IR 05000344/1992031
| ML20198E155 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1992 |
| From: | Coblentz L, Reese J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198E154 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-92-31, NUDOCS 9212040245 | |
| Download: ML20198E155 (8) | |
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L U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
REGION V
Report:
50-344/92-31 j.
License:
NPF-1 Licen:ee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 SW Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204
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i Facility:.
Trojan Nuclear Plant Inspection location:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection duration:
Se tember 28 - October 2, 1992
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Prepared by:
hl h/ks/4 flytz,Sen'r adiation SpecialisF Date-Signed l
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-Approved by:
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pam,ep/H. Reesel Chi ~ef Date signed Fa'ciuties Radiological Protection Branch
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Summary:
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Areas Insnected: Routine, unannounced inspection of followup items,
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environmental monitoring, control room ventilation, and control of. radwaste
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activities.
Inspection procedures 92701, 80721, and 84750 were used.
Results: The licensee's programs for environmental monitoring had improved since the last inspection; however, c.ontinued discrepancies were noted in
analysis of milk samples for iodine-131 (Section 3.a).
Other; items identified i
for inspector followup included:
(1) The level of procedural controls and level of. worker system-knowledge evidenced in the inadvertent draining of the Spent Resin j.
Storage _ Tank (Section 5.a); and (2) The generation of. hydrogen gas in Powdex resin (Section 5.b).
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- No violations.of NRC requirements were identified.
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9212040245 921110
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PDR ADOCK 05000344 0-P,D R,
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licenseg H. Chernoff, Manager, Licensing M. Long, Supervisor, Dosime'ry and Environmental Monitoring R. Machon, General Manager, Trojan Nuclear Plant T. Meek, Manager, Personnel Protection D. Nordstrom, Ger.eral Manager, Nuclear Oversight G. Rich, Manager, Chemistry W. Robinson, Vice President, Nuclear R. Sherman, Engineer, Compliance H. Story, Acting Manager, Radiation Protection (RP) Technical Support NRC J. Melfi, Resident Inspector The individuals listed above attended the exit meeting on October 2, 1992. The inspector met and held discussions with additional members cf the licensee's staff during the inspection.
2.
Followuo (92701)
Lte.m 50-344/92-08-01 (Ocen): This item concerned the lack of clearly defined compensatory actions for post-accident reactor coolant analysis with the post-accident sampling system (PASS) inoperable.
On July 22, 1992, the licensee had issued Revision 16 to Chemistry Manual Procedure (CMP) 41, " Reactor Coolant Liquid Post-Accident Sampling System Operating Procedure." This revision included Section 7.11.7, which gave general suggestions for estimating reactor coolant activity, hydrogen and dissolved gases, and boron concentration in the absence of PASS.
The inspector observed that CMP-41 still did not give specific guidance for achieving reasonable estimates of the required reactor coolant system parameters with PASS inoperable. The inspector noted, further, that neither chemistry technicians nor technical support center (TSC) staff would have been able to use the existing written guidance as a stand-alone procedure for achieving estimates of reactor coolant parameters useful in assessing core damage.
l In response to the inspector's observations, the licensee stated that the procedure would be further revised to provide specific guidance, as noted. These actions will be reviewed in a future inspection.
j In walkdowns of the system, the inspector noted that the PASS drain tank i
level switch (LS-5743) bore a label indicating that it had last been calibrated in 1983.
Licensee records indicated that the most recent calibration had been performed in July 1989. The inspector noted that the licensee's maintenance procedures required the switch to be calibrated on a 2-year interval, and that over 3 years had elapsed since
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the last calibration. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's observation, and stated that appropriate actions would be taken to correct this discrepancy.
3.
Environmental Monitorina (80721)
The inspector evaluated aspects of this program area by interviews with cognizant personnel, reviews of recent records and reports, and observation of work in progress. Observations were made regarding environmental sampling and analysis, the annual land use census, and meteorological monitoring.
a.
Environmental Samplina and Analysis The licensee's sampling records and schedules indicated that sample collection had been conducted at the locations and frequencies prescribed by Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.12-1.
All laboratory analyses were being performed by an Albuquerque, New Mexico vendor. The inspector noted the following items:
(1) The licensee had maintained records of vendor participation in interlaboratory comparison programs, as required by TS 3.12.3.
(2)
Sample collection, in all cases observed, was performed in a technically sound manner and in accordance with applicable procedures. Specifically, the inspector observed sample collection for Columbia River crayfish, recreation pond. fish, and air samples from various locations.
No problems were noted.
(3)
In review of the 1991 Annual Environmental Monitoring Report, the inspector noted that the vendor continued to have difficulty with low chemical recovery for analyzing iodine-131 in milk samples. As a result, the vendor had not achieved the TS-required lower limit of detectability (LLD) of 1.0 picocuries/ liter for several samples.
In addition, data was in
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some instances incomplete due to the samples having been " lost in analysis."
(4)
In review of 1992 sampling records, the inspector further noted that the vendor had failed to achieve the required LLD for iodine-131 for the first six sets of milk samples taken in 1992. As a result, an appropriate environmental analysis for iodine-131 in milk had not been performed from December 9, 1991, until April 27, 1992.
l In discussions with the licensee, the inspector noted that similar l
problems had been observed during previous inspections (see Inspection Reports 50-344/90-37, 50-344/91-02, and 50-344/91-30).
Members of the licensee's radiological environmental monitoring
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program (REMP) stated that they were aware of this problem, and had been considering various corrective actions.
The inspector l
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concluded that inadequate control of vendor performance was a continuing weakness of the licensee's program for sampling and analysis. This matter will be further examined in a future inspection (50-344/92-31-01).
b.
Annual land Use Census Preliminary results of the licensee's recently performed land use census indicated that the requirements of TS 4.12.2 were being met.
Several changes to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) sampling locations were being proposed.
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During tours of the site environs and in discussions with REMP staff, the inspector noted several land use changes (including
expansion of the Prescott Beach recreational facilities and construction of a new industrial-use dock across the river ia
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Kalama, Washington). The inspector noted that these changes did not
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appear consistent with information on site characteristics as presented in Chapter.2 of the licensee's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
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In discussions with the inspector, the licensee stated that a site characteristics study had recently been completed, and that applicable information would be included in the December 1992 update to the UFSAR.
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Meteorolooical Monitorina
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The licensee had made several system upgrades since the last inspection of the meteorological monitoring equipment.
Each of the sensors required to be operable per TS 3.3.3.4. had been replaced with equi) ment of equal or better accuracy. The new equipment had
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been purciased specifically to ensure that the accuracies listed in the UFSAR and Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," would be met for wind speed, wind direction, and
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differential temperature.
The inspector reviewed the applicable spare parts equivalency evaluation report (SPEER)91-255 for instrument replacement.
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addition, the inspector reviewed the revised Surveillance Procedures
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SPI-A-94-0033-2 and SPI-B-94-0033-2, both dated July 14, 1992, for calibration of the 33-foot meteorological tower. instruments.
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discrepancies were noted.
In review of the most recent calibrations of the meteorological instruments, the inspector noted that SPI-B-94-0033-2, Section 7.1.1 listed the following calibration acceptance criteria:
All AS LEFT data recorded on Table 12 and Table 19 are within required tolerances or all AS FOUND data recorded on Table 5 and Table 15 are within required tolerances.
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In review of "as found" and "as left" data for the Channel B instrument calibration performed on July 15, 1992, the inspector noted the following items:
(1) For the wind direction instrument, all "as found" readings had been within required tolerances (as recorded in Table 5).
(2) For the wind speed instrument, the "as found" readings for several processor input frequencies were not within required tolerances (as recorded in Table 15),
(3)
"As left" wind speed processor readings, as recorded in Table l
19, were within required tolerances; however, the "as left" reading for the wind speed recorder was not within the required
tolerance.
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(4) An in-process inspection had been conducted during the calibration in question. The Quality Control inspector's:
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remarks stated that the Channel B "as left" readings' "were
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found to be acceptable."
The inspector asked the system engineer whether an out-of-tolerance
"as left" recorder reading met the accrptance criteria of Section 3-7.1.1.
The system engineer stated that adjustments had been made to
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the recorder, and in-tolerance "as left" recorder data had been
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recorded in later tables in the procedure. The system engineer-stated, further, that the procedure would be re-evaluated to ensure that the acceptance criteria were adequately stated.
With the exceptions noted, the licensee's program for environmental
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i monitoring appeared capable of meeting the licensee's safety objectives.
No violations of NRC requirements were-identified.
4.
Control Room Ventilation System (84750)
The inspector reviewed the status of the control room normal and
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emergency ventilation systems by system walkdowns, discussions with the
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system engineer, and review'of procedures and calibrations.
Selected surveillances required by TS 4.7.6.1 were reviewed, including the
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following tests:
a.
ST-40223, " Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Carbon Sample,"
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for Trains A and B, performed May 22, 1992, b.
ST-40213, " Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CB-1A)" for in-place testing, performed in May 1992.
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ST-40214, " Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CB-1B)" for -
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in-place testing, performed in May 1992.
d.
.ST-40227, ST-40228, ST-40229, ST-40230, and ST-40231, for isolation of normal ventilation on high radiation and toxic gas signals.
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The licensee's program for operating and testing control room ventilation systems, in the aspects observed, was adequate in meeting the licensee's safety objectives.
No violations of NRC requirements were iuentified.
5.
Control of Radwaste Activities (84750)
The inspector reviewed circumstances surrounding two licensee incidents involving control of radwaste activities. The first involved an inadvertent draining of spent resin from the spent resin storage tank (SRST) to the clean waste receiver tank (CWRT).
The second involved discovery of explosive hydrogen gas in drums of Powdex resin, a.
Inadvertent Draining of SRST Resin In July 1992, the licensee had attempted to perform maintenance on several diaphragm valves in line to the SRST.
In preparation for the maintenance, a clearance had been written to drain excess water from the SRST.
On July 15, the clearance was performed.
On July 16, the CWRT rump suction strainers had become clogged, and elevated dose rates (1500 millirem / hour on contact) had been found coming from one strainer. On July 17, Operations had informed RP
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that they must have pumped resin to the CWRT, causing the clogged
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strainer and elevated dose rates. On July 18, after two more discoveries of unexpected elevated dose rates, RP had performed plant-wide surveys to determine areas of resin migration.
As a result of this incident, the licensee had taken several corrective actions:
(1) Corrective Action Request (CAR) C92-0364 had been written to investigate the problem.
(2) All hot spots had been flushed to the CWRT, where possible.
(3) A procedure had been written and implemented to clean up the CWRT.
(4)
Results of the CAR and investigation had been discussed with RP personnel.
During review of the licensee's corrective actions, the inspector noted that a contributing cause of the inadvertent transfer had been an apparent lack of system knowledge by operations, maintenance, and RP personnel.
In addition, no procedure existed for draining the
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SRST, and the clearance had been used in lieu of an approved procedure. The inspector observed that the ' :ensee's evaluation did not appear to have fully addressed the is of system knowledge, nor had the licensee assessed whether an adequate level of control had been exerted in using a clearance to drain the SRST. This matter will be examined further in a future inspection (50-344/92-31-02).
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b.
Discovery of Exolosive levels of Hydroaen Gas in Powoex Resin Drums
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Backaround In September 1992, the licensee had been contacted by a Richland, Washington waste processing vendor. The vendor stated that approximately 150 drums of Powdex resin generated by Trojan had been discovered at the waste prucessing facility.
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The-licensee had previously had a waste processing contract _
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with this vendor. The contract had expired in December 1991,
and the licensee had mistakenly assumed that all Trojan-j radioactive waste sent to the vendor had been processed. The
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vendor had offered no explanation as to why the-drums of Powdex
resin had previously gone unnoticed.
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I The licensee's records showed that this Powdex resin had been
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generated in 1988 and 1989.
The drums in question had been j
included in shipments to the vendor in 1988, 1989, and 1990.
l The shipments had been reported to the NRC in Semi-Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports, as required.
Although no contract currently existed with the vendor, the
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licensee had agreed to have the vendor open the drums to use
the Powdex as filler material in radwaste overpacks.
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(2) Discovery of Explosive Gas
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On September 21, 1992, the vendor had called the licensee to i
report a problem. A worker had been using an electric impact I
wrench to open the Powdex drums. On opening one of the drums, l
a tongue of flame had " shot out," singeing the hair on.the worker's arm and beard.
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The vendor asked the licensee to explain the presence of explosive gas in the Powdex resin drums. Approximately 30'
drums had been processed at this time.
(3) Licensee Followup l _
The licensee ha'd sent representatives to the waste processing _
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facility to examine the Powdex drums. = Eighteen drums had been i
tested, using an explosimeter. Three drums had showed levels of explosive gas above the lower threshold.
The licensee-had compiled a history of the Powdex drums
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involved, to determine the times and methods of generation, packaging, and shipment. No abnormalities had been detected in
_the way the resin had been handled.
To determine the method of gas generation,-the, licensee had
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reviewed past industry reports, NRC Information Notices,-and
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plant records.
The licensee had also contacted the Powdex vendor, other licensees, and industry experts (including the Electric Power Research Institute). At the time of the inspection, no precedent had been discovered for generation of explosive gas in Powdex resin.
After the inspection, the licensee returned to the Richland waste processing facility to sample the remaining drums using an evacuated sample bomb and gas chromatograph. Of 101 drums sampled, 10 were found to contain hydrogen in the air volume, in levels ranging from 1% to 26.2%.
In addition, the licensee sampled more recently packaged drums of Powdex resin that had been stored onsite in preparation for shipment. Of 43 drums sampled, 5 had detectable levels of hydrogen in the air mixture. The highest levels were 2%, 3.6%,
J and 7%. The resin had been packaged in July 1992, and the drums had been stored for about 3 months.
As corrective action, the licensee had decided to install passive vents in all drums used for packaging and shipment of Powdex resin.
In addition, the licensee was actively working with contractors and industry experts to determine the exact mechanism responsible for generating the hydrogen. This matter will be further examined in a future inspection (50-344/92-31-03).
In the aspects examined, the licensee's programs for control of radwaste activities appeared to warrant continued attention, in order to ensure that both radiological and non-radiological hazards were properly controlled. No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
6.
Exit Interview The inspector met with members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 2, 1992. The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's.
observations.