IR 05000344/1997004
| ML20199F929 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199F906 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-97-04, 50-344-97-4, 72-0017-97-04, 72-17-97-4, NUDOCS 9711250045 | |
| Download: ML20199F929 (9) | |
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.,,o ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMN'ISSION :
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-344:72-17 License No.:
NFP-1 Report No.:
50-344/97-04;72 17/97-04 Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company (PGE)
Facility:
Trojan Nuclear Plant Location:
121 S.W. Salmon Street, TB-17 Portland, Oregon Dates:
September 29 - October 2,1997 Inspectors:
Lee H. Thonus, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved By:
D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief
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Nuclear Materials inspection and Fuel Cycle Decommissioning (
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Trojan Nuclear Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-344/97-04;72-17/97-04 Portland General Electric (PGE) is proceeding with overal decommissioning activities at the Trojan nuclear facility in parallel. Their goalis to move the spent fuel to a 10 CFR Part 72 licensed Indcpendent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) and to complete decommissioning and terminate the 10 CFR part 50 license by calendar year 2001.
To accomplish this goal, Portland General Electric personnel are processing fuel debris in the fuel building to reduce it to a form suitable for storage in the ISFSI. They are also constructing the ISFSI pad and continuing with decontamination and dismantlement activities in the reactor containment and auxiliary buildings. Material which PGE expects can be released for unconditional use is prepared for free release in the demineralizer building. The preparation
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includes any required decontamination and a preliminary survey. The materialis then sent to the turbine building for final free release surveys.
Fuel Debris Processino The licensee processed 15 cans of fuel debris. The fuel debris consisted primarily of fuel
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pellets, fuel pellet fragments, weld dross, and filter material which had been vacuumed out of the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool floor. The cans were placed in 3 capsules which were filled with inert gas and welded closed. The fuel debris processing observed by the inspector was performed in accordance with the licensee's safety analysis and supporting documents (Section 1).
Drv Cask Storaoe Placement of rebar for the transfer station portion of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage
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installation was found to be consistent with the licensee's drawings. Preparations for the concrete pour of the transfer station were nearing completion (Section 2).
antrol of Radioactive Material The license.
interim corrective actions following the discovery of several contaminated
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articles outside of the radiologically controlled area were reasonable but had not been completed. The licensee's evaluation of the extent of the release of contaminated items is still under 'ay. The NRC will continue to review the licensee's actions in this area as an inspection fol!owup item (50-344/97004-01) (Section 3).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status
~ Active decommissior$ing continued at Trojan, with the goal of placing the spent fuelin a 10 CFR Part 72 licensed ISFSl and terminating the Part 50 license by calendar year 2001.
Critical path / priority work included fuel debris processing, ISFSI construction and support activities, and work in support of reactor vessel removal and shipment. Decontamination, dismantlement, packaging and shipment of radioactive waste and re19ase of non-radioactive items continued.
Fuel debris processing had experienced several delays in startup, but once in operation, the processing proceeded efficiently. PGE and their contractors, GTS Duratek had completed the processing of 15 cans of fuel debris and had placed them into three capsules. The capsules were overpacks which could hold as many as five fuel debris cans each. The capsules were filled with helium gas and closed with a seal weld. The seal welds were inspected using dye penetrant and found to be acceptable.
The ISFSI storage pad continues under construction. The cask storage portion had been completed and the steel reinforcement (rebar) for the cask transfer station had been placed.
Two concrete pours remained to complete the facility. Th rebar placement for the cask transfer station was found to be consistent with specifications. Final shimming of the rebar at the outer edge of transfer station portion of the ISFSI pad had not yet been completed.
Fuel Debris Processing (37801,71801)
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1.1 Insoection Scoce The purpose of the fuel debris processing project was to sea fuel debris materialinto canisters that could be stored at the ISFQ. The fuel debris consisted primarily of fuel pellets, fuel pellet fragments, weld dross, and filter media. The activities associated with s,c pmming and sealing of the fuel debris material was observed to verify compliance with the limits and conditions specified in the licensee's safety analysis 1.2 Observations and Findinas The licensee had processed 15 cans of fuel debris which were placed in three capsules.
.The capsules were overpack containers capable of holding five fuel debris cans each.
The fuel debris material consisted primarily of fuel pellets, fuel pellet fragments, weld dross, and filter material which had been vacuumed out of the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool (SFP) floor. The inspector observed several activities associated with the fuel debris processing project. This included the processing of a fuel debris can, transfer of the can to the fuel transfer canal, and the inspection of the seal weld on a capsule using dye penetrant testing.
The fuel debris cans were filled with fuel debris material and heated to 1100 *F to drive off organic material such that the remaining H would result in less than 0.250 moles per
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capsule. This limit precluded the formation of flammable / explosive mixtures in the -
capsule due to radiolytic decomposition of the organic materials that would occur over time. The potential for formation of flammable / explosive mixtures would preclude storage of this material at the ISFSI. The inspector observed the end pcint phase of a fuel debris can being processed by tr.e licensee's contractor GTS Duratek. The H 2 concentration measured at the reformer outlet was less than 200 ppm coincident with a zero reading of CO per the acceptance criteria developed during laboratory and pilot testing. These criteria assured complete to near-complete removal of hydrogen bearing material such that the remaining hydrogen in a capsule containing five process cans would be less than 0.250 moles. The inspector also reviewed the data from the first 10 process cans to verify that the end point criteria had been met for each can.
The fuel debris cans were then placed in capsules wh.ch were filled with inert gas and welded closed. The welds were inspected using dye penetrant testing techniques. The inspector observed the dye penetrant testing of the root pass weld of the third capsule.
The weld was determined to be satisfactory with no voids observed. The root and fill welds of the previous capsules had also been found by the licensee to be acceptable.
The licensee's safety analysis and supporting documents contained limits and precautions to assure that the fuel debris processing project could be conducted safely and produce an acceptable end product for storage. The fuel debris cans and capsule were observed to be processed in accordance with the licensee's safety analysis and suppomy documents.
The inspector observed that the licensee used safe load paths and was within the 5 foot load height restriction while moving the transfer bell to and from the fuel transfer canal.
These load path and height limits had been incorporated into the plant procedures. The licensee also utilized a visual aid to delimit the 5 foot load height restriction.
The inspector reviewed radiation survey data taken from the fuel debris cans, the transfer bell, and the cesium trap and discussed the results of the surveys with radiation protection technicians coverbg the fuel debris processing project. All of the data indicated radiation levels were at least a factor of 10 below PGE's safety analysis limits of 350 rem /hr (3.5 Sv/hr) for the process cans, 50 mrem /hr (0.5 mSv/hr) for the transfer bell, and 50 mrem /hr (0.5 mSv/hr) for the shielded cesium trap.
PGE's safety analysis for the fuel debris processing project stated that emergency actions or procedures would be developed for:
drop of a process can
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drop of transfer bell
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failure of process piping
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equipment drop causing spent fuel pool liner tear
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Emergency actions for these events were developed and incorporated into PGE procedures SEG/TRJ/ PRO-025," Operation of the Steam Reformer System," dated
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August 29,1997, and FHP13, " Fuel Handling Emergency Procedure," dated October 1,1997.
1.3 Conclusion The licensee processed 15 cans of fuel debris. The fuel debris consisted primarily of fuel pellets, fuel pellet fragments, weld dross, and filter material which had been vacuumed out of the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool (SFP) floor. The cans were placed in 3 capsules which were filled with inert gas and welded closed. The fuel debris processing observed by the inspector was performed in accordance with the licensee's safety analysis and supporting documents.
Dry Cask Storage (46053)
2.1 Insoection Scoce The licensee plans to store spent fuel at an onsite independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The facility is under construction at the Trojan site. The NRC is currently reviening PGE's application for issuance of a 10 CFR Part 72 license.
Preoarations for the pouring of concrete for a portion of the storage pad were reviewed by the inspector.
2.3 lospection Findings The licensee had prepared the transfer station portion of the ISFSI pad for the first concrete pour. The rebar had been placed. Shimming of the rebar had not yet been completed on the peripheral side of the pour.
The rebar placement was 10 inches on center as specified in the licensee's drawings and had been performed in a workmanlike manner. Shimming on the peripheral edge, to obtain a 2 inch clearance, had not yet been performed, The interior edges (abutting the remainder of the ISFSI pad) did not require the 2-inch clearance.
2.3 Conclusion Placement of rebar for the transfer station portion of the ISFSI was found to be consistent with the licensee's drawings. Preparations for the concrete pour of the transfer station were nearing completion.
Control of Radioactive Material (92701)
3.1 Insoection Scooq NRC Inspection Report 50-344/97-03 issued September 9,1997, identified a non-cited licensee identified violation and a cited violstion related to the survey and release of potentially contam',nated material. On September 15,1997, PGE radiation protection technicians found a contaminated bucket in an area outside of the licensee's radiation controlled area but within the facilty's fenced area. The hcensee initiated a Corrective
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Action Request (CAR) 97-0024 to investigate and identify corrective actions. The inspector reviewed the status of the licensee's findings and interim corrective actions.
3.2 Observations and Findinos
in April,1997, the licensee informed the NRC that contaminated material had been improperly released from Trojan's radiologically controlled area. Subsequent to that finding, in September,1997, the licensee informed the NRC that additional conteminated material had been found outside the radiologically controlled area, but within the site fenced area. The licensee was in the process of determining the root cause(s) and developing corrective actions to address the problem. The licensee had conducted surveys of storage areas outside the radiologically controlled area and identified several contaminated items, including wrenches, shackles, a lifting cable, a lifting eye, a screwdriver and scaffold tubing. A bucket surveyed was found to have fixed beta-gamma contamination of 200,000 dpm/20 cnf. The licensee's free release limit for fixed contamination was 1,000 dpm/20 cnf. The bucket was being used to transport material to the survey / release facility. The bucket had come from a North American (licensee contractor) tool room. A survey of the ISFSI pad found two scaffold tubes with fixed contamination. Additional site surveys were still underway by the licensee.
Interim actions taken by the licensee included instituting a two man rule at the survey / release facility, stationing a radiation protection technician at the exit from the radiologically controlled area to survey items being removed and to observe personnel exiting, and performing surveys of storage areas which might contain items which had been released from the radiologically controlled area.
The inspector observed the survey and release facility and found that the two man rule was being implemented. The technicians were observed to be thorough and methodical in their surveys. The technicians were using thin window G-M * pancake" type probes with 20 cm area. The technicians were allowed to take breaks when they felt fatigued.
After the technicians released a bin of material, a sample of severalitems was selected by a radiation protection supervisor and resurveyed.
The licensee had also stationed a radiation protection technician at the radiologically controlled area exit to survey hard hats and hand carried items being removed from the radiologically controlled area. Previous practice had allowed the owner of the items to survey his/her own hard hat and hand carried items. The technician also responded to alarms from the automated personnel monitors. Trojan had not completed a determination of the extent to which contaminated materials existed outside the radiologically controlled area, or the extent that radioactive materials may have been transported offsite. Trojan's quality assurance organization had responded aggressively to the discoveries. Their involvement lead to the discovery of the contaminated scaffold tubes at the ISFSI pad. The quality assurance organstion wac planning to have an independent assessment performed by an independent offsite group. The licensee's interim corrective actions appeared reasonable. The NRC will continue to follow the licensee's actions in this area as an inspection follow item (IFI) (50-344/97004-01).
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Cop lusions The licensee's interim corrective actions following the discovery of several contaminated articles outside of the radiologically controlled area were reasonable but had not been -
completed.' The licensee's evaluation of the extent of the release of contaminated items
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Exit Meeting The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at
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the _ inspector were identified as proprietary and are not discussed in the inspection
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ATTACHMENI
. PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Gildow, ISFSI Project
.. T. Meek, Radiation Protection
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D. Nordstrom, Nuclear Oversight H. Pate, Licensing S. Quennoz, Trojan Site Executive
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S. Schnieder, Plant Operations-M. Tursa, ISFSI Engineer
- C. Yundt, Plant Support / Technical Functions GTS Durat4 R. Roberts, Engineer State pf Oregon A; Bless, Resident inspector, Oregon Office of Energy INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37801 Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications at Permanently Shutdown Reactors-46053 Structural Concrete Work Observation 71801-Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors 92701 Follow up ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Openn 50-344/97004-01
!FI Follow corrective actions re: surveys Closed None-Discussed
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LIST OF ACRONYMS-CAR corrective action request cm:
centimeter CFR-Code of Federal Regulations dpm-
~ disintegrations per minute GM-Geiger Mueller ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Installation mrem-milli Roentgen equivalent man
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mSv milli Slevert NRC.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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ppm parts per million PGE Portland General Electric
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