ML20207E161

Responds to NRC 861118 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Re Violations Noted from Insp on 860721 & 0808.Upon Discovery of Inoperable Pressurizer Safety Valve,Unit Placed in Cold Shutdown & Valve Replaced

ML20207E161
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	12/30/1986
From:	Bernard Thomas COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
2557K, EA-86-163, NUDOCS 8701020076
Download: ML20207E161 (10)

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' CoRMnonwealth h

'H-- Q One Fast Nabonel Plaza, Cruce0o. lilinois

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( / Address Reply to: Post Omco Box 767 V/ Ctucago,lunois 60000 0767 Y[ December 30, 1986

Mr.~ James M. Taylor,; Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' Washington, DC. 20555

Subject:

-Byron Station Unit 1 Proposed Civil Penalty EA 86-163

'NRC Docket No. 50-454 References (a): August 18, 1986 letter from

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C.E.'.Norelius to Cordell Reed (b): November 18, 1986 letter from J.G. Keppler to J.J. O'Connor

Dear Mr. Taylor:

Reference (a) provided the results of an inspection at Byron Station between' July 21 and August 8, 1986. As a result of this inspection and further discussions durjng an enforcement conference on August 25, 1986, certain activities were found to be in violation of NRC requirements.

Reference (b) transmitted a. Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty related to the violations identified in reference (a). a Attachment A of this letter contains Commonwealth Edison's response to tile Notice of Violation enclosed with roference (b). On December 17, 1986, Conunonwealth Edison was granted a 14-day extension on the due date for the response to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty.

Commonwealth Edison believes the proposed civil penalty should have been mitigated completely. This is based not only on the discussion in Attachment B of this letter regarding the five factors in Section V.B of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, but also on the following discussion of the NRC's enforcement discretion as it should be applied to this situation.

M_inimal Safety Sinnificance Commonwealth Edison believes the installation of the inoperable pressurizer safety valve presented minimal safety significance This should allow the NRC to exercise its enforcement discretion to completely mitigate the proposed civil penalty.

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The aggregated violations (A through C) involve the installation of

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one inoperable l pressurizer safety valve. There are three pressurizer safety 1 valves installed:in the plant. Their function is to prevent reactor coolant system pressure from exceeding.110% of system design pressure. . The design j

. pressure of the reactorLeoolant system is 2485 pois. Additionally, there are

.two: pressurizer. power operated relief valves installed.in the plant. Their functions.are to prevent' actuation of the reactor high-pressure trip during

-design transients and to limit undesirable openings of the pressurizer safety

, o valves. <

Under the. actual conditions that' existed during this event, it is

-clear that the possibility of overpressurizing the reactor coolant system was not present. Reactor coolant pressure could not be increased above 1750 psig because of,the lowered setpoint of the inoperable pressurizer safety valve.

Even if it was fortuitous that the inoperable pressurizer safety l valve'11fted at a-lower setpoint of 1750 psis, assuming the valve would rot actuato at any pressure and assuming a transient occurred which caused reactor coolant pressure to increase above normal operating pressure, the reactor

. coolant system was still adequately protected from overpressurization. This is bec6use the two pressurizer. power operated relief valves were operable during this event. :A review of FSAR table 5.4-16 indicates the pressurizer power operated relief valves together have the relief capacity of a

- pressurizer safety valve.

The reactor coolant system was protected from overpressurization While the inoperable pressurizer safety valve was installed. Therefore, Commonwealth Edison believes this event was of minimal safety significance and warrants WRC enforcement discretion to completely mitigate the proposed penalty.

Separate Violations Aanreasted f

l Violations A and C, the installation of an inoperable valve which was j.

!also not tested before installation, were the unavoidable consequences of

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. violation B, failure to properly control nonconforming equipment to prevent its inadvertent installation, since these two consequences (violations A and

(' C) were not separate, additional errors, the NRC did not have to consider these consequences as separate violations. The installation of an untested.

l linoperable valve did not result from a separate failure to follow procedures

l. .for' testing the valve or determining its operability. Those tests and determinations had been performed for the valve which the Byron personnel believed they were installing. Thus, the NRC should exercise its discretion to recognize that the events underlying violations A and C were simply unavoidable consequences of violation B which does not warrant their treatment as independent violations.

With respect to violation D, its aggregation with the others is not appropriate. The specification of an incorrect tolerance was unrelated to the repair-related events in violations A through C. Violation D is related to the other violations only in the broadest sense that it was maintenance

.related. Such a generalized relationship between events does not justify its l

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aggregation.with~the other violations into one collective Severity Level III ,

problem.

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.The foregoing discussion provides another basis for the NRC to Lexercise'its_ enforcement dis:retion and completely mitigate the proposed penalty..

. Punitive Aspects of Proposed Enforcement Action

- ' Commonwealth Edison believes that its broad ranging response, both

~for the short and long term. warrant the NRC's exercise of discretion to minimize rather than maximize the violations associated with these events.

The prompt and extensive short term corrective actions did result in a partial mitigation of the penalty and, thus, will not be relied on further. The long

~ term corrective' actions, the broad look at all maintenance activities by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the establishment of a task .

~ force.to review the maintenance situation and develop a conduct of maintenance program all clearly demonstrate Cosmonwealth Edison's recognition of the need for disciplined control of maintenance activities and a commitment to such

. control. . In view of Conunonwealth Edison's commitments, the. NRC's imposition

.;.of a civil penalty would. add nothing to Commonwealth Edison's appreciation of the problem or determination to achieve its solution. Rather, the civil

, penalty would be simply a punitive fine which is inconsistent with Commonwealth Edison's response.

For all the reasons presented above and in Attachment B, Commonwealth Edison believes the proposed civil penalty for this event should be completely mitigated.

Please direct any questions regarding this matter to the Director of Nuclear Licensing.

Very truly yours,

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Bide L. Thomas Executive Vice President Attachments cc: oJ.C." Keppler-Region III J

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SUBSCRIBRD'and SWORN to before me'thisifo % ay l of X]O r :m /vn, 1986 d Y ko +M)

Nota Public I

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ATTACHMENT A

Violations A. B a'nd C JA2 ? Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 requires that all' Pressurizer Code Safety

Valves.be operable in Modes, 1, 2, and 3 with a lift setting of 2485 psig t'l percent, and that with.one Pressurizer Code' Safety Valve inoperable, either. restore-the inoperable valve to Operable status within 15 minutes or be in at least Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least Hot Shutdown

-within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Technical l Specification 3.0.4 requires that entry into an Operational Mode shall not be made unless the conditions for the Limiting condition for Operation'are met without reliance on the provisions contained in the Action requirements.

Contrary to the above, on July 17, 1986, Unit 1 entered Mode 3 with Pressurizer Code Safety Valve, Serial No. N56964-00-0031 inoperable in

.that the valve dise was not installed and the lift setting was not 2485 psig 1 1 percent. In addition, on July 17-18, 1986 while in Mode 3, actions were not taken to restore valve No. N56964-00-0031 to an operable status within 15 minutes or be in at least hot shutdown within the l; following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

B. 10'CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Celtet*lon IV, Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components, as implemented by ihe Commonwealth Edison Quality Assurance Manual, Quality Requirement 15.0, requires that measures shall be established to control materials, parts, or components, which do not conform to requirements in order to prevent their inadvertent use or installation.- These measures shall include, as appropriate, procedures for identification, documentation, segregation, disposition, and notification to affected organizations.

Contrary to the above, in October 1985, the licensee's program did not assure the . control of nonconfoaming materials in that af ter partial g

maintenance on Pressurizer Code, Safety Valve, Serial No. N56964-00-0031, was performed, the valve was not properly identified, documented, or segregated and on July 6, 1986 the valve was inadvertently installed.

C. . Technical. Specification 4.0.5.a requires that inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components and ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in'accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g), 'except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission.

The applicable ASME B&PV Code is the 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda, Which in Section II, Subsection IWV-3200 requires that when a valve or its control system has been replaced or repaired or has undergone maintenance that could affect its performance, and prior to the time it is returned to

- service, it shall be tested to demonstrate that the performance parameters which could be affected by the replacement, repair or maintenance are

' within acceptable limits.

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Contrary to the above, on July 6, 1986 Pressurizer Code Safety Valve

~ Serial No. W56964-00-0031, an ASME B&PV Code Class 1 valve, was installed

~ and placed into; service after'it had undergone maintenance that could affect its performance without any testing being performed to demonstrate that-it would perform acceptably.

4dmission of Alleaed Violations We have reviewed the inspector's. account of the events and find it to

-be' accurate. We admit that our measures to control a nonconforming

<pressuriser safety valve (serial no. N56964-00-0031) did not prevent the

inadvertent installation:of the valve.' As a result of this, we admit: a

' pressurizer safety valve (serial no. N56964-00-0031) was returned to service without being tested to demonstrate its performance parameters were within Lacceptable' limits; Technical Specification 3.0.4. was not met because Unit 1 entered Mode'3 without the limiting condition for operation of Technical ^

Specification 3.4.2.2 being satisfied and; the action statement of Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 for an inoperable pressurizer safety valve was not met.

Reason for Violations The violations are attributed to documentation for a pressurizer safety valve (serial no. N56964-00-0031) reflecting the test information for another pressurizer safety valve.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved Upon discovery of.the inoperable pressurizer safety valve, Unit I was placed in cold shutdown and the inoperable valve was replaced.

Corrective Action to Avoid Further Violation The following actions have been taken:

- Meetings were held with appropriate departments stressing that documentation must match the equipment being tested or worked on.

The meetings were completed August 6, 1986.

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- The safety valve bench test procedure was revised to more clearly

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indicate equipment identifications. The procedure revision was approved for use on August 22, 1986.

- Segregation cages have been constructed for storage of contaminated equipment. This was completed November 18, 1986.

- The Conduct of Maintenance Task Force implemented a program to review the control of other 'like' components being repaired. A work practice was established in the maintenance department that only allows one component to be worked on at a time in each segregated

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area. Additionally..the stores department has been-directed to accept into their control system reworked spare parts that are not to be inunediately installed in the plant. These programs were

-implemented in September, 1986 and will be evaluated regarding their effectiveness during the first' refueling outage for Unit 1.

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- _A segregated storage area for contaminated spare parts was established in the auxiliary building. This was completed October 1, 1986.

-- An INPO assessment of maintenance activities was requested. The assessment was completed August 15, 1986 and the recommendations are being reviewed and acted upon appropriately.

- Date ilhen Full Compliance was Achieved Unit .1 was plued in cold shutdown on July 18, 1986. The inoperable

pressurizar safety valve was removed and replaced on July 19, 1986. The replacement valve was tested prior to its installation. The majority of the enhanced measures to control maintenance activities and nonconforming parts were implemented by November 18, 1986. Some of the INPO reconnendations are still being considered.

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Violation D v

10fCFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.-as implemented by the Cownonwealth Edison Quality Assurance Manual, Quality Requirement 5.0, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a

. type' appropriate'to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance

.with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures,

'or drawings'shsil include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria.for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

Contrary to the above, the licensee's program failed to assure that

' appropriate' quantitative acceptance criteria were specified in instructions or procedures. Nuclear Werk Request B31703, used on July 19, 1986 to test the lift setting of Pressurizer. Code Safety Valves 1RY8310A and 1RY8010C, t

. referenced Maintenance Procedure BNP 3100-9, R3 vision 1, which specified a tolerance of i 3 perce It instead of i i percent as required by technical specifications. As a result Pressurizer Code Safety Valve 1RY8010C was set with a tolerance greater than i i percent.

Admission of the Allemed Violation We have reviewed the inspector's account of the event and find it to be. accurate. We admit that Maintenance Procedure BNP 3100-9, Revision 1 did not contain appropriate quantitative acceptunce criteria for the tolerance on the lift setting for pressurizar safety valves.

Reason for Violation since the maintenance procedure did not contain a pre-determined tolerance for the lift setting of the pressurizer safety valves, the tolerrnce specified in the vendor manual for.the valves was used. The vendor manual specified a tolerance of i 3 percent.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved Upon discovery of the wrong tolerance being used in the maintenance procedure, a review of the valve lift setting test results was performed. The lift setting for valve IRY8010A was found to be within the i 1 percent tolerence specified in the Technical specifications. This was determined from a review of the pre-calibration and post-calibration data on the test gauge ,

which showed the instrument was reading high. Valve IRY8010C was removed from '

the reactor coolant system and ratested to meet the i i percent technical j specification tolerance.

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' Corrective Action to Avoid Purther Violation The following maintenance procedures were developed which contain specific setpoints and tolerances for safety and relief valves which are listed in the Technical specifications:

BMP 3120-1 pressurizer safety valves BMP 3119-2 RHR relief valves BMP 3114-12 main steam safety valves

.Date When Full Compliance was Achieved BMP 3120-1 was approved for use on August 22, 1986. BMP 3119-2 and BMP 3114-12 were approved for use on December 11, 1986.

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y ATTACHMENT B

'Section V(B) of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C authorizes the Commission

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e .to mitigate civil penalties and enumerates the mitigation factors which will

.be considered. These factors are addressed below and are shown to warrant

. full. mitigation of the proposed penalty.

prompt Identification and Reporting

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" Reduction of up to :50% of the base civil penalty may be given when a

' licensee identifies the violation and promptly reports the violation to the

- NBC . . ...No consideration will be given to this factor if the licensee does

~not take immediate action to correct the problem upon discovery". (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C Note V.B.1). Commonwealth Edison took immediate corrective action upon discovering that'an. inoperable valve had been installed inadvertently. Therefore, mitigation is available here for prompt Lidentification~and reporting of the violation. Commonwealth Edison believes

.that it promptly identified and reported the violation. The NRC staff disagrees because Commonwealth Edison became aware of the problem only after the valve actuated, as opposed to when it was installed. While this is clearly correct, it does not preclude mitigation when all the factors identified by the Commission are considered.

"In weighing [ prompt identification and reporting), consideration

.will be given to, among other things, the length of time the violation existed prior to discovery, the opportunity avellable to discover the violation, the ease of discoveey and the promptness and completeness of any required report" (10 CFR part 2, Appendix C Note, V.B.1). Commonwealth Edison believes the NRC t

staff considered only the first factor -- the length of time the violation existed prior to discovery.

The gravamen of Violation A was that the valve was not operable when Mode 3 was entered. Thus, Violation A actually occurred when Mode 3 was entered with an inoperable valve, and not when the valve was actually installed. Accordingly, Violation A was discovered almost immediately after it occurred. Similarly, the record shows that Violation D was discovered one day after-it occurred. This leaves only Violatiors B and C (failure to adequately control nonconforming materials and failure to test a repaired valve prior to its installation) as the only violations which went undiscovered for any length of time. However, these two violations should not be considered as separate, cumulative events because Violation C was an unavoidable consequence of Violation B. The valve which Commonwealth Edison believed it had installed had been tested. Under these circumstances, the length of time for which the violatiets went undiscovered does not weigh heavily against mitigation.

Violations A through C all resulted from a mixup of two valves, one  ;

of which was internally incomplete. Once the two valves were interchenged, there was no opportunity to discover that fact until the incomplete valve actuated. It was essentially impossible to discover the mixup until Mode 3 was entered and reactor coolant pressure increased. Therefore, Violations B and C went undiscovered for the minimum time possible under the circumstances.

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n Finally, Commonwealth Edison provided the URC with complete reports of the violations. ,

For all these reasona, commonwealth Edison believes that consideration of all the timeliness factors in the Commission's Enforcement policy. supports the full 50% mitigation for prompt identification and reporting.

Corrective Actions Because the NRC Staff has recognized this factor to the fullest extent possible, no further discussion is warranted.

past performance Prior good performance in the general area of concern permits the reduction of a civil penalty by up to 100% of the base value. Byron Station has had a good record in this general area of concern since operation began approximately one and one-half years prior to this event. Although a

.long-term record of performance has yet to be created, the record established thus far in the maintenance area warrants an additional degree of mitigation for this factor.

Prior Notice Byron has not received any earlier notices in this general area.

Multiple Occurrences There have not been any multiple occurrences in this general area at Byron.

Conclusion The foregoing discussion of the mitigation factors in Section V(B) of 10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C shows that full mitigation of the proposed civil penalty is warranted.

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