IR 05000498/1987019

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Insp Repts 50-498/87-19 & 50-499/87-14 on 870327-0508. Violations Noted:Exams Revealed That Coatings Placed on Machined Surfaces of Pipe Supports FC-1009-RR02 & FC-1009-R001,contrary to Project Specs
ML20215E398
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 06/12/1987
From: Constable G, Garrison D, Clay Johnson, Renee Taylor
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215E354 List:
References
50-498-87-19, 50-499-87-14, IEIN-79-01, IEIN-79-03, IEIN-79-07, IEIN-79-09, IEIN-79-1, IEIN-79-3, IEIN-79-33, IEIN-79-37, IEIN-79-7, IEIN-79-9, IEIN-80-14, IEIN-84-84, NUDOCS 8706190357
Download: ML20215E398 (12)


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x, APPENDIX B

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGt!LATORY COMMISSION ~

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/87-19 Construction Permits: CPPR128 50-499/87-19 CPPR-129

. Dockets: 50-498 and 50-499 Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) '

P. O. Box 1700 Houston,' Texas. 77001

facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)

Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: March 27 through May 8, 1987 w

Inspectors: - d2 O '

nior Resident Inspector, Project D#te '

Section C, Reactor Projects Branch M l2-

. L. u rr1 son, Resid nt Inspector, Project Date ' 6 ~)

Section C, nr P D ets Branch

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R. G. Taylor, Project Inspector, Project Da'te Section C, Reactor Projects Branch

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s Approved: . . ._ < /-

Ch-T. ConstabletThief, Project Section C

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Date

//7 Reactor Projects Branch  ;

l 8706190357 PDR ADOCK hhoPDR98 G

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l Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted March 27 through May 8, 1987 (Report 50-498/87-19 50-499/87-19)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including site tours; l licensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee action on previously reported items; licensee action on IE Notices; followup on Part 21 reports; safety-related piping; safety-related heating, ventilating, and air ;

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conditioning (HVAC) systems; and post-tensioning system Results: Within the eight areas inspected, one violation, with three examples, !

was identifie !

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DETAIL , ~_ Persons Contacted-PrincipalLi_censeeEmppy_ees'

~*J. T. Westermeier, General Mi. niger

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  • J. E. Geiger, General Nanager, Nuclear Assurance
  • T. J. Jordon, Project.QA Manager
  • M.'A. McBurnett,~ Manager, Support Licensing
  • D. C. King, Construction Manage .
  • L. Guthrie, Manager, SAFETEAM i
  • D. W.-Bohner, Operations QA Superviso ' *T. M. Sobey, Pla.nt Completion
  • S..M. Scott, Lead Engineer, Project Compliance
  • W. P. Evans, Project Compliance Enginee BechtelPowerCorporation(Bechtel)
  • D. L. Long, Construction Manager-
  • R. W. Miller, Deputy Project QA Manager
  • R. H. Medina, QA Supervisor Ebasco Service _Inc. (Ebasco)
  • A. M. Cutrona, Quality Project Site Manager
  • R. E. Powe, QA Supervisor In addition to the above, the NRC inspector also held discussions with other members of the HL&P, Bechtel, Prescon,~and Ebasco staff * Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on May 8, 198 . Site Tour i

The NRC resident inspectors made routine site tours in order to observe -!

ongoing work activities and the condition of installed safety-related 1 equipment, and plant status. The Unit 2 reactor vessel upber and lower i internals were observed being lowered into the vessel by tie NRC

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inspectors. The following areas for both units were inspected: fuel handling building (FHB), mechanical and electrical auxiliary building (MEAB),dieselgeneratorbuilding(DGB),andreactorcontainment building (RCB).

Within the areas inspected,.no violations or deviations were identified.

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4 . Licensee Action on_ Prev _ iou _s;Inspe_ction Findings (Closed) Violation _(498/8612-02;499/8612-02: EA86-10_, Item _1. _

This violation related to a finding that approximately 15 percent of the fillet welds for socket type connections of 2-inch schedule 160 pipe were undersize even though final quality control inspections had been performed. -It initially appeared that the problem did not_ extend to other sizes or schedules of socket welds. The licensee subsequently established by a sampling inspection that the init'ial indication was correct. During subsequent investigation as to.cause, the licensee concluded that the quality control' inspectors were not properly considering the effect.of weld face concavity on the measured weld _ leg size. The NRC inspector would note that concavity-of fillet welds tends to'become a greater problem as weld-size increases. The 3/8-inch fillet weld associated with the 2-inch schedule 160 pipe socket weld is the largest commonly used in piping systems. The nonconforming welds were corrected by adding weld metal.or accepted "use-as-is" based on the smaller weld sizes allowed by

- American Society _ of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N-316. A craft and quality control (QC) inspector training program was, initiated and completed shortly after the' initial finding was discovered. Special-fillet weld gauges were also procured to ease the inspectors task and to-avoid confusion. The NRC inspector had no further questions and this item is considerei close (Closed) Violation (498/8_612-_16;_498/8612_-16_: _EA86-10, Item'II.B)

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Thisiteminvolvedafinding)thatthelicenseehadfailedtoissue nonconformance reports (NCRs and apply procedurally required. hold tags in a timely manner in regard to some deficient conditions observed by an NRC inspector and Westinghouse personnel involving the Unit I reactor pressurizer. SSP-8 was revised to require Westinghouse personnel to initiate NCRs as well as any appropriate internal documentation when -

deficient conditions are identified affecting Westinghouse _ furnished equipment. The licensee also made administrative changes to expedite a) plication of hold tags. The NRC resident inspectors have verified that tie entire process is now functioning properly. The NRC inspector had no further questions and this item is considered close (Closed) Vio_lation (498/8612_-14j 499/8612-14: EA86-1L Item I.C_._4)

This-item related to a finding that two fan motors had not been supplied with wire terminal lugs and one pump motor was supplied with Class B

.. insulation versus the Class H required. NCRs BE-03335 and BE-03334 document the. installation of the lugs and installation of heat shrink tubing to fix frayed insulation. Bechtel engineering established that there were no other cases where the upgrading of Specification ES1040 was not complied with by a vendor. For further information on this item refer to NRC Inspection Report 50-498/86-12; 50-499/86-12 under the Caption PEA 3.b (1.b-Miscellaneous). This item is considered close !

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(Closed) Violation-(498/8612-11; 499/8612-11: EA86-10; Item I.C.1)

This item involved a finding that a vendor had supplied faulty extenders and insulating barriers ~ attached to molded case circuit breakers furnished-

'as part of Class IE motor control centers. This item is closed on the basisoftheclosureofIncidentReviewCommittee(IRC) Item 300inNRC Inspection Report 50-498/86-38; 50-499/86-38. IRC Item'300 was a 50.55(e)

report which resulted from the NRC inspection finding. The NRC inspector would note that subsequent to the review of IRC in December 1986, the licensee discovered six breakers with the extenders installed in Unit 2 motor control centers'not previously identified. - 'It appears that these breakers were installed late in 1986 or early 1987 as the result of a configuration control package modification utilizing breakers received

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from the vendor in early 1985 and stored in a warehouse until the modification was implemented. This belated discovery brought to question the effectiveness of the licensee corrective action program. The licensee reported the discovery of the additional breakers and the larger generic issue re 50.55(e)garding the corrective item identified action as IRC Item 356. program The NRC breakdown to.the will review IRC 356NRC as a when the licensee finishes his activities on the item and furnishes a final report regarding the matter. Not withstanding the' problem reported in IRC 356, the NRC inspector is satisfied that the licensee has taken-adequate corrective action in regard-to the violation identified above and the item is therefore considered close (Closed) Violation (498/8612-01; 498/8612-01: EA86-10, Item I.A.1)

This item involved a finding that the instrumentation installation program was weak and that both craft and QC personnel were poorly trained based upon identified discrepancies involv.ing 8 of the then installed and accepted 26 instruments. Records indicated that all 26 instruments had been accepted by one QC inspector. The entire 26 were reinspected with deficiencies identified in each installation. Based on this-data, the licensee caused all of the work of the inspector involved to be reinspected. Via a records management computer search, 1,063 individual inspection activities were identified and reinspected as necessary. Early in 1986, the procedures governing instrumentation installations was substantially revised and both craft and quality personnel were provided training in the application of the procedures. In addition, the licensee implemented a program to hold craft supervision directly responsible for the work of their subordinate personnel. The licensee also instituted a supervisory overview of the performances of the QC personnel. Based on 4 NRC inspection in this activity area since the above actions were taken, it appears that instrumentation installation area has functioned properly.

L (See NRC Inspection _ Reports 50-498/86-27 and 50-498/86-36). The NRC i inspector has no further questions and this item is considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (498/8612-18; 499/8612-18)

This item related to a concern that the design interface activities between the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) supplier and the architect

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engineer.(A/E)werenotbein$effedtivelyauditedwhichmayhave contributed to design h ntro problems identified in NRC Enforcement 4

' Action 86-10. This issue was partially reviewed and documented in NRC'

Inspection Report 50-498/86-12; 50-499/86-12. During an inspection-documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/86-32; 50-499/86-32 an NRC inspector examined several audit reports related to design interface activities. This inspection has established-that design. interfaces have been subjected to' effective auditing by the licensee. The above identifiedunresolveditem(498/8612-18;499/8612-18)-isconsideredclose (Closed) Unresolved Item (498/8136-02; 499/8136-02) ,

. This item related to a concern that quality assurance (QA) records control was transferred to Be::htel .from Brown & Root during the transition of STP engineer / constructor responsibility and whether Bechtel's perforece would be satisfactory. .NRC inspections during the past six years have established the STP records management system functions satisfactorily and this item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (498/8623-01)

This item concerned a welder identified on the hardware but not' documented on the American Welding Society (AWS) welding checklist. This was considered an open item because the licensee had previously identified a '

similar deficiency which was documented onsite Deficiency Report (SDR)

No. H-338R. Since that time, the licensee has accessed the problem and has determined by inspections that there are no hardware deficiencies, but rather a documentation problem. The licensee has made enhancements to their program since that time. They have performed surveillances after the-implementation of the new program and have found no deficiencies in the documentation. Review of this program by the NRC inspector indicates that the concern has been properly addressed. This item is considered close . LicenseeActiononPreviouslyReportedItems(10CFR50.55el The NRC inspector reviewed the following deficiency evalut. tion I reports (DER) and/or IRC and determined that no further 'uction is necessar I (Closed)IRC323 IRC Item 323 resulted from an audit finding in April 1986 that safety-related electrical cables instMled in vertical conduit runs were j not supported in accordance with specification requirements. The lack of i support could have caused failure of a cable at sometime in the 40-year design life of the plan Invescigation established that neither the I

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craft nor QC inspectors understood the guidance criteria of the'

specification as implemented by Procedure SSP-27, " Installation of Electrical Cable," Revision 1. Training was provided to both craft and QC personnel and a reinspection program was implemented to identify all cases where such supports were needed but not installed. The reinspection established 144 individual-installations as being subject to the criteri Of the-144, 82 were dispositioned by engineering to "use-as-is" based on a case basis evaluation of the physical configuration of a' conduit run. The :

balance of 62 installations were reworked as directed by engineering provided in dispositions to NCRs. The'NRC inspector.had'no further questions and IRC Item 323 is considered close (Closed) IRL 211 Closed _NRC Information Notice (IEN) 84-84 through Revision 1 Closed Westinghouse Part 21 report dated September 14, 1984 Closed Westinghouse' Part 21 report dated September 26, 1984 All of the above items relate to two 3roblems with. Westinghouse furnished 7.5Kva vital AC system inverters whic1 contain General Electric Company

' manufactured ferro-resonant transformers. In case one (Westinghouse report dated September 14,1984), the reported problem was improper wire terminals. Incasetwo(WestinghouseletterdatedSeptember 26,1984),

the problem was an' improperly secured transformer core that vibrated !

sufficiently to cause failure of winding insulation. In both cases, should the deficiency occur, the inverter output voltage dropped by about 50 percent resulting in failure of a safety-related instrumentation channel. In both instances the licensee has taken the corrective measures recommended by Westinghouse and IEN 84-84. The NRC inspector had no further questions and all of the above items are considered closed. Licensee Action on IE Notices (IEN)

Licensee action on IENs has been reviewed by the NRC inspectors and found satisfactory and are listed below:

80-14 Safety Suggestions From Employees 79-09 Spill of Radioactively Contaminated Resins 79-37 Cracking in Low Pressure Turbine Discs 79-33 Improper Closure of Primary Containment Equipment Access Hatches 79-07 Rupture of Radwaste Tanks 79-03 Limitorque Valve Geared Limit Switch Lubricant 79-01 Bergen Paterson Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arresters

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, Followup on'10 CFR Par _t'21 Reports

<The following Part 21 reports are considered closed on the basis that the licensee ~has established that none of the-involved components have been u_tilized tin' safety-related systems at ST ~NRC Log N ,R_eporting Vendo'r Letter Date-P'1-87-10-'

2 Validyne Engineering Corporation October 16, 1986 P21-87-03 The Foxboro Company June.4,,1986 P21-86-13 The Foxboro Company October 7, 1986 4 P21-87-11! General Electric Company November 14, 1986

-- Safety-Related_ Pipjng _(U_ nit _ _1_)

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a '. :0bservation The NRC inspectors examined approximately 125 linear feet of pipe run of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup-(FC) system. The NRC inspectorsexaminedfieldwelds(FW),piperundimensions, orientation'and configuration in accordance with construction /

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installation drawings and procedures, welder qualification, incorporation of field change request (FCR) and identification and i control.of material. By direct observation, and independent ~

evaluation of work performance, work in progress'and completed work,

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the NRC inspectors have determined that activities relative to-

. safety-related piping outside the reactor pressure coolant boundary are being accomplished in accordance with NRC requirements, Safety Analysis Report (SAR) commitments and licensee procedures. The-system number and spool piece identification are listed below:

. FC-1011-C . FC-1101-E

.- FC-1011-D- . FC-1101-G

. FC-1012-A thru H . FC-1101-F No violations or deviations were identifie ~

i Records Review l The NRC_ inspector reviewed records of field welds made on the system observed above and also qualification of welders who performed the welds. Review of the licensee's record system for preparing, reviewing and maintaining records appear to be functioning properl Records reviewed reflect _ work accomplishments consistent with licensee requirements and SAR commitments. Records were properly i

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identified, and stored, and could be retrieved in a reasonable tim Records reviewed are listed below:

. FC1012 FW0002 . FC1012 FW0003 FC1012 FW000 . FC1011 FW0001 ;

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. FC1011 FW0002 . FC1011 FW0003 No violations or deviations were identifie . Safety-Related pipe Supports And Restraints Systems l

As-Built Configuration The NRC inspector selected eight as-built / final design pipe supports structural drawings and compared these with the actual support installation. All supports examined were installed within tolerances as required and all FCRs were incorporated as require Records of these supports were easily retrievable and contained I appropriate documentation as required by procedures. There was a deficiency identified on Supports FC-1009-RR02 and FC-9009-RR01. This . !

deficiency concerned protective coatings on machine surfaces of support Examination of these two supports indicated that protective coatings had been applied to the machined surfaces. Discussion with the licensee prior to the inspection indicated that protective coatings should not be applied to any machined surfaces of a suppor Even though the protective coatings is considered nonsafety in the FHB, ,

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this deficiency was identified on ASME Class 3 supports. The licensee also identified coatings applied to machine surfaces of lubrite plate assemblie Review of Specifications 3C080AS1001 for coatings inside the RCB and 7A810AS1000 for coatings outside the RCB state that machined surfaces shall not be coated. Contrary to this reauirement, pipe supports identified above have protective coating on machine surfaces, a violation ;

of project specifications. This is a ' violatio (498/8719-01)

Supports examined are listed below:

. FC-9009-RR-0001 . FC-1013-HL-5001

. FC-1012-HL-5001 . FC-1012-HL-5002

. FC-1012-HL-5003 . FC-1011-HL-5001

. FC-1009-RR-0002 . FC-1009-HL-5001

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9. Safety-Related Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems (Unit 2) Observation The NRC inspectors selected two HVAC systems inside containment for examination. One system was safety-related including supports, and the other system was nonsafety; however, the supports were Class 7 (II/I). The NRC inspector examined the HVAC systems for the following attributes: proper orientation and configuration, size of duct, correct material, proper bolting and bolting material, welding, proper location of dampers, and overall conformance to design drawings and procedure It was determined through direct observation and evaluation of work, that the overall installation of safety-relateo HVAC systems were in compliance with licensee commitments and codes. However, there were deficiencies identified on each system as described below:

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. 5/8 inch Hilti Bolt for Support No. 2-1-0087-S002 did not meet minimum edge distance as required by SSP-14, Table (Safety Class 3)

. Support Nos. 2-1-0096-S009, 2-1-0096-5011, and 2-1-0096-S013 k '

violated the installation cut sheet where a minimum 1 1/2 inch overlap was specified. Measurement indicated 1- to 1 1/4-inch, L which was less than the minimum 1 1/2 inch specified. (Class 7) j j

The deficiencies noted above will be considered as additional examples of the preceeding violation. (499/8719-01;499/8719-02) Records The NRC inspectors reviewed records of the HVAC systems inspected, and qualifications of five welders performing work on the HVAC systems. Records were legible and easily retrievable. Welders records reviewed indicated that the welders were qualified during the time frame that the welds were made. Records reviewed are listed I below by syste l Reactor Cubicle Exhaust System Drawing N Supports Duct Section SV14-2V-0087-A-ID 2-1-0087-S002 Section 021 through 031 !

2-1-0087-S003 l 2-1-0087-S004 l 2-1-0087-S005 2-1-0087-S007 l

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Reactor Cavity Support Vent System Drawing N Supports Duct Sections 5V14-2V-0096-A-ID 2-1-0096-S008 'Section 015 through 035 2-1-0096-S011 2-1-0096-S012:

2-1-0096-S013 2-1-0096-S014 2-1-0096-S015 2-1-0096-S016 4 2-1-0096-S017 FCR Welders ID FCR EH-00058- . SNR . S0T

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. SJP l No additional violations or deviations were identifie . Containment (Post-Tensioning) Installation (Unit 2)

An inspection of the work activities and review of records was performed in order to assess the on going work of the post-tensioning contractor (Prescon). Work Observation Nine tendons were inspected'in the laydown area, each was protected with covers, tagged supported off the ground, and secure.. Tendon cover cans were also inspected for dunnage and storage. Two additional were inspected during the off loading. These were properly rigged with fabric covered slings at three points and were staged on dunnage that was plastic covered. The tendons were then covered and tied down to protect the tendon grease coating. One tendon was observed during rigging and hoisting into the tendon gallery. This operation was performed in accordance with procedure Tendons inspected during this period were 2V-116, -122, -124, -126,

-128, -130, -135, -136, and -14 Records Therecordsassociatedwithfivetendons(2V-122,-124,-126,-128, and -130) were reviewed for completeness, accuracy, and compliance i to procedures. The records reviewed were the fabrication process l records, mill test reports for wire and stressing washers, and related documentatio No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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11. Exit Interview The NRC inspectors niet with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on Nay 8,1987, and sunciarized the scope and findings- of the inspection, i

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