IR 05000344/1990016
| ML20055G634 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1990 |
| From: | Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055G632 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-90-16, NUDOCS 9007240006 | |
| Download: ML20055G634 (11) | |
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U. S. NVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No. 50-344/90-16 Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:
Trojan Inspection at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted:
May 6 - June 9, 1990
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Inspectors:
R. C. Barr Senior Resident Inspector J. F. Melfi Resident Inspector Approved By:
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~7-4 90 5. A. Richards, Chief Date Signed ReactorProjectsBranch Summary:
Inspection on May 6 - June 9, 1990 (Report 50-344/90-16)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection of operational safety verification, su7veillance, ion procedures refueling activities, and follow-up on previousl maintenance Inspect 30703, 61726, 62703, 71707, 92700,y identifiedItems.
92701, and 93702 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspection.
Results General Conclusions and Specific Findings There were several Licensee Event Reports (LERs) related to problems noted with Service Water sup)1ies t( various electrical switchboard rooms and problems with Control Room ventilation.
The inspectors will continue to monitor the problem resolution with these systems.
Significant Safety Matters None F'
o PDC
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Summary of Violations and Deviations None Open items Summary Four LERs and three enforcement items were closed.
One unresolved item was opened (see Section 4. of the report).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- T. D. Walt, Acting Vice President, Nuclear 80. P. Yundt Assistant Plant General Manager G.A.Lieuallen,GeneralManager,Trojanixcellence
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A. N. Roller, Outage Manager
General Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance
- C, K. Seaman, Manager, Plant Modifications
- M. J. Singh, J. D. Reid, Manager, Quality Support Services
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Personnel Protection
- J. W. Lentsch, Manager, Nuclear Security A. R. Ankrum, Manager, J. A. Reinhart, Manager, Operations R. M. Nelson, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department M. W. Hoffman, Acting Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering
- S. A Bauer, Branch Manager, Nuclear Regulation
- J. F. Whelan, Branch Manager, Maintenance J.
Mody, Branch Manager, Plant Systems Engineering
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D. L. Nordstrom Branch Manager, Quality Operations J.P.Fischer,fM/EABranchManager T. O. Meek Branch Manager Radiation Protection R.N.PrewItt, Supervisor,,QualitySystems
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R. L. Russell, Branch Manager, Operations J. C. Heitzman Acting Assistant Operations Sunervisor N. A. Regoli I
J.A. Benjamin,nstrumentandControlSupervisoi-Supervisor, Quality Audits J. D. Guberski, Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department Engineer
- W. J. Williams, Compliance Engineer
- D.
Couch, Compliance Engineer The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
These included shift supervisors, reactor and at.xiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Plant Status The plant was shutdown for refueling during this entire inspection period with the facility in Mode 5.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
j The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or biweekly basis.
Daily the insaectors observed control room activities to verify the licensee's ad1erence to limiting conditions for operation as crescribed
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in the facility Technical Specifications.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain
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information on plant conditions, trends and compliance with regulations.
On occasions when a shift turnover was In progress the turnover of informationonplantstatuswasobservedtodetermInethatpertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift personnel.
Each week the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:
General plant and equipment conditions.
Maintenance requests and repairs.
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
Ignition sources and flammable material control.
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(e Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures.
Interiors of electrical and control panels.
Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
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Radiation protection controls.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
Radioactive waste systems.
Proper storage of compressed gas bottles.
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the inspectors examined the licensee's equipment clearance Weeklyl with respect to removal of equipment from service to determine contro that the licensee com,nlied with technical specification limiting conditions for operation.
Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure
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that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance evolutions.
Logsofjumpers, bypasses,cautionandtesttagswere examined by the inspectors.
Each week the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions procedures, security, training and other topics related to in prog,ress work activities.
The inspectors examined the licensee's Corrective Action Program to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action.
Routine inspections of the licensee's physical security program were performed in the areas of access control, organization and staffing, and j
L detection and assessment systems.
The insaectors observed the access verified the control measures used at the entrance to tie protected area,l area
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integrity of portions of the protected area barrier and vita barriers, and observed in several instances the implementation of compensatory c)easures upon breach of vital area barriers.
Portions of I
the. isolation zone were verified to be free of obstructions.
Functioning
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l of central and secondary alarm stations (including the use of CCTV monitors) was observed. On a sampling basis, the inspectors verified
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I that the required minimum number of armed guards and individuals authorized to direct security activities were on site.
The inspectors conducted routine inspections of selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program.
A sampling of radiation
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work permits (RWP) was reviewed for completeness and adequacy of information.
During the course of inspection activities and periodic tours of plant areas, the inspectors verified proper use of personnel monitoringequipment,observedindividualsleavin'btheradiation controlled area and signing out on appropriate RW s, and observed the posting of radiation areas and contaminated areas.
Posted radiation levels at locations within the fuel and auxiliary buildings were verified using both NRC and licensee portable survey meters.
The involvement of health physics supervisors and engineers and their awareness of significant plant activities was assessed through conversations and review of RWP sign in records.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety features.
This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance (61726, 62703)
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The station electrical batteries provide the source for emergency Direct Current (DC) power to the plant.
The batteries are required by Technical Specification 3.8.2.3 to be operable.
l On April 10, 1990, the licensee wrote Corrective Action Request (CAR)
C90-3070 to note that there was some discoloration on some of the battery cells.
The licensee contacted the vendor, who stated that this was due to copper contamination.
The licensee stated in CAR C90-3070 that the copper contamination of the cell was caused by small holes in the cell posts.
A copper insert is placed in the lead post of the cell to increase current carrying capacity.
The licensee stated that the root l
cause for the small holes in the posts was a manufacturing defect.
l Title 10 Part 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires reporting of manufacturing defects.
The inspectors were not able to identify any
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Part 21 report that had been issued on this item at the end of the reporting period.
The possible failure not to issue a Part 21 report on the battery cells is an unresolved item (50-344/90-16-01).
l The licensee replaced six cells (Cell Numbers 5, 16, 18, 19, 52, and 57)
on the B train battery under Maintenance Request (MR) 90-4439.
The inspector observed portions of the maintenance activity on the station
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battery.
The work seen by the inspector was performed by qualified t
technicians using MR 90-4439.
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After replacement of the battery, the licensee conducted the ei hteen monthsurveillancetestonthebattery,andperformedthetestko
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l currents greater than the load profile stated in the FSAR.
The inspector i
reviewed the results of the test, and the battery passed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Surveillance (61726)
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The licensee's containment building is tested at the design basis pressure (60 psig) to verify that the containment building will hold i
pressure and to quantify the leak rate out of the containment.
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Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) is performed to ensure that i
the limits of exposure to the public will be below federal limits following a design basis accident.
The licensee performs these tests to the frequency saecified in Technical Saecification Surveillance recuirement 4.6.1.2.a.
T1e licensee performed
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tiis surveillance under Periocic Engineering Test (PET) 5-1, Revision 9.
The inspector observed portions of the licensee's testing.
The licensee j
verified the interior and exterior lineups for the penetrations into containment.
The inspector independently performed a random sample of 10 l
penetrations, and no discrepancies with the lineups were found, The licensee monitored subvolumes of containment by temperature, and by
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knowing the volume, temperature and pressure could determine the air Thehumidityoftheairwasalsomonilored,andtheweightofthe mass.
water in the air was added to the air mass.
The instruments used for the l
test were verified by the inspector to be in calibration.
The licensee used a verified computer program to ascertain the total mass and leakrate.
The acceptance criteria for leakage out of containment is
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O.10 weight %/ day.
The licensee's test showed the containment air leakrate was 0.00615 weight %/ day, with an upper confidence level of 0.0731 weight %/ day.
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Af ter determining the leakrate, hat the instrumentr,tfon can detect thisthe license the containment, and verifies t known leakrate.
The licensee imposed a leakratc of 0.85 weight %/ day, and the instrumentation and computer program calculated the induced leakrate as 0.795 weight %/ day, which is within the acceptance criteria.
The inspector observed the licensee conduct portions of the test, and
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independently checked some of the data points.
No discrepancies were identified in the checks.
No violations or deviations were identifieo, 6.
Event Follow-up (93702, 92700, 92701)
Thus far, inspections on twelve events which were reported by the licensee during the 1990 Refueling Outage, the inspectors conducted followup in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
Of these twelve events, one report was subsequently withdrawn following the licensee's detailed evaluation, one event was documented via the licensee Corrective Action Program (CAP) and i
ten events were documented in Licensee Event Reports (LERs).
Seven of
the LERs are discussed in Section 7 of this report;iscussed in NRC one LER is discussed
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in NRC Inspection Report 50-344/90-11; one LER is d Inspection Report 50-344/90-19; and one LER is yet to be submitted.
The following documents the followup on the event not reported as an LER.
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Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal While Ad. justing Process Wonitor Setpoints On March 25 1990, with the facility in Mode 5 (cold shutdown), an unexpected $ngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)isolationsignalwasgenerated whilereadjustingthealarmandisolationsetpointsonthe rocess monitor for the containment vent signal.
The containment drogen vent system was not in operation nor was it required to be oper le.
No effluent was being released to the environment when the isolation signal occurred.
The licensee determined the cause of the event was that t1e operatoradjustingthesettingshadturnedthecalibrateswitchpastthe desired position, resulting in an ESF actuation.
The licensee recognized this event as a repeat occurrence, immediately reported the event per 10 CFR 50.72 and initiated Corrective Action Request (CAR) C90-1006.
The CAR continues to be evaluated.
The licensee is considering procedure or equipment changes that will caution the operator on repositioning the
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calibrate switch or which will not allow the operator to inadvertently
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move the switch to a position that would generate an ESF signal.
The inspectors will in the course of routine inspection, followup on the
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corrective actio,ns of CAR C90-1006.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Follow-up of Licensee Event Reports [LERs] (92700)
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LER 90-08, Revision 0, (Closed), " Control Building Ventilation System Inadvertently Isolated on a Toxic Gas Signal Due to a Training Weakness for Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Technicians." On March 19 1990 with the facility in Mode 1 and surveillance PICT 25-1, " Control, Room Air Intake Sulfur Dioxide (502) Detection," being performed the control building normal ventilation system (CB-2) isolated.
The licensee determined that the isolation occurred due to the I&C technician replacing a light bulb in a lighted dual function switch.
The push button switch arovides indication that the 502 detector is energized and de-energizes tie detector when pushed.
The licensee concluded the cause of the event was a training weakness since the technician did not realize that he should not have intentionally caused the isolation without informing the control room. As corrective actions, the licensee conducted a lessons learned session with the I&C technicians, will evaluate the use of the bypass switch during maintenance and testing, and will relabel the positions of the bypass switch.
The inspectors' review of this event found that a Maintenance Request, MR 90-2794, had been written and hung on the switch to replace the light bulb.
The I&C technician obtain a copy of the MR pr,ior to replacing the light bulb.although required by plant did not A rev the MR noted that the work instructions did not include precautions for replacing the light bulb. The MR had not been released for work, was not i
on the plan-of-the-day to be worked, and the control room was not informed that the bulb was being replaced.
The inspectors determined that the I&C technician understood the operation of the 502 circuitry and
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fully recognized that CB-2 would isolate if the button was pushed.
He believed, however, that since he was conducting a surveillance it was acceptable to actuate CB-2 for the light bulb replacement.
The I
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inspectors found that the technician had not been counselled for his noncompliance with plant procedures.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had conducted a lessons learned session with the I&C technicians; however, it was noted that not all the technicians had
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attended the training. As a result of the inspectors' followup the licenseecommittedtoreevaluatecontrolsduringlightbulbreplacement.
Further followup of this event will occur as part of the routine inspection program.
LER 90-09, Revision 0, (Closed), " Inadequate Process for Transmittal of Setpoint Calculations Results in Incorrect Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation 5etpoint."
(Discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-344/90-06)
i LER 90-10, Revision 0, (Closed), " Chlorine Detector Failure Causes Isolation of Control Room Normal Ventilation System." On March 27 1990, withthefacilityshutdowninMode5,thecontrolroomnormalvent}lation
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system CB-1) isolated on a B train chlorine signal.
The licensee evaluat(iondeterminedtheisolationwasanequipmentfailureduetoa
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leaking membrane cap on a chlorine detector that resulted in a loss of electrolyte.
The licensee learned in discussions with the vendor (Sensidyne) that the membrane installation was not contained in the vendor manual.
The licensee replaced the detector and no further leakage has occurred.
The licensee returned the chlorine detector to the vendor
for confirmation of their failure analysis.
The inspectors observed the installation and calibration of the replacement detector and verified that the vendor manual had been changed to incorporate the additional information.
LER 90-11, Revision 0, (0 pen), " Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Unfiltered In-Leakage Exceeds F5AR Value Ap)arently Due to Missing 5ealant on Duct." The licensee determined on Marci 30, 1990 that untiltered air in-leakage in the control room emergency ventilation system B train exceeded values allowed in the safety analysis.
The licensee determined the leak to be a result of damage to the ventilation duct work that most probably occurred while working on aeseismic support in June 1989.
The licensee is continuing to evaluate this event and has committed to supplement the LER.
A temporary epoxy repair has been completed.
This LER is open pending review of the supplemental LER.
LER 90-12, Revision 0, (0 pen), " Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
Electrical Switchgear Could Ex)erience Common Mode Failure From Elevated Temperatures as a Result of E5; Room Cooler Design Error." On April 9, 1990, while reviewing the loading sequence of the emergency dieselgenerators(EDGs),itchgearroomsdidnotautomaticallystartthe licensee fou for the ESF electrical sw following an ESF actuation no procedural requirements existed to manuallystartthefansfollowinganESFsignal;andnoroomtemperature alarms existed to alert operators that ESF room temperatures were increasing.
As a result of these circumstances, the iicensee determined that the temperature in the ESF switthgear rooms could exceed the tem)erature assumed in the safety analysis for a design basis accident wit 1 a loss of off-site power.
A conservative worst case calculation
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indicated that the room heat-up rates could be 3-5 degrees F. per minute, and the room could exceed design temperatures in less that thirty minutes.
The licensee concluded the cause of this event was design
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oversight.
As corrective action, the licensee changed the design (RDC 90-017) to have the room cooler fans automatically start during an ESF i
actuation.
The licensee verified that the design change automatically
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started the fans by conducting a loss of power test.
The licensee also verified that the starting sequence for other room cooling fans met design requirements.
The inspectors discussed the event with the design engineers to
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understand the heating rate and the design assum)tions.
After the completion of the design change the inspectors o) served the loss of power test that verified automatic starting of the fans.
This LER remains open
pending further consideration of the safety significance.
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LER 90-13, Revision 0, (Closed), " Control Room Emergency Ventilation Disabled Due to Door 25 Being Closed." On April 22 thelIcensee,withthedetermined 1990 racility in Mode 6 and refueling in progress thattheControlRoomEmergencyVentilation$ystemwasnotOPERABLE
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because auxiliary building door 25 was closed when required to be open.
The licensee continues the evaluation of this event for root cause and
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has committed to provide a supplemental LER.
As immediate corrective action, the licensee suspended fuel handling operations, closed door 25 and conducted an event critique.
When the door was closed, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was declared operable and refueling restarted.
This LER is closed based on the licensee immediate corrective action and the commitment to provide a supplemental LER.
i LER 90-14, Revision 0, (0 pen), " Error in Original Classification / Building of a ventilation Boundary Wall Could Have
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Rendered Control Room Emer0ency Ventilation System Ino)erable Due to a 5eismic Event." On May 9, 1990, with the facility in Mode 5 (cold shutdown),
the licensee identified that one of the walls that forms a portion of the control room emergency ventilation boundary was not seismically qualified per design requirements.
The wall is required in order to maintain a aositive pressure in the control room to protect plant operators during ligh airborne toxic gas accidents.
The licensee determined the cause of the event to be a construction error in that the wall was not erected to construction specifications.
As corrective actions, the licensee redesignated the control room ventilation boundary, reinforced the partition wall, revised _ plant procedures and tested the boundary to ensure it met technical specification requirements for maintaining positive pressure.
The licensee has also committed to evaluate other facility plaster partition steel stud walls to ensure the walls conform to design requirements.
The inspectors observed selected portions of repair to the partition wall
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and observed the surveillance test on the modified control room emergency ventilation boundary.
This LER remains open pending further review of the licensee's actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Followup On Open Items, Corrective Actions for Violations and Unresolved Items (92701, 92702)
Enforcement Item 50-344/90-06-01, (Closed), " Inadequate Closure of Corrective Action Request (CAR)." The licensee determined that CAR C90-5007, which stated that a component had been replaced even though the component was not replaced, was improperly closed due to a personnel error in that communications between an engineer and his supervisor were misinterpreted.
As corrective action Additionally,helicenseereopenedtheCARand t
corrected the deficiency.
the licensee counselled the engineer and his supervisor on the need for clear and concise communication.
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The inspectors verified that the CAR was properly dispostioned.
Enforcement Item 50-344/90-06-04, (Closed), " Noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.3.2."
In the May 17, 1990 response to the Notice of Violation, the licensee concluded that the incorrect setting of the trip setpoint for Steam flow in Two Steam Lines-High was due to personnel error in that the review for a previous event failed to identify this
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incorrect setpoint.
As corrective actions, the licensee shutdown the reactor to achieve compliance, reviewed all Engineered Safety feature Actuation System (ESFAS) set)oint calculations to ensure existing setpoints were correct, esta)11shed interim measures to control incorporation of new or revised calculations of plant setpoints, and discussed the event and its root cause during an engineering group meeting. Additionally the licensee read'usted the setpoint for Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines,-High and will verlfy the setpoint during the startup from the 1990 Refueling Outage.
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The inspectors observed the reactor plant shutdown, reviewed the interim guidance for controlling plant setpoint changes, verified that this event wasdiscussedduringanengineeringgroupmeetingletionoftheHighSteam and verified that the licensee's " Ready for Startup" list included comp l
Flow Calibration prior to entering Mode 3.
Open Item 50-344/89-17-07, (Closed), " Plant Modifications Department Training Deficiencies." To address previously identified deficiencies in i
the training of employees in the Plant Modifications Departmen't,
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procedure PMT-1, " Plant Modifications Training Procedure," was
implemented.
The procedure establishes a well defined and auditable Departmental training program that includes initial training, short term training, long term training and retraining.
The procedure establishes clear responsibilities and requirements for supervisors and employees with respect to training.
This item is closed based on the implementation of PMT-1 and its program requirements, 9.
Unresolved Item An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item a deviation, or a violation.
AnunresolveditemisdocumentedInSection4.
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Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspectors met with the licerisee representatives denoted in Section 1 on June 29, 1990, and with licensee management throughout the inspection period.
In these meetings the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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