ML20151T436
| ML20151T436 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1988 |
| From: | Hooker C, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151T416 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-88-27, NUDOCS 8808160361 | |
| Download: ML20151T436 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000344/1988027
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ft1ISSION
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REGION V
Report No.
50-344/88-27
Docket No.
50-344
License No.
Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company-
121 5.W. Salmon Street
Portland, Oregon 97204
Facility Name: Trojan Nuclear Plant
Inspection at: Ranier, Oregon
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Inspection Conducted:
June 27-July 1, 1988
Inspector:
04. ,
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YbYPV
C. A. Hooker, Radiation Specialist.
Date Slgned
Approved:
h. 9.
4 _^ ^ _
7/DOW
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G. P. % )as, Chief
Da'te S'igned
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Emergency Preparedness and Radiological
Protection Branch
Summary:
Inspection on June 27-July 1, 1988 (Report No. 50-344/88-27)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on
previous inspection findings, chemistry controls, control of radioactive
materials and contamination, external exposure control, internal exposure
control, ALARA, and review of licensee reports.
Inspection procedures 30703,
92701, 79701, 83726, 83724, 83725, 83728 and 90713 were addressed.
Results:
In the areas inspected the licensee's program appeared adequate
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accomplish its safety objectives.
The licensees performance, overall,
appeared to be improving.
One apparent violation was identified in one area:
10 CFR 50.59, failure to
perform a written safety evaluation (paragraph 3).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
a.
Portland General Electric (PGE)
- C. A. Olmstead, General Manager, Trojan
- G. A. Zimmerman, Manager, Radiological Safety Branch (RSB)
- N. C. Dyer, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety & Regulation
Department
G. L. Rich, Manager, Chemistry Branch (MCB)
- T. O. Meek, Manager, Radiation Protection Branch (MRPB)
- R. C. Rupe, Manager, Performance Monitoring / Event Analysis-
Branch
- C. H. Brown, Manager, Quality Assurance (QA) Operations Branch
- D. L. Nordstrom, Compliance Engineer
- G. R. Huey, Supervisor, Radiation Protection (RP)
- G. C. Kernion, Supervisor, Chemistry Laboratory -
- N. C. Dyer, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety & Regulation
Department
- L. D. Larson, Unit Supervisor, Radwaste (USRW)
- L. E. Rocha, Supervisor, Health Physics (SHP)
"A. D. Rice, Plant Chemist
J. C. Wiles, Unit Supervisor, RP Planning
b.
NRC Resident Inspectors
R. C. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector
- G. Y. Suh, Resident Inspector
- Denotes individuals attending the exit interview on July 1, 1988.
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In addition to the individuals noted above, the inspector met and held
discussions with other members of the licensee's and contractor's staffs.
2.
Follow-up Items (92701)
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(0 pen) Fo110w 9.p (50-344/88-04-01):
Inspection Report Nos. 50-344/88-04
and 50-344/88-20 documented the review of the licensee's efforts to
complete and implement their Integrated Plan for Improving RP Performance
(IPIRPP).
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
updated Radiological Control Action Plan (RCAP), dated June 27, 1988.
The updated RCAP outlined actions completed, progress and expected
completion dates for actions to be completed on their IPIRPP.
Based on
this review the inspector determined that the following action item needs
to be completed by the licensee:
Item I.A. "Prepare a management review of the radiological risks for
Plant operations with loose fuel pellets in primary systems."
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The licensee expected to have this item completed by July 31,-1988,
which will be examined in a subsequent inspection.
This matter
remains open.
IE Information Notices
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The inspector verified that the licensee ~had received, reviewed and was
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taking or had taken action on IE Information Notice Nos. 87-39, 88-08,
88-22 and 88-32.
With respect to IE Notice (IEN) No. 88-32, Prompt Reporting to NRC of
Significant Incidents Involvina Radioactive Material, involving the
reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.402 and 20.403, the inspector noted
that in August 1987, as a result of their April 1987 refueling outage
contamination incident, the licensee had discussed the reporting
requirements of 10 CFR 20.403 with the Office Nuclear Reactor Regulation
(i1RR).
Based on this discussion the licensee informed the inspector that
they had an understanding that only contamination incidents which result
in offsite property damage were required to be reported for the following
10 CFR 20.403 requirements:
10 CFR 204.403(a) 4, Immediate notification of property damage in
excess of $2000,000.
10 CFR 20.403(b) 4, twenty-four hour notification of property damage
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in excess of $2,000.
The licensee made changes to Nuclear Division Procedure, NPD No. 100-4,
Reporting Requirements, to reflect their understanding.
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The licensee's review of IEN 88-32 in June 1988 determined that their
interpretation of the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.403 was
different than the NRC policy described in the IEN.
During this
inspection the inspector discussed the reporting requirements o' 10 CFR
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20.403 with the licensee, who also contacted NRR for further
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clarification.
Based on these discussions it appeared the licensee now, has a clear
understanding of the reporting requirements as outlined in IEN 88-32.
This matter was discussed at the exit interview on July 1,1988, and the
inspector was informed that procedure NPD 100-4 would be revised to
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reflect the NRC policy as described in IEN 88-32.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Chemistry Control Program (79701)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's primary and secondary chemistry
control program to determine the licensee's compliance with Technical
Specification (TS) requirements, licensee procedures and recommendations
outlined in various industry standards.
Inspection Report No,
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50-344/88-11 also documents previous inspection efforts in this area.
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Audits
The last QA audit of this area was discussed in Inspection Report No.
50-344/87-26, paragraph 4.
The inspector was informed by the QA
department that the next schedule QA audit of this area would be
performed during last week of July 1988.
Changes
The inspector observed that the licensee had recently replaced their old
Ion Chromotograph (IC) in the Hot Lab with with one from the Cold Lab,
which was replaced with a new one.
The inspector also noted that the
licensee had installed a new Plasma Spectrographic Unit in the Hot Lab.
The new equipment was being tested and new operating procedures were
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being developed.
With management approval, the licensee has made plans to operate with an
elevated reactor coolant pH (7.4) by maintaining a higher lithium
concentration (2.2 ppm) during upcoming Cycle 11.
Recent industry
experience and research has shown that increasing the reactor coolant pH
level will reduce radiation levels in the primary systems. Operating
plants with increased pH levels have shown significantly less crud
deposition on fuel and subsequent transport of activated corrosion
products to out-of-core. regions.
Trojan's FSAR, Table 5.2-5, notes that
the upper limit for lithium is 2.22 ppm.
The' licensee will operate with
a lithium concentration of 2.2 ppm until a pH of 7.4 is reached.
After
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this pnt the lithium concentration will be coordinated with changing
boric at.id concentrations to keep the pH constant.
Program Control
The inspector reviewed procedure A0-11-2, Plant Chemistry Control, and
the Plant Operating Manual (POM), Volume U ,. Trojan Chemistry Manual.
Procedure A0-11-2 adequately described responsibilities for the
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administration of the plant chemistry control program.
The POM Volume 11
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outlined the sampling frequancies, analysis and action levels which were
noted to be consistent with EPRI-NP 2704, "PWR Secondary Chemistry
Guidelines " dated October 1982.
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The inspector reviewed se?ected laboratory analysis data sheets from
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September 1987, through June 28, 1988, of primary and secondary chemistry
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measurements.
Secondary chemistry sampling frequencies met or exceeded
procedural requirements and industry recommendations.
In each case, when
control values were exceeded, it was noted that appropriate corrective
actions were taken.
Primary chemistry sampling was performed in
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accordance with TS 3.4.7 and 4.4.7 requirements.
The inspec'ar also reviewed the licensee's monthly chemistry reports for
March, A
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The reports documented problems that
.ded c' rrent status of the reactor coolant activity,
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secondary a..sistry, primary-to-secondary leakage, radioactive
liquid / gaseous releases, and updated graphs Of primary and secondary
variables.
Prior to the licensee's refueling shutdown on April 13, 1988,
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reactor coolant dose equivalent iodine-131 activity averaged 0.083 uCi/gm
and gross gamma averaged 2.8 uCi/gm.
The licensee's trending of reactor
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coolant activity prior to and after shutdown determined that no fuel
damage was noted during Cycle 10.
The licensees primary-to-secondary
leak rate during Cycle 10 was fairly constant at about 1.0 gpd.
During a tour of the secondary chemistry laboratory on June 28, 1988, the
inspector observed that three stock chemical reagents had expiration
dates of May 1988.
The inspector also determined that these reagents had
not been used and the licensee quickly disposed of them when the matter
was brought to their attention.
The inspector also observed that a small
reagent bottle containing a pH 4 buffer solution with an expiration ~date
of May 1988 was currently being used in the lab; however, the stock
solution had an expiration date of August 1992.
It was determined that
the licensee had failed to relabel the small bottle being used in the
lab.
In each case the chemical reagents were within the licensee's
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extended use limits outlined in Table VII-2 of the licensee's Chemistry
Manual. The MCB informed the inspector it was standard practice to
dispose of such reagents on their expiration dates during their monthly
lab audits; however, due to refueling outage activities, the May 1988
audit had not been performed. The inspector encouraged the MCB to
consider more frequent audits for expired chemicals and chemical
reagents.
The MCB acknowledged the inspector's encouragement.
This
matter was also discussed at the exit interview on July 1, 1988.
The inspector examined calibration records of selected laboratory
analytical equipment.
Calibrations were noted to be performed in
accordance with the licensee's program outlined in Section VI of the
Chemistry Manual.
The licensee seemed to be maintaining their previous level of performance
in this area and the chemistry control program appeared adequate to
ensure integrity and longevity of plant components.
No violations or
deviations were identified.
4.
Radiological Controls (83726, 83724, 83725 and 83728)
This part of the inspection covered the areas of: control of radioactive
materials and contamination, surveys and monitoring; external exposure
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control; internal exposure control; and ALARA.
The inspector reviewed
selected records in each area, held discussions with licensee
representatives, and conducted facility tours to determine the licensee's
compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, TS requirwents, and
recommendations outlined in various industry standards.
Inspection
Report No. 50-344/88-20 also documents previous inspection efforts in
these areas, including a review of QA audits, changes, and licensee
procedures,
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Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination, Surveys and
Monitoring
During facility tours the inspector observed proper use of friskers
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and whole body personnel contamination monitors by workers exiting
the radiologically controlled areas (RCAs).
Personnel contar.ination
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reports examined from May 20-June 24, 1988, were adequately
documented, evaluated and included in personnel record files.
During the period of January 1-June 23, 1988, the licensee had
experienceo 60 skin and 117 clothing contaminations for 1988.
The
licensec maintains and posts graphs of personnel contaminations, for
worker review, from 1980 to current date.
The licensee was noted to
be evaluating methods to minimize personnel contaminations or, a
continuing basis.
During facility tours the inspector observed that surveys of
personnel working in discreet radioactive particle area (red zones)
were adequately conduced in accordance with the licensee's
procedures.
Survey records indicated that detailed radiation and
contamination surveys were being performed with supervisory reviews
for all outage and routine surveys.
Sealed Source Leak Tests
Racords of sealed source leak tests and inventories performed in
August 1987 and February 1988 were examined.
During the August 1987
tests the licensee identified one .5 uCi Cs-137 source that had a
leak test result of 0.002 oci.
Alt.iough the leak test results were
less than the TS 0.005 uCi limit, the source was disposed of as
radioactive waste.
The inspector observed that the August 1987 leak
tust results were noted to be recorded as satisfactory instead in
units of radioactivity measurements.
Technical Specification .
3.7.7.1 limits sealed source removable contamination to 0.0005 uCi,
a unit of activity.
The inspector discussed this inconsistency with
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the licensee's MRPB and at the exit interview on July 1, 1988.
The
inspector's concerns were acknowledged by the licensee.
Storage of Radioactive Materials
During a discussion with USRW, the inspector was informed that the
licensee had relocated their waste storage trailers from their
normal onsite locations to the Pebble Springs warehouse yard area.
The iicensee typically stores their packaged low level rad'.oactive
waste in enclosed vendor supplied trailers that will ultimately be
used for transporting the waste.
The licensee does not have a
radioactive storage facility and has limited onsite storage
capacity.
The licensee's backlog of onsite radioactive waste due to
waste scaling factor discrepancies was discussed in Inspection
Report No. 50-344/88-04.
The licensee was just completing rew
scaling factors for all waste streams during this inspection
(50-344/88-27).
The licensee was also negotiating to have their
compacted waste sent to a newly licensed facility (super compactor)
for further compaction to reduce their waste volume prior to burial.
On June 30. 1988, the inspector toured the Pebble Springs storage
area with the USRW.
The inspector observed that the licer.see had
four trailers of compacted dry active waste (DAW) and one trailcr
containing processed drums of spent powdex resin.
The licensee had
properly barricaded and posted the area around the tre.ilers ia
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accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements.
The inspector made
radiation measurements of the. area using an NRC R02 ion chamber,
S/N2691, due for calibration July 13, 1988.
The inspectors
measurements indicated less than 0.5 mrem /hr at the posted area
boundary and typically less than 10 meem/hr among the trailers,
inside of the boundary.
No problems were identified with posting or
condition of the trailers.
The inspector a'so toured and inspected an additional eight flat bed
trailers that contained moisture separator reheaters (MSRs) and
associated piping that had been removed during the licensee's 1987
refueling outage for ultimate vendor decontamination and disposal.
Due to the low activity on the MSRs, this inspector did not detect
any measurable radiation levels using the R0-2 survey meter.
The
inspector noted that the MSRs had been wrapped in plastic, loaded
onto the trailers and licensee made plywood enclosures around the
MSRs.
During a visual inspection of these trailers the inspector
noted that two of the trailers had standing water in pockets and low
places in the plastic wrapping around the MSRs.
Some of the water
filled sections were noted to be bulging from the sides of the
trailer.
No actual evidence of leakage was observed.
The USRW
informed the inspector that since the MSRs were dry when removed
from the plant, the observed water was most likely from condensation
and/or in leakage from rain.
The USRW took immediate steps to have
the liquid and ground area around the trailers sampled and analyzed
for radioactivity.
Subsequent sample results indicated no activity
other than that seen on background samples.
Based on discussions with cognizant licensee representatives and
review of licensee documents, the inspector made the following
observations:
According to the USRW, there was about 2-3 mci of radioactivity
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in each of the eight trailers containing the MSRs.
Due to the
large surface area involved and complexity involved with
determining activity within the MSR tube bundle, the licensee
had not completed a final knalysis of the total amount of
radioactive material with the trailers.
The activity in the four trailers of the compacted DAW drums
ranged from about 1.0 Ci to about 1.8 Ci per trailer, a total
of about 5.0 Ci of radioactive matcrial.
With respect to the powdex resin, which originally contained
only detectable levels of I-131, essentially had no activity
remaining due to decay.
A memorandum from T.O. Heek to File, dated April 17, 1987,
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designated the Pebble Springs area as a temporary radioactive
materials storage area (TRMSA) for the MSRs and other outage
material.
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A memorandum from T.O. Meek to File, dated April 4, 1988,
designated the Pebble Springs area as IRMSA for a trailer
containing drums of powdex resin.
A memorandum from T. O. Meek to File dated May 3, 1988,
designated the Pebble Springs area as a TRMSA for a trailer
containing compacted trash.
Section 2.1.1.3, page 2-1-3, of the licensee's Final Safety
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Analysis Report (FSAR) states, in part, that the restricted
crea, as defined in 10 CFR 20, is shown in Figure 2.1-5.
Figure 2.1-5 depict. the restricted area as being within the
immediate site protected area boundary.
10 CFR 20.3 "Restricted Area" is defined, in part, as any areas
access to which is controlled by the licensee for purposes of
protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and
radioactive materials.
Section 11.4.2.5 states, in part, that the onsite storage
facilities for packaged radioactive wastes are provided at
Elevation 93 feet of the Fuel Building, the Radwaste Annex to
the Fuel Building, and in a designated short-term storage area
within the protected Plant boundary.
Although the Pebble Springs area is within the lice..see's
property boundary, it is not in the protected area boundary as
defined in the licensee's FSAR.
10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) states, in part, that "The licensee shall
maintain records of changes in the facility ... made pursuant
to this section, to the extent that these changes constitute
changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis
report ... These records must include a written safety
evaluation ...."
During discussions with the MRPB and USRW the inspector was informed
that a written safety evaluation had not been performed for
establishing the TRMSAs outside of the FSAR defined restricted area
boundary.
It should also be noted that the MSRs have been in
temporary storage in excess of one year.
Failure to perform a
written safety evaluation was identified as an apparent violation of
10 CFR 50.59(b)(1), (50-344/88-27-01).
During tours of the containment, auxiliary, and fuel handling
buildings the inspector made independent radiation measurements
using the R0-2 survey meter, described above.
The inspector noted
that radiation areas and high radiation areas were posted as
required by 10 CFR Part 20.
Licensee access controls were
consistent with TS, Section 6.12, and licensee procedures.
During facility tuurs, the inspector also noted that housekeeping
practices were generally good throughout the plant.
The removal of
used refueling outage equipment from the spent fuel pool floor area
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was remarkably improved from that noticed during the licensee's 1987
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refueling outage (Report No. 50-344/87-33).
The licensee was also
utilizing a contracted portable tool decontamination unit (trailer)
during the outage.
According the the licensee, the tool
decontamination was very effective in reducing contamination levels
on their reusable fixed contaminated tools.
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The licensee's performance in this area seemed adequate to meet
their safety objectives.
The licensee needs to improve on attention
to detail regarding FSAR commitments.
One apparent violation was
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identified.
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External Exposure Control,
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The inspector selected for examination several personnel files of
individuals involved in contamination incidents since the last
inspection in this area, and terminated contract personnel who
worked onsite during the refueling outage.
In the samples examined,
it was verified that forms NRC-4 and NRC-5 or equivalents were
maintained as appropriate.
For terminated workers, letters
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documenting exposures pursuant to 10 CFR 19.13 had been sent and/or
were being prepared for notification within the required time frame.
The inspector was informed by the SHP of a worker who had come on
site with Co-60 embedded in his left little finger.
The worker had
apparently been involved in an incident at another facility in 1986
that resulted in Co-60 being imbedded in his finger.
Trojan was
supplied with a statement that this individual was receiving a dose
to the finger of 91.5 mrads/ day, as of April 28, 1986, from the
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imbedded Co 60.
The inspector noted that the licensee took
appropriate measures to ensure that the exposure due to the imbedded
Co-60 and exposure received, while at Trojan, did not exceed any NRC
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limits.
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Oaily exposure updates fro;n pocket ion chamber and/or digit:.
alarming dosimeter were provided to department management.
Exposures were reviewed on a continuing bases by the.ALARA planning
group.
The inspector noted no instances of failure of workers to
properly use dosimetry devices.
The licensee appeared to be maintaining their previous level of
performance in this area.
No violation or deviations were
identified,
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Internal Exposure Control
Review of selected air sample data and maximum permissib'e
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concentration (MPC) work sheets for work performed during the
refueling outage, and a cross check of workers involved, did not
indicate that any individual had received an intake of radioactive
material which would exceed the 40 MPC-hour control measure
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requiring an evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 20.103 (b)(2).
Whole
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body counts (WBCs) examined for selected individuals indicated no
intakes of radioactive materials that would require internal dose
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evaluations.
The inspector noted that-in two cases the licensee had
conservatively obtained urine samples for Sr-90' analysis from
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workers who had been contaminated on the face or/and near the nose
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-with Cs-137.
The licensee did not find any detectable activity on a
. WBC of one worker and onit about 11 nCi, or < 1.0% of a maximum -
- permissible body burden (MPBB) - Cs-137 on the WBC of the other
worker.
The vendor supplied Sr-90 urine sample results for the
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worker with no detectable activity on the WBC was < 6.0 nC1/1.
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The licensee's procedures require bioassy analysis for Sr-90 when
the WBC indicates > 5.05 maximum permissible organ burden with
fission produr;ts present,
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On December 21, 1987, the Corporate RSB issued a report of their
review of Trojans' Respiratory Protection Program.
The report
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outlined nine recommendations for program improvement. The
inspector noted that the recommendations were administrative in
nature and did not represent a significant problem.
Based on
discussion with cognizant licensee representatives and review of
licensee procedures, the-inspector determined that the responsible
departments had evaluated and implemented changes, as appropriate
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for program improvement.
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The licensees performance in this area appeared adequate to meet
their safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were
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identified.
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Inspection Report No. 50-344/88-20, documsnted that the licensee had
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established a goal of 295 person-rem for 1988 with 254 person-rem
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for the refueling outage.
It was also documented that as of May 17,
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1988, the licensee had used 177 person-rem.
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During this inspection the inspector noted that as of June 23, 1988,
the licensee had used about 344 person-rem. The licensee
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representative stated that unexpected and' unplanned: tasks such as
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pipe whip restraints (about 65 person-rem), additional large bore
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hangar repairs (about 20 person-rem) and pressurizer surge line
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replacement (about 30 person-rem) were major contributors in
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exceeding their goals.
The inspector was informed by the ALARA
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planners that a good number of the workers _used during this.
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refueling outage lacked nuclear experience. -The licensee had
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estimated 12 person-rem for the reactor disassembly task and used
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about 18 person-rem.
The ALARA planners informed the inspector.that
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the primary cause of the estimate being exceeded was due to
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inexperienced workers supplied by the contract vendor.-
During facility tours the inspector did not observe any poor ALARA
practices that would have an adverse effect in the licensee's
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program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Licensee Reports (90713)
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Report
An in-office review of the 1987 Annual Environmental Radiological
Surveillance Program showed that Trojan provided their data and analysis
of radiological environmental samples and measurements, made during this
period, in accordance with the program addressed in Section 3/4-12 of
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their Technical Specifications.
Comparison with previous years data and
environmental surveillance reports supports their conclusion that there
is no indication that the operation of the Trojan Nuclear Plant
significantly impacted on plant environs during 1987.
Sample results reported were below regulatory reporting action levels.
Direct radiation levels measured with TLD and gross beta analysis of air
particulate indicator recorded dose values not significantly different
from control locations or all locations.
Although Sr-9C activity in milk
showed levels that exceeded reporting levels defined by Technical Specification 3.1.2, the values were consistent with those addressed in
the 1986 Environmental Surveillance Report which have been attributable
with atmospheric fallout from weapons testing and not frcm Trojan
operations.
Gamma analysis for air particulate and analysis for food
crops and water samples from the terrestrial environment and samples from
the aquatic environment were at or below the levels of detectability.
The report included maps of all sampling locations, results of licensee
participation in the EPA Intercomparison Program for quality control
analysis, and an updated land use census.
Radioactive Effluent Release Report (RERP)
The licensee's RERP for the period of July 1,1987, through December 31,
1987, dated February 29, 1988, was reviewed in office.
This timely
report was issued in accordance with TS 6.9.1.S.3 and 6.9.1.5.4 and
included a summary of the quantities of radioactive liquid and gaseous
effluents and solid waste released from the facility as outlined in NRC
Regulatory Guide 1-21.
The report also included this dose due to liquid
and gaseous effluents.
The report also reported that the condenser air
ejector flow rate measuring device (FR-3100) was inoperable during the
period of January 1,1987 through August 7,1987, until modifications
were completed. The report also noted that in 1987 the licensee had
continued to detect low levels of Tritium in the waters released from
storm and sanitary sewer systems.
The Tritium levels remain less than
the MPC specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Table II, Column II, and less than
the U.S. EPA drinking water standards.
The licensee is continuing '.o
monitor the Tritium levels in these systems.
No errors or anomalies were
identified.
Annual Personnel Exposure Monitoring Report for 1987
This timely report showed the exposure distribution among various work
groups and work functions as required by TS 6.9.1.5.
No errors or
anomalies were identified.
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No violations or deviations were. identified.
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Exit Interview
The insnector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in Paragraph
1, at tne conclusion of the inspection on July 1, 1988.
The scope and
findings of the inspection were summarized.
The licensee was informed that the apparent violation identified in this
report needed further in office review and that plant Annager would be
notified by telephone of the NRCs decision as to whether it would be a
violation or acceptable item.
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