expected to change state for the given test input.
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addition, the photocells were observed to be connected to indicating
lights different than those indicated in the procedures.
The observed
ramping of the test signal was as follows.
The simulated signal was
decreased until the first bistable changed state, then increased until
the associated trip or reset action occurred, then decreased again to the
next value at which a bistable changed state.
At this point, the signal
was again increased until the associated trip or reset action occurred.
These actions continued until each bistable had been tested and the test
input was at one volt.
Discussions with engineering and maintenance
personnel indicated no technical difference between the observed method
and the steps outlined in the procedure.
The above findings constitu'.2
an apparent violation to follow approved procedures (50-344/89-01-01).
Discussions with maintenance supervision and several instrumentation and
control technicians indicated that the observed method of performing the
surveillance testing may be the general practice within the shop.
The
inspectors noted that draft revisions of PICT 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4
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(revised by the contractor for the Procedure Upgrade Program) more
closely outlined the observed method for performing the test.
Testing of channels 519 and 549 per PICT-5-2 was observed by a quality
control inspector performing a scheduled quality inspection calibration
observation. Quality Inspection Procedure QIP 15, Revision 0, titled "QI
Observations of I&C Calibration Activities," provided the requirements
for performing and documenting observations. QIP 15 specifies, in part,
that the inspector :ste whether work was performed in accordance with.
approved procedures to assure that plant procedures are being followed.
The inspectors reviewed the completed observation report and discussed
observation activities with the quality control inspector. The failure
to follow approved procedures was not noted by the QC inspector in his
report. The QC inspector stated that he had not recognized the
procedural violations. He stated that he had been called shortly prior
to the performance of PICT-5-2 and was able to only do a cursory review
of the procedure in prepard ion for performing his observation. The
fai.ure to note that work was not perfomed in accordance with approved
procedures is an apparent violation of QIP-15 requirements
(50-344/89-01-02). A contributing factor to this violation appears to be
the fcct that the QC inspector did not have adequate time to prepare for
the test.
Further, the inspectors reviewed completed quality control observation
reports since July 1988 for observations of surveillance testing
performed by instrumentation and control technicians.
There were four
observations on PICT-5-1, PICT-5-2 PICT-5-3, or PICT-5-4. There were
eight other observations. performed for similar surveillance tests which
involved similar procedural steps. None of these observation reports
- documented failure to follow approved procedures. The inspectors
discussed initial findings with quality assurance management who stated
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that they were conducting an evaluation in response to the findings.
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Two apparent violations and no deviations were identified.
6.
Event Follow-Up (93702, 92701)
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Control Room Doors Blocked Open-Entry into T.S. 3.0.3
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From approximately 8:40 AM to 9 05 AM, A January 23, 1989, with the
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reactor at 100% power, the control room door s were maintained open while
conducting corrective maintenance per a Maintenance Request (MR 89-0656)
to repair the lower door latch assembly. Tbc control room doors are part
of the control room emergency ventilation system boundary. With respect
to Trojan Technical Specification 3.7.6.1., two independent control room
emergency ventilation systems shall be operable. With the control room
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doors maintained open, both trains of the control room emergency
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ventilation system were technically rendered inoperable. However, it
should be noted, the sealing surface was capable of providing the
boundary i f the door had been shut,
Plant Administrative Procedure (AO)
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3-21, Revision 2, dated July 7, 1987, permitted the work that was
performed by stating in section 4.2, "If any portion of the control room
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emergency ventilation system boundary as defined in 4.1.1 through 4.1.5
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above is breached, the entire control room emergency ventilation system
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may'be rendered inoperable.
If work must take place on the boundary
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during modes 1-4 or during fuel ~ movement,>an' individual must be~available
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at all times at the work site who is capable of immediately plugging the.
' breach if the control room emergency ventilation system is required. .If
the breach cannot be immediately plugged, then depending on thetsize'of,
the breach and operating margin (>1.75 sq. inch is significant) the'
control room emergency ventilation system boundary may be Linoperable,.
placing the plant in a one-hour action statement."
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When the shift supervisor returned to the control room from a' meeting, he'
directed the control room doors be immediately1 shut due'to his recalling
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previous direction provided by a memorandum dated September 27, 1988 from
the Operations Manager to the Shift Supervisors that directed " control
room doors shall not be blocked oper until'this issue is resolved.
This
applies in Modes 1-4 and during core alterations." The inspectors noted
that the memorandum was not in the active Night Order book in the control
room.
The inspectors also noted administrative procedure A0-3-21,
Revision 2, " Control Room Emergency Ventilation Boundary" had no,been
changed to reflect tne direction provided by the memorandum.
Further,
operation at 100% power in Mode I with both trains of control room,
emergency ventilation system inoperable constituted entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. and went unrecognized for approximately twenty
minutes and was not noted in the maintenance work request.
Additionally,
the review of the maintenance request appeared to be superficial in that
i t did not identi fy technical specifications were applicable.
Although this condition was controlled such that there was not a
technical concern, this event provides another example where the practice
of using internal memorandums vice changing procedures resulted in an
unwanted operation.
A revision to A0 3-21 was made on February 21, 1989
to assure acceptable control of the doors.
Additional licensee analysis
showed.that the doors could be opened for transit of materials since
recent design modification added a second set of doors to the control
room boundary.
No violations er deviations were identified.
7.
Follow-Up of Lice 7see Event Reports (90?l2 ,92700)
The following LER's are closed based on in-office review, inspector
verification of the implementation of selected corrective actions and
licensee commitment to perform future corrective actions:
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LER 88-18, Revision 2, (Closed), " Unfiltered In-Leakage in the Control
Room Emergency Ventilation System".
The inspectors reviewed Revision 2
to Licensee Event Report 88-18 and concluded that the report addressed
questions raised in the review of Revision 1, as discussed in Inspection
Report 50-344/88-40.
LER 88-22, Revision 1, (Closed), " Train 'A'
Safety Injection Due to
Spurious Electronic Spike During Plant Heat-uo"
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LER 89-01, Revision 0, (Closed), ' Engineered Safety Features Valve
Actuation Due to an Electrical Shovt Circuit When Incorrect Indicating
Lamp Used"
The following LERs are closed based on inspector follow-up that included
discussions with licensee representatives, detailed event evaluation,
verification of appropriateness and implementation of corrective actions,
and the licensee commitment to perform future corrective actions-
LER 88-49, Revision 0, (0 pen) " Partial Containment Isolations Result
f rom Signal Spike and Operator Error."
This event report describes three
events that resulted in the automatic isolation of the steam generator
blowdown (SGBD) system.
Two of the events were caused by spurious
electronics spikes and the other by operator error.
As follow-up, the
inspectors verified, as was stated in the LER, that no discharge to the
Columbia River was in progress.
Also, the inspectors examined the
licensee's corrective actions including that the setpoints of the process
radiation monitor (PRM 10) had been changed.
The LER committed to changing the setpoints of PRM 10, the steam
generator blowdown sample line radiation monitor alert and high alarm
setpoints, to 2 times background and 25,000 cpm, respectively.
The
inspectors verified that the licensee had performed a 50.59 Safety
Analysis for the setpoints change.
However, two concerns were raised by
the inspector during the verification of the setpoint change.
First, the
procedurc Periodic Operating Test (POT) 26-2, Revision 24, " Radiation
Monitoring System," had not been changed, as had been stated in the LER,
to reflect the change of the setpoints.
This is an apparent violation of
10CFR50.9 (50-344/89-01-03).
Further research identified that on
December 30, 1988, the setpoint change had been performed using the
guidance given in a memorandum from the Plant General Manager to the
Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department; however, sometime
between December 30, 1988 and January 23, 1989, the setpoints had been
returned to the pre-memo values.
Then on January 23, 1989, while
performing POT 26-2, the setpoints were again returned to the memo
desired values without actually deviating the procedure.
Using memoranda
to direct plant operation vice approved procedures was the major
contributing cause of this apparent violation.
Second, the calibration
sticker located on the face of PRM10 indicated the old setpoints for the
alert and high alarms and not the revised setpoints.
The licensee, when notified of the inspector's concerns and the apparent
violation, immediately deviated the procedure to indicate the memo
desired setpoints of 2.0 times background and 25,000 cpm for the alert
and high alarm setpoints, respectively.
Additionally, the licensee
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changed plant procedures to require plant procedures be deviated within
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24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of issuing a memorandum affecting plant operations.
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licensee identified personnel oversight as the reason the procedure
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change had not been made, as stated in the LER.
Finally, the licensee
corrected the calibration sticker on the PRM 10 meter face.
While performing the follow-up, the inspectors also noted the Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 10.4.8., Steam Generator Blowdown
System, had not yet been revised to reflect the major design change made
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to-the system during the 1988 Refueling Outage. Although the update of the-
FSAR is not outside the 1 year requirement, there was ample opportunity to
revise the:FSAR.(for example in the November 8, 1988 FSAR amendment) with
the~ design * change. Also, the licensed operator training manual had not yet
been updated; although the training lesson plan had been updated and
operators had been trained on the new system.
LER 88-19, Rev 0 and Rev 1,(Closed), " Surveillance Required by Technical
Specifications Not Performed Following Containment Hydrogen Vent System
Adsorber Replacement."
This event report describes an incident in which a Technical
Specification surveillance was not performed due to a series of errors in
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the control of plant surveillance and work activities.
A maintenance request (MR-0177) was written by the system engineer on
November 24, 1987, to perform sampling of various charcoal adsorber
systems. The charcoal adsorber sampling was. performed by a maintenance
craftsman. On January 14, 1988, the system engineer requested the
Maintenance Engineering Supervisor, via telephone vice formally
annotating the MR, to have the "A" train hydrogen vent adsorber (CS-9A)
sampled. Due to a communication error, the "B" train charcoal was
sampled. Subsequent to sampling CS-9B, the mechanic did not annotate the
MR, as required to do by Administrative Procedure (AO-3-9, Revision 26,-
" Maintenance Requests"), that he had sampled CS-98. Therefore, the
system engineer, who believed the sample wa's from CS-9A, incorrectly and
unknowingly labeled the sample CS-9A.
It should be noted the work
instructions did not require the mechanic to. label the samples.
On February 2,1988, a sample of CS-9A was taken, with the results
requiring CS-9A charcoal adsorber replacement. A new system engineer
amended MR-0177 (that authorized sampling of charcoal adsorbers) to
replace the adsorber in CS-9A.
A0-3-9, " Maintenance Requests", section
I.B., permits amending MR's by stating " Maintenance Requests written for
support activities such as H&V testing and engineering troubleshooting
shall not be used to implement corrective actions unless the work
instructions have been amended to direct the specific action." The
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inspectors consider this a poor practice - even though allowed by
procedures, and indicated that a better practice may be to generate a
new maintenance request.
It should also be noted, there was no requirement for shift supervision
to approve the amended work instructions even though the initial work
scope required shift supervision approval. This also appears to be a
weak work practice.
This practice contributed to the event because the
maintenance craftsman, contrary to AC-3-9 requirements, went to the job
' site without the maintenance request, due to the request being in
routing.
Next, the system engineer used poor communication practices when he
verbally directed the mechanic to replace the charcoal adsorber (CS-9A).
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The mechanic then proceeded to the job site. When at the job site, the
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mechanic violated Plant Safety (PS) Procedure 3-30 that states in section IV. E.,
"It is the responsibility of the person accepting the equipment clearance
to check the equipment and assure himself that the equipment.is satisfactorily
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tagged and the equipment is deenergized and cleared for work before starting
work." Next, the mechanic proceeded.to incorrectly replace the charcoal
adsorber in CS-9B, the operable hydrogen ventilation system, and-thereby
-violated Administrative Order (AO) 3-9, Revision 26, in Section I. item 4.
that states, "the assigned craftsman / technician performs the maintenance
prescribed by the MR work instructions and documents its completion in
the work performed section of the MR." (50-344/89-01-04).
When the mechanic completed the adsorber replacement, he left the job
site and because he did not have the maintenance request he did not
annotate that maintenance had been performed on CS-98. However, the
storeroom material issues / returns form (PGE 2345) recorded that charcoal
had been issued for the replacement CS-9B charcoal adsorber. A careful
review of the documentation would have identified the discrepancy'between
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the MR and the issues receipt form.
A0-3-9, " Maintenance Requests"
states in section II.H. that the Work Group Craft Supervisor / Designee
"make routine visits to the work area during the performance of major
work activities." The work group supervisor did not consider the
charcoal replacement to be a major job and, therefore, did not make a
field observation of the work in progress.
" Major" work activities are
not defined and thereby can lead to inconsistent supervisory involvement
in plant activities. This has been a longstanding NRC concern with PGE
work execution and control.
This event contains numerous procedural violations and poor work
practices. Collectively, the causes of this event represent a
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programmatic breakdown of work practices. The licensee is continuing to
review the circumstances of this event and has agreed to submit a revised
LER. The violations in this section are in areas that had not been
acceptably addressed by the licensee.
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Two apparent violations were identified.
8.
Follow-Up on Open Items and Corrective Actions for Violations (92701,
92702)
Open Item 50-344/88-13-01 (Closed) Inadequate Safety Evaluation for
Opening Feedwater Drain Valves.
The licensee responded to the Notice of
Violation via letter dated June 17, 1988.
In this response the licensee
attributed the cause of the event to an inadequate safety evaluation.
The licensee noted personnel, who perform safety evaluations for Portland
General Electric Company, had no formal training in the performance of
safety evaluations. Also, the licensee noted the procedure that governed
safety evaluations lacked detail. As longer term corrective actions, the
licensee committed to revise Nuclear Department Procedure (NDP) 100-5
" Preparation of Safety Evaluations Required by 10 CFR 50 and Trojan
Technical Specifications" by October 31, 1988.
The procedure was revised
on December 22, 1988. The inspectors reviewed the procedure revision to
verify the changes to NDP 100-5 clarified the depth and detail required
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for safety evaluations and specified the qualifications of persons
performing and reviewing evaluations. Subsequent to the event, the
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licensee conducted formal training for those individuals ho ~perforni,
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review or approve safety evaluations.
This training has been formally
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incorporated into the Trojan Training Program.
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Open Item 88-03-01, (Closed), Fastener Receipt Inspection and Material "
.
Control: In response to identified deficiencies in the receipt, storage,'.
and issuance of fasteners and nuts, the licensee developed an action planL
which included review of procurement spt.cifications for consistency,
repeat receipt inspection of in stock fasteners and nuts, evaluation of
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the adequacy of receipt inspection plans, and an evaluation of fasteners
issued from purchase orders with no material left in stock.
A
significant portion of ~ the corrective actions were documented in
Nonconformance Report NCR 87-417.
The inspectors reviewed a sampling'of
the evaluations for specific stock items in NCR 87-417.
In addition, the
inspectors discussed completed actions with licensee representatives in
materials control and quality assurance.
Based on the above, this item
is closed.
9.
Exit' Interview (30702, 30703)
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph
l'on February 10, 1989, and with licensee management throughout the
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,
inspection period.
A meeting was also held on February 17, 1989.
In
these meetings the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the
inspection activities.
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