IR 05000344/1993011
| ML20057C592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1993 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057C587 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-93-11, NUDOCS 9309290143 | |
| Download: ML20057C592 (11) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
i Report No.
50-344/93-11 Docket No.
50-344 l
License No.
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Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company r
121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204
Facility Name:
Trojan Nuclear Plant Inspection At:
Rainier,. Oregon
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Inspection Conducted:
July 6 - August 16, 1993 Inspector:
J. F. Melfi, Resident Inspector Approved By:
P. H. pphnson, Chief Date Signed
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React 6v Projects Section 1 J
Summary:
Inspection on July 6 - Auaust 16. 1993 (Inspection Report No. 50-344/93-11)
Areas Insoected:
Routine announced, resident inspection of operational i
safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, and followup of previously
identified items. This inspection was conducted according to NRC Manual
Chapter 2561.
Inspection procedures 37700, 41500, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710,
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73051, 92700, 92701 and 93702 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspection, i
Safety Issues Manaaement System (SIMS) Items: None.
Results:
l General Conclusions and Specific Findinas:
i The licensee continued to adjust plant staffing, procedures and programs as
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appropriate to the shutdown condition of the plant.
The plant's programs and licensed staff appeared adequate for the work activities being performed.
Sianificant Safety Matters:
None
Summary of Violations and Deviations: None r
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9309290143 930908 PDR ADOCK 05000344 G
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A DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted t
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Portland General Electric
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J. E. Cross, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
- S. M. Quennoz, Plant General Manager i
D. L. Nordstrom, General Manager, Nuclear Oversight
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M. B. Lackey, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering T. D. Walt, General Manager, Technical Functions L. K. Houghtby, General Manager, Plant Support
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- C. P. Yundt, General Manager, Special Projects
- H. K. Chernoff, Manager, Licensing
- J. P. Sullivan, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering J. A. Kirkebo, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering
- J. M. Mihelich, Manager, Technical Services
- S. A. Schneider, Manager, Operations
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- J. A. Vingerud, Manager, Maintenance T. O. Meek, Manager, Personnel Protection
J. D. Westvold, Manager, Quality Assurance E. W. Ford, Compliance Engineer
- B. M. Hugo, Compliance Engineer
- A. S. McCabe, Plant System Engineering Engineer
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b.
Oreoon Department of Enerov A. Bless, Resident Safety Manager
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V. Sarte, Resident Inspector
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.The inspector also talked with other licensee employees during the inspection. These included shift supervisors, certified fuel handlers,
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auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
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- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Plant Status
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The reactor remained defueled throughout the reporting period. Operators maintained spent fuel pool level and temperature appropriately. At the
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end of the reporting period, 282 people remained onsite.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (717011
During this inspection period, the inspector observed and examined plant activities to verify the safety of ti.e licensee's facility.
The inspector observed these activities on a daily, weekly or biweekly basis.
The inspector observed control room activities daily to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for. operation as prescribed
in the facility Technical Specifications. The inspector examined logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records to obtain t
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information on plant conditions, trends and compliance with regulations.
On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the inspector observed turnover of plant information to determine that on-shift operators relayed pertinent information to oncoming shift personnel.
Each week the inspector toured accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:
a.
General plant and equipment conditions b.
Maintenance requests and repairs c.
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment d.
Ignition sources and flammable material control e.
Conduct of activities according to the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures f.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness
Radioactive waste systems h.
Proper storage of compressed gas bottles Each week the inspector talked with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training and other topics related to in-progress work activities.
The inspector periodically observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee implemented these practices in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements. The inspector verified that health physics supervisors and personnel conducted plant tours to observe activities in progress and were aware of significant plant activities, particularly those related to radiological conditions and/or challenges. ALARA considerations were an integral part of each RWP (Radiation Work Permit) reviewed.
The inspector conducted routine inspections of selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program. During inspection activities and periodic tours of plant areas, the inspector verified proper use of personnel monitoring equipment, observed individuals leaving the radia-tion controlled area and signing out on appropriate RWPs, and observed the posting of radiation areas and contaminated areas. The inspector assessed the involvement of health physics supervisors and their awareness of significant plant activities through conversetions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance (627031 a.
Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Purification Pump The inspector reviewed documentation associated with work on the SFP purification pump per maintenance request (MR) 93-00429. The licensee initiated this MR to repair a leak on the mechanical seal.
They disassembled the pump and reassembled it using appropriate new parts. The SFP purification pump provides flow through a filter and demineralizer to remove fission products and other contaminants which may be introduced from a leaking fuel assembly in the SF.
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This pump is small (7.5 horsepower,132 gallons per minute, 22 psi)
and is not considered quality-related. The documentation appeared completa but_the inspector questioned the post-maintenance test (PMT) rejuirements. The only PMT was to check for leakage. There was no check to see if the pump delivered sufficient flow and
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pressure.
The inspector discussed this situation with the licensee, since reassembly of any pump should imply a check of pump performance.
The licensee stated that they had not checked this pump previously, and did not have any baseline data on it.
The licensee is considering getting baseline data on this pump. The inspector will follow up on this issue during routine inspection, b.
Transformer Tao Chanae The inspector observed licensee activities to lower the bus voltage on safety-related busses B-02 and B-04.
The licensee reduced the voltage from 505 volts to 485 volts by changing the transformer taps. During the observation, the inspector watched maintenance personnel tighten the bolts on the transformer taps. However, there was no reference to a torque value in the maintenance request (MR)
or the vendor manual. The licensee's electrical standards provide torque values for electrical connections when none are found in the vendor manual. The licensee modified the MR to include torque values. Subsequent licensee review indicated that a torque value was not necessary for this type of connection, only that it be tightly secured.
c.
Emeroency Diesel Generator (EDG) work The inspector observed portions and reviewed documentation of MR 92-04636, MR 93-00264 and MR 93-00331 on the B train EDG. These MRs were initiated to perform scheduled annual maintenance, evaluate the sightglass on a Woodward governor, and change the lube oil in the diesel, respectively. The work observed was done according to the maintenance instructions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance (61726)
Ouarterly Surveillance of Station Batteries The inspector observed portions of the licensee's quarterly surveillance on their station batteries pursuant to Technical Specification 3/4.8.2.3.
Qualified personnel performed the surveillance using calibrated equipment. The personnel used Maintenance Request (MR) 93-00612 and Maintenance Procedure (MP) 1-14.2, "125 Volt Station Battery Quarterly Surveillance," as guidance for this surveillance.
The battery passed the quarterly surveillance test satisfactorily. To verify if the surveillance program was still scheduling surveillances adequately, the inspector review the two previous surveillances.
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records review of the two previous surveillances showed that this test had been performed quarterly as required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
I 6.
Inservice Inspection (ISI)/ Inservice Test (IST)/ Snubber Surveillance
Proarams (73051)
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The inspector discussed the ISI/IST snubber program changes with the
licensee. The licensee noted these programs are no longer required to
meet American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code requirements.
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Part 50.55a of the Code of Federal Regulations notes that the ASME code is only applicable to operating plants. The licensee documented this
position in a March 15, 1993 letter to the NRC.
The requirements for work on these mechanical systems reverts to the i
original design requirements specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, " Test Control,"
i still requires a test program to verify operability on operating systems.
The licensee is currently using most of the same procedures that they used before the plant shutdown. The licensee may revise these procedures, as applicable, in the future. The specifics of these
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programs are discussed below.
a.
ISI Procram After discussions with the licensee, the inspector concluded that
the licensee mostly uses the same ISI program. Most of the same
procedures are still in place. While the amount of welding activities onsite has declined, the licensee would still qualify
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welders and perform the same nondestructive examination (NDE) as
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before the plant shut down.
If the licensee welds on a remaining
mechanical system, the welding will be performed according to the
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original FSAR ccamitments, as the ASME code allows. The licensee will perform NDE as committed in the FSAR.
The ten-year inspection of welds around the plant has been canceled.
r This inspection is no longer required since the plant is permanently shut down.
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IST Proaram l
The IST program required surveillance tests on safety-related
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systems. Due to the plant's closure, the number of functional systems has declined and less IST is required. The inspector concluded that the licensee is still using the same surveillance procedures and measuring the same parameters (e.g., flow, pressure, vibration) for the systems which remain operable (e.g. service water, component cooling water).
The licensee is considering changing the testing frequency and may change the acceptance criteria for several pumps and valves, since the required flowrates
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on the pumps and leak rates on the valves are less limiting.
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Snubber Testina Proaram
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Snubbers can connect mechanical components to supports.
Failure of I
a snubber can affect the operability of a system. Technical Speci-fication 3/4.7.10 required 10 per cent of each snubber type to be tested every 18 months. The licensee currently tests snubbers only
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on systems which must be maintained operable.
Prior to the plant
shutdown, the licensee had 82 snubbers in their program, but now has
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only 27. The licensee still tests 10 per cent of each type of l
snubber. The licensee's procedure still employs the same snubber
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t testing methods it used before the plant's permanent closure.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Desian Chanaes and Modifications (37700)
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Due to the permanent closure of the plant, the licensee canceled many'
design changes and modifications that they intended to implement. To
determine whether these design changes were canceled appropriately, the inspector reviewed canceled packages on currently operating systems.
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The licensee began canceling design modifications when the four-year
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phasecut was announced in mid-1992. The criteria then for canceling a
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design modification included consideration of how the cancellation would
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affect nuclear and personnel safety, public and regulatory confidence, l
reliable generation, and competitiveness. These modifications were
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assessed by the Facility Resource Allocation Committee (FRAC) and the
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Facility Resource Implementation Committee (FRIC).
FRIC and FRAC made i
the initial determination for cancellation.
The onsite and offsite
review committee; also reviewed the modifications proposed for
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cancellation.
l The inspector questioned the licensee regarding the criteria being used (
to implement modifications. The licensee responded that a modification will still be implemented if it is important to safety or if it is economic.
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i The inspector reviewed 57 design packages that the licensee had canceled on currently operating systems. The inspector found that all of the
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modifications had been canceled appropriately.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Trainina and Qualification Effectiveness (41500)
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The inspector reviewed the training program for operators and maintenance
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personnel. The licensee eliminated the trhining organization in May,
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1993.
The inspector found that the personnel are currently qualified
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based upon their previous qualification. The individual departments now conduct the training for their workers.
The inspector asked if the new training rule (10 CFR 50.120) will apply-to Trojan. The licensee, having asked for exemption in a letter dated August 10, 1993, believes that this new rule will not apply to Trojan.
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Maintenance Oraanization Trainino The qualification of maintenance craftsmen is based on the previous
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training program. The licensee assigns workers to the specific jobs based on a qualification matrix. The licensee is continuing to assign
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qualified craftsmen to the work assignments.
l The inspector discussed the current program with the maintenance manager, and concluded that it appeared appropriate.
l Operations Oraanization Trainino The certified fuel handlers and auxiliary operators are qualified for their jobs based upon the previous training program. The Operations
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Department is currently developing self-study guides appropriate for the
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current plant conditions. The licensee has developed a Certified Fuel Handler Qualification Card to document completion of training for auxiliary operators and certified fuel handlers.
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The inspector discussed the program with the licensee, and concluded that it appeared appropriate for the current condition of the plant.
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tio violations or deviations were identified.
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P 9.
Enaineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown (71710)
i The inspector walked down the emergency diesel generator and several support systems for the diesel (e.g., fuel oil, air start). The
inspector verified that the system lineup matched plant drawings. The hangers and supports were aligned properly and an adequate level of i
housekeeping was maintained around the diesels and in the' control
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cabinets. lio evidence of overheating was noted in the electrical control
cabinets. The valves in the system were installed correctly, in the
correct position and not leaking excessively. The labeling of the t
components appeared appropriate.
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i No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Event follow-up (62703. 92701. 93702)
a.
Instrument Air (I A) Relief Valves
'i During tours of the turbine building, the inspector noticed that the
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discharge lines from the air tank relief valves pointed straight up,
The inspector questioned whether this discharge line configuration
.i could allow moisture to accumulate on the relief valve internals.
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If so, moisture could degrade the spring or corrode the valve shut.
These IA tanks are American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Section VIII tanks.
Trojan Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
notes that these tanks are designed to ASME Section VIII. ASME Section VIII, Division I, Section UG 135(g) states:
i Discharge lines from pressure relieving safety devices shall be designed to facilitate drainage or shall be
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fitted with drains to prevent liquid from lodging in the discharge side of the safety device, and such lines shall lead to a safe place of discharge.
The licensee reviewed the relief valve configuration and code requirements, and observed that the relief valves have drain holes in them to permit drainage of any water in the discharge line.
In discussions with the inspector, the Authorized Nuclear Insurer (ANI)
noted that these relief valve drain holes meet the code requirement for drainage on the discharge lines. The inspector agreed with the ANI assessment.
b.
Radwaste Discharae Limit Exceeded On July 15, 1993, the licensee discovered that they had exceeded their discharge permit for boron. Specifically, the monthly discharge limit is 0.1 milligram (mg) per liter (L) of boron.
The licensee was removing boron from their refueling water storage tank (RWST). The daily limit for boron discharge is 1.0 mg/L.
Previously, the boron discharges made by the licensee were of short duration and the monthly limit was not exceeded.
Since the licensee-was discharging continuously during the early portion of the month of July, the licensee calculated they had exceeded the monthly limit. The licensee's initial determination of root cause was procedural inadequacy since the procedure did not call for calculation of the monthly limit.
The licensee was still evaluating this event and was planning to report to the State and the NRC that they exceeded their discharge limit. The licensee is considering obtaining a one-time waiver from the state to discharge most of the RWST. To remove most of the water from the RWST, the licensee is moving the water to other tanks inside the auxiliary building. The inspector will follow up on this situation during routine inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Plant Review Board (pRB)/Tro.ian Nuclear Ooerations Board (TNOB)
To assess the effectiveness of the onsite and offsite review committees, the inspector attended a TNOB meeting and a PRB meeting. The. inspector had previously reviewed meeting minutes from earlier meetings of the PRB
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and TNOB, as noted in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-344/93-09.
The inspector concluded that the questions asked by the TNOB and PRB were
probing.
The inspector had one observation during his assessment. The
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PRB was reviewing changes to Operating Instruction (01)'12-2, " Borated
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Water Removal." Specifically, the licensee discussed procedural guidance i
to transfer refueling water storage tank (RWST) borated water to the fuel
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transfer canal (FTC). 01 12-2 stated that the water in the FTC should be
filled to a ' desired' level. The inspector questioned the adequacy of
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this guidance, since the level in the FTC should be less than or equal to the level in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). This is because the door between
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the SFP and FTC opens into the EFP. A higher level in the FTC would tend
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to open the door into the SFP.
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An inflated pneumatic boot seal is provided around the door periphery.
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i If this non-safety related air supply failed, and if the FTC level was higher than the SFP, the door could open and possib1; damage the SFP
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structure. The inspector noted that the licensee hao depressurized the
boot seal on one previous occasion when the level in the FTC was high.
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This depressurization caused the door to hit the side of the SFP.
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The PRB concurred with this comment and incorporated a caution statement l
into 0I 12-2.
The inspector observed portions of the fill' of the FTC l
using OI 12-2 and noted that the operator followed the procedure.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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12.
Followun of Open Items (92701)
Followup Item 91-19-01 (Closed). " Fire Protection Staff Oualifications"
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Since Trojan had many contract fire protection personnel at the time of this earlier inspection, this item was opened to track Trojan's ongoing actions to ensure that adequate fire protection staff qualifications r
would be maintained. Trojan committed that permanent plant staff members
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would apply for membership in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
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The issue was further assessed and left open in NRC Inspection Report No.
l 50-344/92-05. The adequacy of two Appendix R fire protection
calculations was included in this issue at that time.
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t The licensee corrected the errors in the calculations.
Permanent staff
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members also applied for and were granted membership in the Society of
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Fire Protection Engineers.
l Due to the permanent shutdown of the plant, Appendix R is no longer
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applicable to Trojan.
Further, although the need for permanent fire l
protection engineers has been reduced, the-licensee still has
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knowledgeable fire protection engineers on their staff.
Based on the permanent shutdown of the plant, this item is closed.
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Followun Item 92-28-01 (Closed). " Commitment to Revise EP-001 To Address
Two Issues"
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i The inspector opened this item to track two issues identified during an
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in-office review of changes to Emergency Procedure (EP) 001, " Emergency Classification." These issues were that (1) the initial notification to plant personnel did not appear to meet evaluation criterion E.3 in i
NUREG-0654, since the initial notification form did not include
information on the release status and (2) the units for area radiation l
monitors (ARMS) 15A and ISB were changed from 2000 millirem / hour to 2000 Rem / hour. The licensee committed to change these items.
The licensee verified that their personnel will include radioactive
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release information during initial notification.
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tracking the first issue and intends to provide unambiguous procedural
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guidance for EP-001 after approval of the new emergency plan.
ARMS 15A and ISB are the containment high radiation monitors.
Due to the permanent removal of fuel from containment, the second issue is no longer relevant.
Based upon the licensee's intent to change the procedure and the permanent shutdown of the plant, this issue is closed.
13.
Followup of Enforcement Items (92701)
y The following two enforcement items concern the adequacy of Trojan's dedication of components for safety-related applications.
Enforcement Item 88-26-03 (Closed). "Adeauacy of Commercial-Grade
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Procurement Dedication Process"
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Enforcement Item 88-46-01 (Closed). "Inadeauate Enaineerina Evaluations
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for Soare and Commercial-Grade items" During audits of Trojan's procurement process, inspectors concluded that the licensee's processes did not ensure performance at least equivalent to that of the original equipment. The NRC noted the following specific
examples of a deficient procurement process for installed components:
Eroded portions of the main feedwater (MFW) piping and fittings
inside containment had been replaced.
The replacement materials were purchased commercial-grade without adequate audits to assure that the materials were fabricated with a Quality Assurance (QA)
program consistent with regulatory requirements.
A commercial-grade Agastat time delay relay installed in the diesel
driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump did not have its critical characteristics properly evaluated and specified.
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A commercial-grade air pressure regulator installed in the emergency
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diesel generator air start system did not have its critical characteristics properly evaluated and specified.
The procurement of commercial-grade items intended for safety-related applications is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria III (Design Control), IV (Procurement Document Control) and VII (Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services). These criteria establish the technical, acceptance and reporting requirements
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that apply to the procurement and use of commercial-grade items for safety-related applications.
In practice, in purchasing items for safety-related applications, the licensee has two principal choices:
purchase the items as safety-related from a supplier with an approved quality assurance program or purchase
the items commercial-grade and perform inspections and tests to verify the acceptability of the items.
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The licensee revised procedures and provided additional guidance for the i
procurement of commercial-gra'e items. These procedures incorporated current industry guidance on commercial-grade items.
The inspector reviewed these procedures ano concluded that the guidance was
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appropriate.
Due to the permanent shutdown of the plant, the number of safety-related or quality-related systems is significantly reduced.
The licensee
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intends to revise these procedures in the future to reflect plant status.
I Based on the licensee's actions and the current plant status, these items
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are closed.
14. Exit interview (30703)
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The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
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on August 26, 1993, and with licensee management throughout the
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inspection period. During these meetings the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information
reviewed by or discussed with the inspector during the inspection.
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