IR 05000528/1985012
| ML20140G793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1985 |
| From: | Novak R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Fraley R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140B723 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-45 NUDOCS 8510010042 | |
| Download: ML20140G793 (3) | |
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o, UNITED STATES . E j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
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Docket No.: 50-528 ,qEP i 6@ MEMORANDUM FOR: Raymond F. Fraley, Executive Director j Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards FROM: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing, OL SUBJECT: STARTUP EXPERIENCE ON PALO VERDE UNIT 1 ' In its letter report on Palo Verde, Units 1, 2 and 3, dated December 15, 1981, the ACRS requested that the staff keep the Comittee informed of the startup experience on Unit 1 prior to fuel loading on Unit 2.
The following two documents are provided in response to that request.
1.
Letter from D. F. Kirsch to the Arizona Nuclear Power Project, dated , ' August 6, 1985, transmitting Inspectica Report No. 50-528/85-12 on the ! enhanced operational inspection conducted on Palo Verde Unit I during i initial startup and low power testing.
I 2.
Memorandum from Dennis F. Kirsch to Hugh L. Thompson, dated July 30, 1985, providing a review of the startup experience for Palo Verde Unit 1 (up , to 50% power operation).
As indicated in the above documents, no significant problems were experienced during the startup testing of Palo Verde Unit 1.
The. areas where difficulties were encountered and appropriately handled by the licensee included several , reactor trips, unidentified leakage in the reactor coolant system, and leaking tubes in the condenser.
In addition, operability of the post-accident sampling system under postulated accident conditions required licensee attention.
After an extended outage during parts of July and August 1985 to correct the . above difficulties, Palo Verde Unit 1 is back to 50% power. Additional testing -- at this level and at the 80% level is planned before comercial operation is achieved (scheduled for the end of 1985).
. Can' tact: E. Licitra, NRR x27200
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. ._ _.__.._ _ _. __ _ _..____ _. . -.. _.. .. . ' . . . . o . . 2- - The applicant's current schedule for Palo Verde Unit 2 is to load fuel in November 1985 and achieve initial criticality in January 1986. The staff will continue to keep the Comittee advised on the startup experience of Unit 1, as you requested.
... - Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director
for Licensing ^ Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated
REGION V== Report No. 50-528/85-12 Docket No. 50-528 License No. h7F-34 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 Inspection at: Palo Verde Site
Inspection conducted: 22 - June 5, 1985 and July 16, 1985 Inspectors: L /M'/W h8[ J. L.
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.L ... = .. \\ - .. . . . . . . i-2- . l C os. A...youfing Personnel: . L. R. Peterson, Consultant, Lawrence Livermore National Lab.
! B. F. Gore, Consultant, Pacific Northwest Laboratories J. W. Upton, Jr., Consultant, Pacific Northwest Laboratories
A. J. Boegel, Consultant, Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Approved By: [[ _M /7
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~ A. E. ChafIce: Chief, Reactor Projects Branch Date Signed Summarv: -
^ ' ,, Inspection on May 22 - June 5,1985 (Report No. 50-528/85-12) _ ._ Areas Inspected: Enhanced Team Inspection of the operating crews and + operational support activities during initial startup and low power testing.
! This inspection involved 447 inspection hours by nine NRC personnel and 210 inspection hours by four NRC consultants.
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Findings: No violations of NRC requirements resulted from ths inspection.
? Observations by the Special Inspection Team were discussed with licensee ! management for their consideration, and actions were taken, and are expected j to continue, to improve operational activities. These dbservations are
discussed throughout the report; and relate principally to needed improvements in the control room environment (e.g., reduction in noise levels, operator . alertness, and communications), retrieval of information for post-event l evaluation, and reactor engineering support for operations.
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Persons Centacted
- E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP Executive Vice President
,,
- G. Haynes, Vice President Nuclear Production
! (Announced as Vice President on May 30, 1985)
- D. B. Karner, ANPP Assistant Vice President Nuclear Production
- J. R. Bynum, ANPP Plant Manager i
- W. E. Ide, ANPP Director, Corporate QA/QC J. E. Allen, ANPP Operations Manager
_
- L.A. Souza, ANPP Assistant Director Corporate QA/QC
- 0. J. Zeringue, ANPP Technical Support Manager
- R. C. Younger, ANPP Unit I Operations Superintendent a
- D. F. Hoppes, ANPP Reactor Engineering Supervisor j
- V. W. Montefour, ANPP Quality Assurance Engineer
' F. Philpott, CE Lead Engineer ! L. Briner, Shift Advisor (Southern California Edison Company) R. Gouge, Day Shift Supervisor C. N. Russo, Manager QA Audit and Surveillance Discussions were also held with numerous other personnel, including shift
supervisors, reactor operators, QA/QC engineers and inspection / surveillance personnel, during the inspection.
- Present at Site Exit Interview on June 5,1985.
- Present at Corporate Office Exit Interview on July 16, 1985.
. 2.
Enhanced Inspection Team Composition and Pattern of Inspection The inspection was carried out be senior members of the Region V and.NRC headquarters staffs, Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors assigned to ' operating power reactors in Region V, and four NRC consultants from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Battelle Pacific ' Northwest Laboratories (Phl).
from PNL currently provide contract assistance to the NRC staff in the conduct of operator license examinations for PWR (Combustion Engineering , supplied) power reactor facilities. The consultant from LLNL is an experienced reactor physicist, and has previously served as a consultant to the NRC staff in the area of human factors evaluation of control room layout and design as well as inspections of the type of the current inspection.
To evaluate the performance of the operating crews, members of the Enhanced Inspection Team were assigned to around-the-clock coverage of
shift operations commencing on May 22, 1985, i preparation for initial criticality was started.when plant heatup in ' This around-the-clock coverage continued through initial criticality (on May 25, 1985) and i , until June 5, 1985.
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.. .. .. ,, ' .- . The above pattern of inspection permitted members of the inspection team . to observe the performance of each of the six operating crews as well as ] the conduct of portions of all of the zero power physics tests.
3.
Assessment of Operating Crew Performance ,. Operating crew performance was assessed based upon the inspection team's , observation of (1) the conduct of scheduled plant evolutions during ,
initial criticality and zero power physics tests, (2) crew response to unplanned events, and (3) through discussions with individual operating
crew members.
Particular emphasis was given to the extent to which Shift Advisors (individuals under contract to the licensee to provide on-shift experience in the operation of similar licensed power reactor facilities) , { were integrated into the shift operations.
. . t The overall performance of the operating crews was judged by the Special Inspection Team to be average to above average in plant knowledge and in the conduct of operating duties (including the use of and adherence to operating procedures) when compared to operators of power reactor facilities of similar type during the initial plant startup and early [ operating period.
Early in the inspection period, on May 23, 1985, the inspection team . observed that an annunciator, CEA Deviation - Tech Spec Violation, was - activated during a period following manipulation of the control element , assembl'ies (control rods). At the time a licensed operator was in , attendance at the CEA controls adjacent to the panel where the annunciator was located.
Also present was an operator trainee, who on ' occasion manipulated the annunciator acknowledge button to silence [ audible annunciators as they were activated. After a period of several minutes, the inspection team leader questioned the two operators present . as to their knowledge of the conditions causing this annunciator to be activated. Neither had an immediate explanation. After some prompting by the NRC inspector, the operators referred to the annunciator response procedures manual located on the front of the control panel nearby.
" Still there was not an explanation by either operator for a period of t several minutes, after which a third individual (an STA) was asked of his
knowledge of the conditions accounting for the annunciator's activation.
i It was only after a period of more than 30 minutes that sufficient ! attention and actions were taken by the operating crew to satisfactorily understand and explain the reasons and significance of the annunciator's
being activated.
It was determined that one or more CIA's were out of position in two different rod groups sufficiently to cause the deviation alarm condition. The deviation was not, however, sufficiently great to constitute a violation of the technical specifications.
This observation by the inspection team was discussed the following morning with senior site and corporate management, and characterized as < unacceptable attentiveness and alertness on the part of the control room
operators involved. Steps were taken by licensee m.anagement; to assure the alertness of control room operators such that this circumstance was ' not repeated during the balance of the inspection period. There were numerous occasions during che inspection when control room operators were asked about actuated annunciators and other system and component status.
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.! , );.. . i ' On these occasions, except for the instance discussed above, the operators demonstrated an exceptionally good level of knowledge of plant , i instrumentation and equipment status.
i The inspection team observed shift turnover practices on frequent ] occasion.
Th'e shift turnover of plant and equipment status, particularly
within the control room - including thorough " walk down" of instrument i and control room panels was judged to be of exceptional quality.
There were instances where the inspection team observed circumstances g within the control room warranting attenbion by licensee management i and/or supervision, particularly with regard to reducing noise levels or potential distraction of control room operating personnel. An example . where licensee corrective action was prompt in correcting the condition a i involved shift briefings by the test direct ~or at the beginning of each l shift. Initially these briefing were conducted adjacent to the j " horseshoe" area of the control room. The numbers of people involved q plus discussion among those involved in the briefing created potential
distractions to the operators. When this observation was brought to the attention of supervision steps were taken to relocate such briefings in - d the computer room immediately adjacent to the control room.
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Two other observations by the inspection team regarding the control room environment were (1) the location of telephones for calls from outside l the plant and (2) the background noise level resulting from the control room normal air conditioning system.
In the first instance, it was j - i observed on numerous occasions that calls received in the horseshoe area, generally answered by the reactor plant operator, were for indisiduals in the opposite end of the control room. This necessitated rather loud verbal paging, without the aid of an intercom or buzzer system, to transfer the call to the' individual for whom it was intended.
Regarding the control room air conditioning noise level, apparently generated by the high velocity air exiting the ceiling vents, the inspection team, particularly on the non-day shift periods, observed , substantial annoyance due to this condition over a period of an eight ) hour shift.
' ,' l Licensee management; committed to give further attention to these conditions.
In the case of the control room air conditioning, the j condition had oeen previously identified for further evaluation by the j licensee.
1 ~ The relatively low numbers of control room annunciators actuated (or lit) during plant operations was a particularly positive observation by the inspection team. This circumstance had resulted from a comprehensive and , effective effort by the licensee to reduce substantially the number of '
unnecessary and nuisance alarm conditions.
L Not withstanding the need for licensee management to give continuing y attention to those areas discussed above to enhance the control room p environmant and the alertness of plant operators, the inspection team found the performance of the operating personnel to be good. Their overall attitude was observed to be very positive toward "doing the job ! l I . - -
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Few personnel errors were observed; this being in
large part the result of substantial utilization of the plant specific simulator to train operators in the testing procedures and ope 2ations
l tavolved.
l Attachments 1 through 4 provide additional observations and comments by i consultant members of the special inspection team regarding the j performance of the operating crews.
4.
Initial Criticality and Zero Power Testing f ) Members of the Enhanced Inspection Team witnessed initial criticality and i.
portions of all low power tests. Details regarding the conduct and j results of these tests are discussed in Attachment 4.
- j 5.
Engineering Direction and Support of Operations and Testing ~ a ! The technical direction and of initial criticality and low power testing activities was provided by individuals within the Reactor Engineering j Section of the licensee's onsite Technical Support staff. This staff is
composed currently of approximately 12 engineers, half of whom are
employees under contract from the NSSS (Combustion Engineering - CE) ! contractor. Approximately an equal number of contract CE technical ! personnel are also available to the Reactor Engineering staff, when j needed.
The licensee's staff within Reactor Engineering is relatively inexperienced with regard to the startup and operation of commercial
t nuclear plants - thus the need for the presence of contract personnel in this part of the organization.
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The Inspection Team observed that the licensee's Reactor Engineering i personnel were noticeably dependent upon the advice of the more j experienced CE representatives during the initial approach to criticality I and low power physics tests. The licensee's current plans are to retain i CE representatives through completion of the power ascension testing on { Unit 1.
e ! The lack of experience within the Reactor Engineering staff was also j evident during a period of uncertainty regarding the absolute reactor i power level below five percent power. A period of several hours was j necessary before a satisfactory level of confidence was established in j the actual reactor thermal power verses that indicated by the nuclear ,i instrumentation.
i At the time of the Management Interviews, this subject was discussed with . licensee management in the' context of a need to reexamine continued CE
j presence beyond the completion of Unit I startup.
6.
Quality Assurance / Quality Control Involvement
The extent of Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC) involvement in i early operational activities was exceptionally noteworthy during the current inspection. Their presence and substantive involvement in such . I, e- . . . -.. - - - - -
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' ,- . activities as low power physics testing, inspection and surveillance of maintenance and troubleshooting (diesel generator apparent malfanction, etc.), health physics activities and housekeeping was readily evident during the inspection. Discussion with QA/QC management revealed plans for greater involvement of the QA/QC staff in operational activities such - as independent verification of valving and electrical system lineup.
7.
Post-Event Information Retrieval Systems , The inspection team observed rather substantial difficulties in the i retrieval and evaluation of information necessary to reconstruct the sequence of events during eauy operation during the current inspection - as compared to similar facilities in Region V.
This was particularly the . case during the period, discussed in paragraph 5., above, when uncertainty existed on the actual power level.
In response to the inspection team's observation, licensee management indicated that steps, including a reassessment of the amount and type of parameters to be programmed for retrieval by the plant process computer (s), were being taken to icprove the utilization of post-trip / event information systems.
8.
Management Involvement During the course of the current inspection particular attention was given by the inspection team to the presence and involvement of site and corporate management in the day-to-day operational activities.
Corporate office management, including the Executive Vice President, Corporate QA/QC Manager, and Assistant Vice President, were observed at the plant on frequent occasion. All were present at the time of initial , ' criticality on May 25, 1985.
The Plant Manager and key managers and supervisors of his staff - including in particular the Reactor Engineering Supervisor, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent, Assistant Operations Superintendent and Technical Support Manager - were observed to be involved extensively in operational activities. Examples of such involvement included unusual efforts to assure operability of the hydrogen monitors and resolution of diesel-generator fuel oil discrepancies.
Overall management involvement was observed to be substantive and effective. The prevailing attitude which seemed to permeate the entire staff associated with operations and operational support activities was one of unusual caution and thoroughness during the approach to initial plant operation and the conduct of each plant evolution.
9.
Management Meetings The results of the current inspection were discussed with those licensee ~ representatives indicated in paragraph I at the conclusion of the inspection on June 5,1985 (onsite) and at the corporate offices on July 16, 1985.
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' .. . . - Licensee representatives indicated that particular continuing attention
would be given to the following observations of the inspection team.
l l Ctilization of post-event information systems (Paragraph 7).
.. b.
Retention of supplemental (contractor) Reactor Engineering staff (Paragraph 5).
i Enhancement of control room environment and operator alertness c.
(Paragraph 3).
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. . . .. .. . ~.- \\ . .. .. , . OBattelle - 0.- AMCMENT 1 Pacific North *est Laboratories l P.C.ScsSH Richland. W ashington U.s.A. 993s2 Te!ephone ($09 375-3755 rete 15 2su June 14, 1985 Mr. Jess Crews NRC Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 j
Dear Jess:
. SUBJECT: PALO VERDE STARTUP SPECIAL INSPECTION As a member of the on-shift special Inspection Team at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) from May 29 through June 5, I monitored the , licensee's swing shifts at Unit 1.
I monitored the shift-turnover, including the pre-shift-turnover Driefings and I made two plant tours to observe operations outside of the control room.
I also made a visit to the Chemistry facilities to discuss their measurements of dissolved H2 in the primary coolant.
I haa a meeting with Mr. Art Ramey, Quality System Supervisor, to discuss the role of the QA Department at PVNGS.
Tne operating crews (OPS Department) that I observed carried out their duties in a correct and professional manner.
As a total perspective, the operating crews exhibited sufficient caution and thoroughness in their handling of initial power ascer.sion operations. See the addendum page, " Specific Items".
As I indicated in our " exit" meeting, my "on-plant" schedule had been the following: May 29 6 hrs acnin
8 nrs ..n n y June 1 8 hrs swing
8 hrs swing
8 hrs swing
8 hrs swing
3 hrs acuin Since ly you
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m V . W. Upton, Jr.
enfor Research Scientist JWU:cas . mmh--a m ---mg P65'd66Ck 6560 328
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-. - - ~ ~ ;.a .: ' .. . . .. . . SPECIFIC ITEMS NOTED PVNGS STARTUP, LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTS AND INITIAL ASCENT IN POWER MAY 29 THROUGH JUNE 5,1985 1.
The Low Power Physics Test concerning control-rod symetry was conducted proficiently and Reactor Engineering was present in the' control room for the tests.
2.
The first time that a D/G was declared inoperable (D/G A) and a test was performed on 0/G B, there was some confusion as to the interpretation of' , the strip chart recording of the D/Gs voltage, speed and frequency. The ' zero values were not on the chart paper zero.
I expressed my concern to the STAS and to a QA representative. All subsequent similar tests did not have this problem.
3.
At one time a CPC sensor alarm was received and a computer technician was called to the control room. The shift tech was very unsure of himself and placed a call for guidance.
- 4.
The potential proolem that occurred during the ascent to 3% power with the log power reading it has been thoroughly discussed.
I reviewed the T-power calculations that were made with the PMS data and was able to docunent in the NRC log that the maximum power that had been reached was 4.87%. 5.
Chemistry had difficulty in determining the amount of dissolved H2 in the , primary coolant.
6.
OPS executed very well. The integration of the STAS, Reactor Engineering, Chemi stry, etc., with the operations in the control room neecs improvement.
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ATTACHMENT 2
Pacific Northwest Laboratories , P O. Bou 999 June 6,1985 Richland, Washington U.S.A. 99332 Telephone tso9.
) Telen 15 2874 Mr. Jess Crews NRC Region Y 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596
Dear Jess:
SUBJECT: PR.0 VERDE STARTUP.SPECIM. INSPECTION As a member of the on-shift special inspection team at Palo Verde Power Plant, May 22-28,1985, I observed the day shift including pre-shift-turnover brief-ings.
I also observed achievement of initial criticality at 1:45 AM, May 25.1985 and the first return to criticality at 10:56 AM May 27.
In addition to control room oberservations I made two plant tours with NRC and plant personnel to verify equipment performance.
The operating crews which I observed carried out their duties responsibly and professionally. They worked as a team and exchanged observations, questions and cautions. They were knowledgeable about their plant and procedures.
In response to your request, my effort for this project was as follows.
I reported 56 professional staff hours for billing purposes.
In addition, I spent about 12 hours of casual overtime on project activities, exclusive of travel between Phoenix and the site.
[/ Sincerel 6]ht + Bryan F ore Senior search Scientist ) BFG:drp N"8 "' pog aum ADocx osooog,gg o PDR __ ._ _ _ _ __ _ . . - . ..
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, ' I ' . Specific Items Noted During Palo Verde Startup and Low Power Physics Tests 5/22 - 5/28/85 1.
The Low Power Physics Test Procedure, 72PY-1RX30, is vastly improved over the Low Power Physics Test Controlling Document, 72PY-lRX03, which it replaced prior to test initiation. Concerns which I expressed in my 1etter dated May 15, 1985 were remedied by this new procedure.
2.
Noted a minor discrepancy between the Test Log and the Control Room Log - - when reviewing the sequence of actions leading to boration to subcriti- - cality which had occurred when I was off shift.
The CR log noted a second borori injection between 05:23 and 03:28 on May 27,1985 which nas not recorded in the test log. Notations in the test log satisfactorily identi-fied the overboration incident and reported final boron concentration hqw ev er.
i 3.
Observed some minor confusion concerning the use of "NA" and logging of { comments during an operator's first performance of RPS and ESF Channel Surveillances after entry into Mode 2 at 320 F for low power testing.
He consulted with supervision, asked appropriate questions and made reason-able interpretations.
4.
Reviewed temporary modifications to nuclear instrumentations Control Channel connections, for hookup of the reactivity computer, during a modification made during testing.
Appropriate documentation, tagging and verification procedures were followed.
' ' 5.
Suggested rewording a step in the recently modified Plant Protective System Functional Testing Procedure. Observed a technician incorrectly ~ interpret an instruction to adjust a negative setpoint value to "20 mV' greater than" the value.
(He was corrected by the engineer who had modi-fied the procedure and was overseeing its initial application). Suggested rewording step to "20 mV more positive than."
6.
Shift briefing by operations personnel were clear and concise.
7.
APS Monitoring and Audit personnel actively reviewed procedures for ade- - quacy, change control and documentation of performance and surveillance , data. They provided clarification of administrative details to operators and test personnel.
Interactions which I observed were cordial and pro-fessional.
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. . =.m .- . ~. , . . .. . . . - ., . ,3 ATTACHMENT 3 ' Pacific Northwest Laboratoric< , . . P.O. Son 999
~ ' * * aschland. W46hington U.$A. 99.132 Te4ephone (500: . Teles 15 3874 . - . -- June 18,1985 . ...__
k Mr. Jess Crows ! NRC Region V ' q 1450 Marta Lane, sutte 210 { Walnut Creek, CA 94596 '
Dear Jess:
l .. SUBJECT: Palo Verde Startup Special Inspection As a member of the on-shift special inspection team at Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station (PVNGS), May \\ 26-31,195i I observed the day shift operations ' ' including pre shift turnover briefings between on-going and off-going opera - ~ crews as weil as briefings between Engineering and Operations.
. to the control room observations, I also made three plant tours to observe In addition - - operattons outstde of the control room.
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The operating crews that I observed performed their duties in a professional They were alert, and had a very posittve attitude toward their job.. ma nne r.
The personnel that I observed outstde the control roan on my plant tours were - knowledgeable about their plant and procedures and were professional in the performance of their dutjes.
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- During the perted of observation eentioned above, 40 profesatonal staff hours $ were charged to the inspection as well as 10 hours of casual overtime that - will not be btlled to the inspection.
S ely, . . ' - John Boegel Senior Research Engineer _ . , MBahk < - . . BEMMM&MAE d M EM A J - ! ~ bR 560CA 6560 520 P0 - PDR / -- .
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- l W i SPECIFIC ITEMS NOTED DURING PALO VERDE ! STARTUP AND LDIf POWER PHYSICS TESTS MY W-31 , . -. 1.
Low Power Phystes Tests were performed proficiently with Good communtcation - observed between operations and engineering personnel.
A grou.nd problem was observed by shift personnel on MA subgroup 64. Two rods legged the other l rods causing a deviation alarm.
Iac was notified and began to take voltage vs time measurements for each control rod maneuver tc detenntne the n the problem.' professionally.I observed these measurements, and found them to be perfonned 2.
Dbserved Aux 11tary Feed Pump A excess flow check valve test.
Check valve did not perform satisfactortly.
the problem and suggesting either repair or replacement of the valve. En - dures were followed correctly during the test and adequate safety precautions Proco-were taken during pump run-up.
the 'A' pump sunp and once noted, was subsequently cleaned. ~ Debris (g 3.
SIT B had a nitrogen overpressure leak throughout the entire parted of my observation.
grossed to once per shtft.The frequency of operator action to pressurtze the tank pro-While this was an annoyance and distraction, the , operating crews performed this exercise by procedure in a professional manner.
4.
D/G A was inoperable due to an excessive amount of microbes found in the fuel tank.
Because of this, D/G B had to be started once per shift.
due to excessive vibration.about 11 minutes had elapsed following D/G B sta After as. per technical spectf fcations.This placed Unit 1 into a two hour action statement shooting efforts of plant engineering on 0/G 5.During this period I observed the troubl These personnel carried out their diagnosttes professionally and emarcised the proper personnel safety precautions.
The vibratton analysis team was very responstve to the problem and the awareness that the plant was in a two hour action statement or shutdow was foremost on the minds of each team member.
a etartup test run at full load.with D/G B and it was declared operab the procedure calls for local start.During the startup for the full load test, This procedure step was deviated and the D/G B was started remotely. Operations explained that this was due to etc.) and that the procedure was in the process of )etng see the poi for this change, however.
I did not . 5.
recorded hourly due to malfunctiontag fire protection equip shift I observed that a temperature reading was not recorded on the shiftDuring on log. This was noted by the shift crew one hour later.
perly filed and util go the PRS for review.
The incident was pro- -
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The ongotng surveillance being performed on the RPS was a continuous annoyance and distraction.
The operations crews handled this professionally.
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crew to stve an audible alam as a remhder to m track of elapsed tir.e when in action stataments etc.
being used to its fullest potential and very few of the operations crews k how to use it.
The, STA's seem to be the only ones trained on it.
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W.: ATTACHMENT 4 1333 T.5 -2 l'1 (P ! r a NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SAFETY 85-06-50 PG?'Oiv!M -
June 28,1985 , , . d Jesse Crews, Senior Reactor Engineer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Con: mission, Region V 1450 Maria Lane Suite 202, Walnut Creek, Califorr.ia 94596
Dear Mr. Crews:
. Encloset is a statener.: of my observations, findings, and coc:ments as a member
of the NRC Region V Enhanced Inspection Team during the initial reactor start;p and low power physi:s tests at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station, Unit 1 , Please contact me at (415) 423-0952 or FTS 8-543-0952 it ru-ther information is neeced.
Sincerely,
. = _.
g-L. Rolf Peterson Nuclear Systens Safety Pr'og*am
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- - .:....- ~ - . -. .: . ;.w . =, . ' - - - E . W . ,. . . . . . Caservations and Ccnnents Ir.itial Pes:ttr Etsrtur and Lew Pcwer Reactor Physic s *ests Pale Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 NEC negion V Enhanced Inspecticn by L. Rolf Peterson, P.E.
' awrence Livernsre National Laboratory ' _ ! June 21, 1985 Backsreund I , i I participated as a censultant nenter cf the NEC Reglen V Enhancec j Inspectien Team at Pale Verde Nuclear Generating Statien, Unit 1 (Pale Verde 1), fren May 22 through May 31, 1985.
During this inspection I reviewed the precedures for initial criticality and low ptwer physics testa, etzer>ed the peri re.ar.:e ci reacter test and reactor eperations perscenel durir.g reacter startug and Icw power operatien, and evaluated l the prell..inary aesu.;4 vi the low pcwer reaccer physics tests.
The initial startup of Palo Verde 1 was conducted using Arizona Public Servi:e Cc. (AF2', Pale Verde Nuclear Generating Statien Manual, Orccedure ~CIC-i?XO2. Ir.itia; Criticality. Revision 1, dated May 20, 1565.
Startup and initial criticality was performed with the prinary reacter ecclant systen (FCS) at 320 degrees F temperature and 600 psia pressure.
Initia; criticality was achieved at 0145 cn May 25, 1965.
Lew pcwer reactcr ;hysic.s tests were conducted using APE Frocedure 72PY-t?X30, Lew Pcwer Physics Test, Revision 0, dated May 22, 1985.
Initia; ;;w pcwer physics tests were conducted at RCS ten;erature / 320 cegrees F / 630 psia.
Final low power physics tests were pressure = cenducted at FCE ter.perature / pressure = 565 degrees F / 2250 psia.
The icw pcwer rhysi:s tests cennenced on May 25, 1955, and were cencluded on June 1, 1985.
Cn May 22, 1985, I attended a briefin; by David Hoppes, the supervising APS reactor test engineer, and Frank Philpott, the lead Combustion I Engineering (CE! reactor engineer on site for the Palo Verde 1 startup.
The briefing sunnari=ed the plans for initial criticality and low power physics tests and reviewed the major evolutions included in the procedures cited at ve.
Initial Criticalitv I reviewed in detail Procedure 72:C-1RX02, Initial Criticality.
Seven properly approved Procedure Change Notices (PCNs) corrected minor dis;repancies in the eriginal Initial Criticality Precedure.
I feund that the precedure, including the PCNs, was complete and incorporated geed cperating practices for a safe approach to initial reacter criticality.
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__ _. _ - _ _ - . o.. ~ .,s._._..a... - . a., ~ k- -- - ~ ' ' . . . . - The pre:edure in:1uded adequate precautiens to prevent an unanti:! pated criti:alitv and t: ensure procer detecticn of the neutren hultiplica*ien c or.:.s <. r up.
Ine Frceecure established safe initial conditions for - reaeter startup with a high beron eeneentration and all centrol element assently (CEA) groups fully withdrawn except for CEA Croup 5, which was withdrawn te half inserti n.
, ' The F'::edure f:r t;r:n diluti:n to apprca:h criticality was cautic'ga and orderly.
It provided for periodic sanpling and 11boratory. analysis ' of the RCE and pressurl=e-beren concentrations and for monitoring RCF berence.eter readings curing bcron dilution and mixing.
The procedure , i called for Inverse Count Rate Ratio (ICRR or 1/M) plots versus boren c:ncentraticn ar.d versus time during tcron dilution and mixing to assist i in the precietion ci conditiens for initial c.iticality.
The procedure alsc required verification of at least one dacade of nuclear instrumentarien respense everlap between the startup channels and the log safet; :hannels during the final pertions cf the appr:ach te
- ritical.
I observsd eperati ns in the centrol rcen during early stages ci boren di! ti:n : .M a : . 'o~f.
a:. tserved the final twc h:urc cf the
appr:ach t: initial criticality.
Initial criticality was declared at - .... ' - ;.::a . 3.: ..a.
..:, -: :. e... ... ... ... c r e r a t a.cas we.re sase,y a r. J . . . . 0:npetently ;erf:rned in acccrdanes with the Initial Critiemlity , Frece:ure.
The pretieted FCI ter:n c:ncentration for initial criticality with CEA Grcap 5 halfway witndrawn anc all other CEAs fully withdrawn was 10cI p pr.
- t.d.
p ; r. ). The actual neasured borcn concentration at
- initia; criticality :n this cenfiguration was 1054 p;r.. This value was well within the a::eptable uncertainty of the predicted critical bcron c:;.:e: a-i : . W Tcwer F: vri s er e ~ After Fal: Verde 1 initial :riticality was established, AFE en ered Pro:edure 72.0Y-1F.X30, Low Power Pnysics Test, Revision O.
Tests
included in this preceture were: Critical bercn concentration measurements with different control rod con figura tions ; !sethernal tenperature r.easurements with different contrcl rod configurations; Reactivity wcrth measurements of regulating CEA Groups 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 insertions with no everlap at RCS 320 degrees F / 600 psia and withdrawals with ne overlap at RCS 565 degrees F / 2250 psia; I , , I 2- - - - - - - - . -
_ - _ - _ _ - - - _
.a.
... u.a w -.:a - - - - = -- ='=~; ~~ , . , . . Reactivity wcrth neasurement of shutdown CEA Croup B insertion at RCS 320 degrees F / 600 psia: Peactivity werth neaeurenent of insertion of Shutdown CEA Group A minus one CEA (Group A-1) at RCS 320 degrees F / 600 psia.
sinulating..ighest reactivity worth elenent CEA 77 stuck in the fully withdrawn position: , Pseudo-ejected CEA reactivity worth neasurement at RCS E65 der-eer F / 22!O priat Reactivity worth neasurenents of pseudo-dropped CEA, Part Length CEA (PLCEA), and PLCEA Subgroup at PCS 565 degreer F / 225C psia; , CEA reactivity worth synnetry checks at RCS 565 degrees F/ 2250 pris: , Reactivity werth neasurement of PLCEA Group P (an optional neasurenent fcr infernation only15 , CEA rea:tivity werth nessurements by exchange of reactivity te:wes.. CEr ;r:a;a s c;t:cnal neasur er.ents ). I reviewed APS Precedure 72PY-1RX?O, Rev 0, Low Power Physics Test, prior te and durir.g tne time that I observed the icw power physics tests at Pale Verde S.
The precedur+ was nedified by four PCNs te e;rrect mince discrepancies and to change the frequency of boron sampling during long periods of bcron stability.
I found that the precedure was cenplete anc explicit f:r all physics test activities.
The peccedure establishes prerequisites for low power physics testing that included conprehensive perscnr.el indoctrinatieni pretest briefing of operations personnel; equipnent availability, calibration, and configuration requirements: anc special sarveillance requirements.
Initial conditions for entery inte the procedure were clearly statec.
Special precautions to be observed during the procedure were provided.
] i I observed in the control roon representative portions of all activities and measurenents during the Icw power physics tests.
All tasks were j j perforned in accordance with the test procedure and approved PCNs.
During the low pcwer physics tests, the normal shif t test crew was an APS Responsible Engineer, two assistants, and a Combustion Engineering representative.
I observed that the reactor test and reactor operating crews preperly followed test procedures throughout the tests.
The APS and Combustion Engineering reactor test personnel had a good basic understaning of the measurenants being made and used proper test , I techniques to ensure that valid data was obtained.
I also observed close ccoperation between the APS reacter test personnel and the Combustion Engineering representatives.
The A?E reacter test pe.rzonnel were noticeably deper. dent upon the advice of the nere experienced Conbustion Engineering representatives during the apprcach to initial criticality and during early portiens of the low power physics tests.
I noted a definite increase in confidence and 3- - - - - - -- - = - -- - - - - - - - -
__ , _.... -... ~. -. - ~ - ~- - - =- -' - - - " - ' _ . . .. ' . ...d..c.0..
- * '. * -TZ /*=:.wr tect ;.4rsi.nt.61 ss they ga.ne; e:sp erier. e
. . during the course of the low power physics tests.
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Ft.ya. s tests reviewwd raw data ar.c ccrervec the - -............. AFE data analysis process.
All experiment data was analyced by at least tw: pe: Ele tc cetect errors and ninini e interpretive variation.
Good r+::rda wer+ ;:c;; ci a.1 raw data for future reference.
icund the -
data analysis efi:rt was well planned and adequately staffed.
I did not
chr+r"e an" dis:re an:les that went undetected or unterre: ed.
I believe that the data obtained was good and that the final results of data analyses were accurate.
. In all cases except one, the measured paraneters con form ed to predicted design values that were prcvided by Cenbustion Engineering and inecrperated into the AFE procedure.
The predicted worth for insertion of CEA Creup A minus one CEA withdrawn to sinulate a stuck rod assembly 'CEA Cr:up A-t $ was -0.E7 iDk/k with an acceptance rante between -0.4' ant ~..C' ilk k.
T".e measured reactivity werth of CEA Cr up A-1 was-0.55 %~k't.
Tne larger than expected negative reactivity of CEA u Grcup A-1 is nct a safety problem since it indicates that mere shutdown > rea:tivity tnan was predicted is available from insertion of this CEA tr:ur whe- :n+ :i the high+s-w:rth CEAs 1.. the group ir stuck in the fully withcrawn pcsition.
A?S test pers nnel generated a Test Exception Report (TER) for the CEA Orcup A-: c.*32urenen; and initiated an Engineering Evaluatien Request 'EEE).
The AFE Test Results Eeview Group ( TERC ) reviewed the TER on M6y 30.
The TERC ade an interin deterninatien that the higher than expe:tec negative reactivity worth of CEA Croup A-1 did not inpact safety ir, M:d+ tel:w Oli p:wer.
The TEEC referred the EEF to
Cembusti:n Engineerir.g f:r final evaluation of the inpa:t of exce:eding ' the expected negative reactivity worth.
I agree with the TRRC e a! ati:n and disp.siti:- Of this deviation fron predicted tett resuits.
C C'::'_ *:3 ' M:3 I found that Ari ena Fublic Service had adequate and complete procedures in place to safe!y conduct the startup to initial criticality and the icw power physics tests at Palc Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1
The Falo Verde 1 operating crews and reactor test personnel that I , observed on shift in the control roon during initial startup and thecughout the performance of low power physics tests followed established procedures.
, I cbserved that the Fale Verde i reactor operating crews and reactor test personnel perforned the approach to initial criticality and all low pcwer physics tests ccmpetently.
I also observed good cocperation and assistance fr:n Cenbustion Engineering representatives on shift during the Falo Verde 1 startup and low power physics tests.
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- I ebserved representative Fert; ns of the dats acquisition and analysis activitiee by the reaet:r test pers:nnel during initial criticality
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.-, a..a .sw ;cwer physics testa.
Accurate cata was obtained for all startup ar.d t es' e"elut i ens. ! concur with the test d a *. a analyset and ' evaluacier.s made by Ari=sna Public Service and Cembustion Engineering perscr.r.e1.
Ne +ciatiores fr:n expected nuclear design characteristics l' that uculd adversely affect safety cf operations of Palo-Verde 1 were chaerted d rit.g th= ir.itisi reacter startup ar.d the low p c h e.- physics . test progran, , /h .. - L.
Rolf Petersen, P,E.
Nuclear Systens Safety Program Lawrence Livermere National Lab ratcry . < l c ,
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