IR 05000498/1987071

Discusses 871230 Enforcement Conference Re Findings of Insp Repts 50-498/87-71 & 50-499/87-71 on 871101-30.Meeting Summary Encl.Meeting Beneficial

ML20148K715
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	01/19/1988
From:	Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Goldberg J HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
References
EA-87-240, NUDOCS 8801280025
Download: ML20148K715 (17)

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In Reply Refer To:

Dockets: 50-498 M !O N 50-499 EA 87-240

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Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: J. H. Goldberg, Group Vice President, Nuclear P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Gentlemen:

This refers to the enforcement conference conducted in the NRC Region IV office on December 30, 1987, with you and other members of your staff and Region IV staff members to discuss findings of'the NRC inspection conducted during the period of November 1-30, 1987, which were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/87-71; 50-499/87-71, dated December 18, 198 The topics covered are described in the enclosed meeting summar It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and provided a better understanding of the concerns identified during the inspectior In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Roo Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be pleased to discuss them with yo

Sincerely, Original Signed By L J. Callan L. J. Callan, Director Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure:

Meeting Suntnary cc:

Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: M. Wisenberg, Manager Nuclear Licensing P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 c,b RIV:DRP/D % C:. RP E0 D:DR k HFBundy:gb stable DAP ers LJCallan

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8801280025 880119 PDR G

ADOCK 05000498 PDR

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Houston Lighting and Power Company 2 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: Gerald E. Vaughn, Vice President Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001

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Central Power & Light Company ATTN: R. L. Range /R. P. Verret P.O. Box 2121 '

Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 City Public Service Board ATTH: R. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, Texas 78296 City of Austin ATTN: M. B. Lee /J.-E. Malaski P.O. Box 1088 Austin, Texas 78767-8814 Texas Radiation Control Program Director

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bec distrib. by RIV:

• DRP *RRI-0PS-R. D. Martin, RA *RRI-CONS '

Section Chief (DRP/D) RPSB-DRSS

• RIV File

• Lisa Shea, RM/ALF *RSTS Operator R. Bachmann, 0GC *H. Bundy ,

• P. Kadambi, NRR Project Manager *R. Taylor

• DRS D. Powers i

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MEETING SUMMARY - DECEMBER 30, 1987 Licensee: Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P).

Facility: South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2 Dockets: 50-498 Operating License: NPF-71 50-499 Construction Permit: CPPR-128 Subject: Enforcement Conference Concerning NRC Inspection Findings (HRC Inspection Report 50-498/87-71; 50-499/87-71) and Related Concerns On December 30, 1987, representatives of HL&P met with NRC Region IV and NRR personnel in the NRC office in Arlington, Texas to discuss the findings documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/87-71; 50-499/87-71, dated December 18, 1987. Other recent events of mutual concern were also discussed. The attendance list and summary of the licensee presentatice are attached. The meeting was held at the request of the NRC, Region I The licensee discussed root causes for selected events, corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence, and results achieved to-dat The NRC staff expressed particular concern regarding the two events discussed below: Plant Entered Mode 4 on October 31, 1987, with High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) System Valves Shut The licensee agreed that this was the most serious of the events selected for discussion. There was no direct safety impact because the reactor core has not been operational and no decay heat was present. Accordingly, the major NRC concern was with regard to the evident weaknesses in the licensee operating practices which allowed this condition to continue for 51 hours5.902778e-4 days <br />0.0142 hours <br />8.43254e-5 weeks <br />1.94055e-5 months <br /> prior to discovery. Many operators, supervisors and managers had opportunities to question the off-normal valve positions during this perio Pressurizer Pressure-Low Trip Septpoint Was Set lass Conservatively than Technical Specification (TS) Requirement on November 24, 1987

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This setpoint error had the effect of rendering all four. channels of the safety injection actuation system inoperable. The staff questioned the efficiency of the licensee's procedure review and approval process in allowing the incorrect setpoint to be inserted in the procedure. This setpoint had been changed as result of engineering analysis by the vendor and HL&P had requested the TS change as a result of this analysis. NRC Inspection Report 50-498/87-27 discussed this change as a followup to HL&P Incident Review Committee Item 333. Also NRC Inspection Report 50-498/

87-39, Open Item 498/8739-10, identified specific TS setpoint errors for annunciators and suggested further verification of instrument setpoint Despite these references and subsequent TS audits performed by the licensee, the setpoint error was not corrected prior to entry into Mode Another concern the NRC staff had was the fact that HL&P in Licensee Event Report (LER)87-017, dated December 21, 1987, failed to recognize the ;

change to Mode 3 with incorrect setpoints as a TS violation. This point was clarified in the meetin . _ ___ __ _ _ ___

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The NRC staff explained to licensee representatives the enforcement polic The licensee was commended for his candor in reporting and discussing the above described event Attachments:

A. Enforcement Conference Attendance Outline of HL&P's Presentation

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Attachment A Enforcement Conference Attendance December 30, 1987 Name Title Organization J. H. Goldberg Group VP Nuclear HL&P G. E. Vaughn VP Nuclear Operations ' 'HL&P W. H. Kinsey Plant Manager, STP HL&P-M. Wisenburg Manager, Engineering & Licensing HL&P M. A. McBurnett Manager, Operations Support HL&P Licensing L. Joe Callan Director, Division of Reactor NRC, RIV Projects J. L. Milhoan Director, Division of Reactor NRC, RIV Safety A. Bill Beach Deputy Director, Division or NRC, RIV Reactor Projects H. L. Scott Enforcement Staff NRC, RIV G. L. Constable Chief, Reactor Projects Section D NRC, RIV-D. M. Hunnicutt Chief, Test Programs Section NRC, RIV M. T. Hardt Director, Nuclear Division City Public Service San Antonio D. R. Carpenter Senior Inspector-STP NRC, RIV H. F. Bundy Project Engineer NRC, RIV N. P. Kadan61 Project Manager NRC, NRR J. 1. Tapia ProjectEngineer(SectionA) NRC, RIV

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PROJECT

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NRC ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ,

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i i i ARLINGTON, TEXAS i

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DECEMBER 30,1987 i i

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AGENDA

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e Introduction - J. H. Goldberg e Technical Specification - W. H. Kinsey Violations e Management initiatives - W. H. Kinsey e Questions / Answers

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EVENT e Plant entered Mode 4 on 10-31-87 with HHSI system valves isolate * Discovered during shift tumover on 11-02-8 e immediately opened Train "B" and "C" valve ROOT CAUSE e Poorly planned evolution. Operations Management in effort to verify plant lineup did not understand procedural relationships and operator performing evolution did not understand "big picture."

CORRECTIVE ACTION e Remedial training for operators and management on compliance with procedures, selection of procedures, proper planning and attention to detai * Revise specific involved procedures and review others for similar weaknes O Enhance shift tumover information on status of Safety Related equipmen e Simulator training with emphasis on mode changes and accompanying requirements.

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EVENT e Plant staff discovered that Reactor Containment Building (RCB)

Atmosphere monitor 1-131 channel was not tested in accordance with

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technical specifications on 09-18-8 e Grab sampling of RCB initiated and the channel tested within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ROOT CAUSE e Process for review of last minute technical specification changes and incorporation of technical specifications into surveillance procedures was not ngorous. Management relied on responsible individuals to perform last minute changes without verification.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

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e Review technical specification surveillances and LCO numbers, with exception of ESF and RTS setpoints, against surveillances.

i e implementation of future technical specification changes will be performed using a detailed process that incorporates independent verification.

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EVENT e Plant staff discovered Pressurizer Pressure-Low Trip Setpoint was set less conservatively than technical specification requirement on 11-24-8 * Plant conditions required for function never achieve e Instruments recalibrated within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ROOT CAUSE '

e Process for review of last minute technical specification changes and incorporation of technical specifications into surveillance procedures  !

was not ngorous. Management relied on responsible individuals to perform last minute changes without verificatio CORRECr1VE ACTION e Review Engineered Safety Features and Reactor Trip System setpoints against surveillance procedures to ensure no other items were misse e implementation of future technical specification changes will be ,

performed using a detailed process that incorporates independent verificatio <

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EVENT e Plant staff discovered that the slave relay contact for train "A" containment spray actuation was not tested on 11-24-8 * Performed test within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ROOT CAUSE e Superficial review of procedure field change and absence of written interpretation of technical specification requirement CORRECTIVE ACTION e Reviewed trains "B" and "C" to ensure identical error was not mad e Remedial training for I&C Division Supervision on independent verification of procedure changes and on attention to detai _ _ _ _ ________ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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EVENT e Plant staff discovered the 4160 degraded voltage and the degraded voltage coincident with safety injections contacts were not tested on 12-12-8 * Performed tests within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ROOT CAUSE e Technical preparation and independent review were not rigorou Absence of written interpretation of technical specification requirements.

l CORRECTIVE ACTION e Established station policy on relay testin * Performed two independent reviews of al! I&C and electrical surveillance tests for compliance with technical specification _- ___ _ - - _ - _ - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - -

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EVENT e Plant staff discovered both toxic gas monitors out of service on 12-06-8 * Placed control room in recirculation mode and restored monitors to servic ROOT CAUSE e insufficient supervision and training of reactor operator student conducting routine log reading C_ORRECnVE ACTION e Conduct Plant Operations and Chemical Operations staffs crew briefings, stressing importance of conducting thorough indoctrination /tmining for students. Reemphasize responsibility for student action * Reprogram toxic gas monitors such that operators are only required to read computer printouts to perform channel operation check e Review and revise OJT training program for operator round * Review and revise operator logs for channel check recording requirement * Complete technical specification equipment "positive statusing" review.

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EVEXT e NRC Resident insp'ector informed Plant Manager that, contrary to commitment, "A train Auxiliary Feedwater cross-connect volve was not tagged closed when plant entered mode ROOT CAUSE e Insufficient written guidance and training provided to shift personnel on implementation of "Night Order" assignments.

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. e Revise "Night Order" administrative procedure and train shift

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EVENT e Two fire protection dampers were found to be blocked open with electrical tie wraps and wire. These dampers were designed to be held open with fusible link * Fire watches immediately established in affected area ROOT CAUSE o Uakown. Quality assurance records indicate adequate installatio No evidence can be found of maintenance or in situ testing on the affected dampers following installatio CORRECTIVE ACTION e One damper has been restored to full service. Other damper is still inoperative awaiting replacement parts.

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't MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES O PLANNED e Executive management briefings with all supervision and management

• Additional review of recent plant startup events e increase emphasis on use of simulator for normal evolution training

• Peer involvement on personnel error investigations

e Root cause determination training for representative Department personnel e Continued high level management involvement in Station Operation

/ Plan of Day Meetings

/ Station Problem Reports

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