ML20236J759

Insp Repts 50-348/87-14 & 50-364/87-14 on 870611-0710. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Enforcement Matters,Monthly Surveillance Observation,Monthly Maint Observation & Operational Safety Verification

ML20236J759
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	07/28/1987
From:	Bradford W, Dance H, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236J749	List: ML20236J746 ML20236J756 ML20236J759
References
50-348-87-14, 50-364-87-14, NUDOCS 8708060273
Download: ML20236J759 (6)

See also: IR 05000348/1987014

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UWl?ED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

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Report No.: 50 348/87-14 and 50-364/87-14

Licensee: Alabama Power Company

600 North 18th Street

Birmingham, AL 35291-0400

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License No.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: June 11 - July 10, 1987 l

Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama

Inspectors.!#

W. H. Bradford

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Date Signed

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Approved by: b $t o

H. C. Dance, 'Section Chief

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Ddte Signed

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Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, onsite inspection entailed: previous enforcement

matters, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, and

operational safety verification.

Results: One violation was identified: inspection and acceptance testing had

not been performed on control room fire dampers.

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B70B060273 970730

PDR AbOCK 05000348

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Licensee Empicyees Contacted:

J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager i

D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant. Manager

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W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager

R. D. Hill, Operations Manager

C. D.'Nesbitt, Technical Manager

R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager

L. A. Ward, Maintenance. Manager

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L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager

B. Moore, Operations Supervisor-

J. E. Odom, Operations Unit Supervisor

B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor-

T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor

J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor

L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor.

R. H. Marlow,-Technical Supervisor

L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager

J. K. 0sterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review

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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations

personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and

office personnel.

2. Exit Interview-

The- inspection scope and findings were summarized during management

interviews throughout the report period and on July 9,1987, with the

general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection

findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the

inspection findings identified in Paragraph 7. The licensee did not'

identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this

inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) i

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(Closed) Violation (348/86-29-02) Residual heat removal system loop

suction valves automatic isolation feature defeated by electrical jumpers.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action outlined in

correspondence dated April 23, 1987. The licensee's corrective action has

been reviewed and is considered acceptable, j

(Closed) Violation (348, 364/87-02-01) Failure to follow an approved

procedure concerning diesel generator lube oil strainers identification

numbers. The inspectors have verified the licensee corrective action in a  !

review of the appropriate procedures. The corrective action is considered i

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acceptable.

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(Closed) Violation (348, 364/86-29-01) Failure to follow approved

procedures concerning Quality Control Measures which requires that the

first line supervisor exercise primary responsibility for controlling the

quality of work within his areas of responsibility. The licensee's-

corrective action is considered to be acceptable.

4. Unresolved Item *

See paragraph 7.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed and reviewed technical specification required

surveillance testing and' verified that testing was performed in accordance

with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that

limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria

and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the

test; that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly j

reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that '

personnel conducting the tests were. qualified. The inspector witnessed /

reviewed portions of the following test activities:

STP-80.10 - Diesel Generator 2C 1000 KW Load Rejection Test.

STP-17.0 -

Containment Cooling System Train A (B) Operability Test.

STP-1.0 -

Operations Daily Shift Surveillance Requirements.

STP-71.0 -

Main Control Room Remote Valve Verification.

STP-11.8 - RHR System Check Valves Inservice Test.

STP-16.9' -

Containment Spray Pump Monthly Inservice Test.

STP-9.0 - RCS Leakage Test.

FNP-0-PMP-

1087 - Test For Isolation of Fire Dampers In The Control Room

Air Conditioning System.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components

were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance

with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards,

and were in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during the review: limiting conditions for

operations were met while components or systems were removed from service;

approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were

accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable;

functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning

components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained;

• An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were

properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention

controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status

of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related

equipment maintenance which may affect system performance. The following

maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Unit 1 FCV-3227A repair

1A Inverter repair

Unit 1 Containment Building tendon surveillance & inspection

1C Diesel Generator PMs

Fire Damper inspection and maintenance j

Service Water battery racks repair

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No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report

period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency

systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of

affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building,

turbine building and service water. structure were conducted to observe

plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive

vibrations. The ' inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting

Conditions for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance ,

tests. The verifications were accomplished by direct observation of l

monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible  !

hydraulic snubbers, and review of. completed logs, records, and chemistry l

results. The licensee's compliance with LCO action statemants were i

reviewed as events occurred.

The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee

management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor,

shift foremen and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions

provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing

activities in progress, as well as discussions of significant problems.

The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force

members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the

facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the

organization of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of

gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were

proper; and procedures were followed. l

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On June 18, 1987, during the performance of STP 80.10 " Diesel Generator 2C i

1000 KW Load Rejection Test", the licensee found an electrical problem in

which 2C diesel generator would not have non-essential engine protection

(NEEP) when aligned to 2B battery. The licensee has found a wiring error

in termination cabinet 38B on 1TB1-3. The non-essential engine protection

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is bypassed during emergency starting of the diesel generator. Therefore,  ;

from an emergency start situation the diesel generator was not affected. 4

This item is unresolved pending further investigation (348; 364/87-14-02).

On June 9,1987 at approximately 10:30 a.m., the licensee attempted to

perform FNP-0-PMP-1087 " Test for Isolation of Fire Dampers in the Control

Room Air Conditioning System." The NRC resident inspector was present to 4

observe the test. The test could not be performed because both trains "A"

and "B" were found to be electrically inoperable. (See Unresolved Item

348-364/87-13-02). Each damper is composed of four sections with each

section operating independently of the other three sections. An

investigation of the electrical components of the fire dampers was

initiated by the licensee with the following results:

a. Links were found open in terminal box A1TB015 on train "A" and also

in terminal box B1T019 on train "B".

b. Additional links were found open in field wired terminal boxes '

located at each fire damper.

c. The terminal box for damper XV2782AD was improperly wired in that

there were two jumper wires installed.

d. The SRD's (explosive release device) electrical wiring in each damper

were not connected.

e. One damper did not have the SRD's installed.

The licensee rectified the wiring, closed the links and verified the

installation in accordance with the drawing.

FNP-0-PMP-1087 was performed again on June 11, 1987 on train "A" dampers.

The test was unsatisfactory due to mechanical binding of the dampers and a

electrical problem. Inspection indicated that wiring supplied with SRDs

had separated from the SRD and shorted against the metal damper / duct work.

The licensee cleaned, lubricated and exercised the train "A" dampers. The

dampers were then mechanically actuated. The damper would not fully close

and latch with air flow in the duct. The dampers were actuated without air

flow in the duct and this time performed as intended. Testing on train

"B" dampers indicated similar results.

The original fire dampers, located in the horizontal duct work, were

installed during plant construction. The firestats and SRD circuits were

tested satisfactorily by startup test procedure 400-3-444. The fire

dampers are designed to operate by melting of thermal links or by

anticipatory electrical signals from firestats and SRD's. The firestats

are designed to operate at lower temperature. The Fire Protection

Re-evaluation program required that fire dampers be relocated in the ]

vertical run of duct work at the penetration in the penthouse floor. l

Bechtel Change Notice BM-3088, CWR-32.85 and MWR-30023 accomplished this l

and the work was completed on November 21, 1980. The dampers were ,

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mechanically tested without air flow on December 9, 1980 and the

mechanical work was functionally accepted on December 23, 1980. The SRD's

were relocated under Bechtel Change Notice BE-4502 and completed under CWR

1-32.86 and MWR-26982 on February 18, 1981. The inspection and functional.

testing performed was inadequate to prove the work. The four fire dampers

were re-inspected as late as March 1982. During this inspection the wiring

was found to be incomplete on the SRDs on all four dampers in that none of

the wiring to the SRDs had been terminated. Two MWRs were written to

complete the work. These MWRs were never implemented. Inadequate

corrective actions on the fire dampers are addressed in NRC inspection

report 348, 364/87-11 as a Potential Enforcement Finding, i

The inspections and testing of completed work, which is required before ,

functional acceptance to prove operability of the system or component, was

inadequate or had not been implemented. This resulted in the electrical

modification to the dampers to be incomplete and therefore the electrical

initiation portion of the fire dampers was inoperable beginning on

February 18, 1981 to June 1987. The inspection and testing of the

completed work as required by 10 CFR 50 Criterion X and XI were inadequate i

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in that the uncompleted wiring circuits, the jumpers installed in a field

terminal box, and the open links in the field terminal boxes were not

identified as not conforming to documented instructions, procedures and

drawings. This is a violation (348, 364/87-14-01). '

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