ML20235V451
| ML20235V451 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1987 |
| From: | Decker T, Sartor W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235V282 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-87-20, 50-364-87-20, NUDOCS 8710150168 | |
| Download: ML20235V451 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1987020
Text
km Rfoog UNITED STATES
'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON
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n REGION 18
101 MARIETTA STRE ET, N.W.
g j
- e ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323
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OCT 0 2 B37
Report Nos.: 50-348/87-20 and 50-364/87-20
Licensee: Alabama Power Company
600 North 18th Street
$ Birmingham, AL 35291
Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8
Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: September 8-11, 1987
Inspectors: A' <- A f/##/87
E. D. Testa p Date Signed
% kh hu 9fa?DLf87
W. M. Sartor p Date Signed
-Accompanying Personnel: W. Bradford
T. Stetka
F. Victor
Approved by: s/[ /d 9 A 87
T. R. Decker, Section Chief D6te Signed
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the annual
radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
Results: No violatians or deviations were identified; however, two concerns
were identified addressing the lack of a challenging exercise scenario and the
making of offsite notifications.
8710150168 871002
PDR ADOCK0500g8
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REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons' Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. P. Mcdonald, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Generation
- W. G. Hairston, III, Vice President, Operations
- J. D. Woodard, General Manager, Nuclear
- W. C. Carr, Chemistry and Environmental Supervisor
- L. S. Williams, Training Manager
- W. G. Shipman, Assistant General Manager, Administration
- D. N. Morey, Assistant General Manager, Operations
- J. E. Odom, Unit Supervisor
- R. G. Berryhill, Manager - Systems Performance
- C. D. Nesbitt, Manager Technical
- K. W. McCracken Manager - Technical Support ;
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- L. A. Ward, Manager - Maintenance
- R. B. Wiggins, Operations Training Supervisor
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Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2. Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 11, 1987,
with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above. The inspector
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection
findings. Major emphasis was directed toward the findings identified in
Paragraph 7.. The inspector further discussed these items with licensee
representatives via telephone on September 16, 1987. The licensee did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
the inspectors during this inspection.
3. ExerciseScenario(82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that
provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion
of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and
organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E
to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of
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The scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives in
,
advance of the scheduled exercise date. Scenario problems identified
l during the review were discussed with the licensee, i.e., the finding that
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some areas required additional data to improve exercise control. Both NRC
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L evaluators and licensee controllers noted the need for additional dose
rane information to augment the health physics control of the exercise.
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The scenario provided information to the States, counties, local
government and federal agencies consistent with their participation in the '
exercise.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise. The
inspectors observed neither prompting nor undue interaction between
controllers and players. The scope and objectives of the exercise were
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satisfied.
No violations or devietions were identified, j
4. AssignmentofResponsibility(82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary rs .a.Wiities for
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and that
emergency
ddequate staff response by the to
Was available licensee
respondwere
to anspecifically
emergent 4t@n '. f.t to 3 .
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 J n 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654. ]
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for
the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff
was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response
organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives;
however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or
continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not
requi red. Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review
of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number
of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of
the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspectors also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and
Operations Support Center (OSC). . In accordance with the scope and
objectives of the scenario, activation of the Emergency Operations
Facility (E0F) was accomplished the previous day during an EOF activation
drill . The arrival of Corporate Response Organization personnel was timed
to simulate actual response time.
The scenario developed for this exercise exercised the onsite emergency l
organization.
The scenario developed for this exercise was an uncomplicated reactor
coolant leak in the containment which progressed from a small to large
leak rate. The casualty unit was operating with 1% failed fuel. A leak
path from the containment through a post-accident venting system exhaust
line was postulated to provide protective action decisionmaking and
provide a source term for dose assessment and Radiation Monitoring Teams.
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l- -The exercise began at'7:00 a.m. on September 10, 1987. The E0F and News
l Media Center (NMC) corporate players were pre-staged in a classroom of the
E Training Center and instructed to arrive at the E0F and NMC at 9:30 a.m.
The _E0F and NMC setups were accomplished during a previous day's drill for
.those facilities.
The lack of a challenging scenario made it difficult to assess the
adequacy of the 9mergency organization in responding to a casualty that
was neither time demanding and/or event demanding. However, the scenario
was adequate to address the limited objectives the licensee had
established..
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's-offsite emergency organization was observed to assure that
the following requirements were implemented pursuant to
10CFR50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV. A of ' Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance' promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2)
provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident
response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of '
onsite and offsite support 7 organizational interactions.
The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was
adequately defined and 'that staff was available to fill key functional
positions within the organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency
response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift
personnel. The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency
Coordinator upon inniation of the simulated emergency, and directed the
response until formally relieved by the Assistant Regional Nanager, ,
Operations. Required interactions between the licensee's emergency '
response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate
and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification
and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance
reconnended in IE Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to identify and properly
-classify an emergency, and escalate it to more severe emergency
classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed. Licensee
actions in this area were timely and effective.
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Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was
effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan
and Implementing Procedures. The system was observed to be adequate for
classification of the simulated accident sequences. The emergency
procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during
the simulated ~ emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified. :
7. ' Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for
-notification of State and local response organizations and emergency
personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup
messages to response organizations were established. This area was
further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the
populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to
10CFR50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were
established and available for use in providing information regarding the
simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response- !
organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response
organizations, if required. Notification of the States of Alabama and
Georgia and other designated offsite response organizations was completed.
Timely followup notification messages were made and hard copies
appropriately distributed. It was observed however, that both Central
Daylight Savings Time (CDST) and Central Standard Time (CST) appeared on
the Followup Message / Periodic Update Message Form. The computer generated
time was operating on CST and the drill personnel on CDST.
Inspector Followup Item 50-348/87-20-01, 50-364/87-20-01, Failure to use a )
common time designation on Followup Message / Periodic Update Message Forms. 1
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Inspection disclosed that completion of the initial notification at the l
Alert declaration notification was delayed beyond 15 minutes
(approximately 24 minutes) due to the incorrect contact of the Alabama
Emergency Management Agency instead of the Alabama Bureau of Radiological
Health as required by Procedure FNP-0-EIP-26, "Offsite Notification." At
the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency declaration the licensee
failed to use the Initial Notification Message Form as required by
Procedure FNP-0-EIP-18 " Site Area Emergency," and FNP-0-EIP-19, " General
Emergency."
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Inspector Followup Item 50-348/87-20-02, 50-364/87-20-02, Failure to use !
the Initial Notification Message Fonn for Site Area Emergency and General ]
Emergency declarations as required by FNP-0-EIP-18, " Site Area Emergency," !
and FNP-0-EIP-19, " General Emergency." The licensee identified and the )
inspector observed the failure to complete required offsite notifications, !
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at the Alert declaration, by Procedure FNP-EIP-26, "Offsite Notification," !
within 15 minutes. '
No sioiations or deviations were identified.
8. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and
equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and specific criteria defined in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the
emergency response facilities, and evaluated the equipment provided for
emergency use during the exercise.
a. Control Room - The inspector observed that following review and
analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations
personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to "'e
simulated emergency. Emergency procedures were readily available, ,
routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and j
mitigation exercises.
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Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those
personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective
management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded
. overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for "
orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions. .
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of
their duties, responsibilities, and authorities. Control Room
personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency l
classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures I
to determine and declare the proper emergency classification.
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It was observed that data and information provided as the scenario's j
initial sequence of accident events and conditions were readily
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interpreted by the Control Room staff and factored into commencing ;
the exercise in a timely manner. The Control Room staff demonstrated l
the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and l
implement required mitigating actions. l
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The Control Room notification message associated with the Alert i
Classification is discussed in Paragraph 7 above.
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b. Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed
following notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated
emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification. The
facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties,
authorities, and responsibilities. Required operations at the
facility proceeded in an orderly manner. This facility was provided
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with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff. TSC
security was promptly established. Radiological habitability was
mnnitored during the exercise. Dedicated communicators were assigned
to the TSC and required notifications were implemented. See
Paragraph 7 above.
The TSC staff identified, classified and declared the Site Area and
General Emergency. Notification of State, Federal and local agencies
was readily completed within 15 minutes. Protective action
recommendations to the State were consistent with the EAL matrix and
guidance promulgated in IE Notice 83-28. It was noted that the
Emergency Director failed to maintain a log of facility activities
throughout the exercise.
Inspector Followup Item'50-348/87-20-03, 50-364/87-20-03, Failure to
maintain an Emergency Director log of important activities.
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The Emergency Director moved about the TSC discussing plant data and
information and occasionally went to the Control Room to gather and
evaluate pertinent plant data. During those times he failed to
designate a person to be in charge during his absence.
Inspector Followup Item 50-348/87-20-04, 50-364/87-20-04, Failure to
designate a person in charge when the Emergency Director left the
TSC.
c. Operations Support Center - The OSC was promptly staffed following
activation of the emergency plan by the Emergency Coordinator. An
inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and
dispatched.
d. Emergency Operations Facility -
Consistent with the exercise
objectives, the E0F was staffed and activated following declaration
of the General Emergency. The Emergency Director demonstrated
management and control of the facility. Af ter declaring the E0F
staffed and operational, communications between the E0F and TSC were
maintained. Exchange of technical information and frequent
consultation with the TSC were implemented by the staff.
Dose assessment and projections were performed. The dose assessment
group demonstrated proficiency in both manual and computerized dose
assessment. Close contact between assessment groups in the E0F and
TSC were maintained.
Status boards were strategically located to facilitate viewing by the
E0F staff. Status boards were updated as required to chronicle
changes in plant status, accident assessment and mitigation
throughout the exercise. The inspectors noted that a status board
dedicated to trending of simulated plant systems status and
engineering data was maintained and updated during the accident
sequence.
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The EOF security was established during facility activation and was
maintained throughout the exercise. Inspection disclosed that
security was confined to a single entrance to the facility, while
additional entrance / exits were unattended.
No violations or deviations were identified !
9. 'AccidentAssessment(82301)
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Thin area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and
equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific criteria in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.
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The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of
plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and
offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the
level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.
Radiological effluent data was received in the TSC and E0F.
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No violations or deviations were identified. j
10. ProtectiveResponse(82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective
actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developad and in place,
and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of ,
non-essential were implemented promptly pursuant to
10 CFR 50.47(b) personnel,(10) and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.J of!
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The protective measures decisionmaking process was observed by the
hispectors. Recommendations implemented by the TSC staff were timely.
No violations or deviations were identified. I
11. Radiological Exposure Control (82301) l
This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling
radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented ;
for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines l
consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and j
specific criteria defined in Section II.K of NUREG-0654. !
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An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout I
the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and {
by conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response j
facilities. Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of j
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emergency actions, and adequate protective clothing and respiratory
protection was available and used as appropriate.
Dosimetry was available and appropriately used. High range dosimeters '
were also available in case they were needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine that deficiencies and improvements identified during the
exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for
corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of
Appendi). E to.10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.N
of NUREG-0654.
A formal critique was held on September 11, 1987, with exercise
controllers and observers, licensee management, and NRC representatives.
Findings identified during the exercise and plans for corrective action
were discussed. One licensee identified findings involved the difficulty
associated with obtaining an air iodine sample using silver zeolite I
cartridges. Pumps used to sample air could not obtain the procedure
required sample flow volume. Other different equipment problems
associated with Radiological Monitoring teams have been identified during
previous exercise critiques.
Inspector Followup Item 50-348/87-20-05, 50-364/87-20-05, Failure of j
Radiological Monitoring Team equipment to function as required by
Procedure FNP-0-EIP-4.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent
inspections. The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both
substantive deficiencies and indicated improvement items. The conduct and
content of the critique was consistent with regulatory requirements and
guidance cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. (Closed) Inspector Followup Items (IFI) 50-348/86-26-01, 50-364/86-28-01:
Prompt provision of initial hard copy and subsequent update of States
following declaration of emergency classifications. Inspection verified
that subject initici hard copy and subsequent updates were promptly
provided to states.
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(Closed) Exercise Weakness (EWS) 50-348/86-28-02, 50-364/86-28-02: !
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Failure to include in the initial protective action recommendation
following declaration of the General Emergency the 22.5 sectors
immediately adjacent to the principal zone exposed to the plume,
j Inspection disclosed that the 22.5 sectors immediately adjacent to the
principal zone exposed to the plume were included in the initial
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protective action recommendation ~' following declaration of - the General
Emergency.-
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(Closed): EWS 50-348/86-28-03, 50-364/86-28-03: Failure -~of offsite
- Radiation Monitoring Team No.1 to perform consistent with requirements of
- Procedure FNP-0-EIP-4. . ' Review of selected training records. for -the
Radiation Monitoring Team . indicated that. additional Radiation Monitoring
, Team training covering the'. requirements of Procedure FNP-0-EIP-4 had been
provided to team members.-
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1987 FAIEEY IWCIBR PUWF BummarY EXERCISE
SEFImpant 10, 1987 I
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I. Participating Organizations '
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full Participation: Alabama Power Ccapany, the State of Alabama,
and'Bouston County. )
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Limited * Participation: 'the State of Georgia and Early County.
II. Purpose
A. 'Ib aset the requirements of 10CPR50, Appendix E and
NUREG-0654/FDE-REP-1, Rev.1.
B. 'Id conduct a small-scale exercise that will include the mobili-
zation of Alabama Power Company personnel and adequate resources
to verify the capability of Alabama Power Company to respond to
an accident scenario requiring response.
III. Objectives
A. On-site Objectives (Alabama Power Company)
1. Demonstrate that control room staff can assess the event,
clastify the event, take corrective measures to control the
event and activate emergency response procedures.
2. Demonstrate that plant staff can activate and staff the
T4chnical support Center (TSC) and perform accident response
activities including:
a. Dose Assessment
b. Off-site notification and protective action recommendations
c. Post Accident Sampling Activities
d. Personnel Accountability for all personnel on-site
e. . Radiation Monitoring 'Itan (RPrr) Dispatch and Control
f. Reclassification of emergency status
3. Demonstrate the capability to prepare the caergency operations
Facility (E0r) in a timely fashion for use by the corporate
staff upon arrival.**
4. Demonstrate the capability to turn over EOF functions to the
por staff when the Bor is activated and staffd .
5. Demonstrate the ability to au<pment Eor staff with non-essential
plant personnel.
, 6. Demonsticate the adequacy of the plant's ccumunication system
including: Communication links to Corporate Emergency
Operations Center (EOC); News Media Center (if1C);
communication links to state and local authorities.
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- Communications activities only
- To be tested in a separate drill the day before the exercise. This will
allow pre-stagingVthese activities on the day of the exercise.
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Demonstrate the health physics c:pability to obtain and process
post-accident' liquid samples and'to respond to elevated direct
radiatiortaeasurements in the plant.
B. Off-Site Objectives (Alabama Power Company)
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~1. Demonstrate that-corporate staff can be activated in a timely.
.'. fashion and dispatched to PNP.*-
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2. Demonstrate that Corporate Headquarters Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) staff can provide initial support for:
..a. . EOF activation *
'. b. Logistics
c.
y d. . Support
Briefing oforganization notification
company management
4 e. . News release preparation
3. Demonstrate.that EOF staff can:
a. Assume'the dose assessment' function and
the RMT direction and control function
from the TSC staff.
b .' Assume the logistics, manpower and
engineering function' from the EOC.
c. Prepare and coordinate news releases and
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' activate the Inc.*
4. . Demonstrate that the Public Information Organization can
respond to media and public inquiries, establish'a rumor
control center,'and issue and coordinate news releases.
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C. Off-Site Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ Objectives (State of Alabama
and Houston County):
1. Demonstrate that decisions can be communicated with regard
to protective measures for the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
'2. Demonstrate that adequate communications can be maintnined
between the Houston County EOC and field units.
3. Demonstrate that the State of Alabama can activate emergency
worker assembly points,' dispatch radiation monitoring teams
in a timely manner, provide assessment of a simulated
airborne release and comunicate their assessment to the
Houston County EOC. i
4. Demonstrate that the State of Alabama radiation control staff
can assess the accident and make appropriate recommendations
to the State's decision makers,
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5. Demonstrate'the ability to coordinate a precautionary evacua-
tion ** of a school within the 10 mile EPZ.
To be tested in a separate drill the day before the exercise.. This will
allow pre-staging of these activities on the day of the exercise.
- The evacuation will be terminated just prior to actual transportation of
students.
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$"' 6. Demonstrate the ability to alert river traffic by
coordination with the Alabama Conservation Department.
D.: Joint Objectives (Alabama Power Company, State of Alabama and
.Houstan comty)
1. Demonstrate that all parties can coordinate news releases
and conduct a joint news conference.
2. Demonstrate that adequate technical information can be
exchanged among involved agencies.
IV. Exercise Limits
the exercise will begin prior to 8 A.M. CINST and conclude by 4:00 P.M.
CDST.
Following proper coordination, the alert and notification system will
be activated Dy the State of Alabama.
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SEPTEMBER 10, 1987
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EMERGENCY EXERCISE
SCENARIO
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1987 RADIATION DEEENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO TEONICAL EVENTS
1.0 INITIAL PIMir 00lOITIONS
1.1 Unit I is at 100% power equilibrium conditions, middle core
life, cycle #9, 725'ppn boron.
1.2 Unit II is at 100% power equilibrium conditions, middle core
life, cycle #6, 725 ppm boron.
1.3 Unit I Iros in effect:
-1B charging pump out of service for maintenance (admin. LCO).
-PORV 444B has been declared inoperable and its associated
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block valve has been shut with power removed.
1.4= Unit II LCOs in effect:
-Steam Generator pressure transmitter 476 is inoperable.
-2B Diesel Generator is out of service for maintenance.
1.5 Meterological Conditions:
-Wind speed 3.0 mph 9 150 ft. 2.0 riph @ 35'
-Wind direction from 152' @ 150 ft. 153' @ 35' I
-ot .5* r/165 f t.
1.6 Unit I has a 1% cladding failure.
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2.0 EQUIPMDrf NO SYIMMDI S'DdUS
2.1 Unit I
2.1.1 Waste Gas Compressor 1A out of service. Estimated
, time of repair: 3 days.
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2.1.2 1B charging pump out of service. Estimated time of
l repair: 1 day.
2.1.3 1A Aux Building Exhaust ran out of service.
. Estimated time of repair: 2 days.
2.1.4 SPDS System out of service.
2.2 Unit II
2.2.1 Steam Generator pressure transmitter 476 out of service.
Estimated time of repair: 2 days.
2.2.2 Air Compressor 2A out of service for repair.
2.2.3 Diesel Generator 28 out of service for yearly
maintenance. Estimated time of repair: 10 days.
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3.0 MAINTENANCE ITEMS
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3.1 2A air compressor is out of service due to oil leak.
!, 3.2 IB charging pump is out of service to investigate oil leak.
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Estimated time of repair is one day..
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'3.3 Unit n Steam Generator pressure transmitter 476 has been
spiking low; currently out of service for investigation.
Estimated repair time is 2 days-.
3.4 Repairs are in progress on Waste Gas Compressor lA. Estimated
repair time is 3 days.
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3.5' 2B Diesel Generator yearly maintenance is in progress.
Currently in day 2 of a scheduled 10 day maintenance period.
3.6 1A Aux Building Exhaust ran is out of service to repair
controller switch. Estimated time of repair: 3 days.
3.7 Unit I SPDS system is inoperable and repair time is unknown,
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The exercise begins at approximately 0700 with a Unit I Reactor.
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i Coolant System (RCS) leak that will ramp to 70 gpn over the next !
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hour. We leak will require a plant shutdown in accordance with I
leakage, technical specifications. I
By approximately 0755 'an Alert should be declared due to RCS leakage.
We leakage will remain at 70 gpm until 0845 at which time the
leakage increases to approximately 1200 gpm which causes a reactor
trip and". safety injection. Approximately 15 minutes later, the
leak develops into a massive rupture resulting in approximately
an 8000 gpm leak path.
By approximately 0910 a Site Area Emergency should be declared due
to the major loss of primary coolant.
At 0945 a leak path will develop out of containment through the (,3;r F1
postaccident venting system exhaust line. Radiation monitoring
teams will be dispatched to determine off-site dose and a d, [/I ,
determination of protective action will be made. A re-entry should .j
be organized to isolate the leak path. Trouble shooting and repair L,g
of the leak path will be allowed to progress up until the point Ipp
.
of actual isolation, but for drill purposes, the isolation process
will be stopped just short of isolation. his drill intervention is f)
necessary to ensure the RMTs have sufficient time to acceeplish all
objectives. ,
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After the leak path develops out of containment,'the Emergency-
Director may conservatively declare a General-Emergency based on the
criteria of the. loss ~of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers with
a potential loss of the third.
We exercise will be terminated once the RMTs have tracked the
plume, collected samples of water, soil, vegetation, and air
(radiological monitoring drill), the EOF has been staffed and
is performing EDr activities, and the News Media Center staff
has conducted a press conference.
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