ML20236J759
| ML20236J759 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1987 |
| From: | Bradford W, Dance H, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236J749 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-87-14, 50-364-87-14, NUDOCS 8708060273 | |
| Download: ML20236J759 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1987014
Text
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UWl?ED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50 348/87-14 and 50-364/87-14
Licensee: Alabama Power Company
600 North 18th Street
Birmingham, AL 35291-0400
Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364
License No.:
Facility Name:
Farley 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: June 11 - July 10, 1987
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Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama
Inspectors.!#
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W. H. Bradford
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Date Signed
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W. H.
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Date Signed
Approved by:
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H. C. Dance, 'Section Chief
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Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, onsite inspection entailed:
previous enforcement
matters, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, and
operational safety verification.
Results:
One violation was identified:
inspection and acceptance testing had
not been performed on control room fire dampers.
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B70B060273 970730
AbOCK 05000348
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Licensee Empicyees Contacted:
J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager
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D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant. Manager
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W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager
R. D. Hill, Operations Manager
C. D.'Nesbitt, Technical Manager
R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager
L. A. Ward, Maintenance. Manager
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L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager
B. Moore, Operations Supervisor-
J. E. Odom, Operations Unit Supervisor
B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor-
T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor
J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor
L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor.
R. H. Marlow,-Technical Supervisor
L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager
J. K. 0sterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review
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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations
personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and
office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview-
The- inspection scope and findings were summarized during management
interviews throughout the report period and on July 9,1987, with the
general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection
findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the
inspection findings identified in Paragraph 7.
The licensee did not'
identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this
inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
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(Closed) Violation (348/86-29-02)
Residual heat removal system loop
suction valves automatic isolation feature defeated by electrical jumpers.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action outlined in
correspondence dated April 23, 1987. The licensee's corrective action has
been reviewed and is considered acceptable,
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(Closed) Violation (348, 364/87-02-01)
Failure to follow an approved
procedure concerning diesel generator lube oil strainers identification
numbers. The inspectors have verified the licensee corrective action in a
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review of the appropriate procedures.
The corrective action is considered
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acceptable.
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(Closed) Violation (348, 364/86-29-01)
Failure to follow approved
procedures concerning Quality Control Measures which requires that the
first line supervisor exercise primary responsibility for controlling the
quality of work within his areas of responsibility.
The licensee's-
corrective action is considered to be acceptable.
4.
Unresolved Item *
See paragraph 7.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed and reviewed technical specification required
surveillance testing and' verified that testing was performed in accordance
with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that
limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria
and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the
test; that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly
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reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that
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personnel conducting the tests were. qualified. The inspector witnessed /
reviewed portions of the following test activities:
Diesel Generator 2C 1000 KW Load Rejection Test.
STP-80.10
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Containment Cooling System Train A (B) Operability Test.
STP-17.0
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Operations Daily Shift Surveillance Requirements.
STP-1.0
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STP-71.0
Main Control Room Remote Valve Verification.
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STP-11.8
- RHR System Check Valves Inservice Test.
Containment Spray Pump Monthly Inservice Test.
STP-16.9'
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STP-9.0
- RCS Leakage Test.
FNP-0-PMP-
1087
- Test For Isolation of Fire Dampers In The Control Room
Air Conditioning System.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components
were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance
with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards,
and were in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during the review:
limiting conditions for
operations were met while components or systems were removed from service;
approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were
accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable;
functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning
components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained;
- An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were
properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention
controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status
of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related
equipment maintenance which may affect system performance. The following
maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Unit 1 FCV-3227A repair
1A Inverter repair
Unit 1 Containment Building tendon surveillance & inspection
1C Diesel Generator PMs
Fire Damper inspection and maintenance
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Service Water battery racks repair
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report
period.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency
systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of
affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building,
turbine building and service water. structure were conducted to observe
plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive
vibrations. The ' inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting
Conditions for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance
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tests.
The verifications were accomplished by direct observation of
monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible
hydraulic snubbers, and review of. completed logs, records, and chemistry
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results.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statemants were
reviewed as events occurred.
The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee
management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor,
shift foremen and licensed operators.
These meetings and discussions
provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing
activities in progress, as well as discussions of significant problems.
The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force
members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the
organization of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of
gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were
proper; and procedures were followed.
On June 18, 1987, during the performance of STP 80.10 " Diesel Generator 2C
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1000 KW Load Rejection Test", the licensee found an electrical problem in
which 2C diesel generator would not have non-essential engine protection
(NEEP) when aligned to 2B battery. The licensee has found a wiring error
in termination cabinet 38B on 1TB1-3. The non-essential engine protection
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is bypassed during emergency starting of the diesel generator. Therefore,
from an emergency start situation the diesel generator was not affected.
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This item is unresolved pending further investigation (348; 364/87-14-02).
On June 9,1987 at approximately 10:30 a.m., the licensee attempted to
perform FNP-0-PMP-1087 " Test for Isolation of Fire Dampers in the Control
Room Air Conditioning System."
The NRC resident inspector was present to
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observe the test. The test could not be performed because both trains
"A"
and "B" were found to be electrically inoperable.
(See Unresolved Item
348-364/87-13-02).
Each damper is composed of four sections with each
section operating independently of the other three sections.
An
investigation of the electrical components of the fire dampers was
initiated by the licensee with the following results:
a.
Links were found open in terminal box A1TB015 on train
"A" and also
in terminal box B1T019 on train "B".
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b.
Additional links were found open in field wired terminal boxes
located at each fire damper.
c.
The terminal box for damper XV2782AD was improperly wired in that
there were two jumper wires installed.
d.
The SRD's (explosive release device) electrical wiring in each damper
were not connected.
e.
One damper did not have the SRD's installed.
The licensee rectified the wiring, closed the links and verified the
installation in accordance with the drawing.
FNP-0-PMP-1087 was performed again on June 11, 1987 on train "A" dampers.
The test was unsatisfactory due to mechanical binding of the dampers and a
electrical problem.
Inspection indicated that wiring supplied with SRDs
had separated from the SRD and shorted against the metal damper / duct work.
The licensee cleaned, lubricated and exercised the train "A" dampers. The
dampers were then mechanically actuated. The damper would not fully close
and latch with air flow in the duct. The dampers were actuated without air
flow in the duct and this time performed as intended.
Testing on train
"B" dampers indicated similar results.
The original fire dampers, located in the horizontal duct work, were
installed during plant construction.
The firestats and SRD circuits were
tested satisfactorily by startup test procedure 400-3-444.
The fire
dampers are designed to operate by melting of thermal links or by
anticipatory electrical signals from firestats and SRD's.
The firestats
are designed to operate at lower temperature.
The Fire Protection
Re-evaluation program required that fire dampers be relocated in the
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vertical run of duct work at the penetration in the penthouse floor.
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Bechtel Change Notice BM-3088, CWR-32.85 and MWR-30023 accomplished this
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and the work was completed on November 21, 1980.
The dampers were
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mechanically tested without air flow on December 9,
1980 and the
mechanical work was functionally accepted on December 23, 1980. The SRD's
were relocated under Bechtel Change Notice BE-4502 and completed under CWR
1-32.86 and MWR-26982 on February 18, 1981. The inspection and functional.
testing performed was inadequate to prove the work. The four fire dampers
were re-inspected as late as March 1982. During this inspection the wiring
was found to be incomplete on the SRDs on all four dampers in that none of
the wiring to the SRDs had been terminated.
Two MWRs were written to
complete the work.
These MWRs were never implemented.
Inadequate
corrective actions on the fire dampers are addressed in NRC inspection
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report 348, 364/87-11 as a Potential Enforcement Finding,
The inspections and testing of completed work, which is required before
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functional acceptance to prove operability of the system or component, was
inadequate or had not been implemented.
This resulted in the electrical
modification to the dampers to be incomplete and therefore the electrical
initiation portion of the fire dampers was inoperable beginning on
February 18, 1981 to June 1987.
The inspection and testing of the
completed work as required by 10 CFR 50 Criterion X and XI were inadequate
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in that the uncompleted wiring circuits, the jumpers installed in a field
terminal box, and the open links in the field terminal boxes were not
identified as not conforming to documented instructions, procedures and
drawings.
This is a violation (348, 364/87-14-01).
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