ML20235A937

Forwards Revised Page 3 to Draft Rept on Seismic Effects on Bodega Bay Reactor Prepared by N M Newmark

ML20235A937
Person / Time
Site:	05000000, Bodega Bay
Issue date:	09/30/1964
From:	Case E US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Kouts H Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Shared Package
ML20234A767	List: IA-85-665, Discusses Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,Including Const of Nuclear Plants in Seismically Active Zones ML20234A761 ML20234A769 ML20234A792 ML20234A798 ML20234A803 ML20234A812 ML20234A816 ML20234A827 ML20234A830 ML20234A838 ML20234A841 ML20234A844 ML20234A847 ML20234A851 ML20234A855 ML20234A858 ML20234A861 ML20234A864 ML20234A868 ML20234A871 ML20234A874 ML20234A893 ML20234A896 ML20234A900 ML20234A911 ML20234A922 ML20234A929 ML20234A932 ML20234A937 ML20234A944 ML20234A956 ML20234A965 ML20234A968 ML20234A976 ML20234A984 ML20234A993 ML20234A996 ML20234A999 ML20234B005 ML20234B008 ML20234B023 ML20234B032 ML20234B035 ML20234B040 ML20234B062 ML20234B066 ML20234B076 ML20234B084 ML20234B098 ... further results
References
FOIA-85-665 NUDOCS 8709230471
Download: ML20235A937 (2)

Text

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I september 30,196h Dr. Herbert Kouts

Chaineen, Advisory Commaittee -

on Reactor Safeguards J

' g# - , -

U. S. Atossic Energy Commission Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Ec#t :

Transmitted herewith for the tase of t.he Committee are eighteen copies of a avised page thne of the Draft Report prepared by N. H. Newmark on Seismic Effects on Bedega Bay Reactor previously fonarded to you by our letter of September 23.

Since mly yours, Edson G. Cape Assistant Director Division of Reactor Licensing .\

Enclosure:

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As stated above ,

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The supply of power to the facility, from power lines crossing the major fault, might be interrupted, although the probability of such inter-  !

ruption is fairly lov. In the event of such interruption, auxiliary power supplies are required. The sources of auxiliary power described appear to have adequate capability to ratist the postulated earthquake e ffe cts .

In general, the provisions for meeting the various requirements are based on methods which in the light of analysis and study appear to be reasonably adequate.

The earthquake motions, in terms of acceleration and velocity, appear to be 2 to 3 times more intense than any that have been recorded in the United States , and probably about twice as intense as those experienced anywhere else in the world in the recent years for which we have fairly -

good records. Nevertheless , it appears that the design objectives can be accomplished. )

I A more detailed discussion of the various points described in Amendment No. 8 is contained in the following material. In addition, consideration I is given to several points not specifically discussed in the amendment. j EFFECTIVENESS OF SAND IAYER IN SHOCK ISOLATION The sand layer under the containment building is intended to act in two ways : (1) to isolate in part the containment structure from the high peaks 'of acceleration that might be transmitted to it from the ground beneath it; and (2) to permit either horizontal or vertical faulting to J take place in the rock beneath the containment structure without damaging I l

the structure. It vill be shown in the following discussion that the I effectiveness of the sand layer in reducing the peak accelerations may be questionable, but its effectiveness in reducing the effects of faulting is substantial.

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