IR 05000344/1990025
| ML20059M198 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1990 |
| From: | Coblentz L, Tenbrook W, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059M196 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-90-25, NUDOCS 9010030272 | |
| Download: ML20059M198 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Y
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Report No. 50-344/90-25 License No. NPF-1 Licensee:
Portland General E'ectric Company ~
121 SW Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:
TrojanPlant Inspection at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection Conducted:
August 20-24, 1990 Inspected by:
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9 /t 9e W. d. TenBrook, Radiation Specialist Date Signed
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L.gCopentz,RadptionSpecialist Date Signed
' Approved by: b. kh CNWh0 l
G. P. (Yu1Vis, Chief Date Signed
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Reacte% Radiological Protection Branch
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Sumn.ary:
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Areas Insaected:
Routine,unannouncedinspectionofinspectorfollowupidems, Licensee Event Reports (LER) and gaseous radwaste systems.
Inspection precedures 84724, 84750, 92700 and 92701 were used.
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a Reeults: The licensee's program for management of gaseous waste continued,to
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exhibit weaknesses in the design, operation and maintenance of the containment
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monitoring system, PRM-1, and the auxiliary building duct monitor PRM-2 (Sections 3.and 4).
Deficiencies in PRM-2 had persisted.for two years after
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l-identification, as interim corrective actions were not thorough _ enough to meet i
the licensee's prior commitments (Section 4).
A continuing program strength
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was the low quantity of gaseous effluent released, as documented in the
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Semi-Annual Effluent Report for the first two quarters of 1990 (Section 4).
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f 9010030272 900918 PDR ADOCK 05000344 O
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DETAILS l
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Persons Contacted L!censee
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S. Bauer, Nuclear Re ulation Branch Mana er
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J. Benjamin, Audits upervisor, Quality erations
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E Bradley-Muham:aad, Quality Assurance E ineer d. Clark, Plant System Engineer J. Cross, Vice President Nuclear G.Huey, Supervisor,RadIationProtection
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M. Hoffmann, Nuclear Plant Engineering Branch Manager J. Lentsch, Personnel Protection Manager J. Mody, Plant System Engineering Branch Manager
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R. Nelson, Nuclear Safety and Regulation Manager D. Nordstrom, Quality.Operatiens Branch Manager E. Peterson, Maintenance Bran h Manager J. Reinhart, Operations Manager
M. Schwartz, Technical ~ Services. Manager M.. Singh, Plant Modifications Manager.
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C. Sprain, Chemistry Branch Manager
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B. Thomas, Supervisor, Plant System Engineering W. Williams, Regulatory Compliance J. Willison, Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Regulation
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J. Helfi, Resident Inspector The individuals listed above attended the exit meeting on August.24,
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1990.
'ihe inspectors met and held discussions with additional members of i
the lir.entee's staff during the inspection.
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Follosup (92701)
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Item 50-344/89-30-03 (0)en'):
This item concerned whether design: leakage from containment atmospiere purge! valves' constituted an unmonitored-release path when the containment monitoring-system!(PRM-1) was aligned to the containment' interior..'not the purge duct. The licensee's evaluation concluded-that estimated purge,valvecefflunnt. leakage, when
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summed with monitored effluent, did not exceed thetlimits of4 technical specifications 'TS)- 3/4.11.2.1 and 3/4.11.2.4.
Purge valve. effluent was estimated u be approximately. half the. sum of monitored gaseous-
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effluent based on leakage at 0.6 weight percent / day and 60 psign
.t However, inspection report-50-344/89-30 documented a licensee statement
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that purge valve leakage could be greater at lower cc,ainment pressure because of the valve desion.,>This possibility war not' addressed in the licensee's evaluation.
Als6, measured results for purge valve'1pakage
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effluent were not presented in the evaluation.
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During the review of this item! the inspect 6r-~also learned 3 hat a design
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change (RDC 88-023) had been performed to provide automatic realignment of PRM-1 to the purge duct on a containment isolation signal to assure.
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l that the duct was sampled following~an accident.'
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The significance of abtual purge valve leakage at operating pressure and the licenset's accounting,0f the resulting effluent will be assessed during a subsequent inspectibn.
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g Item 50-344/89-30-07 (0 pen):Nhis.itemconcernedtheRadwasteAction
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Plan.
The licensee had contracted an offsite vendor.to sort,.
decontaminate and compact low-level' dry radwaste and monitor clean waste
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from controlled areas.
Licensee management.had raised concerns regarding the contractor's methods and facilities had discontinued shipments to
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'he contractor, and had secured all theIr radwaste on the' contractor's pumises. ' Further licensee actions regarding the contract will be
examined during_ a subsequent inspection. *
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Item 50-344/IN-90-35 (Closed):
The inspector verified that information notice 90-35 had been distributed to appropriate licensee personnel;-
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Onsite Followup of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
Item 50'344/90-19-L0 (Closed):
This report conc r inappropriate
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contaliiment atmosphere radioiodine setpoint.(PRE 9 during a containment purge on March 3, 1990.
An order of e error in
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reading or recording the instrument background wa.
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setpoint.
PR& 1 particulate and noble; gas setpoints 4.. correct.
No other improper setpoints were i h ntified by the licensee.
Operations-personnel were counselled as to the r responsibilities in establishing-
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radiation monitor setpoints.
During inspector interviews, operators
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demonstrated satisfactory understanding of radiation monitor setpoints.
The inspectors had no further questions'in this matter.
l Item 50-344/90-20-L0.(0 pen}:
This report concerned the inoperability of j
PRM-1A, containment particulate channel, due to denleted filter paper.
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The licensee had received multiple PRM-1A filter % er tear ala ns during the week prior to the followup inspection.
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- filter paper, tear alarm of the group was immediately prior to a planned. filter paper l
I surveillance referenced as a corrective action in licensee. report 90 20.-
During the filter paper surveillance and alarm response, the chemistry technician noted that the paper supply was unexpectedly low and the paper speed was unexpectedly high.(two inches / hour).
The paper was replaced
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and the paper speed was reset to are inch / hour.
No further alarms were received.
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The licensee's investigation did not reveal the cause of the unexpectedly
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low paper supply. 70uring responses to the multiple paper tear alarms, reactor operators and chenistry technicians =did not observe a high paper I
l speed until the final alarm <The system engineer, I&C and operations
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I evaluated whether recentiy established flow surveillances for the PRM-1 l
post-accident monicoring channels had caused filter paper depletion. -The
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licensee did not observe any unusual changes in filter paper speed during l
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the diagnostic testing.
During the exit meeting, the licensee stated
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that they were considering a modification to PRM-1 to eliminate
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unnece6sary multiple paper speeds.
Correctiva actions concerning PRM-1A will be evaluated in a subsequent inspection.
Item 50-344/90-30-LO (Closed):
This item concerned a containment
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ventilation isolation on July 2,1990, when FRM-18 exceeded its setpoint.
On August 23, 1990, the inspectors responded to an additional. ventilation.
. isolation and interviewed. instrumentation (I&C) technicians during.
troubleshooting of PRM-1.
The inspectors verified that the monitor alarm on July 2,1990 was due to a momentary " spike" on the B channel and that activity trends on all chanals were otherwise undisturbed.
Maintenance and testing of PRM-1 was continuing through the inspection.
The inspectors haa no further questions in this matter..
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Gaseous Radwaste Systems (84724)
Audits and Appraisals The insp2ctors reviewed AP-641, " Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of.
Radwaste Systems," issued July 12, 1990.
Seven audit findings were issued, four dealing with maintenance of radwaste system components and three dealing with system changes.
Responses to all Corrective Action Requests (CAR) for the findings were not complete at the time of the inspection.
The scope of the audit was producilvely directed toward the licensee's efforts to improve control of maintenance and modifications.
Changes During a facility tour, the inspectors observed that a flexible ruiber sleeve joining the vent collecthn hWer fan (VC-304) discharge to the discharge piping was degraded and leaking.
A deficiency tag, dated April 6, 1990, had been placed on the sleeve.
Maintenance. request (MR) 90-4421 l
l had been written to repair the, sleeve, and the licensee was' waiting' for appropriate parts.
The leakage from the sleeve was drawn into the-auxiliary building ventilation system and monitored.
No personnel contamination was attributed to the ieakage.
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The rubber sleeves on the discharge and suction of VC-304 were the only non-metallic-items observed in,the' vent collection _ system piping.
Given the degraded condition of the sleeve,:the inspectors inquired whether this sleeve met appropriate code for the system and'was the original
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design or a subsequent modification.
Discussions with Nuclear Plant l
Engineering and review of ANSI /ASME B31.1 105.3 demonstrated that non-metallic material could be used if it met the pressure and temperature conditions of service and had satisfactory service i
experience.
The degrded discharge sleeve was, fabricated from neoprene rubber, installed during construction'and had degraded over plant life.
The licensee also produced MR 89-6208, which described'the specification-and installation of a new plioflex' duct on,the suction side of the fan.
The new plioflex material was not degraded., During a review of MR 89-6208 by QA personnel and the inspectors, QA personnel noted that the r
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- design drawings' continue'd to. reflect neoprene as the duct material, not plio! %. MR 89-6208 had provided for installation of plioflex on the
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f an suction without an appropriate design change, such as a Spare Parts Engineering Evaluation Request or Nonconformance Report.
QA issued a corrective action request to address the design change to reflect installation of plioflex.
Effluent
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The inspectors reviewed gaseous effluent discharge permits for waste gas decay tank releases ana containment pressure reduction releases.
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Selected calculations were verified using the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Minor editorial errors in the Manual were idantified during the calculation review and brought to the licensee's attention-for correction.
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The licensee's timely Semi-Annual Efiluent Release Report.was received following the inspection period.
Total gaseous activities released'
continued to be low compared with similar facilities.
The balance of the report will be evaluated during a subsequent inspection.
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Instrumentation
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u The inspectors reviewed channel checks, source checks, channel, s
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calibrations snd channel functional tests for process and effluent monitoring instrumentation as required by TS 3.3.3.11.
The inspectors notedthatthecondenserairejectormonitor,PRM-6,wasinoperable,from June 25, 1990 to July 20, 1990 due to'high offgas flow and an'ino)erable sample line chiller, Grab samples of air ejector e1 fluent were catained per TS 3.3.3.11 action statements.
A special report had been issued to the commission to document the PRM-6 inoperability as required by' TS 3.'3. 3.11.
PRM-6 had been restored to service with no further problems
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af ter the sample chiller was repaired.
The inspectors had no further questions in this matter (50-344/90-08-Y0, closed).
The inspectors held discussions with nuclear plant engineering and
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chemistry personnel on the effectiveness of current sampling
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configurations on the auxiliary building duct monitor, PRM-2, and-the
steam jet air ejector monitor, PRM-6.
PRM-6'obtained a representative
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sample from a small diameter line.
However Internal Event Report 88-
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representative manner using a single probe in a large duct.
The licensee
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performed a tracer gas test to measure flow variation across a cross-section of the duct and discovered severe flow variation which, in (
turn, varied with fan aligmilar problem with PRM-1. Internal Event Report 88-119 nments.
September 1988, found a's The licansee did not write a report specific to PRM-2.
However, a licensee report was written for the PRM-1 condition, stating that the discovery of the PRM-1 problem was occasioned by the condition of PRM-2.'
The sampling conditions of PRM-2 were also reported in the 1988 Trojan Annual Report. The licensee's proposed corrective actions were to move the sampling probe further downstream, develop' conservative correction factors based on testing, restrict' flow configurations known to cause
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s severely non-representative sampling conditions and add extensions to the vent collection header and waste gas dischargt header to promote upstream mixing.
Also, the licensee proposed to redesign the PRM-2 sampling probe.
The inspectors noted that redesign of the PRM-2 sampling probe was the only corrective action that would have brought the system in compliance with the licensee's commitment to ANSI N13.1-1969, " Guide for Sampling Airborne Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities."
The inspectors examined the status of corrective actions for PRM-2 and concluded that'the sampling method still did not meet the licensee's commitment to ANSI N13.1-1969. The inspectors granted that the licensee's correction factor might inoeed conservatively measure PRM-2 effluent,.but stated that there was no provision in ANSI N13.1-1969 to use such a factor with single point sampling in a large duct with significant flow variation.
Only verification of uniform flow or~a-multipoint sampling probe would have satisfied the licensee's commitment to ANSI N13.1-1969.
The correction factor had been used for over two years, and the installation of a redesigned sample probe, as discussed in the,1988 Annual Report had not been budgeted or scheduled.
The inspectors and licensee management discussed' corrective actions for-PRM-2 during the inspection and at the exit meeting.
The licensee's staff stated that a written commitment'date for compliance with ANSI N13.1-1969 would be provided to the NRC regionci administrator following theinspection(50-344/90-25-01).
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Air Cleaning Systems.
k The inspectors reviewed contractor, work packages for TS surveillances of
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air cleaning systems.
Surveillances a( 720. hour fan runs, monthly and.18 month frequencies were performed ahead of schedule for.the following i
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systems:
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CB-1:
Control room ventilation?
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AB-4:
Spent fuel pool exhaust. '
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CS-9:
Containment' hydrogen vent.
The inspector reviewed a selected refueling surveillance of the conteinment hydrogen vent filtration system. performed June 12-15, 1990.
The surveillance was performed in accordance with ANSI N510 1375, imsting of Huclear Air-Cleaning Systems, Minor design weaknesses regarding manway design and access to,each-filter element were identified.
during the surveillance.
System performance ~ met the acceptance criteria of the standard and TS.4.6.4.3.
Facility Tours The inspectors conducted tours of the auxiliary building and unrestricted areas near the plant.
The inspectors performed independent radiation measurements using a ion chamber NRC #009154, calibration due 11/13/30, scintillation detector PGE #397, calibration due 11/10/90, and ratemeter with Geiger-Mueller probe PGE_ #2134, calibration due 11/10/90.
The inspectors observed the following:
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o The licensee had maintained good housekeeping in the auxiliary.
building.
o Posting and labeling were consistent with 10 CFR 20.203.
Proper
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dosimetry was worn by individuals in radiologically controlled
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areas.
Themaximumdoserateinthhnortheastunrestrictedarea, o
overlooking the outdoor radioactive waste storage area, was 0.15 mR/hr, within the 2 mR/hr limit.
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The licensee's program ~for' management of gaseous waste continued to
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- exhibit weaknesses in the design, operation and maintenance of effluent monitoring systems.:particularly PRM-1 and?2.
PRM-2 deficiencies'had persisted for-years;after identification,'as interim corrective actions were not thorough enough to meet the licensee's FSAR commitments.
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continuing program strength wasithe low quantity'of gaseous effluent released,sasireflec;tedduringthefirsttwoquartersof1990.1 l
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Exit Meeting (30703)4^
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TheinspectorsmetwithlihenseelmanagementonAugust.24,1990 to discuss
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the scope and findings of the inspection.
The inspectors presented their
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observations regarding:the acceptability of PRM-2 as currently configured and noted that corrective actions for PRM-2 deficier-ies had.not been scheduled despite identification of the problems at long-term corrective action two years before. -The Vice President,. Nuclear and his staff
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stated that they would supply the comm ssion with'a date for completion i
of the planned modification to PRM-2.
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