IR 05000344/1989016
| ML20246F843 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1989 |
| From: | Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246F839 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-89-16, NUDOCS 8907140065 | |
| Download: ML20246F843 (11) | |
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p-U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
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! eport No.:
50-344/89-16-R Docket No.:
50-344 License No.:
NPF-1-Ocensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street
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Portland, Oregon 97204
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Facility Name:
Trojan
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Inspection'at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection ronducted:
May 14 - June 17, 1989 Inspectors:
R. C.'Barr Senior Resident Inspector J. F. Melfi Resident Inspector Approved By:
%*M'h-M. M. Mendonca, Chief Oate Signed Reactor Projects Section 1 Summary:
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Inspection on May 14 - June 17, 1989 (Report 50-344/89-16J
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Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection of operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, refueling activities, and follow-up on previously identified items.
Inspection procedures 30703, 255100, 61726, 62703, 71707, 90712,-92700, 92701, 92702, and 93702 were used as guidance during the core :t of the inspection.
Results:
An unresolved item was identified with respect to the appropriate level of review necessary for lower tier procedures (paragraph 5).
890714006D 890628
{DR ADOCK 05000344 PDC
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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D. W. Cockfield, Vice President, Nuclear
- C P. Yundt, Plant General Manager
.T. D. Walt, General Manager, Technical Functions
- D. L. Nordstrom, Acting Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance
- R. P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance.
G. A. Zimmerman, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department A. N. Roller, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering D. W. Swan, Manager,. Technical Services M. J. Singh, Manager, Plant Modifications
- J. D. Reid, Manager, Quality Support Services
- J. W. Lentsch, Manager, Personnel Protection A. R. Ankrum, Manager, Nuclear Security
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- R. E. Susee, Manager, Planning and Scheduling
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J. M. Anderson, Manager, Trojan Materials E. B. James, Outage Manager
- P. A. Morton, Branch Manager, Plant Systems Engineering R. L. Russell, Branch Manager, Operations T. O. Meek, Branch Manager, Radiation Protection D. L. Bennett, Branch Manager, Maintenance S. A. Bauer, Branch Manager, Nuclear Regulation R. C. Rupe, t.; ting Operations Branch Manager, Quality Assurance R. H. Budzeck, Assistant Operations Supervisor R. A. Reinart, Instrument and Control Supervisor A. M. Puzey, Office Supervisor M. D. Gatlin, Warehouse Supervisor D. F. Levin, Supervisor, Plant Modifications R. Prewitt, Quality Systems Supervisor
- J. A. Benjamin, Supervisor Quality Audit
- W. J. Williams, Regulatory Compliance Engineer -
The inspectors also interviewed and talked w!th other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
These itcluded shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians L
and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those atteriding the exit interview.
l 2.
Plant Status-The plant was shutdown in Mode 6 conducting the 1989 Refueling Outage with reactor core reload in progress on May 14, 1989.
Core Reloading completed on May 16, 1989, with the plant shifting to Mode 5 on May 25, 1989.
The period concluded with the reactor at mid-loop in Mode 5 and steam generator tube inspections in progress.
During this period the licensee continued evaluation on the impact of finding loose wires in containment electrical penetrations; capped a number flux' thimble that were found to have thinned walls (IEB 88-09); and found a number of steam
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~ generator tubes that exhibited through wall circumferential cracking in the tube sheet area.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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During this inspection period, the. inspectors observed and examined -
activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or biweekly basis.
Daily the inspectors; observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift personnel.
Each week the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:
(a) General plant and equipment conditions.
(b) Maintenance requests and repairs.
(c) Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
(d) Ignition sources and flammable material control.
(e) Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures.
(f) Interiors of electrical and control panels.
(g) Implem.itation of the licensee's physical security plan.
(h) Radiation protection controls.
(i) Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
(j) Radioactive waste systems.
(k) Proper storage of compressed gas bottles.
Weekly, the inspectors examined the licensee's equipment clearance control with respect to removal of equipment from service to determine that the licensee complied with technical specification limiting l
conditions for operation.
Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure i
i that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance l
evolutions.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution and test tags were examined by the inspectors.
l Each week the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent l
topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security,
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training and other topics related to in progress work activities.
The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCRs) to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action.
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Routine inspections of the licensee's physical security program were:
performed in the 'reas of access control,. organization and staffing sand
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'~ detection and assessment systems. The inspectors observed the access
control. measures used at the. entrance to,the protected area' verified the
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integrity of-portions of the' protected area barrier and vital. area barriers, and observed in several instances the implementation of t
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- compensatory measures upon breach of-vital area barriers.
Portions of
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c the' isolation zone were verified to be free'of obstructions.
Functioning-
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of central.and secondary'~ alarm stations (including the use of CCTV monitors) was observed.
On a sampling basis, the inspectors v'erified
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that the required minimum number of armed guards and individuals'
.. authorized to direct security activities were on site.
The inspectors conducted routine inspections of selected activities ~of
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the licensee's radiological protection program. 'A sampling of radiation s
work permits (RWP) was reviewed for completeness and adequacy'of information.
During the course of inspection activities and periodic tours of plant areas, the inspectors verified proper use of personnel'
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monitoring equipment, observed individuals leaving the radiation
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controlled area and signing out on appropriate RWP's, and observed the
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pos' ting-of radiation ~ areas and contaminated areas.
Posted radiation
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levels at locations within the fuel and auxiliary buildings were verified
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using both NRC'and= licensee portable survey meters.
The involvement of.
l health physics supervisors and engineers and their awareness'.of-l significant plant activities was assessed through conversations and review of RWP sign-in records.
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The inspectors, verified the operability of selected engineered safety features. 'This was done by direct visual verification of the correct
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position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable.
. No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.-
Maintenance (62703)
The inspectors observed portions of the licensee's corrective maintenance activities on plugging the tubes and eddy current testing in the steam generators. This licensee's effort on plugging the steam generators was to address, in part, NRC Bulletin 89-01, " Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs." Several plants have experienced stress corrosion cracking and leaks in Westinghouse Mechanical Plugs.
The: plugs
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that failed in the industry were from certain~ lots with heat numbers 3779, 3513, 3962, and 4523. The licensee identified in Non Conformance Report (NCR)89-061 that 82 plugs from heat 3962 were installed at Trojan, and scheduled these for repair. The licensee elected to use Babcock and Wilcox Plug-A-Plug (PAP) to repair these 82 plugs.
To determine if the steam generator tubes had flaws and where the flaws were, the licensee used three types of magnetic probes. These probes emit a magnetic field, and flaws (cracks, dents, etc.) in the tube wall distort the magnetic field.
One probe used was a bobbin probe, which is a single sensor that is pushed through the tube.
Another probe used was the 8x1 probe, which has 8 elements that touch the surface of the tube
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li and measure a 45 degree arch on the tube.
The last probe used was.the Motorized Rotatory Pancake Coil (MRPC).
This probe consists of a single element, which is rotated by a motor at 360 RPM and travels at 0.1
inches /second.
The different probes are compared below:
PROBE SPEED-ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES Bobbin'
24 in/sec Speed, Meets Tech Specs Poor indication near tube sheet
'8x1 6 in/sec Better resolution Can have poor than bobbin indication near tube sheet, slower than bobbin
'MRPC 0.1 in/sec High resolution Very slow The licensee has completed their investigation, and has to-date found 51 circumferential cracks (A-S/G-1, B S/G-23, C S/G-21, DS/G-6). The licensee has also found 73 axial indications, but has determined that all; i
the indications were pluggable.
The licensee used a contractor, Allen Nuclear Associates (ANA) to perform this work and the eddy current work.
The contractor performed the work remotely, using robotics and cameras to do the work after initial setup.
The eddy current work for Steam Generators A, B, C, and D was performed using Maintenance Requests (MRs) 89-2656, 89-0434, 89-0433, and 89-2655 respectively.
The inspectors verified that the contractor was using approved procedures, and the personnel appeared qualified.
The licensee had the equipment tagged out for service, and the replacement parts for the PAP work appeared to be properly certified.
The inspectors observed that radiological controls were in place to control the work, with separate Radiological Work Permits (RWPs) issued.
The inspectors also toured containment and verified that controls were in place.
Quality Inspection (QI) hold points were identified and observed, and QI inspectors were noted observing activities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance (61726)
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The inspectors observed the licensee perform the quarterly calibration of the Power Range (PR) Nuclear Instruments.
The Instrumentation and Control technicians used Periodic Instrumentation and Control Test (PICT)-11-1, Revision 21, " Nuclear Instrumentation, Power Range," and Instrument and Control Procedure (ICP)-21-76, Revision 0, " Calibration of Power Range Nuclear Instruments," to perform the calibration of the Power Range Nuclear Instruments. The inspectors noted that the precautions and prerequisites were met. the power supply voltages were within tolerance, l
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the' technical specification frequency was met and that the calibration equipment'was within their calibration due date.
The technicians set the values'of the instruments to the, values determined by Nuclear Engineering, who had determined the excore power from incore
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f measurements.
'A review of the recorls showed that the required surveillance frequency was met.
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During the_ inspection,- the technicians were noted by the inspectors to be using a lower tier procedure for the calibration of thcse instruments.
The lower _ tier procedure (ICP-21-76) was issued April 7,1988, and
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previous to this procedure being issued, the vendor manual was being used. The lower tier procedure was signed by the supervisor of the I&C shop, but PICT-11-1 which tests the alarm functions, trip setpoints settings was signed by the plant manager.
l The inspectors-will investigate the acceptability and review process for lower level procedures. This item is unresolved and will be followed up in a future inspection (50-344/89-16-01).
6.
Event Follow-up (93702, 62703, 92701)
Steam Generator Tube Cracking As part of their response to NRC Bulletin 88-02, " Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generator Tubes," the licensee in.a letter dated November 1, 1988, committed to perform eddy current examination sf all l
tubes of all four steam generators.
On June 10, 1989, while co nocting j.
these examinations, circumferential cracking was identified between 1/2"
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to 4 1/2" from the top of the tube sheet area in a small percentage of the steam generator tubes examined.
Additionally, axial cracking was i
identified using the Babcock and Wilcox (B&A) Remotely Operated Generator
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Examination and Repair (ROGER) Manipulator system and the motorized rotating pancake coil (MRPC) eddy current probe.
As follow-up action, the licensee concluded that MRPC examination was required for all steam generator tubes that'had been examined by different eddy current probes.
The licensee also concluded plugging would be required for any tube that exhibited either circumferential or i
axial cracking.
At the close of this inspection period, the licensee was conducting additional eddy current examinations, removing previously installed plugs for tubes that had been previously plugged and plugging tubes that had identified circumferential or axial cracks.
The inspectors, prior to the recognition of the steam generator tube cracking, observed licensee eddy current examination of the steam generator tubes (see section 4) and concluded acceptable practices were f
used. The inspectors will continue to evaluate this area through routine
inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Follow-up of Licensee Event Reports (92700, 90712)
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The following LERs are closed based on in-office review, inspector verification of the implementation of selected corrective actions and licensee commitment to perform future corrective actions:
LER 88-27. Revision 1 (Closed), "High Head Safety Injection Inoperable on Loss of Volume Control Tank Isolation Capability Due:-
to Personnel Error" This revised event report provided additional corrective actions for an event in which Technical Specification 3.0.3. was unknowingly entered due to not having the ability to isolate the volume control tank. These actions taken or committed to were:
establishing improved administrative controls to clearly identify the safety related train in which work is being conducted; conducting additional training for work planners so as to ensure instructions are clear as to which trains are involved in work; revising Administrative Orders to improve work controls by specifying corrective actions not be performed using maintenance requests for support activities; and clarifying management expectations for Quality Control inspectors in documenting
, procedural noncompliance.
The inspectors verified the training and procedural. changes committed to in this LER had been performed.
The inspectors also noted that while procedures had been changed and training conducted, similar events have recurred, i.e., QC inspectors not documenting procedure noncompliance and work (troubleshooting) performed on an unrelated work requests.
This has been an ongoing concern with PGE that will continue to be followed under routine inspection.
LER 88-35, Revision 1, (Closed), " Surveillance Interval on Gaseous Radwaste Oxygen Monitor Exceeded due to Data Entry Error." This l
revised licensee event report provided additional data as to the
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.cause of the event and additional corrective actions taken or planned to be taken.
The licensee concluded the causes of exceeding the surveillance interval on the gaseous radwaste oxygen monitor was i
personnel error, inadequate training and an inadequate means to differentiate between data entry for periodic surveillance and surveillance that are performed as part of a retest for corrective maintenance.
As additional corrective actions the licensee performed the required surveillance, trained data entry personnel l
and changed the automated scheduling system to provide separate individual data sheets for surveillance performed only on a routine scheduled basis.
The inspectors verified that procedures had been revised.
Additionally, the inspectors plan to attend the training when given.
LER 88-46, Revision 1, (Closed), " Containment Ventilation Isolation Due to Electronic Noise Spike." This revised licensee event report provided additional data as to the cause of isolations of several j
ventilation isolations.
The licensee concluded the cause of che
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isolation was electronics noise spikes from t": ;peration of solenoid valves whose control circuits are in the Process Radiation
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Monitor System cabinet (C-41).
The generated signal noise affected either the detector cabling or the power supply.
As corrective
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action the licensee under a nonconformance report (NCR) is c
evaluating installing' noise suppression devices in the radiation
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' monitoring circuitry.
The inspectors observed portions of the
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J testing performed in identifying root cause. The inspectors
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. concluded the licensee investigation, evaluation and testing done to
' determine root cause was disciplined, well-conceived and timely.
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b.
The following LERs are closed based on inspector follow-up that included discussions with licensee representatives, detailed event evaluation, or verification of appropriateness and implementation of corrective actions and licensee commitment to perform future corrective actions:
LER 89-06, Revision 0, (Closed), " Steam Dump Failure Resulting in Engineered Safety Feature Actuation.
This licensee event report described an event, the failure of the automatic steam dumps to properly control pressure and the eventual failure of an instrument air line to one of the steam dump valves, with the reactor at 6%
power in Mode 1 that resulted in an Engineered Safety Features actuation (feedwater isolation, auxiliary fr ed pump start and steam generator [S/G] blowdown isolation) due to high-high water level signal from the "C" steam generator.
The 1.censee has not yet determined the cause of the event and has committed to provide a revised LER when the cause is identified.
As interim corrective
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actions the licensee, prior to the conclusion of the 1980 Refueling Outage, will overhaul steam dump valves to ascertain the cause of the event.
Additionally, flexible instrument air hoses will replace j
rigid air line tubing. Also during this event, the "A" Shutdown Rod Bank would not manually or automatically drive; however, the rods did insert when de-energized.
The licensee has included the resolution of these items on the Ready-for-Startup Checklist.
The inspectors observed the broken air line, interviewed operators and the system engineer involved with the event, and observed portions of the troubleshooting associated with root cause determination.
The. inspectors will continue follow-up of this event in the course of completion of the 1989 Refueling Outage.
Historically the steam dumps at.the Trojan facility have had several nuisance problems.
Management attention is recommended to ensure the steam dump systec.
functions as deFigned.
l LER 89-07, Revision 0, (Closed), " Control Room Isolation Damper Closure Time Exceeds Required Maximum." This event report described the failure of normal Control Room Ventilation (CB-2) isolation dampers [DM-10501 A&B, DM-10504 A&B] to close within the time required by Technical Specifications.
The licensee has not yet determined the cause of the event and has committed to revise the LER when the cause is determined.
The licensee, as corrective l~
action, has performed extensive troubleshooting and event
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Adjustments of system pressure switches have been made
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so that the damper isolation times. meet technical specification
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ic-ently, the licensee is evaluating / investigating design changes anu esting methodology in an attempt to identify root causes.
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance test L
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documentation.
The inspectors wi11 continue to follow the progress of root causes determination.
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LER 89-08, Revision 0, (Closed), " Spent Fuel Exhaust System-
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Inoperable While Moving Fuel." This licensee event report described the failure to maintain the technical specification required negative pressure in the Spent Fuel. Pool Exhaust System during refueling operations.
The licensee determined the causes of the event to be lack of formal administrative controls for doors and not bringing an issue to a level of management that could ensure plant wide resolution. As corrective actions the licensee placed signs on j
all Fuel and Auxiliary Building doors that could impact Spent Fuel l
Ventilation, revised Operations Night Orders and Shiftly Routines to address doors during refueling operations and will perform testing of ventilation systems to identify acceptable refueling. ventilation
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system lineups that will ensure compliance with technical specifications.
The inspectors attended the event. critique, reviewed logs and surveillance and met with licensee management to discuss the causes and corrective actions.
The inspectors noted
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that this event represents frequently recurring problems with
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ventilation systems, in particular ventilation systems important to safety, and the establishment of adequate controls to prevent
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events. The recurrence of events of this type are particularly troublesome because understanding of ventilation' systems and their -
design and adequate administrative controls'have been the subject of previous enforcement and management attention.
PGE Management should develop a comprehensive plan to ensure the ventilation systems' design is thoroughly understood, functions as dasigned, and is adequately controlled and operated using plant procedures.
LER 89-09, Revision 0, (Closed), " Improper Wirino Results in Loss of an Automatic Feature for a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suction Isolation Valve." This licensee event report described the inoperability of an RHR suction isolation valve (MO-8702).
The licensee determined the cause of the event to be an undocumented wiring change made during plant construction, and a subsequent 1988 plant modification whose design was based on the wiring as it was documented in plant drawings.
The post modification testing of the 1988 design change failed to identify the inoperability of the l
MO-8702 high pressure interlock due to inadequate testing scope.
As corrective actions the licensee corrected the wiring error, updated prints, and changed procedures to required design (corporate)
engineering involvement in post modification testing.
The resident inspectors performed a detailed investigation of the event which is documented in NRC inspection report 50-397/89-10.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Follow-Up on Open Items and Corrective Actions for Violations (92701, 92702]
Enforcement Item 50-344/89-01-03 (Closed) Instrument and Control (I&C)
Surveillance Test Not Performed Per Procedures.
The licensee responded to the Notice of Violation via letter dated April 14, 1989.
In this
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response the licensee attributed the cause of the violation to be
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Lpersonnel error.
As corrective actions personnel were c?<ised that
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' technical equivalency is not sufficient justification for not folicwing procedures and that, if an equivalent method was to be used, the procedure should have been changed.
The licensee also reviewed and revised Plant Instrument and Control Tests (PICTs) to address the issue
of technica'l equivalency.
The inspectors reviewed selected PICT
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procedures to verify appropriate changes had been implemented.
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Enforcement Item 50-344/89-01-03 (Closed) Failure to Provide Accarate Information in Licensee Event Report (LER) 88-49 Revision 0.
The licensee attributed the cause of the violation to be personnel error in.
that a communication error occurred between the individual assigned and his manager to assure a corrective action was performed.
The incorrect information that the corrective action was completed was then relayed by the Manager to the LER author.
As corrective actions, the licensee immediately revised the procedure that was reported as already having been revised and revised the procedure providing guidance for writing LERs to specifically require obtaining the procedure revision member and date when making statements in an LER that a procedure has been changed.
The inspectors verified these actions were performed.
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Enforcement Item 50-344/89-01-04 (Closed) Incorrect Replacement of Containment Hydrogen Ventilation Adsorber.
The licensee attributed the cause of the violation to be personnel error in that a communication error between the system engineer and the maintenance craftsman resulted in replacement.of the "B" train charcoal adsorber vice the "A" train.
As corrective action the craftsman received additional instruction on the need to read and follow MR instructions.
The engineer received training on the need to be clear and concise when providing verbal and written instructions.
Also, the licensee has implemented the requirement to have a " field copy" of the maintenance request at the worksite while conducting maintenance.
The inspectors verified that maintenance craftsman have and are using the " field" copy of the maintenance request when performing maintenance.
9.
TI 15-100, (Closed), " Proper Receipt, Storage, and Handling of Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil (2515/100)
This temporary instruction (TI) provided for an assessment of the licensee's program to maintain the quality of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fuel oil that is stored on site.
The specific items that were to be verified were the following:
- That the licensee routinely determines the quality of stored fuel oil with effective scheduled analyses.
- That the licensee can detect degradation of stored fuel oil quality, as may be indicated by excessive water accumulation, oxidation, or biological contamination, among other possible i
causes of degradation.
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- That the licensee routinely monitors and cleans filters, strainers and other components prone to fouling in the fuel oil system.
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- That the licensee routinely reviews and evaluates NRC information on this subject.
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The licensee monitors the EDG fuel oil quality on a bimonthly basis'
alternating fuel oil tanks to meet the technical specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.3.
The licensee uses Chemical Manual Procedure 3 (CMP 3),
" Fuel Oil Test", to verify this technical specification.
The licensee sends the samples taken to an Audited Laboratory, Oregon Analytical f
Laboratory, for monthly checks on the fuel oil.
The last surveillance of
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the laboratory identified that the fuel oil was being monitored by
.different ASTM procedures than what was specified in the chemistry j
manual.
The methods were reviewed and compared'by the licensee, and
. determined to be adequate.
The criteria was met with the different ASTM
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procedures.and the chemistry manual was updated.
Based on these procedures and discussions with the licensee, the inspectors concludeo that the licensee is adequately monitoring the quality of their fuel oil.
The inspectors also noted that the licensee does monitor semiannually and change out the fuel oil filters annually on the diesel.
The licensee does monitor the accumulation of water in the fuel oil, and.other contaminants to detect causes of degradation.
H To verify the review by the-licensee of NRC information on this subject, the inspectors asked to see the licensee's evaluation of Information Notice 87004.
The licensee evaluated this Notice in Operational Assessment Review (OAR) 87-08.
For applicability to their site, the OAR was closed on 4/8/87 with only some minor procedural changes taken to reflect their practices. There was no future action to be taken by the licensee.
Based on the above review by the inspector, the licensee appears to have an acceptable program to verify the quality of their fuel oil.
The information requested by this TI will be forwarded to the NRC office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
10.
Unresolved Items
'An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a deviation, or a violation.
An unresolved item is documented #n paragraph 5.
11.
Exit Interview (30703')
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The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on June 23, 1989, and with licensee management throughout the inspection period.
In these meetings the inspectors summarized the scope
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l and findings of the inspection activities.
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