ML20244E268
| ML20244E268 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point, 05000000, Trojan |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1989 |
| From: | Lanning W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| IEIN-89-038, IEIN-89-38, OREM-89-015, OREM-89-15, NUDOCS 8904240386 | |
| Download: ML20244E268 (16) | |
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lPR12 gg MEMORANDUM FOR:
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM:
Wayne D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment
SUBJECT:
THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING April 12, 1989 - MEETING 89-15 On April 12, 1989, an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-15) was held to brief senior managers from NRR, AE00, Commission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on April 5, 1989. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.
The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. presents three significant events identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program and a summary of reactor scrams for the week ending 04/09/89.
WayneD.Lanning, Chief [
A Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ Encl.:
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- WDLan ing DATE :04/ /4/89
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T. Murley, NRR M. Slosson, NRR F.11iraglia, t,RR R. Capra, NRR J. Sniezek, NRR R. Bevan, NRR E. Jordan, AE0D G. Knighton,llRR J. Ta" lor, ED0 E. Beckjord, RES W. Russell, R1 li. Ernst, RIl B. Davis, R111 R. D. Martin, RIV J. B. Martin, RV W. Kane, RI L. Reyes, R11 E. Greenman, Rlli L. Callan, RIV D. Kirsch, RV
- 5. Varga, l'Rh E. Boger, NRR G. Lainas, NRR L. Shao,liRR B. Grimes, NRR F. Congel,!!RE E. Weiss, AE00 T. liartin, EDO J. Lieberman, OE J. Guttmann, SECY
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SPR121993 MEMORAliDutt FOR:
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Accessment FROM:
Wayne D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment SUBCECT:
THE OPEFATIt!G REACTORS EVEtiTS MEETil:G April li, 1989 - 11EETIt!G 89-15 On April 12,19FS, an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-15) was held to brief scricr managers f rom itRR, AE0D, RES, Ccu.ission Staff, and Pcgional Offices on events which cc.currec since our last raeeting on April 5,1989. The list of attendees is it.cluded as Enclosure 1.
The ever:ts discussed and the significant elernents of these events are presented in Enclosure E. presents three significant events identified for input into the t;RC perfortcance incicator progrix and a summt.ry of reactor scrams for the wee'. ending 04/09/89.
r kN Wayne D. Lanning. Chi Events tssessment Eranch Division of Operational Events Assessrient Encicsures:
As sti.ted cc w/ Encl.:
-See fiext Fage
EllCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (89-15)
April 12, 1989 NAME ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION L.11arsh NRR/ DEST R. Kendall NRR/D0EA
- 11. Harper AE0D/DSP N. Fields NRR/00EA J. Carter NRR/D0EA R. Bevan NRR/DRSP E. Boger tire /ACR-1 R. Capra NRR/PD1-1 H. Berkow NRR/PD' E W. Jensen NRR/D0EA c
J. Smith NRR/RSL M. Johnson OED0 W. Troskoski OE L. florrholra Oct1/KC M. Virgilio NRR/DR:P E. Rossi NRR/00EA R. Baer RES/DS1P R. Lobel NRR/00EA P. Baranowsky NRR/00EA M. Reardon NRR/D0EA D
ENCLOSURE 2 1
l l
l CPERATlf;G RE ACTORS EVERTS _RRJI_EE]RG. 89-15 R
EVENTS ASSES _SMENT_3 RANCH LQfATION:
1_2B-1L_WRIJE_ FLINT WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 1989, 11:00 A.M.
TRCJAN UhlT 1 INOPERABLE RilR ISOLATION VALVE INDIAN PClhl Ul;1T 2 STEAK DAMAGE TO SERVICE WATEf; SYSTEM CAELES CENERIC ISSUE CCI ATMOSPHERIC LUMP VALVES (UPDATES)
89-15 TROJAN UNIT 1
]
JROP1RfBLE RHR IJiOLATION yllyf h2Bil 9, 1989 PROBLEM AUTO-CLOSE PRESSURE INTERLOCK ON RHR LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVE INOFERABLE.
ChDbE INCORRECTLY WikED BISTABLE IN HIGH PRESSURE INTERLOCK CIRCUITRY.
.ShFETY SIGfdflfABff DECRADATICf! 0F CNE LEVEL OF OVERPRESSURE PROTECT 10t! FOR THE RHR SYSTEM.
LlECUSBlDD 0
WITH THE. UNIT IN MODE 5, LICENSEE TESTED THE OPERABILITY OF
.THE SELIES REDUNCANT, RHR ISCLATION VALVES MC-8701 ANL MO-S7C2.
o VALVE HC-870; FA] LEE TC CLOSE ON A SIMULATED PRESSur,E SIGNAL.
o THESE VALVES ISCLATE RHR HOT ' rG SUCTION ANP ARE NORMALLY CLOSED ANE EEENEFGlZED WHEN ThE REACTOR IS IN MODES 1, 2, CR 3 AND ARE OPEi:ED WHEN THE Rhh SYSTEM IE PLACED IN SERVICE If1 MODES 4, 5, GR 6.
c THE CPERAT10l! 0F EACh VALVE IS PRESSURE 1NTERLOCKET TO PREVEf:T THE MANUAL CPENIUC 0F THF VALVES UNLESS RCS PRESSURE IS BELCW 420 PSI.
THIS ENSURES THE RHR SYSTEM IS NOT OVER PRESSURIZED.
o IF THE VALVES ARE IN THE OPEN POSIT 10fi, THE PRESSURE INTERLOCK IS DESIGNED TO CAUSE THE VALVES TO CLOSE AUTOMATICALLY WHEf: F.CS PRESSURE INCREASES TO ECO PSI.
o LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT Tile ElSTAELE MCPULE RELATEL TO THE ECO PSI PRESSURE INTERLOCK CIRCUITRY WAS INCORRECTLY WIRFD WITH REVERSE PCIARITY.
CCNlALT:
- h. FIELES SICEVEflT' _lfS_
REFERENCE:
50.72 #15:00
TROJ#f! UNIT 1 89-15 o
AS A RESULT OF THE MODIFICATIONS TC THE UtlIT's REMOTE SHUTDOWN STATION DURING THE 19EE REFUEllf1G OUTAGE, THIS DISTABLE MODULE HAD EEEt MOVED TO AN ADJACENT SLOT 1ll THE "HAGAN RACK" If! WHICH IT WAS LOCATED.
O LICENSEE STATED THAT TiiE POLARITY OF THE CABLES TO THE SLOT OCCUPIED EY THE DISTABLE WAS OPPOSITE THE BISTABLE's REQUIRED POLARITY, EVEN THOUGH THE COLOR CODIt!G ON THE WIRES INDICATED CTHERWISE.
o AS A RESULT OF THIS REVERSE POLARITY CONDITION, THE FAILED VALVE WOULD HAVE OPENED AT ANY PRESSURE Of RECEIPT OF A MANUAL OPEN SICt:AL AND WOULD N01 HAVE CLCSED ON RECEIPT OF AN AUTC CLOSE SIGNAL.
o L.lCENSEE STATED THAT THE VALVE WAS SUCCESSFULLY POST t1Alf!TENAf;CE TESTED FOLLOWING THE 19E8 l'0DIFICAT10N, AND CANT:0T ACCOUllT FOR THE DISTAELE WIRIt:G ERROR REl:Alf;1NG UNDETECTED.
O THE FAILURE OF THIS VALVE TO FUNCT10t; PROPERLY REMOVED OfiE LEVEL 0F OVER PFESSURE PROTECTION F0F THE RHR SYSTEM.
OTHER LEVELS OF PFOTECTION INCLUDE THE SECCI:D ISCLAT10f: VALVE, THE TWO PRESSURIZER PORVS SET TO LIFT AT LiOC PSI AND 45C PSI, RESPECTIVELY, ANL WRITTEI: ADMlf!ISTRATIVE PROCEDURES VHICli GOVERN CPERATION OF ISOLATION VALVES.
O THE VALVE WAS SUCCESSFULLY TESTED APPROXIMATELY Nll!E M0hTHS AGO CURlhC THE LICENSEE's LAST REFUEllNC OUTACF (THE UNIT IS O!! A Cl:E YE AR REFUELil;C CYCLE).
Epl10WUP c
LICENSEE IS lilVESTIGATING FOSi-MAINT NANCE TESTING PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE WHY IN0FERAPIllTY WAe OUI'D.
O LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE REASON FOR THE MISC 0DED WIRING.
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REGICN IS FOLLOWit:G LICENSEE's EFFORT.
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89-15 INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 STEAM DAMAGE TO SERVICE WATEP SYSTEM CABLES APRIL 8, 1989 PROBLEM CABLES ASSOCIATED WITH REDUNDANT TRAINS OF THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM L
(SWS) WERE FOUND TO BE PHYSICALLY DAMAGED.
THIS CONDITION EXISTED l
SINCE APRIL 1985, CAUSE A LEAK IN A LINE (APPR0X 3 INCHES IN DIAMETER) SUPPLYING 40 PSIG STEAM TO LIFTING JETS USED IN THE SWS TRAVELING SCREEN WASH SYSTEM SUBJECTED THE CABLES AND THEIR ENCLOSURES TO A STEAM ENVIRONMENT U
(APPROX 300 F),
USE OF THE STEAM LINE WAS TERMINATED IN APRIL 1985.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE l
STEAM DAMAGE TO CAELES ASSOCIATED WITH REDUNDANT TRAINS OF THE'SW SYSTEM CAN LEAD TO POTENTIAL COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL SERVICE
- WATER, l
DISCUSSION l
c THERE ARE SIX 50% CAPACITY SWS PUMPS; 2 HEADERS WITH 3 PUMPS EACH, ONE HEADER IS NEEDED IMMEDIATELY FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THE OTHER HEADER IS ALSO NEEDED, BUT NOT IMMEDIATELY (NEEDED FOR THE RECIRCULATION PHASE),
o POWER FEED AND CONTRCL CIRCUIT CABLES ARE ROUTED THROUGH PVC CONDUITS EMBEDDED IN AN UNDERGROUND CONCRETE FILLED DUCT THAT RUNS FROM THE TURBINE BUILDING TO THE SWS PUMPS, o
THERE ARE 15 CONDUITS IN THE DUCT (3 R0WS OF 5),
THE CONDUITS ARE SEPARATED BY APPROX 1 INCH, THE DUCT IS BURIED APPROX 6 INCHES.
BELOW GROUND, THE STEAM LINE WAS ALSO BURIED AND RAN PARALLEL TO THE DUCT, o
IN APRIL 1985, A SWS CABLE FAILED.
THE CABLE WAS PULLED AND STEAM DAMAGE WAS IDENTIFIED AS THE CAUSE OF FAILURE.
THE CABLE WAS
- REPLACED, THE TRAVELING SCREEN WASH PROCESS WAS CHANGED TO NO LONGER USE STEAM.
THE OTHER CABLES WERE TESTED (MEGGER TEST)
SATISFACTORILY, CONTACT:
P. KENDALL SIGEVENT NO
REFERENCE:
10 CFR 50,72 # 15253
l't!DIAN PolNT UNIT 2 89-15 l
0 ON APRIL 8, 1989, WITH THE PLANT IN A REFUELING OUTAGE, THE LICENSEE WAS REPLACING SWS CABLES TO EllhlNATE SPLICES LOCATED If A MANHOLE APPROX 100 FT FRON THE TLREINE BLDG, PROBLEt2S HAD EEEN EXPERIENCED Wilh MOISTURE AFFECTING THE SPLICES, c
THE STANDARD PROCEDURE FOR REPLACING CABLE IS TO RUN A " MOUSE" THROUGH THE CONDUIT AFTER THE CABLE IS REMOVED TO VERIFY THAT NO l
ELOCKAGE EXISTS.
THE CONEUIT IS 5 INCHES IN DIAMETER.
THE MOUSE IS A 4 INCH DIAMETER BULLET SHAPED PIECE OF STEEL.
BLOCKAGE WAS ENCOUNTERED AND ITS LOCATION DETERMINED TO BE AEJACENT TO THE TbRBINE BblLDING.
c lHE col; CRETE DUCT AT THE POINT OF BLCCKACE WAS UNEARTHED, REVEALING THE DAMAGE.
SECTICI.S OF PVC CCNDUIT ADJACENT TO THE TUREINE BUILEING WERE SEVERELY DEFORMED.
PORTIONS OF THE SURROUNDING CONCRETE WERE MISS!!iG/ ERODED AWAY.
CONLUIT WAS FOUND TO BE SAGGil!G APPROX G INCHES.
SCME CABLE OUTER COVER DAMAGE IS VISIBLE.
THE AREA 0F DAMACE IS APPRCX ;C INCHES EEEP BY 2C INCHES WIDE BY 12 FT LONG.
THE DAMAGE EXTENDEL TO INSIEE THE TURBil!E BLLG, o
THE CALLES ARE INSl! LATED EY_A Vlf;YL SHEATH, THEN ENCLCSED IN A LEAD SHEATH, ANE THEN C0ATED WITH A PRCTECTIVE VINYL COVER, o
ANOTHER MECCER TEST WAS PERFORMED, ALL CAELES WERE FOUNE TO FUi;Cll0t! PRCPERLY IN SPITE OF THE DAMAGE.
O THE CAELE SEPARATICl; CONFIGURATION USED IS CONSISTEf!T WITH THE 1F-2 LICENSII!G LESIGN BASIS, AND HAS EEEN RECENTLY REVIEWED AND APPRCVED EY fiRR.
fDEBE.CTJy[_L[T10t3 ALL DAMAGED COI:DUlT Af!D CAELES WILL LE REPLACED PRIOR TO PLANT
- STARTUP, ED11DEUE REG 10N 1 IS MONITORING NPLEMENTATION OF LICENSEE'S CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.
I 1
89-15 LE.NEAlf_J1SJE CCI ATM0SP}if_R_IL_IdLMP. _ VALVES J.U.PRAJESJ PA0ElfM AIR OPERATED ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES MANUFACTURED BY CONTROL COMPCNENTS INC. (CCl) Fall TO OPEN ON DEMAND AT PALO VERDE AND AT OTliER PL ANTS.
LAUSE CAUSE BEING INVESTIGATED.
MAY BE COMBINATION OF DIRTY AIR, VALVE STEM LINDING, UNCERSIZED VALVE PILOT, AND NITROGEN PRESSURE REbuLATOR hlSCALIBRAT10N.
SAFETY.f.lLNIFICANCE ATMOSPHERIC DUNP VALVES (ADVs) ARE RELIEE UPON FOR EMERGENCY PLANT C00LLOWN INCLULING STEAM GENERATOR TUEE RUPTURE.
DISCUSSION ON MARCH 3, 1985, PALO VERDE bNIT 3 EXPERIENCED A LOAD REJECTION TRANSIENT WillCH RESULTED IN MA!N STEAM LINE ISOLATION.
c ALL FOUR ADVs FAILED TO OPEN CN LEMAND.
c-Lf;lTS 1 ANL E WEPE TESTEF AND SOME MALFUNCTIONED.
c INFORMATICA NOTICE E9-38 ISSUED BY NRR, VALVE VENECR CCl CONTACTED BY NRC STAFF AND REPORTED A POTENTIAL L
LESIGN LEFICIENCY.
CCl INFORMED CUSTOMERS OF lhE POTENTIAL DEFICIENCY UNDER 10 CFR 21, t
DATED APRll 4, 1909.
o PL AllTS IDENTIFIED FOR CONCERN LY CCI AS HAVING ADVs SIMILAR TD THOSE AT PALO VERDE ARE:
WATERFORD 3 - TWO VALVES CATAWDA 1 R 2 - FCUR VALVES EACH SAN ONCFRE 2 8 3 - TWC VALVES EACH NRC STAFF REC.UESTED JUSTiflCAT10N FCR ADV OPERABILITY FR0h o
AFFECTED PLAl:TS.
o AFVs TESTED AT SAN ONOFRE 3.
CNE OPENED SLOWLY (1 MIN).
CCfsT ACT :
W. JENSEN
REFERENCE:
IC CFR EC 71 R 14912,145U,14930, AND FORulNC REPORT C4/10/00
6ENERIC 1SSUE 89-15 O
SAN ONCFRE 2 ADVs TC EE TESTED LATER THIS WEEK (04/10 - 04/14/89).
O APVs TESTED AT CATAWBA 2.
CNE ADV FAILED TO OPEN.
CORRODED PISTON RING FCUND.
PILCT FLOW AREA INCREASED PER CCI RECOMMENDATION.
O VATERFORD 3 LICENSEE DOES I:0T PLAN ADDITIONAL ACV TESTING.
o NO PREVIOUS HISTORY OF PROLLENS AT WATERFORD o
CCI RECUESTED MEETING WITH NRC STAFF.
o CCI MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 1:30 P.M. APRIL 13, 1989, ROOM OWFN, 2F-17.
FOL L OWlLP o
PLAl'T JLSTlFICITION FOR ADV OPERABILITY EEING REVIEWED BY TiiE REC 10NS.
0 E;E COCRDlWAT!NC VEETIl!C WITH CCI ANL INFORMING REGIONS.
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PERFORMANCE INDICATORS S16NIFICANT EVENTS 1
' PLANT NAME-EVENT EVENT DESCRIFT]DN GTR SIGNIFICANCE DATE GC6UIRE 1..
03/07/69 A STEAM EENERATOR TUBE RUFTURE DCCURRED IN THE 'P' STEAM 0 FOTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DEGRADATION
' l BEhERATOR WITh A MAX 1h0M LEAK RATE OF ABOUT 500 PGM. Ali 0F FR! MARY C0CLANT FRESSURE.
ON SITE. BRIEFINS 99-10 & 89-11 (VERBAL, NO SLIDES).
BOUNDARY SAN ONCFRE 1 02/02/89 FASTENERS ON THERMAL SHIELD FOUND BROKEN.
O POTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DE6AADAT10N OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUlFMENT SURRY 1 & 2 01/31/89 NUMEROUS MOVs AND OPERATORS HAD DEFICIENCIES MAKING THEM 2 POTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DEGRADATION INDFERAFLE. FOUND DURING ENGINEERING EVALUATION.
OF SAFETY-RELATED EDUlFMENT NUMERDUS E4FETY SYSTEMS MAY HAVE BEEN INDPERABLE.
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NOTES 1.
PLAllT SPECIFIC DATA EASED Of! It!ITIAL-REVIEW 0F 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST.
PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT. SUNDAY THROUGH I41DllIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN R00 tiOTI0tl, At:D EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLAliNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDAt;CE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE 111 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.
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2.
COMPLICATIONS: REC 0VERY.C0'iPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERS0 fit 1EL ERRORS UNRELATEli TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
3.
PERS0ht;EL RELATED PROBLElis ILCLUDE HUf1At' ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIEllCIES, AND l'ANUAL STEAli GENERAT0h LEVEL C0f TE0L PROBLEMS.
4 "0THEP"'It!CLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO Ef;VIR0tMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTillitG), SYSTEM DESICf!, OR UtlKf;0Wfi CAUSE.
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