IR 05000344/1988032

Insp Rept 50-344/88-32 on 880711-15.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Open Items & Written Repts of Nonroutine Events

ML20151P763
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	07/25/1988
From:	Mindonca M, Pereira D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151P756	List: IR 05000344/1988032 ML20151P753
References
50-344-88-32, NUDOCS 8808100180
Download: ML20151P763 (10)

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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

REGION V

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Report No: 50-344/88-32

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Docket N License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Nuclear Plant Inspection at: al ier, Oregon

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Inspection c nduct :

Jul g15,188

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Inspector: avf( -

[FI 0. B. Pereira, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved by: be%'- Fw dwr- 7/w/PJ M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed Reactor Project Section 1 Summary:

Inspection During the Period of July 11-15 1988 (Report 50-344/88-32)

Areas Inspected: This routine, unannounced inspection by the Project Inspector involved the onsite followup of open items and onsite followup of  ;

written reports of non-routine event '

During this inspection, inspection modules 30703, 92701, and 92700 were use Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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8808100180 PDR 880725  !

Q ADOCK 05000344  !

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel

• C. A. Olmstead, Plant Manager

• D. W. Swan, Manager, Technical Services

• J. Lentsch, Manager, Personnel Protection D. Nordstrom, Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department R. A. Reinart, Supervisor, Instrument and Control

• C. Brown, Manager, Quality Assurance Operations Branch

• J. Anderson, Materials Manager

• L. Erickson, Quality Assurance Manager

• J. Aldersebaes, Manager, Plant Modifications

• L. Hinson, Plant Review Board Engineer

• M. J. Singh, Outage Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• R. Carr G. Suh Oregon Department of Energy H. Moomey, Oregon Resident Inspector

Attended the Exit Meeting on July 15, 1988, Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) Followup Item 87-19-01 (Closed) Maintenance Program Licensee !

Identified Deficiencies NCAR's P87-041 and 037

The inspector initiated followup item 87-19-01 which concerned the licensee's preventive maintenance program and a licensee Quality Assurance Audit conducted during the month of March 1987. Their audit discovered two Nonconforming Activity Reports (NCARs),

P87-041, and P87-037. The first, NCAR P87-041, identified that the current program lacked procedural requirements for updating and revision in that it did not define interfaces with equipment lists, OCPs and the Q-list. In addition, there was also no objective evidence that the Trojan Scheduling System Users Manual referenced in MP-3-8 has been reviewed and approved or was being controlle The second, NCAR P87-037, stated that the current preventive maintenance program did not specify requirements for the control of computerized record !

The inspector reviewed the licensee's responses to NCAR's P87-041, l and P87-037 and determined that their responses were evaluated and '

accepted by Quality Assurance supervision. NCAR P87-041

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proceduralized the interface with the equipment lists, DCPs and the Q-list, and the Trojan Scheduling System Users Manual was reviewed and approved by the Maintenance Supervisor. NCAR P87-037 revised Maintenance Procedure 3-8 to define proper preventive maintenance record retention requirements, and identify the methods of retention. The inspector's review concluded that followup item 87-19-01 is close b. Followup Item 88-15-01 (Closed) A0-3-16 Needs Correction

_QAP-5, 11-1, and 11-2 have been deleted In inspection report 88-15, the inspector determined that Administrative Order (AO)-3-16 referenced Quality Assurance Procedures (QAPs) that were no longer valid. The correction of A0-3-16's references were presented to the Office Supervisor who initiated changes to A0-3-1 The inspector reviewed A0-3-16 and determined that the appropriate changes were inserted. Followup item 88-15-01 is close c. Followup Item 87-39-02 (Closed) Barton Transmitter Calibration Difficulty In inspection report 87-39, the inspector witnessed the licensee having difficulty with the calibrations of several Barton Model 763A pressure transmitters in which they experienced a 30 to 50 pound

"zero adjust drift" and that the "span setting" on several instruments drifted slightl The licensee has commenced a pressure transmitter monitoring program

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in which Barton model 763/763A transmitters are monitored by means of increased calibration and/or data acquisition to ensure that the transmitters are not drif ting or otherwise in the process of failin The program was intended to be in effect until full power operation is attained after the 1989 refueling outage. The licensee's result. indicated that the transmitters which were found out of calibration high (Accumulators, Main Steam, and Pressurizer)

were believed to have undergone a change in their pressure sensing module (Bourdon or link wire) set during their depressurization for the 1988 outage. There were 41.7% (ten out of twenty four) of the transmitters found out of the +/-0.5% calibration requiremen Three of the ten transmitters that were beyond the +/-0.5%

requirement, were greater than 1.0% out of calibration. Since the licensee's action plan seems to acceptably address the problem, the inspectar considers followup item 87-39-02 closed, d. Followup Item 87-08-P (Closed) Part 21 General Electric HFA Relay Armature binding when de-energized resulted in failed Contact Operation Followup item 87-08-P is a Part 21 issue where a General Electric (GE) HFA auxiliary relay, which had been continuously energized with ac power, failed to provide correct contact operation when l de-energize General Electric's investigation indicated that the mechanical binding, which prevented correct relay operation, was

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caused by incorrect location of a stop tab which is welded to the armature. The incorrect positioning, combined with minor movement of the magnetic assembly, which experiences vibration when the relay is energized with ac power, caused the armature binding. Acenrding to the General Electric letter dated November 14, 1986, the tooling used to weld the stop tab has been corrected, and relays manufactured after October 24, Date Code YA and later, are not subject to this defec The licensee issued Operational Assessment Review (0AR)-86-90 to assess whether Trojan had the General Electric HFA relays, and determined that there was no indication of using or purchasing any GE HFA relays with ac rated coil In addition, Maintenance Procedure (MP)-2-14 was revised to-include the instructions of the November 14, 1986 letter whereby defective relays could be identified. 0AR-86-90 evaluation, review and corrective actions were completed on March 19, 198 Based upon 0AR-86-90 completion, and the licensee corrective actions, the inspector considers followup item 87-08-P close Followup Item 87-09-P (Closed) Part 21 Square D Company General Purpose Relay Class 8501 Type KPD-13 130 VDC Failed to Open Followup item 87-09-P is a Part 21 issue where a Square D Company general purpose relay, Class 8501, Type KPD-13, 130 VDC service relay was energized for a long period of time, which was estimated to be approximately 10 years. When the relay was de energized, the relay failed to drop out and remained in its energized stat The Square D Company's test identified residual magnetism to be the cause. Their probable cause of the residual magnetism was that i

the DC device being constantly energized for such a long perio The licensee initiated Event Report (ER)86-056 after testing of an emergency diesel generator (EDG)-2 control circuit determined that ,

relay BF-6 was found in the energized position when the power was '

secure The licensee's corrective action were to replace the failed relay, inform the Square O Company of the problem, and  ;

evaluate a replacement program and trending of failure rates of j continuously energized relays. The inspector reviewed ER-86-056's '

corrective actions and results and has determined that followup item 87-09-P is close . Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Non-Routine Events (92700) Licensee Event Report 87-11-LO (Closed) Electrical Penetration Leaked Excessively Due to Degraded Seals Licensee Event Report (LER) 87-11-L0 described the event of May 1, 1987 while troubleshooting on leaking electrical penetrations, it was determined that electrical penetration E-107 was leaking excessively, >11,000 cc/ mi The leakage experienced was evaluated further using a helium leak detecto The leakage through E-107 was

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, 4 determined to b'e both into and out of containment, lu., both conductor module seals leakin The root cause of this event was leakage past the electrical penetration conductor seals. The leakage was caused by a permanent compressed displacement of the seals due to ag The seals had been in use since original plant constructio A contributing cause which can affect the leak-tightness of the seals is a change in penetration temperature following shutdown for refueling. Following the plant shutdown, the containment temperature decreased which may have caused differential thermal movement within the electrical penetration which was not compensated for by the seals themselve The licensee's corrective actions included the replacement of seals on E-107 and the subsequent satisfactory leak test. The licensee is evaluating the need for an additional preventive maintenance program to periodically replace the electrical penetration seal Based upon the licensee's corrective actions and evaluation process, the inspector censiders LER 87-11-L0 close b. , Licensee Event Report 87-15-L1 (Closed) Steam Generator Level Transmitters Improperly Calibrated LER 87-15-L1 described the results of an annual calibration of steam generator level transmitters during April 13 through April 15, 198 .

The ten steam generator level transmitters were found apparently out-rf-calibration such that they would not have actuated a turbine trip and feedwater isolation on high-high steam generator water level within thr. Technical Specification allowed value of less than or equal to 76 Further investigation revealed that the calibration was performed improperly, in that the Instrument and Control (I&C) technicians performing the calibration had not completely drained the water from the transmitters prior to beginning the calibratio Failure to completely drain the water i from the transmitters introduced a bias to the as-found calibration, i This resulted in the transmitters being reported as I out-of-calibration low, when in fact they may not have been i out-of-calibration. The I&C technicians then adjusted the l transmittets based on their perception that the transmitters were '

out-of-calibration. Since the transmitters were adjusted without i being completely drained, the actual as-found condition is unknow l There# ore, the 18 month surveillances required by Technical Specifications 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1, while performed within the necessary interval, could not clearly demonstrate operability of the level transmitter The root cause of this event was determined to be procedure !

deficiency. The calibration procedure did not specify that water should be completely drained from the transmitters prior to 1 calibration. A contributing cause was personnel error in that the I&C technicians performing the calibration failed to drain the water from the transmitters prior to beginning calibratio In addition,

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there are no specific drain valves for drair.ing of the water, the swagelock fittings needed to be taken apart and the tubing bent to allow draining of the transmitter The licensee's corrective actions were to recalibrate the steam generator level transmitters to within the allowed toleranc The calibration data sheets for these instruments have been revised to require complete draining of water from the transmitters prior to calibration. The calibration data sheets for other similar transmitters have also been revised in this manner. The I&C technicians were counseled on the need to completely drain the water

, from the level transmitters prior to calibration.

Based upon the licensee's corrective actions, the inspector considers LER-87-15-L1 close c. Licensee Event Report 87-18-LO (Closed) Valve Packing Leakage Exceeded FSAR Assumed Leakage LER 87-18-LO described an event during local leak rate testing (LLRT), on May 9, 1987, when the Containment Spray and Residual Heat Removal recirculation suction valves outside containment (M0-2052B and M0-88118) exhibited packing leaks, The leakage exceeded the 1580 cubic centimeters per hour assumed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for post-accident recirculation leakage. The total leakage from both valves was approximately 150 cubic centimeters (cc)/ minute (9000 cc/ hour). FSAR Section 15.6. specifies an assumed Containment Spray System leakage of 192 cc/ hour and a total Emergency Core Cooling System leakage of 1580 cc/ hour.

The root cause of this event was leakage from the packing of valves MO-88118 and MO-2052 The packing leakage was attributed to normal packing degradstio The licensee's corrective actions were to tighten the valve packings and reperform the leak test satisfactoril Based on the licensee's corrective actions, the inspector considers LER 87-18-L0 close d. Licensee Event Report 87-20-L1 (Closed) Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Missed Due to Inadvertent Deletion From Schedule LER 87-20-L1 described the event on August 3,1987, during a review l i

of surveillance records, that the monthly channel check of the  !

seismic monitoring instrumentation required by Technical '

Specification 4.3.3.3.1 was not performed in July 1987. The last  ;

! time the surveillance was satisfactorily completed was June 23, 1 198 L The root cause of this event was that Periodic Instrument and Control Test (PICT) 12-1, "Seismic Monitoring Triaxial Time-History Recording" was inadvertently deleted from the computerized I

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surveillance schedule due to inadequate understanding of the software. An error in the program caused a scheduling date erro which resulted in the surveillance not being ccheduled for performance in July. A contributing cause was a failure to obtain printout of the Technical Specs (0:ation surveillances independent of the computerized surveillance schedul The printer for the Technical Specification Warning Report was out-of-service for repairs, and an alternate printer ~was not designated to print the repor Since a hard copy of the Technical Specification harning Report was not obtained, personnel were unaware of the pending surveillance required on the seismic monitoring instrumentation, and it was misse The licensee's corrective actions included performing tha Technical Specification required surveillanc The seismic monitoring

instrumentation was verified as operable. A review of surveillance records indicated that no other surveillance was misse The computerized surveillance scheduling program has been reviewe The error which caused this event has been corrected, and additional safeguards have been incorporated into the program to protect against inadvertent deletion of entrie In the event the printer for the Technical Specification Warning Report system fails in the future, a backup printer will be designated to print the report. If no printer is available, surveillances will be tracked manuall Based on the licensee's corrective actions, the inspector considers LER 87-20-L1 close e. Licensee Event Report 87-26-LO (Closed) Missed Surveillance ,

of Post-Accident Leakage Outside Containment LER 87-26-L0 described the event on September 1, 1987 during a review of surveillance records, it was determined thtt Periodic  ;

Engineering Test (PET) 9-3, "Post-Accident Leakage Outside Containment", required by Technical Specification 6.8.4.a. was not

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performed within the 18 month interval. The systems for which the surveillance was missed were: (1) the "B" centrifugal charging pump piping, (2) the safety injection system, and (3) the residual heat removal syste The root cause of the event was personnel error. A schedule for PET-9-3 had not been prepared and, therefore, the surveillance was misse The licensee's corrective action was to perform the Technical

. Specification required surveillanc An updated surveillance schedule for PET-9-3 was issued which indicates the due dates for the next required surveillance. The schedule for all PETS will be ,

added to the computerized surveillance schedule to eliminate the '

need to manually schedule these surveillance Based on the licensee's corrective actions, the inspector considers LER 87-26-L0 close _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______-_ __- ______ - - __. . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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f. Licensee Event P.< pert 88-01-L1 (Closed) Reactor Trip Due to Failed Overpower Delti"'femperatt.re Channel LER 88-01-L1 describes the event on January 8, 1988, when the plant was operating at 100% power; normal operating temperature and pressure. At 1506, a reactor trip occurred due to a spurious overpower delta temperature (0PDT) trip signal on one channel which occurred while another OPDT channel was in a tripped state while surveillance testin At IS18, source range neutron detector N-32 was energized, but no indication was received on the channel of nuclear instrumentatio The root cause of this event was a spurious trip signal from loop

"A" OPDT which occurred while a second 00DT channel was in the tripped condition during surveillance testin The spurious OPDT trip signal was caused by a failed transistor in Lead-Lag Amplifier TY-4120. A review of machinery history revealed no similar failures of Icad-lag modules. The transistor was believed to have failed randomly due to equipment agin The N32 detector's source range channel failed to indicate due to lack of an adequate signal. Formation of an oxide film on the cable connector to the instrument's pre-amplifier apparently caused a reduction in channel signal strength. Other factors, however, such as aging source range cabling or a less than optimum discri;ninator curve setting could have contributed to the. proble The licensee's- corrective actions included performing the emergency instruction recovery actions and to restore the OPDT channel under test to operatio Surveillance testing was performed on each OPDT channel in an attempt to discover the faulty channel without success. The OPDT channel for loop "A" failed the next day while troubleshooting continued, and tripped its associated reactor trip and rod block bistables. Diagnostics of this channel revealed a failed 'ransistor in Lead-Lag Amplifier TY-4120. The failed transistor was replaced, instrumentation in the associated loop was calibrated, and surveillance testing was satisfactorily performed to restore the loop "A" OPDT channel to operable statu .

The licensee's corrective actions to restore indication from source range detector N-32 was to clean the cable connector to the instrument's pre-amplifier and perform the surveillance to demonstrate instrument operability. The ( ele connector will be cleaned at least once per year during the performance of annual source range instrument testing. The cabling for source range detector N32 will be replaced by the end of the 1989 refueling j cutage. A discriminator curve for source range detector N32 will be plotted during the 1988 refueling outage in order to evaluate and optimize detector performanc Based on the licensee's corrective actions, the inspector considers LER 88-01-L1 close .- , -

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8 Licensee Event Report 88-07-L0 (Closed) Control Room Normal Air Conditioning System Isolation Due to Spurious High Chlorine Sjanal LER 88-07-L0 describes the event on April 10, 1988, when an operator observed an apparent indication of low sample flow on the channel

"B" chlorine detector located at the control room normal air conditioning system (CB-2) air intak During investigation of the low flow rate, a momentary spurious high ch1crine alarm was initiated on this instrument which generated an isolation signal for CB- The channel "B" chlorine detector was' confirmed to have a low sample flow rate and was declared inoperable. The chlorine detector was reenergized on April 12 and CB-2 isolation was again initiate Shutdown of the CB-2 system occurred as designed on both occasion The root cause of the event was determined to be failure of the chlorine detector due to normal equipment wear and aging. This model chlorine detector is operated continuously in this application and has a history of reliable operation at Trojan. The cause of the initial high chlorine alarm could not be determine The alarm of the chlorine detector upon reenergization is a normal instrument response, however, the high chlorine alarm and resulting isolation of the normal control room air conditioning system were not anticipate The work and reenergization instructions for repla ement and return to service of the chlorine detector did not identify that this isolation was to be expecte The licensee's corrective actions were to replace the faulty chlorine detector and retest it satisfactoril The false high chlorine alarm could not be duplicated despite numerous attempt Thus, the cause of the initia) high alarm could not be determine The need to incorporate a description of expected equipment response during maintenance activities into work instructions has been reemphasized. Instructions on equipment response upon reenergization are being incorporated into development of Operations work instruction Based upon the licensee's co.rective actions, the inspec, tor considers LER-88-07-LO close . Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph

, 1 on July 15, 1988, and summarized the scope and findings of the

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inspection activitie >

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