IR 05000344/1993008
| ML20056C865 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1993 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056C864 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-93-08, 50-344-93-8, NUDOCS 9307260050 | |
| Download: ML20056C865 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
Report No.
50-344/93-08 Docket No.
50-344
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License No.
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Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 i
Facility Name:
Trojan Nuclear Plant
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Inspection At:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection Conducted:
April 22 - May 31, 1993 Inspectors:
K. E. Johnston, Senior Resident Inspector J. F. Melfi, Resident Inspector Approved By:
h-D @3 P.
( Johnson, Chief Date Signed
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Rea r Projects Section 1 i
Summary:
Inspection on April 22 - May 31.1993 (Inspection Report No. 50-344/93-08)
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't Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced.. resident inspection of operational safety verification, maintenance,- emergency preparedness and followup of previously identified items.
Inspection procedures 62703, 71707, 82701, l
90712, 92701 and 93702 were used-as guidance during the conduct of the
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inspection.
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Safety Issue Management System (SIMS) Items
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SIMS item number GL-89-10 associated with' TI 2S15/109 is closed based on the-permanent closure of the plant.
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Results:
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. General Conclusions and Specific Findinos:
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The licensee is adequately monitoring emergency plan staffing levels, but.
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continuing attention is needed until-the new emergency plan is approved.
Sionificant Safety Matters:
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None 9307260050 930625 7'
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. Summary of Violations and Deviations:-
.j None Open Items Summary:
Eleven followup items (Paragraph 9), two unresolved. items (Paragraph' 9), three
enforcement items (Paragraph 9), two temporary instructions (Paragraph.7) and'
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six LERs (Paragraph 8) were closed.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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a.
Portland General Electric
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J. E. Cross, Vice President and. Chief Nuclear Officer
- S. M. Quennoz, Plant General Manager D. L. Nordstrom, General Manager, Nuclear Oversight
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C. K. Seaman, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering {NPE)
T. D. Walt, Gentral Manager, Technical Functions C. P. Yundt, Project Manager, Special Projects H. K. Chernoff, Manager, Licensing i
- M. D. Gatlin, Manager, Nuclear Security
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L. K. Houghtby, Manager, Plant Support M. B. Lackey, Manager, Planning and Control
- T. O. Meek, Manager, Personnel Protection
- J. M. Mihelich, Manager, Technical Services W. O. Nicholson, Manager, Operations
- J. A. Vingerud, Manager, Maintenance R. C. Rupe,~ Manager, Maintenance Planning
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- J. P. Sullivan, Configuration Management Manager NPE W. J. Williams, Manager, Nuclear Compliance J. C. Cooper, Manager, Emergency Preparedness j
- G. P. Enterline, Branch Manager, Operations J. A. Benjamin, Supervisor, Quality Audits A. Miller, Supervisor, NPE M. G. Cooksey, Maintenance Supervisor C. M. Dieterle, Supervisor, Individual Plant Examination
E. W. Ford, Compliance Specialist
- B. R. Hugo, Compliance Engineer
- M. H. Megehee, Compliance Engineer b.
Oregon Deoartment of Enerav A. Bless, Resident Safety Manager V. Sarte, Resident Inspector The inspectors also talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel,. plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Plant Status
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Trojan remained defueled throughout the reporting period. On May 5, 1993, the NRC issued the licensee a Possession Only License (POL). On'
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May 6,1993, the NRC approved the licensee's Certified Fuel Handler (CFH)
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program. On May 15, 1993, 109 employees departed Trojan, leaving 370 t
plant personnel. At the end of the reporting period, 364 people remained onsite.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined plant -
activities to verify the safety of the licensee's facility. Observations-and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or'-
biweekly basis.
Daily the inspectors observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain
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information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On occasions when a shirt turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that pertinent
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information was relayed to oncoming shift personnel.
Each week the inspectors toured accessible areas of.the facility to observe the following items:
General. plant and equipment conditions
Maintenance requests and repairs
Fire. hazards and fire fighting equipment a
Ignition sources and flammable material control
Conduct rf activities in accordance with the licensee's
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e administrative controls and approved procedures Intericrs of electrical and control panels
Plar.t housekeeping and cleanliness e
Radioactive waste systems a
Proper storage of compressed gas bottles a
Each week the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room and:
with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics.
relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training and other topics related to in-progress work activities.
The inspectors periodically observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee's program was being implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements. The inspectors verified that health physics supervisors and professionals conducted plant tours to observe activities in progress and were aware of significant plant activities, particularly-those related to radiological conditions and/or challenges. ALARA.
considerations were found to be an integral part of ~each RWP (Radiation Work Permit).
The inspectors conducted routine inspections of selected activities of-the licensee's radiological protection program. During the course of-inspection activities and periodic tours.of plant areas, the inspectors -
verified proper use of personnel monitoring equipment, observed u
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l individuals leaving the radiation controlled area and signing out on l
appropriate RWP's, and observed the posting of radiation areas and
contaminated areas. The involvement of health physics supervisors and.
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engineers and their awareness of significant plant activities was assessed through conversations.
Spent Fuel Pool and Containment Tours
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The inspector performed weekly tours of the spent fuel pool and containment and found that the material condition of containment was good
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and the area around the spent fuel pool was clear of items. The inspector noted that the licensee's activities in containment. had declined since most of the systems, including the reanor coolant system (RCS), have been drained as much as possible or deactivated. Due:to'this decline in activity, the plant staff had reduced tt 'r routine tours'in
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containment. Operators now are procedurally requir to tour containment
monthly and radiation protection technicians perform. monthly radiation
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survey.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance (62703. 92701)
The inspector observed portions of the following maintenance activities.
Qualified mechanics conducted these activities according to the written maintenance requests (MRs).
Spot checks of measuring and test equipment (M&TE) verified that the equipment was in calibration.
"B" EmeroencY Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Comoressor a.
The inspector observed licensee activities in repair of' the "B" train EDG air compressor via MR 93-00580. This compressor. supplies air to receiver tanks, which in turn supply the air to start the
"B" EDG. After initial disassembly, the licensee replaced the old air compressor with one from the warehouse. : After installation, the new air compressor tested satisfactorily. The licensee conducted the work activities according to the work instructions and the
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licensee's procedures.
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"C" Steam Generator (SG) Vibration Response Time Test
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- The licensee initiated MR 93-00577 to support accelerometer testing for another utility. This utility wanted to test,two types of accelerometer mountings. One of these mountings.is to become part:
of a loose parts monitoring system on that utility's.RCS.
The inspector noted that the. licensee performed the activities accor' ding.
to MR 93-00577, that radiological practices appeared sound, and that-instrumentation used was in calibration.
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Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP) Disassembiv and Inspection
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The inspector observed part of the disassembly of the "D" SWBP via MR 93-0388. The licensee disassembled this pump to-verf fy that the
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impeller washer was made of st'ainless. steel and was still intact (seeNRCInspectionReport 50-344/93-03) and to perform routine preventive maintenance. The washer was still intact and was found to be made of stainless steel. At the e.nd of the reporting period, the licensee had not completed this maintenance activity due to problems identified by the licensee. These were that (1) the impeller shaft was too small for the lower radial bearing and (2) the pump motor was 0.050 inches higher than the. pump impeller.
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The licensee sent the shaft to the vendor for repair to build up the affected area, and ground down the pump motor stand. The inspector-will observe completion of this maintenance activity when the
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licensee starts reassembly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emeroency Plan Staffino (82701).
The licensee's emergency plan requires a staff of trained people to provide appropriate response to emergency events. Plant staffing has been reduced due to the permanent shutdown. Since the licensee's retention plan has been canceled and the emergency plan still needs to be maintained, the inspector reviewed the licensee's staffing.
The requirements to staff and maintain an emergency ;lan are contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
.O CFR 50.47 and
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10 CFL 50, Appendix E, discuss emergency plan implementation require-ments.
10 CFR 50.54(q) states that a licensee may change the emergency plan without prior NRC approval provided that these changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan.
During a plant emergency, the licensee would provide staffing in four locations. These are the Control Room (CR), Operational Support Center (OSC), Technical Support Center (TSC) and: Emergency Operations Facility (E0F). The licensee's emergency plan has specific staffing assignments identified for each facility.
This plan has 72 positions, with 49 persons procedurally required to staff the four locations.
The inspector reviewed training records for persons required to implet..ent the licensee's emergen:y plan.
The inspector noted several items during this review which the licensee corrected or explained. Emergency Procedure (EP) 503, " Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Data Base Management," stated that three qualified persons are to be provided for each position needed 'to activate one of the emergency response
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facilities. On May 6, 1993, the inspector noted that the upcoming staff reductions scheduled for May 15th would leave some positions with only two. qualified persons. The licensee wrote Temporary Change Notice (TCN)
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93-086 which changed EP 503 to require ' staffing of only two persons for each position. The licensee determined, after discussions with the Emergency Preparedness Branch, Office of NRR, that this change did not represent a reduction in the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
The inspector also noted that some individuals who had been transferred to the PGE corporate office or other PGE locations were still required to
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respond-to an emergency at the plant.
Based on discussions with the i
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licensee, the inspector determined that these individuals could still respond within the required time.
The inspector noted that only one designated person had fulfilled all the l
training requirements for the chemistry supervisor position in the OSC.
Although the chemistry technicians who could staff this position had met all the initial training requirements, they had not yet participated in-However, this was consistent with the an exercise in this position.
licensee's procedures, which stated that the position may be filled by a technician who meets the initial requirements for this position, provided
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These that he/she practices in this position within one year.
individuals were planning to participate in this position during the licensee's next exercise, which was scheduled within one year of their assignment to that OSC position.
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Af ter the layoff of employees on May 15, 1993, the licensee analyzed the After this evalua-r. umber of positions required by the emergency plan.
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tion, the licensee eliminated 18 positions from the various locations, Of these 53 positions, only 31 are required leaving 53 positions.
The licensee determined, after discussion with the Emergency positions.
Preparedness Branch, Office of NRR,-that these changes did not represent a reduction in the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
The inspector concluded that the licensee was managing the staffing
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reductions adequately. The inspector also noted that the plant staff is continuing to decrease in size and that ongoing management attention is The licensee necessary to assure that adequate staffing is maintained.
agreed with this comment.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
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Event Followup (62703. 92701. 93702)
i Effluent Flow Rate Disparity a.
The licensee has been processing and releasing treated water from On May 4,1993, the licensee their radioactive waste systems.
performed a routine calibration of effluent flow transmitter (FT)
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4098, then benan a discharge from the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) monitor tank. Operators then observed that the rate
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of level decrease in the monitor tank did not agree with FT 4098.
The licensee stopped the discharge and investigated the recent
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The licensee found nothing wrong with FT calibration of FT 4098.
4098, but replaced it and, on May 6, returned the system to service.
Operators subsequently resumed the discharge, but discontinued it when they observed that the disparity between the level transmitter and the flow transmitter still existed.
The The inspector discussed this problem with a shift manager.
inspector asked whether the licensee had vi. ified that the water from the monitor tank was not going somewher else or if the level indication on the monitor tanks was correct. The shift manager
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agreed that the flow disparity was not with FT-4098, and stated that he would resolve the problem. He then-(1) verified the flowrate of FT 4098 with an externally mounted ultrasonic flow transmitter and (2) compared the level changes in the CVCS monitor tank by transferring water from another tank. These actions indicated that the CVCS monitor tank level transmitters and FT 4098 were operating correctly.
The licensee restarted the discharge from the CVCS monitor tank and
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again noticed the flow disparity. Operators then monitored tank levels and found that the primary water storage tank (PWST) level
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had increased. The licensee concluded that valve 8235, a' cross-connect between the CVCS minitor tank and the PWST, was. leaking, and wrote a Maintenance Request (MR) to repair it. Operators closed valve PM-013 (downstream ~ of 8235) and continued with the discharge.
After shutting PM-013, the flow indication and CVCS monitor tank level decrease corresponded properly. The inspector noted that
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operators would likely have performed the above troubleshooting without the inspector's prompting, since plant procedures required that the disparity in the transmitters be resolved for the discharge to continue. The inspector noted at the exit meeting that the Operations Department appeared to have responded appropriately to this issue.
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"A" Emeraency Diesel Generator (EDG) Start due to Liahtnina
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On May 31, 1993, lightning strikes on the offsite power lines caused the "A" train EDG to start. There are four' safety-related EDG start signals, including manual, safety injection, loss of offsite power,
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An anticipatory non-safety-related EDG and degraded grid voltage.
start signal is also initiated by undervoltage on.the associated startup transformer. The licensee's safety analysis does' not take credit for this non-safety-related start. The licensee noted that this anticipatory start signal is initiated without a time delay, and that power to the vital buses was not lost.
Operators initially decided that this was not a reportable event.
However, based on a subsequent review, the licensee decided to report the EDG start to the NRC and initiated plans to submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) on this event. This event will be reviewed further after receipt of the LER.
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7.
Temporary Instructions (tis)
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The inspector closed the following tis without further review due to the permanent closure of the plant.
t TI 2515/109 (Closed), Inspection Requirements for Generic Letter
(GL) 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance" (SIMS item number GL-89-10)
TI 2515/111 (Closed), Electrical Distribution System Followup
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Inspection
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Eollow-up of Licensee Event Reoorts (90712. 92700)
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Based on in-office review and the licensee's commitment to cease plant operations, the inspector closed the following LERs.
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review found that the licensee had adequately described the event, determined the root cause, and implemented or identified appropriate corrective actions.
LER 91-11, Revision 1 (Closed), " Degradation of Electrical
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Penetration Assembly (EPA) Seals."
i LER 92-27, Revision 0 (Closed), " Condensate Pump Trip on Ground e
Fault Causes Automatic Main Feedwater Pump and Reactor Trip."
LER 92-24, Revision 0 (Closed), " Procedural Inadequacy Caused a
Control Room Ventilation System Inoperability from Centrifugal Charging Pump Seal Leakage Exceeding Operational Limit."
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The inspector also reviewed the following LERs which described licensee actions related to fire protection issues. These LERs documented findings which resulted from of the licensee's examination of fire barriers.
LER 92-26. Revision 4 (Closed), " Fire Barrier Deficiencies Identified as Result of Onacina Fire Barrier Improvements" This LER concerned additional degraded fire barrier penetrations
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discovered by the licensee during the 18-month surveillance pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.9. Various fire barriers were found deficient due to a programmatic failure to inspect these fire
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barriers. The deficiencies were evaluated and found to have minor
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safety significance.
The licensee is still inspecting fire barriers to assure that they meet TS 3/4.7.9.
LER 92-29. Revision 0 (Closed)
"Inadeauate Construction of Turbine
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Building Wall Caused Inoperability of the Wall as a Three Hour Fire Barrier" On September 23, 1992, engineering personnel found an incorrectly installed roll-up door and penetrations between the turbine building and the transformer yard. These were originally constructed incorrectly. There were no safety consequences to this event. The licensee repaired the roll-up door and the penetrations under Plant Modification Request 92-038. Based on the licensee's corrective actions, this LER is closed.
LER 92-31. Revision 0 (Closed), " Nonfunctional Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Due to Inadeauate Installation Durina Original Plant Construction."
The licensee wrote this LER when they discovered an incorrectly installed conduit in the wall separating the "A" and "B" train EDGs.
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The licensee initiated immediate corrective actions and repaired the penetration. The opening in this penetration was an annular gap of
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5/32 inch, with a radius of approximately 1 1/2 inches. The licensee's evaluation.showed that the gap was not large enough to permit propagation'of a fire from'one EDG room to the other.
The inspector _ concluded that the evaluation appeared reasonable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup of Open and Unresolved Items (92701)
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Open Items Associated With Systems Still Reouired
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The following items are addressed for systems still' required to be operable or issues that are still applicable to the current plant
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status. The inspector examined licensee documentation and discussed c
these issues with licensee personnel, as appropriate, during the inspections.
Followup Item 90-20-02 (Closed), "Certain Safetv-Related Valves Excluded from In-Service Testino (IST) Reouirements." This item concerned the possibility that the licensee's Technical Specifications (TS) inappropriately excluded certain automatic
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safety-related valves from IST requirements. The inspectors noted during that inspection that the licensee's TS ' excluded valves in the i
containment' spray system, containment spray additive system, and component cooling water (CCW) system. The inspectors did not have -
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an immediate valve operability concern since the licensee tested the-
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valves to the IST code. The inspectors concluded that the TS and
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related documents should be revised to require a periodic IST.
To encompass this;possible problem, the licensee reviewed the TS and found that certain valves in the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) and'
service water (SW) systems had also been excluded from'IST.
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licensee identified that License Change Request 79-01, Revision 1,-
excluded all these valves. The reasons for excluding these. valves from IST requirements were not clearly explained in that license
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change request.
E The licensee evaluated this concern and decided not to change the TS. However, the licensee did update their IST program to include the above valves. The licensee's response appeared appropriate since they did perform the appropriate testing. Only the SW and-CCW-
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systems are still required by the existing plant status. The'IST program is no longer required due to the plant status, and licensee is continuing to test valves in the CCW and SW systems. This item
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is closed.
Followup Item 90-34-01 (Closed). " Corrective Action to Provide Quality Classification Lists Was inadeouate." NRC Inspection. Report 50-344/92-05 previously addressed this item. The licensee's quality classification lists were inadequate or conflicted with each other, and corrective actions to resolve these problems were slow. The licensee uses quality classification lists to determine design requirements and help planners decide the quality level of maintenance work instructions. The licensee was intending to update _
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verification of calculations that supported the design basis of the plant. The EDSFI followup inspection report -(50-344/91-201)
partially addressed these issues. The three remaining open issues are:
(1) The licensee needed to assure that full load currents do not exceed derated cable ratings for cables that are generally a
wrapped. A calculation needed to be revised to document these ratings since it referred to several unreviewed calculations.
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(2) The initial design air ventilation flowrates to maintain the emergency diesel generator (EDG) room air temperatures below 116*F were greater than actual flowrates to the EDG room.
This temperature could affect the environmental qualification of electrical equipment in the room.
(3) Several poor assumptions were made in a calculation to determine the heat balance in the EDG rooms.
The remaining issue for item (1), cable ampacity, was an updated final calculation for cable ampacity ratings. The licensee completed this alculation on June 28, 1991.
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The licensee performed another calculation and a test on the EDG
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The final result verified that the air temperature for the rooms.
electrical equipment was less than the qualification temperature.
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The licensee used the test data and had a vendor perform a calculation on the EDG room heatup.
Review of this calculation showed that the EDG room is satisfactory and that the calculation was based upon appropriate assumptions.
In summary, the licensee performed'the calculation for.the cable ampacity and EDG temperature. The EDG test showed that plant equipment did not exceed equipment qualification temperature limits.
Further, the actual EDG load will be substantially lower due to the
plant closure, implying less temperature rise in the room.
Based on the licensees' actions, this item is closed.
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Followup Item 91-01-13 (Closed). "Desian Basis Document. Under-writers Laboratories (UL) Listino, and National-Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code Commitments." NRC Inspection Report 50-344/91-01 identified several deficiencies in design control of
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some fire protection equipment. The licensee corrected these deficiencies during that inspection. The observations questioned
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whether the fire protection equipment met design requirements of NFPA and UL. The licensee said in a March 15, 1991, letter that they would walkdown these systems between September 1991 and September 1992 and identify deviations to the NFPA code and UL standards. The licensee modified this commitment in a February 21, 1992, letter saying that these walkdowns would be done by July 1, 1993. The licensee deleted this commitment in a March 3,1993 letter. The licensee started the walkdowns and identified various probl ems. The licensee stopped this effort after the plant closure was announced. The licensee intends to verify fire protection code i
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these lists and this item was left open in Inspection Report 92-05 to track the licensee's actions.
The -licensee verified and validated the safety-related list by December 1992.
If equipment was not safety-related, a desk-top guide could be used to determine whether it was quality-related.
The licensee intends to modify their safety-related list to reflect the changed status of the plant. The licensee intends to modify the list as they change safety-related designation of systems, structures and components. Based on the licensee's actions, this item.is closed.
Followuo Item 90-34-02 (Closed). " Control of Temperature of Safety-Related Systems Sensitive to Precipitation or Freezino." NRC Inspection Report 50-344/90-34 identified several issues regarding the control and monitoring of equipment, such as heaters and heat tracing, used to maintain system temperatures within design limits.
The licensee had resolved most of the issues prior to the decision
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to cease plant operations. Many systems that required temperature controls, such as borated systems, auxiliary feedwater, reactor vessel level indication, the condensate storage tank, and steam pressure transmitters, are no longer required to be operable.
However, the licensee decided.that some room heaters were still important to safety. The licensee currently has plans to enhance the control of thermostats for room heaters by installing. covers and-warning labels. The licensee plans to complete this action by September 1993. This item is closed based on the actions taken and the licensee's schedule to enhance the control of thermostats.
Followup Item 90-34-03 (Closed). " Instrumentation and Control-4 (I&C) Forms not reviewed for Uncontrolled chances-to the Desian Basis." This item restated the Quality Assurance (QA) department's concern that I&C-4 forms were not previously controlled as engineering documents. This report noted that the licensee'had not taken action to verify that these data sheets, which the licensee had changed, still maintained the plant design basis. The licensee used these data sheets in the calibration of instruments and the potential existed for inaccurate instrument settings.
In response to this item, the licensee verified instrument settings in the reactor protection system and the engineered safety feature (ESF) systems during the I&C procedure upgrade program. The licen-see also initiated Action Plan (AP)91-020 to verify all safety-related and quality-related instrument scaling and setpoints. The licensee intends to verify instrumentation setpoints that provide alarms, interlocks or protection for the remaining safety-related systems that support spent fuel pool cooling (i.e., service water,-
diesel fuel oil, component cooling water and spent fuel pool).
Based on the licensee's proposed actions, this item is closed.
Followup Item 90-200-01 (Closed)
" Numerous Electrical Calculation Errors.".The Electrical Distribution Safety Functional Inspection (EDSFI) noted seven design control deficiencies relating to the e
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compliance in areas.that are still safety-related (e.g., EDG rooms, switchgear rooms, intake structure). The licensee plans to complete actions related to this item by May 1994.. This item is closed.
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Followuo Item 91-40-01 (Closed)
" Annunciator Response Procedures
. During the 1991 Licensed Operator Requalification Not Established."
Evaluation, the NRC examiners identified a non-cited violation for insufficient corrective actions associated with annunciator response The licensee had previously identified' that they used procedures.
annunciator response guides instead of procedures, which was con-trary to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33 requirements. The annunciator i
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response guide would not have the same level of review or detail as t
would be required for a procedure.
The licensee converted their guidelines to procedures for all their i
annunciators and held training on these procedures. The licensee
intends to delete the procedures that are no longer necessary for the current condition of the plant. Based on the licensee's
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completed actions and proposed actions, this item is closed.
Violation 92-09-01 (Closed). "Two Examples Of Failures To Follow Procedures In Motor-0perated Valve (MOV) Calculations."_ The MOV team inspection idsntified two examples of failures to follow t
These examples were (1) returning two valves to procedures.
operable status before reviewing a vendor design calculation and (2) an' electrical maintenance supervisor closing an MOV package without reviewing a data sheet.
The licensee agreed with the violation. The licensee determined-that they did not review the vendor design ' calculations because
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Quality Assurance (QA) manual requirements had changed. The QA Manual was changed on February 4,1991, to require licensee review
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of design calculations before their implementation in 'the plant.
The licensee subsequently reviewed the vendor's calculations for.
this and other valves. The reason for not reviewing the data sheet was a failure to follow procedures. The licensee' revised the
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procedure and emphasized the importance of supervisory reviews.
Based on the licensee's actions, this item.is closed.
92-09-02 (Closed). "Several Issues Reaardina Dearaded Followuo Item Voltage Considerations For Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Calculations."
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This open item concerned the use of motor starting current in degraded voltage calculations for MOVs,. demonstration of adequate
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margin for undervoltage (UV) relay setpoint tolerances, and degraded voltage conditions for direct current (DC) MOVs. This item applied-
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The to valves in the licensee's Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 program.
licensee has completed appropriate calculations to address this item for their MOVs, and has resolved discrepancies. Due.to the closure of the plant,. only two valves in the plant could be considered as needing. this analysis. These valves are the diesel generator fuel.
oil day tank cross-connect valves.
In discussions with the licensee, they showed that these valves were Since the only valves.
satisfactory for degraded voltage conditions.
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left in the program have been satisfactorily reviewed, this item is a
a closed.
Violation 92-24-01 (Closed). "Inadeouate Work Instructions.". The 50-344/92-24 that the inspector noted in NRC Inspection Report licensee did not properly transfer torque values specified on a drawing for a jam nut to the maintenance instructions for a-valve.
The licensee decided that the drawing specifications were not transferred to the work instructions due to a personnel error.- The licensee counselled the individual and reemphasized management expectations to the staff.. Based on the licensee's corrective actions, this item is' closed.
92-32-05 (Closed). " Steam Generator (SG) Workers Exceed Violation This Notice of Violation concerned exceeding Overtime Limits."
overtime limits for contractors during steam generator (SG) sleeving operations during the 1991 Refueling Outage.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's February 8, 1993, response to The licensee admitted the violation and corrected this violation.
the procedure on work hour limits. The licensee stated that further work by contractor personnel on safety-related equipment would be subject to the same work hour limitations as PGE workers. -The inspector has not observed subsequent problems related to the
. control of overtime. Based on the corrective actions committed to in the licensee's response, this item is closed.
Ooen Items' Associated With Systems No Lonner Reouired b.
The following items concerned systems no longer required to be
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operable or issues that are not relevant to the current plant The licensee has shown that the corrective actions were status.
compl eted. The inspectors did not review the licensee's actions.
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These items are closed based on the licensee's commitment to cease
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operations.
Followup Item 91-27-02 (Closed), " Adequacy of Nitrogen System
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Design"
Followup Item 91-27-03 (Closed), " Single Check Valve Nitrogen System / Single Seal Pressure"
Unresolved Item 91-27-04 (Closed), " Seal Replacements" e
Unresolved Item 91-27-05 (Closed), " Acceptance Criteria For Seal Replacements" The following item was addressed for. systems not required to be
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operable or for issues that are not relevant to the current plant The licensee concluded that action to resolve this issue status.
was not warranted. This item is closed based on the licensee's commitment to cease operations.
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Followup Item 92-09-03 (Closed), "Setpoint Control Procedure
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Did Not Cover Motor Operated. Valve (MOV) Switches"
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10. Unresolved Item
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An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a deviation, or a violation. Unresolved items were closed in paragraph 9.
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11. Exit Interview (30703)_
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
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and with licensee management,throughout the inspection period. During these meetings the inspectors summarized the scope and on June 10, 1993,
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The licensee representatives findings of the inspection activities.
acknowledged the inspectors' observations.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials
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reviewed by or discussed with the inspectors during this inspection.
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