ML20151T436

Insp Rept 50-344/88-27 on 880627-0701.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings, Chemistry Controls,Control of Radioactive Matls & Contamination,External Exposure Control & Internal Exposure

ML20151T436
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	07/29/1988
From:	Hooker C, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151T416	List: ML20151T412 ML20151T426 ML20151T436
References
50-344-88-27, NUDOCS 8808160361
Download: ML20151T436 (12)

See also: IR 05000344/1988027

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ft1ISSION

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REGION V

Report No. 50-344/88-27

Docket No. 50-344

License No. NPF-1

Licensee: Portland General Electric Company-

121 5.W. Salmon Street

Portland, Oregon 97204

Facility Name: Trojan Nuclear Plant

Inspection at: Ranier, Oregon '

Inspection Conducted: June 27-July 1, 1988

Inspector: 04. , ^;ds. - YbYPV

C. A. Hooker, Radiation Specialist. Date Slgned

Approved: h. 9. 4 _^ ^ _ _ 7/DOW

G. P. % )as, Chief Da'te S'igned i

Emergency Preparedness and Radiological

Protection Branch

Summary:

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Inspection on June 27-July 1, 1988 (Report No. 50-344/88-27)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on

previous inspection findings, chemistry controls, control of radioactive

materials and contamination, external exposure control, internal exposure

control, ALARA, and review of licensee reports. Inspection procedures 30703,

92701, 79701, 83726, 83724, 83725, 83728 and 90713 were addressed.

Results: In the areas inspected the licensee's program appeared adequate .

accomplish its safety objectives. The licensees performance, overall, I

appeared to be improving.

One apparent violation was identified in one area: 10 CFR 50.59, failure to

perform a written safety evaluation (paragraph 3).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

a. Portland General Electric (PGE)

• C. A. Olmstead, General Manager, Trojan

• G. A. Zimmerman, Manager, Radiological Safety Branch (RSB)

• N. C. Dyer, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety & Regulation

Department

G. L. Rich, Manager, Chemistry Branch (MCB)

• T. O. Meek, Manager, Radiation Protection Branch (MRPB)

• R. C. Rupe, Manager, Performance Monitoring / Event Analysis-

Branch

• C. H. Brown, Manager, Quality Assurance (QA) Operations Branch

• D. L. Nordstrom, Compliance Engineer

• G. R. Huey, Supervisor, Radiation Protection (RP)

• G. C. Kernion, Supervisor, Chemistry Laboratory -

• N. C. Dyer, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety & Regulation

Department

• L. D. Larson, Unit Supervisor, Radwaste (USRW)

• L. E. Rocha, Supervisor, Health Physics (SHP)

"A. D. Rice, Plant Chemist

J. C. Wiles, Unit Supervisor, RP Planning

b. NRC Resident Inspectors

R. C. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector

• G. Y. Suh, Resident Inspector

• Denotes individuals attending the exit interview on July 1, 1988. ,

In addition to the individuals noted above, the inspector met and held

discussions with other members of the licensee's and contractor's staffs.

2. Follow-up Items (92701) -

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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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(0 pen) Fo110w 9.p (50-344/88-04-01): Inspection Report Nos. 50-344/88-04

and 50-344/88-20 documented the review of the licensee's efforts to

complete and implement their Integrated Plan for Improving RP Performance

(IPIRPP). During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's

updated Radiological Control Action Plan (RCAP), dated June 27, 1988.

The updated RCAP outlined actions completed, progress and expected

completion dates for actions to be completed on their IPIRPP. Based on

this review the inspector determined that the following action item needs

to be completed by the licensee:

Item I.A. "Prepare a management review of the radiological risks for

Plant operations with loose fuel pellets in primary systems."

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The licensee expected to have this item completed by July 31,-1988,

which will be examined in a subsequent inspection. This matter

remains open.

IE Information Notices .

The inspector verified that the licensee ~had received, reviewed and was <

taking or had taken action on IE Information Notice Nos. 87-39, 88-08,

88-22 and 88-32.

With respect to IE Notice (IEN) No. 88-32, Prompt Reporting to NRC of

Significant Incidents Involvina Radioactive Material, involving the

reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.402 and 20.403, the inspector noted

that in August 1987, as a result of their April 1987 refueling outage

contamination incident, the licensee had discussed the reporting

requirements of 10 CFR 20.403 with the Office Nuclear Reactor Regulation

(i1RR). Based on this discussion the licensee informed the inspector that

they had an understanding that only contamination incidents which result

in offsite property damage were required to be reported for the following

10 CFR 20.403 requirements:

10 CFR 204.403(a) 4, Immediate notification of property damage in

excess of $2000,000.

10 CFR 20.403(b) 4, twenty-four hour notification of property damage -

in excess of $2,000.

The licensee made changes to Nuclear Division Procedure, NPD No. 100-4,

Reporting Requirements, to reflect their understanding.

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The licensee's review of IEN 88-32 in June 1988 determined that their

interpretation of the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.403 was  ;

different than the NRC policy described in the IEN. During this

inspection the inspector discussed the reporting requirements o' 10 CFR ,

20.403 with the licensee, who also contacted NRR for further '

clarification.

Based on these discussions it appeared the licensee now, has a clear

understanding of the reporting requirements as outlined in IEN 88-32.

This matter was discussed at the exit interview on July 1,1988, and the

inspector was informed that procedure NPD 100-4 would be revised to .

reflect the NRC policy as described in IEN 88-32. l

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Chemistry Control Program (79701)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's primary and secondary chemistry

control program to determine the licensee's compliance with Technical

Specification (TS) requirements, licensee procedures and recommendations

outlined in various industry standards. Inspection Report No, i

50-344/88-11 also documents previous inspection efforts in this area. l

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Audits

The last QA audit of this area was discussed in Inspection Report No.

50-344/87-26, paragraph 4. The inspector was informed by the QA

department that the next schedule QA audit of this area would be

performed during last week of July 1988.

Changes

The inspector observed that the licensee had recently replaced their old

Ion Chromotograph (IC) in the Hot Lab with with one from the Cold Lab,

which was replaced with a new one. The inspector also noted that the

licensee had installed a new Plasma Spectrographic Unit in the Hot Lab.

The new equipment was being tested and new operating procedures were

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being developed.

With management approval, the licensee has made plans to operate with an

elevated reactor coolant pH (7.4) by maintaining a higher lithium

concentration (2.2 ppm) during upcoming Cycle 11. Recent industry

experience and research has shown that increasing the reactor coolant pH

level will reduce radiation levels in the primary systems. Operating

plants with increased pH levels have shown significantly less crud

deposition on fuel and subsequent transport of activated corrosion

products to out-of-core. regions. Trojan's FSAR, Table 5.2-5, notes that

the upper limit for lithium is 2.22 ppm. The' licensee will operate with

a lithium concentration of 2.2 ppm until a pH of 7.4 is reached. After ,

this pnt the lithium concentration will be coordinated with changing

boric at.id concentrations to keep the pH constant.

Program Control

The inspector reviewed procedure A0-11-2, Plant Chemistry Control, and l

the Plant Operating Manual (POM), Volume U ,. Trojan Chemistry Manual.

Procedure A0-11-2 adequately described responsibilities for the ,

administration of the plant chemistry control program. The POM Volume 11 )

outlined the sampling frequancies, analysis and action levels which were  !

noted to be consistent with EPRI-NP 2704, "PWR Secondary Chemistry

Guidelines " dated October 1982. l

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The inspector reviewed se?ected laboratory analysis data sheets from

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September 1987, through June 28, 1988, of primary and secondary chemistry

measurements. Secondary chemistry sampling frequencies met or exceeded

procedural requirements and industry recommendations. In each case, when

control values were exceeded, it was noted that appropriate corrective

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actions were taken. Primary chemistry sampling was performed in

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accordance with TS 3.4.7 and 4.4.7 requirements.

The inspec'ar also reviewed the licensee's monthly chemistry reports for

March, A ' > >nd May 1988. The reports documented problems that

occurreu, ~ .ded c'

u rrent status of the reactor coolant activity,

secondary a..sistry, primary-to-secondary leakage, radioactive

liquid / gaseous releases, and updated graphs Of primary and secondary  !

variables. Prior to the licensee's refueling shutdown on April 13, 1988, l

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reactor coolant dose equivalent iodine-131 activity averaged 0.083 uCi/gm

and gross gamma averaged 2.8 uCi/gm. The licensee's trending of reactor -

coolant activity prior to and after shutdown determined that no fuel

damage was noted during Cycle 10. The licensees primary-to-secondary

leak rate during Cycle 10 was fairly constant at about 1.0 gpd.

During a tour of the secondary chemistry laboratory on June 28, 1988, the

inspector observed that three stock chemical reagents had expiration

dates of May 1988. The inspector also determined that these reagents had

not been used and the licensee quickly disposed of them when the matter

was brought to their attention. The inspector also observed that a small

reagent bottle containing a pH 4 buffer solution with an expiration ~date

of May 1988 was currently being used in the lab; however, the stock

solution had an expiration date of August 1992. It was determined that

the licensee had failed to relabel the small bottle being used in the

. lab. In each case the chemical reagents were within the licensee's

extended use limits outlined in Table VII-2 of the licensee's Chemistry

Manual. The MCB informed the inspector it was standard practice to

dispose of such reagents on their expiration dates during their monthly

lab audits; however, due to refueling outage activities, the May 1988

audit had not been performed. The inspector encouraged the MCB to

consider more frequent audits for expired chemicals and chemical

reagents. The MCB acknowledged the inspector's encouragement. This

matter was also discussed at the exit interview on July 1, 1988.

The inspector examined calibration records of selected laboratory  :

analytical equipment. Calibrations were noted to be performed in

accordance with the licensee's program outlined in Section VI of the

Chemistry Manual.

The licensee seemed to be maintaining their previous level of performance

in this area and the chemistry control program appeared adequate to

ensure integrity and longevity of plant components. No violations or

deviations were identified.

4. Radiological Controls (83726, 83724, 83725 and 83728)

This part of the inspection covered the areas of: control of radioactive

materials and contamination, surveys and monitoring; external exposure ,

control; internal exposure control; and ALARA. The inspector reviewed

selected records in each area, held discussions with licensee

representatives, and conducted facility tours to determine the licensee's

compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, TS requirwents, and

recommendations outlined in various industry standards. Inspection

Report No. 50-344/88-20 also documents previous inspection efforts in

these areas, including a review of QA audits, changes, and licensee

procedures,

a. Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination, Surveys and

Monitoring

During facility tours the inspector observed proper use of friskers -

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and whole body personnel contamination monitors by workers exiting

the radiologically controlled areas (RCAs). Personnel contar.ination

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reports examined from May 20-June 24, 1988, were adequately

documented, evaluated and included in personnel record files.

During the period of January 1-June 23, 1988, the licensee had

experienceo 60 skin and 117 clothing contaminations for 1988. The

licensec maintains and posts graphs of personnel contaminations, for

worker review, from 1980 to current date. The licensee was noted to

be evaluating methods to minimize personnel contaminations or, a

continuing basis.

During facility tours the inspector observed that surveys of

personnel working in discreet radioactive particle area (red zones)

were adequately conduced in accordance with the licensee's

procedures. Survey records indicated that detailed radiation and

contamination surveys were being performed with supervisory reviews

for all outage and routine surveys.

Sealed Source Leak Tests

Racords of sealed source leak tests and inventories performed in

August 1987 and February 1988 were examined. During the August 1987

tests the licensee identified one .5 uCi Cs-137 source that had a

leak test result of 0.002 oci. Alt.iough the leak test results were

less than the TS 0.005 uCi limit, the source was disposed of as

radioactive waste. The inspector observed that the August 1987 leak

tust results were noted to be recorded as satisfactory instead in

units of radioactivity measurements. Technical Specification .

3.7.7.1 limits sealed source removable contamination to 0.0005 uCi,

a unit of activity. The inspector discussed this inconsistency with ,

the licensee's MRPB and at the exit interview on July 1, 1988. The

inspector's concerns were acknowledged by the licensee.

Storage of Radioactive Materials

During a discussion with USRW, the inspector was informed that the

licensee had relocated their waste storage trailers from their

normal onsite locations to the Pebble Springs warehouse yard area.

The iicensee typically stores their packaged low level rad'.oactive

waste in enclosed vendor supplied trailers that will ultimately be

used for transporting the waste. The licensee does not have a

radioactive storage facility and has limited onsite storage

capacity. The licensee's backlog of onsite radioactive waste due to

waste scaling factor discrepancies was discussed in Inspection

Report No. 50-344/88-04. The licensee was just completing rew

scaling factors for all waste streams during this inspection

(50-344/88-27). The licensee was also negotiating to have their

compacted waste sent to a newly licensed facility (super compactor)

for further compaction to reduce their waste volume prior to burial.

On June 30. 1988, the inspector toured the Pebble Springs storage

area with the USRW. The inspector observed that the licer.see had

four trailers of compacted dry active waste (DAW) and one trailcr

containing processed drums of spent powdex resin. The licensee had

properly barricaded and posted the area around the tre.ilers ia

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accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. The inspector made

radiation measurements of the. area using an NRC R02 ion chamber,

S/N2691, due for calibration July 13, 1988. The inspectors

measurements indicated less than 0.5 mrem /hr at the posted area

boundary and typically less than 10 meem/hr among the trailers,

inside of the boundary. No problems were identified with posting or

condition of the trailers.

The inspector a'so toured and inspected an additional eight flat bed

trailers that contained moisture separator reheaters (MSRs) and

associated piping that had been removed during the licensee's 1987

refueling outage for ultimate vendor decontamination and disposal.

Due to the low activity on the MSRs, this inspector did not detect

any measurable radiation levels using the R0-2 survey meter. The

inspector noted that the MSRs had been wrapped in plastic, loaded

onto the trailers and licensee made plywood enclosures around the

MSRs. During a visual inspection of these trailers the inspector

noted that two of the trailers had standing water in pockets and low

places in the plastic wrapping around the MSRs. Some of the water

filled sections were noted to be bulging from the sides of the

trailer. No actual evidence of leakage was observed. The USRW

informed the inspector that since the MSRs were dry when removed

from the plant, the observed water was most likely from condensation

and/or in leakage from rain. The USRW took immediate steps to have

the liquid and ground area around the trailers sampled and analyzed

for radioactivity. Subsequent sample results indicated no activity

other than that seen on background samples.

Based on discussions with cognizant licensee representatives and

review of licensee documents, the inspector made the following

observations:

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According to the USRW, there was about 2-3 mci of radioactivity

in each of the eight trailers containing the MSRs. Due to the

large surface area involved and complexity involved with

determining activity within the MSR tube bundle, the licensee

had not completed a final knalysis of the total amount of

radioactive material with the trailers.

The activity in the four trailers of the compacted DAW drums

ranged from about 1.0 Ci to about 1.8 Ci per trailer, a total

of about 5.0 Ci of radioactive matcrial.

With respect to the powdex resin, which originally contained

only detectable levels of I-131, essentially had no activity

remaining due to decay.

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A memorandum from T.O. Heek to File, dated April 17, 1987,

designated the Pebble Springs area as a temporary radioactive

materials storage area (TRMSA) for the MSRs and other outage

material.

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A memorandum from T.O. Meek to File, dated April 4, 1988,

designated the Pebble Springs area as IRMSA for a trailer

containing drums of powdex resin.

A memorandum from T. O. Meek to File dated May 3, 1988,

designated the Pebble Springs area as a TRMSA for a trailer

containing compacted trash.

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Section 2.1.1.3, page 2-1-3, of the licensee's Final Safety

Analysis Report (FSAR) states, in part, that the restricted

crea, as defined in 10 CFR 20, is shown in Figure 2.1-5.

Figure 2.1-5 depict. the restricted area as being within the

immediate site protected area boundary.

10 CFR 20.3 "Restricted Area" is defined, in part, as any areas

access to which is controlled by the licensee for purposes of

protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and

radioactive materials.

Section 11.4.2.5 states, in part, that the onsite storage

facilities for packaged radioactive wastes are provided at

Elevation 93 feet of the Fuel Building, the Radwaste Annex to

the Fuel Building, and in a designated short-term storage area

within the protected Plant boundary.

Although the Pebble Springs area is within the lice..see's

property boundary, it is not in the protected area boundary as

defined in the licensee's FSAR.

10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) states, in part, that "The licensee shall

maintain records of changes in the facility ... made pursuant

to this section, to the extent that these changes constitute

changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis

report ... These records must include a written safety

evaluation ...."

During discussions with the MRPB and USRW the inspector was informed

that a written safety evaluation had not been performed for  !

establishing the TRMSAs outside of the FSAR defined restricted area  !

boundary. It should also be noted that the MSRs have been in l

temporary storage in excess of one year. Failure to perform a

written safety evaluation was identified as an apparent violation of

10 CFR 50.59(b)(1), (50-344/88-27-01).

During tours of the containment, auxiliary, and fuel handling l

buildings the inspector made independent radiation measurements l

using the R0-2 survey meter, described above. The inspector noted

that radiation areas and high radiation areas were posted as I

required by 10 CFR Part 20. Licensee access controls were

consistent with TS, Section 6.12, and licensee procedures.

During facility tuurs, the inspector also noted that housekeeping

practices were generally good throughout the plant. The removal of

used refueling outage equipment from the spent fuel pool floor area

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was remarkably improved from that noticed during the licensee's 1987 ,

refueling outage (Report No. 50-344/87-33). The licensee was also  !

utilizing a contracted portable tool decontamination unit (trailer)  !

during the outage. According the the licensee, the tool l

decontamination was very effective in reducing contamination levels i

on their reusable fixed contaminated tools. j

The licensee's performance in this area seemed adequate to meet

their safety objectives. The licensee needs to improve on attention

to detail regarding FSAR commitments. One apparent violation was ,

identified. '

b. External Exposure Control, ,

The inspector selected for examination several personnel files of

individuals involved in contamination incidents since the last

inspection in this area, and terminated contract personnel who

worked onsite during the refueling outage. In the samples examined,

it was verified that forms NRC-4 and NRC-5 or equivalents were

maintained as appropriate. For terminated workers, letters ,

documenting exposures pursuant to 10 CFR 19.13 had been sent and/or

were being prepared for notification within the required time frame.

The inspector was informed by the SHP of a worker who had come on

site with Co-60 embedded in his left little finger. The worker had

apparently been involved in an incident at another facility in 1986

that resulted in Co-60 being imbedded in his finger. Trojan was

supplied with a statement that this individual was receiving a dose

to the finger of 91.5 mrads/ day, as of April 28, 1986, from the ,

imbedded Co 60. The inspector noted that the licensee took

appropriate measures to ensure that the exposure due to the imbedded .

Co-60 and exposure received, while at Trojan, did not exceed any NRC l'

limits.

Oaily exposure updates fro;n pocket ion chamber and/or digit:.

alarming dosimeter were provided to department management.

Exposures were reviewed on a continuing bases by the.ALARA planning

group. The inspector noted no instances of failure of workers to

properly use dosimetry devices.

The licensee appeared to be maintaining their previous level of I

performance in this area. No violation or deviations were

identified,

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c. Internal Exposure Control

Review of selected air sample data and maximum permissib'e

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concentration (MPC) work sheets for work performed during the  !

refueling outage, and a cross check of workers involved, did not I

indicate that any individual had received an intake of radioactive

material which would exceed the 40 MPC-hour control measure i

requiring an evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 20.103 (b)(2). Whole '

body counts (WBCs) examined for selected individuals indicated no l

intakes of radioactive materials that would require internal dose 1

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evaluations. The inspector noted that-in two cases the licensee had

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conservatively obtained urine samples for Sr-90' analysis from

workers who had been contaminated on the face or/and near the nose t

-with Cs-137. The licensee did not find any detectable activity on a i

. WBC of one worker and onit about 11 nCi, or < 1.0% of a maximum -

- permissible body burden (MPBB) - Cs-137 on the WBC of the other

worker. The vendor supplied Sr-90 urine sample results for the

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worker with no detectable activity on the WBC was < 6.0 nC1/1. the '

- licensee had not received the sample results for the other worker.

The licensee's procedures require bioassy analysis for Sr-90 when

the WBC indicates > 5.05 maximum permissible organ burden with

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fission produr;ts present,

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On December 21, 1987, the Corporate RSB issued a report of their

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review of Trojans' Respiratory Protection Program. The report

outlined nine recommendations for program improvement. The

inspector noted that the recommendations were administrative in

nature and did not represent a significant problem. Based on

discussion with cognizant licensee representatives and review of

licensee procedures, the-inspector determined that the responsible

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departments had evaluated and implemented changes, as appropriate

for program improvement. .

The licensees performance in this area appeared adequate to meet  !

, their safety objectives. No violations or deviations were

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d. ALARA

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Inspection Report No. 50-344/88-20, documsnted that the licensee had '

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established a goal of 295 person-rem for 1988 with 254 person-rem

for the refueling outage. It was also documented that as of May 17, ,

! 1988, the licensee had used 177 person-rem. ' -

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During this inspection the inspector noted that as of June 23, 1988,

the licensee had used about 344 person-rem. The licensee '

representative stated that unexpected and' unplanned

tasks such as

I pipe whip restraints (about 65 person-rem), additional large bore ,

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hangar repairs (about 20 person-rem) and pressurizer surge line j

replacement (about 30 person-rem) were major contributors in ,

exceeding their goals. The inspector was informed by the ALARA l

planners that a good number of the workers _used during this. '

refueling outage lacked nuclear experience. -The licensee had i

estimated 12 person-rem for the reactor disassembly task and used i

about 18 person-rem. The ALARA planners informed the inspector.that l

the primary cause of the estimate being exceeded was due to l

inexperienced workers supplied by the contract vendor.- l

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During facility tours the inspector did not observe any poor ALARA I

practices that would have an adverse effect in the licensee's 1

program. I

No violations or deviations were identified.

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5. Licensee Reports (90713)

Radiological Environmental Monitoring Report

An in-office review of the 1987 Annual Environmental Radiological

Surveillance Program showed that Trojan provided their data and analysis

of radiological environmental samples and measurements, made during this

period, in accordance with the program addressed in Section 3/4-12 of o

their Technical Specifications. Comparison with previous years data and

environmental surveillance reports supports their conclusion that there

is no indication that the operation of the Trojan Nuclear Plant

significantly impacted on plant environs during 1987.

Sample results reported were below regulatory reporting action levels.

Direct radiation levels measured with TLD and gross beta analysis of air

particulate indicator recorded dose values not significantly different

from control locations or all locations. Although Sr-9C activity in milk

showed levels that exceeded reporting levels defined by Technical

Specification 3.1.2, the values were consistent with those addressed in

the 1986 Environmental Surveillance Report which have been attributable

with atmospheric fallout from weapons testing and not frcm Trojan

operations. Gamma analysis for air particulate and analysis for food

crops and water samples from the terrestrial environment and samples from

the aquatic environment were at or below the levels of detectability.

The report included maps of all sampling locations, results of licensee

participation in the EPA Intercomparison Program for quality control

analysis, and an updated land use census.

Radioactive Effluent Release Report (RERP)

The licensee's RERP for the period of July 1,1987, through December 31,

1987, dated February 29, 1988, was reviewed in office. This timely

report was issued in accordance with TS 6.9.1.S.3 and 6.9.1.5.4 and

included a summary of the quantities of radioactive liquid and gaseous

effluents and solid waste released from the facility as outlined in NRC

Regulatory Guide 1-21. The report also included this dose due to liquid

and gaseous effluents. The report also reported that the condenser air

ejector flow rate measuring device (FR-3100) was inoperable during the

period of January 1,1987 through August 7,1987, until modifications

were completed. The report also noted that in 1987 the licensee had

continued to detect low levels of Tritium in the waters released from

storm and sanitary sewer systems. The Tritium levels remain less than

the MPC specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Table II, Column II, and less than

the U.S. EPA drinking water standards. The licensee is continuing '.o

monitor the Tritium levels in these systems. No errors or anomalies were

identified.

Annual Personnel Exposure Monitoring Report for 1987

This timely report showed the exposure distribution among various work

groups and work functions as required by TS 6.9.1.5. No errors or

anomalies were identified.

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No violations or deviations were. identified.

6, Exit Interview

The insnector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in Paragraph

1, at tne conclusion of the inspection on July 1, 1988. The scope and

findings of the inspection were summarized.

The licensee was informed that the apparent violation identified in this

report needed further in office review and that plant Annager would be

notified by telephone of the NRCs decision as to whether it would be a

violation or acceptable item.

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