IR 05000321/1986016

Insp Repts 50-321/86-16 & 50-366/86-16 on 860602-05.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Offsite Support Staff & Offsite Review Committee

ML20207K177
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	06/24/1986
From:	Belisle G, Runyan M, Michael Scott NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207K159	List: IR 05000321/1986016 ML20207K156
References
50-321-86-16, 50-366-86-16, NUDOCS 8607290352
Download: ML20207K177 (9)

Text

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UNITED STATES

[. km CEC jo NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ n REGION 11

$ j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * 2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-321/86-16 and 50-366/86-16

! Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Hos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: June 2-5, 1986 Inspectors: /I/ e # [ V M. A. Scott uJ [ Date Signed

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M. T. Runyan ctm DM OS

, Date 51 gned Approved by: [ Pr 7 / (/!/3 '

G. A.'Belisle, Acting Section Chief Date' Signed Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted at the corporate offices in the areas of offsite support staff and offsite review committe Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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8607290352 860627 PDR ADOCK 05000321 G PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted

• R. Baker, Nuclear Licensing Manager - Hatch

• J. Beckham, Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Operations C. Boatright, Quality Assurance (QA) Lead Auditor D. Brock, Engineering Liaison Manager W. Burns, Nuclear Licensing Manager - Vogtle L. Byrnes, Senior Nuclear Engineer

• E. Cobb, Chairman, Nuclear Safety Reviews Manager R. Davis, Engineer W. Drinkard, Section Supervising Engineer D. Head, Senior Engineering Associate J. Jordan, Manager, Nuclear Projects

• T. McHenry, Manager, Nuclear Support

• B. McLeod, Manager, Maintenance and Outage Planning

• J. O'Reilly, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations S. Piedra, Technical Support Supervisor

• D. Reed, General Manager, QA

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• K. Rosanski, QA Engineering Support Manager C. Shiver, Engineer D. Smith, Manager Performance and Analysis Other licensee employees contacted included office personne Other Organizations P. Acree, Consultant J. Branum, Engineer, Southern Company Services (SCS)

L. Hagan, Consultant R. Hitchcock, Consultant R. King, Engineer, SCS

• R. Lewis, Consultant D. Montgomery, Consultant

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview i

The inspection scope and findings were suminrized on June 5,1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license The licensee did not

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identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the

- inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

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Unresolved Items Unresolved item were not identified during the inspectio ,

, Offsite Support Staff (40703)

l References: (a) 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1), Conditions of Licenses (b) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapters 13 and 17 (c) 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for

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Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants

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(d) Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program  ;

Requirements (Operations) '

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(e) ANSI N18.7 - 1976, Quality Assurance for the Operational

! Phase of Nuclear Power Plants

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(f) Technical Specifications, Section 6, Administrative Controls

) The inspectors visited the corporate offices to determine if the offsite -

support staff functions were performed by qualified personnel in accordance

! with licensee approved administrative controls, regulatory requirements,

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industry guides and standards, and Technical Specifications (TS). The '

l_ following criteria were used during this review to assess the adequacy of the offsite support staff:

- Administrative controls were established to assign departmental responsibilities, authorities, and lines of communication in conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and the

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licensee's approved QA progra i - Managers, group leaders, and staff members understood their responsi-

! bilities and authoritie The above personnel were qualified for their related wor .

- QA audits of offsite support staff activities were conducted j satisfactorily and corrective actions for identified deficiencies were i completed in a timely manne The documents listed below were reviewed to determine if the previously

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listed criteria had been incorporated into the licensee's offsite support i staff operatio ; Quality Assurance Manual, Revision 37 l 1 i-QA-01-01 Organization and Responsibilities of the QA Department, Revision 11 i

i QA-03-02 Training and Personnel Qualification, Revision 13

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3 l Nuclear Procurement Policy Manual l Chapter 2 Assignment of Responsibility, Revision 2 )

Chapter 3 Administrative Requirements, Revision 1 Chapter 4 Personnel Qualifications, Revision 1 NOP 2-050 General Organization Policy 1/24/86 NOP 2-300 Manager Nuclear Training 1/24/86 N0P 2-350 Manager Nuclear Support 1/24/86 N0P 2-400 Manager Engineering Liaison 1/24/86 N0P 2-500 Manager Nuclear Projects 1/24/86 N0P 2-550 Manager Maintenance and Outage 1/24/86 Planning N0P 2-660 Corporate Staff Presence of Plants 2/17/86 NOP 2-680 General Office Staff Interface with 2/17/86 the Plants N0P 2-800 Function Statements 1/24/86 NOP 3-300 Plant Performance Monitoring 3/24/86 N0P 4-100 Maintenance Management 3/19/86 N0P 4-400 Conduct of Maintenance 3/14/86 N0P 6-050 Design Change Review Connittee 3/31/86 l l

2/10/86 l HOP 11-100 Nuclear Procurement NOI 6-110 Review of Design Change Requests 5/13/86 NOI 18-150 Screening of Operating Experience 5/8/86 Information N01-18-175 Subject Requiring Independent Review 3/20/86 NOI 18-250 Incident Reviews and Reports of 3/18/86 l

Incident Evaluations I

N01-18-300 Monitoring of Plant Activitics 4/29/86 ,

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The inspectors reviewed the following corporate QA and consultant audits of various offsite support activities * i QA Audit of Equipment Qualification, 11/15/85 Southern Company Services (SCS) Hatch Nuclear Operational Support (performed by SCS), 12/5/85 QA Audit of Safety Review Board (SRB), 2/17/86 QA Audit of Nuclear Operations, 2/25/86

Plants Hatch, Vogtle, and Scherer NDT Certification Program, 4/24/86 l

General Electric Company (Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

Design, Appendix R, Shutdown Analysis, Licensee Event Reports (LER),

! Design Change Requests (DCR), performed by SCS, 4/30/86

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Audit of SCS QA Department, 5/28/86

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Bechtel Power Corporation, 5/30/86

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The inspectors interviewed the following Georgia Power personnel and consultants:

' Quality Assurance D. Reed, General Manager, QA i K. Rosanski, QA Engineering Support Manager R. Davis, Engineer Engineering Liaison

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D. Brock, Engineer Liaison Manager

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J.Branum, Engineer (SCS)

R. King, Engineer (SCS)

! Nuclear Projects

! J. Jordan, Manager, Nuclear Projects D. Head, Senior Engineering Associate Nuclear Support

. T. McHenry, Manager, Nuclear Support L. Hagan, Consultant P. Acree, Consultant

S. Piedra, Technical Support Supervisor

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Nuclear Safety and Licensing R. Baker, Nuclear Licensing Manager - Hatch W.' Burns, Nuclear Licensing Manager - Vogtle  !

! L. Byrnes, Senior Nuclear Engineer

Maintenance and Outage Planning B. McLeod, Manager, Maintenance and Outage Planning 4 Performance and Analysis D. Smith, Manager, Performance and Analysis

The interviews referenced above were conducted to assess the administration, indoctrination, and training of the corporate staff. All employees appeared to understand their responsibilities and authorities and could identify the

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! procedures which delineated this information. These procedures, also

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referenced above, provided a high degree of detail pertaining to organiza-

tional structures, interface pathways, and employee training. In several I

disciplines, some staff procedures were in the formation or conceptual stage

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as part of the development of a Nuclear Operations Policy / Nuclear Operations i Instruction (N0P/N01) Manual. This effort parallels a major = restructuring

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and expansion of the Nuclear Operations Department, still in progress, to

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form the groups referenced above. Safety-related staff functions were proceduralized as the first priority.

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All employees had received some form of training, which mostly consisted of general employee training and required reading lists. Training was held mostly in-house in lieu of using outside consultants. This deerphasis on formal technical school usage is the result of hiring individuals with high j experience levels and the licensee's confidence in the on-the-job training

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A majority of the technical staff are degreed engineers. Registration as '

, professional engineers is encouraged by- the licensee's assumption of i

associated fee However, only minor restrictions to advancement are posed by an individual's professional status.

! Based on the interviews, the inspectors concluded that corporate staff I members frequently visited the nuclear sites to augment their support

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function. Several corporate groups had permanent onsite personne Interfaces and communications .between various offsite support groups were

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J clearly delineated by procedure. The inspectors determined that all groups had a close working relationship which resulted in coordinated support to

the sites. Each group appeared to understand the methods of operation and i areas of purview of other corporate group ,

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l The inspectors noted that recent efforts have been made to enhance staff performanc This has included an improved plant performance trending program and a new records identification and maintenance system. The l overall at citude of the staff demonstrated a commitment to excellenc The corporate staff exhibited a high degree of professionalism. The knowledge level and experience was noticeably high as well as the level of awareness and conversance regarding ongoing technical issue Within this area, no violations or deviations were identified. Offsite Review Committee (40701)

References: (a) 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1), Conditions of Licenses (b) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapters 13 and 17 (c) 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants (d) Technical Specifications (TS), Section (e) R ?gulatory Guide 1.33, Duality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations)

(f) ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear power Plants The inspector reviewed the licensee's equivalent to the Offsite Review Committee as delineated in the Standard Review Plan (NUREG 0800). This equivalent organization was called the Safety Review Board (SRB) which was administratively under the Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager who reported to the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations. The review ensured that the SRB performed activities as required by references (a) through (f).

The following criteria were used during this review to assess the overall acceptability of the established program:

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The SRB membership and qualifications were as required by T The SRB held meetings at the required frequency with the required quoru The SRB reviewed those items specified in T The SRB had cognizance of audits performed in the areas specified by T SRB meeting minutes were prepared and issued within the required timef rame _ _ - .

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i The following documents were reviewed to determine if the previous listed

criteria had been incorporated into the licensee's SRB activities:

N0P 10-400 Safety Review Board 5/23/86 NOI 10-401 Conduct of Nuclear Safety Review Board 5/23/86 Meeting I

NOI 10-402 SRB Review of Documentary Material 5/23/86-NOI 10-403 Processing of Safety Review Board 5/23/86

Meeting NOI 10-404 SRB Records Retention and Handling 5/23/86

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NOI 10-405 Safety Review Board Subcomittees 5/23/86 NOI 10-406 SRB Conduct on Onsite Reviews and Audits 5/23/86 i The inspectors examined scheduled and unscheduled-SRB meeting minutes from

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August 1985 to the date of this inspectio Scheduled meetings occurred

, more frequently than the TS required intervals (quarterly) and the unscheduled meetings were held to reduce review document backlog and review other emergent material and events. The minutes indicated review of certain

, documents, SRB Subcomittee (SRBS) minutes, and open item The SRBS performs the majority of review for the SRB. The chairman for the SRB and SRBS are the same individual who provides continuity of reviewed material and prepared both sets of meetings minutes. The SRBS condensed all Plant Hatch reviewed material and sumarized these documents into the SRBS minutes.

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The inspectors reviewed Corporate Audit Report GPC 86-SRB-1/1 dated February 17, 1986. One of the findings of the report was that the SRBS did i not reflect the expertise listed / implied in the TS for the SRB. The closure for this audit item was provided by proposing and adding additional

personnel with SRB mirrored qualifications to the SRBS; the total addition of new members was not complete, j The inspectors attended a SRBS meeting during the inspection. The meeting i was held in accordance with corporate generated procedural requirements. A i typed agenda and hand-outs were distributed to the comittee which supple-

! mented the ensuing discussions. Previous SRBS meeting minutes were reviewed i by the SRBS and voted upon-for acceptance. New plant related documents to j be reviewed by SRBS were presented as indicated in the agenda.-

l The inspectors interviewed SRB and SRBS members and . their chairma Primarily, the discussions centered around corrective actions, qualifica-

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tions of the membership, and issues that had come before the boards. The

inspectors determined that information flowed readily between the SRBS and SRB. Many of the SRB members were on or proposed for the SRB i l

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The inspectors examined the functional areas with which the SRB was involved. Some of the points of interest are as follows:

. All documents coming

- There was very little review document backlog.

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from Plant Hatch were being reviewed at nearly a real time rat Both the SRB and SRBS tracked concerns and findings as open item Although four items had been lost in the tracking system (as identified in the above audit report), the present manual system appears adequate.

j i - Presently, deficiencies found by the SRB and SRBS appear to be adequately followed up under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 2, n

Appendix C,Section V.A for self identification of problem Should findings require escalation for corrective action, the SRB may report those problems to the Senior Vice President of Nuclear

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Operations for resolution. The licensee reported that this course of action had been utilized within the past yea f j

The inspectors evaluated the SRB and SRBS meeting minutes for review dept The minutes only address reviewed documents by title and revision unless there was an open item against the document. The open item in the minutes

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outlined the concern with the document; subsequent minutes carried the item adding additional information until closure occurre The SRB received 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations on procedure changes in lieu of reviewing the changes with the evaluations; this is an acceptable condition due to the fact that the Plant Review Board reviewed the procedure change. Since the

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c SRB review of the TS is overviewed by the NRC, the inspectors did not J examine this proces ,

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The SRB assessed QA and their audits during the course of their normal

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review process. The SRB utilized trending information from other groups and The l

findings in the meeting minutes in performing their QA assessment.

audits were reviewed by the SRB shortly after they were performe I i

Within this area, no violations or deviations were identified.

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