ML20206D891

Forwards Info Repts Received by Commission Under Reporting Requirements of Part 21

ML20206D891
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	04/06/1987
From:	Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Robert Williams PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO
References
REF-PT21-87-087-000 PT21-87-087-000, PT21-87-87, NUDOCS 8704130454
Download: ML20206D891 (2)

Text

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. s APR C 1987 In Reply Refer To:

Docket: 50-267 Public Service Company of Colorado ATTN: Robert 0. Williams, Jr.

Vice President, Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201-0840 Gentlemen:

This forwards for your information reports recently received by the Comission under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.

Although no response is required to this letter, we shall be pleased to answer any questions which you may have regarding this matter.

Sincerely, "CrJafnel 3rgnag g M. L HAf.tp J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch Attachments:

1. Toledo Edison Letter No. 1-706 dated February 3, 1987

2. Niagara Mohawk Letter No. NMP2L 0979 dated January 26, 1987, w/ attachment

3. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. Letter dated December 1, 1986, w/ attachment

4. Vermont Yankee Letter dated Novenber 10, 1986 cc w/ attachments:

llanager, Nuclear Proc'uction Division Fort St. Vrain' Nuclear Station 16805 WCR 191 Platteville, Colorado 80651 P. Tomlinson, Manager, Quality Assurance Division (sameaddress)

Colorado Radiation Control Program Director Colorado Public Utilities Comission bec attachmentshseenextpage) s I 7

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.g' g Public Service Company of Colorado bec w/ attachments to DMB (IE19) bec w/ attachments distrib. by RIV:

RPB DRSP RRI R. D. Martin, RA SectionChief(RPB/A) RSB Section Chief (RSB/ES) Project Inspector R&SPB D. Weiss, RM/ALF RIV File

< HIS System R. Hall RSTS Operator J

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t AlJTOMATIC VALVE CORPORATION W) ,

y [> Worldwide Leaders in Air Control Products ,

RO. Box 435 41144 Vincenti Court Novi. Michigan 48050-0435 Phone:(313) 474-6700 .y Y Telex:23-1203 S N b-t December 19, 1986 _ ,,,

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission . _.

799 Rosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 ._ L ATTENTION: Mr. James Keppler

Dear Jim,

Confirming our conversation with your Geoff Wright on 12/18/86, we wish to notify you of a valve related problem that occured at Pennsylvania Power and Light's Susquehanna Plant #2. They found that Houghto #620 lubricant attacks and degrades aluminum in our valves.

Valves have or are being rebuilt at this time to correct the situation.

Pennsylvania Power and Light has changed their lubricant req'Jirement from Houghto #620 to Parker Super "0" (our qualified lubricant) for the rebuild.

Commonwealth Edison's Quad Cities plants also have valves lubricated with this Houghto #620.

Should you need additional information, please call.

Very trtfly pours, 14h ( ar[

Todd Hutchins Vice President General Manager TH/cg cc: D. Swinton, Automatic Valve J. Graham, PennsylvaniasPower & Light M. Siebert, Commonwealth Edison

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870tO508 P 861219 l FDR ADOOK 05000254 S PDR l AIR CONTROL VALVES

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yzpyggy NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION!301 PtAINFIELD ROAD, SYRACUSE, N.Y.13212/ TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 February 2, 1987 (NMP2L 0989)

Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 63! Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Re: Nine Mlle Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410

Dear Dr. Murley:

In accordance with the requirements of Part 21 of the Commission's regulations, Niagara Mohawk is submitting a written report of a defect in the design of a basic component. Initial notification of this defect was mada to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Mr. J. Linville by telephone on January 23, 1987. The attached report provides the information required by 10CFR21.21.

Very truly yours, NIAGARA M0 HANK POWER CORPORATION C. V. Mangan Senior Vice President KBT/pns i 2524G xc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Project File (2)

-8702noleo-870202

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION Report of Deviation, Defect, or Failure To Comply (1) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission:

The Commission was informed by telephone on January 23, 1987, by Peter E. Francisco, Lead Licensing Engineer.

(2) Identification of the facility, the activity or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which falls to comply or contains a defect: _

Improper electrical manhole duct seal design at Nine Mlle Point Unit 2.

(3) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:

The electrical manhole seals were designed and installed by the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation.

(4) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply; Electrical Manhole #5 is located at EL 244'-0" in the decontamination building. Safety-related electrical duct banks and conduit run from this manhole to the control building and to the service water pump bays. The seals on the duct bank and conduit are Dow Corning 3-6548 (foam) rated at 2 psi. There are no additional seals at the control building end of the duct banks. There are elastomer (with caulk facing) seals at the service water pump bay end of the conduit. However, these seals are only designed to work against pressure from the pump bay side.

A failure of circulating water piping could flood the turbine building pipe tunnels. The water could eventually flood Manhole #5 since the manhole covers are not watertight. The pressure at the bottom of the manhole could cause the duct bank seals to fall. This failure would allow the flood waters to travel through the duct banks and conduit to the control building and the service water pump bays.

The resulting flooding in the control building could disable Category I  ;

electrical equipment that is not designed for submergence. The resulting l flooding in the service water pump bays could disable the safety-related service water pumps. Loss of this equipment would adversely affect the operation of the plant and the safe shutdown capability.

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• (5) The date on which the information of 'such defect ~or failure to comply was obtained:

A potential problem was initially. identified on December ~ 29, 1986. As a result of a preliminary analysis by Stone-and Webster which we received on January 21, 1987, Niagara Mohawk determined that degradation of.such safety-related equipment represents a major reduction in the degree of protection provided to the public health and safety,-and:accordingly could have created a substantial. safety hazard.

' (6) In the case of a basic component which contains a defectLor falls to '

comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being suppled for one or more facilities or activates '

subject to the regulations in this part: _

We have not identified any other components.at Nine Mlle Point Unit 2.

subject to this failure. At this time, we know of no other facilities-

. potentially having this defect.

(7) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken';-the name of the individual or organization responsible for_the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:

The manhole covers have been redesigned to-prevent flooding of the~

manhole. The new manhole covers will be installed prior to initial criticality.

i (8) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the_ facility, activity,'or basic _ component that has been, is being, or will be given.to purchasers or licensees.

Not applicable.

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HXEDO

%s EDISON Docket No. 50-346 JOE VVILUANG. JA.

Samr vce Prescent.Nwjeer

[419]249-2300 License No. NPF-3 (4'S12's s223 Serial No. 1-706 February 3, 1987 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~

Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

This letter confirms our conversation with Messrs. P. Jyron and P. Wohld of your staff on January 29, 1987. Toledo Edison is reporting a problem that was found in the torque switches supplied with Limitorque operators installed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. This condition is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR21.

The concern is that Limitorque did not supply adequate instructions to maintain the torque switches " balanced" so that the torque at torque switch trip is equal for both valve opening and valve closing. With the torque switch unbalanced, the torque switch can trip before the valve operator can produce sufficient torque, or thrust, to operate the valve against its design differential pressure.

Specifically, on January 26, 1987, in the review of the data for Toledo Edison's answer to IE Bulletin 85-03, it was determined that prior to June 9, 1985, (torque) thrust measured for the main steam to auxiliary feed pump turbine #1 containment isolation valves (MS106 and MS106A) was insufficient to close against the desigu differential pressure of 1100 psig. The low closing thrust for these two valves has been determined to be a result of the operators having an unbalanced torque switch. The settings on the torque switches were correct.

Imbalance, prior to developing a method of measuring thrust, was not considered as a significar.t parameter. The u.=e of equipment to measure the thrust now allows this imbalance to be measured and evaluated. Based 1 on IE Bulletin 85-03 testing, calculations indicate that MS106 would have fully closed against a maximum 468 psid pressure and MS106A would have fully closed against.a manimum 901 paid pressure. These pressures are below the design differential pressure of 1100 psig. A mechanical device has been developed to reasure and adjust torque switch balance without having to use thrust measuring test equipment, and has been demonstrated by testing these type of switches.

87021-10083 870203 PDR ADOCK 05000346 S PDR THE TOLEDO EO; SON COMPANY EDISON PLAZA 300 MAOfSON AVENUE TOLEDO. OH'O 43652 k

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Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 1-706 Page 2 Limitorque was informed by phone by Toledo Edison of this problem on January 27, 1987.

Prior to implementation of the Motor Operated Valve Reliability Improve-ment Testing Prograv, Davis-Besse had several unexplained torque switch tripping problems which were solved by replacing the torque switch.

These could likely have been the result of unbalanced torque switches.

Toledo Edison's Motor Operated Valve Reliability Improvement Program 7 confinned proper operation of all torque switches prior to the restart following the June 9, 1985, shutdown. -

Very truly yours, h Ie2 _ (

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PC:DJS:pl ec: DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator (2 copies) 3 f

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III. BASIC PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION i

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] Balance is determined by the relative position of the torque switch tripper arms.

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Y NIAGARA NuMOHAWK NIAG AR A MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION '301 PLAINRELD ROAD. SYRACUSE. N Y.13212 TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 January 26, 1997 (NMP2L 0979) ~

Dr. Thomas Murley, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410

Dear Dr. Murley:

We are hereby providing written notification in accordance with 10CFR21 regarding problems with General Electric supplied Agastat GP Series Relays.

These problems were originally identified at Nine Mlle Peint Unit 2. In summary, several Agastat GP Relays used at Nine Mlle Point Unit 2 have been found improperly seated in their sockets. This condition may have t.een caused by inadequate original installation, workers comi:rg into contact wiB the installed relays, or both.

The corrective actions already taken included establishing instructions for installation and testing to ensure the relays are properly seated.

Corrective actions in progress or to be taken include the following:

1. Identify and locate Agastat GP Relays used in safety related applications for Nine Mlle Point Units 1 and 2.

2. Inspect and correct, if necessary, Agastat GP Relays used in safety related applications at Nine Mlle Point Units 1 and 2. (Completion date - February 9, 1987)

3. Reinspect once a month as described in item 2 above. We will establish a variable preventative maintenance procedure for the reinspection. The monthly frequency may' decrease, if appropriate, based on an evaluation of the information provided by the inspections. Other corrective actions and the root cause of this problem are expected to be identified during reinspections. If necessary, a comprehensive root cause analysis will be performed.

-870tW70126 PDR ADOCK 05000410 9 lT g;j t

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4. Revise the appropriate maintenance procedures to include the recently established instructions for installation and testing of the relays.

(Completion date - March 31, 1987)

5. Include information related'to this. incident in appropriate. training programs for electrical Maintenance personnel, Instrumentation and Control personnel, Quality Control personnel and Operators.

(Completion date - April 30, 1987)

In accordance with 10CFR21.21, attached is a report that describes this incident in more detail based on currently available information Very truly yours, NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION I

C. V. Manga Senior Vice President-

DAC/pns 2499G Attachment xc

Regional Administrator, Region I j Ms. E. G. Adensam, Project Director Mr. W. A. Cook, Resident Inspector-

! Project File (2) f j

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ATTACHMENT 10CFR21 REPORT ON AGASTAT GP RELAY SEATING DEFECT NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 l NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION I. Description of Condition:

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation found problems related to General Electric Agastat GP Relays in December of 1986. A representative of the GE San Jose Electrical Design Group was sent to the site to assist in the investigation. A relay was removed and examined. This examination indicated that the relay was fully functional. Inspection of panels that contain the relays in question showed that several relays were not properly seated. GE provided instructions that are now being used to properly seat the relays and verify that the relays are properly seated.

One problem with seating these relays in their sockets is that proper seating requires over 50 pounds of force. Additionally, the relays may appear to be seated after installation when, in fact, they are not.

Therefore, an objective test has been developed to verify that the relays are seated after installation. The test includes using a 0.030 inch thick non-metallic feeler gauge between the relay and the : socket; if the gauge does not fit in between, then-the relay is adequately seated. .

These relays are equipped with a wire retention clip or a retention strap. If the retention equipment is installed, the relay will remain in place with up to lg vertical force. It is unlikely that they could be vibrated loose. However, installation of the retention device (strap or clip) does not ensure that the relay is properly seated.

The problem may be solely attributable to the original installation of the relays; that is, they were not fully seated when originally installed. Another cause of the problem has been posited as personnel inadvertently coming into contact with or setting equipment on the relays. It is possible to unseat the relays by inadvertent contact. In any case, it does not appear that adequate instructions for installation were available at the time of original installation.

These relays are used in safety related and non-safety-related applications, and therefore, some are basic components. Considering that they were purchased to meet safety related technical requirements and when received were not accompanied with adequately. detailed information procedures necessary to ensure proper seating, it is Niagara Mohawk's opinion that the components are defective. However, the condition that was found in the field may not be solely attributable to.

this defect.

2499G

II. Evaluation of Substantial Safety Hazard:

Had the defect remained undetected, systems which would be relied upon for service would be potentially_ inoperable. These systems could have been, but are not limited to, Resioual Heat Removal, Control Rod Drive, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, and Reactor Protection System.

Niagara Mohawk's inspection results identified relays that did not' meet inspection criteria. but these relays were found_to be electrically functional. There are approximately 1200 of these relays in safety related uses at Nine Mile Point Unit 2, and over 100 for Unit 1. The exact number and location of relays is being determined.

This situation could have led to the inoperability of systems required for safe shutdown, emergency cooling, post-accident containment heat removal or post-accident containment atmosphere cleaning. He have, therefore, concluded a substantial safety hazard exists.

III. Corrective Action in Progress or Planned:

1. Identify and locate Agastat GP Relays used in safety related applications. (Completion date - February 9, 1987)

2. Inspect and correct, if necessary, Agastat GP relays at Units I and 2 used in safety related applications. (Completion date - February 9, 1987)

3. Reinspect once per month as described in item 2 above. We will establish a variable preventative maintenance procedure for the reinspection. The monthly frequency may decrease, if appropriate, based on an evaluation of the information provided by the inspections. Other corrective actions and the root cause of this problem are expected to be identified during reinspections. If necessary, a root cause analysis will be performed.

4.

Revise appropriate maintenance procedures to include the recently established installation and inspection instructions. (Completion date - March 31, 1987) 5.

Include inforn'ation related to this case in appropriate training programs for electrical Maintenance personnel, Instrumentation and Control personnel, Quality Control personnel and Operators.

(Completion date - April 30, 1987) -

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GA Technologies Inc.

Po bon 85608 SA*v D: EGO. CAUFOP'.: A 92134 4619 455-3000 February 23, 1987 Director, Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 i Gentlemen:

This written report is provided in compliance with Part 21 and is a followup to a telephone call made to Region V on February 18, 1987.

The information below is provided as requested by 10CFR21.21.

(i) Person informing the Commission:

Richard A. Dean Senior Vice President GA Technologies Inc.

P. O. Box 85608 San Diego, CA 92138-5608 (ii) Description of the defect:

Sorrento Electronics manufactures a digital and analog version of Reg. Guide 1.97 post-LOCA High Range Radiation Monitor (HRRM). Both versions use an RD-23 ion chamber detector as the in-containment radiation detector.

The detector is interconnected to an RM-80 Microprocessor (Digital) or an RP-2C Readout Module (Analog) with two-coaxial cables. The defective part of this system is the in-containment portion of the ion chamber's signal' coaxial cable. The cable is manufactured-by the Rockbestos Co.

(iii) Identification of the firm:

Sorrento Electronics a subsidiary of GA Technologies Inc.

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If you have any questions concerning this-report, call me at (619) 455-2120.

Address technical questions to:

Dennis Nau .at (619) 457-8905; or Leonard Karpenko at (619) 457-8807 Yours truly,

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Richard A. Dean '4R Senior Vice' President Reactor Programs cc: C. R. Fisher D. C. Nau '

Regional Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane Walnut Creek, CA 94596 i

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e Attachment 1 (vi) The number and location of the components:

Site Digital Analog

/

Arkansas P&L/ Nuclear I X X Beaver Valley X Byron X

Braidwood X

/ Comanche Peak X Duke Power /McGuire X X Indian Point III X X Limerick X Maanshan X EG&G Idaho / FAST X Millstone X

/ River Bend X X

Songs 1 X

Songs 2 & 3 X

Seabrook X Shearon Harris X SMUD/ Rancho Seco X

,St. Lucie t' X X Folf Creek X

i

'G9uth Texas X 72 X

/ wn.k./Bellefonte erford X

Callaway X Hope Creek X Applied Phys. Tech.

Beznau X BGEE/ Cal. Cliffs X Dresden X Quad Cities -X Zion X LaSalle X Conn. Yankee X James Fitzpatrick X X

Northern States /Prarie Island X Monticello

' Pt. Beach X Maine Yankee X Peach Bottom X Dairyland Power /Lacross X ,

X i Ilisconsin/Kewaunee -X Niagara Mohawk Catawba X X

Toledo Edison / Davis Bessie X Fermi II X

Florida Power Corp./ Crystal River X Susquehanna X

Aptec/ Ontario Hydro X Turkey Point l X '

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I M GENERAL OFFICES CDRPORATION OF AMERICA POST OFFICE B0X 180 1000 E AST EOGERTON RO A0 CLEVE L AN D, OHIO 44147 PHONE: 216-526 9900 TELEX: 098 5406 1 I

Office of Inspection & Enforcement US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Ms. Mary Wegner

Subject:

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America 6" Model C Valve and Mercury Check Device Re: IE Information Notice 84-16, dated March 2,1984 IE Information Notice 86-17, dated March 24, 1986

" Automatic" Sprinkler Notification Letter, dated December 12, 1985

Dear Ms. Wegner:

In an effort to keep you and the Nuclear industry aware of the developments concerning our 6" Model C Valve and now, our mercury check device, we are forwarding to you a copy of our November 5,1986, notification letter, and a draft copy of an advertisement we will begin to run in January 1987.

We will notify users and customers of the valves and mercury checks by a direct mail campaign and by an advertising campaign.

On December 1st we began our direct sailing campaign. We have on our mailing list all utilities which own or operate a nuclear power plant in the United States.

The advertisement campaign will be composed of running the advertisement in the following publications: Fire Journal; Occupational Health & Safety; Sprinkler Age; Sprinkler Quarterly; and )

i Fire Protection Contractor. The ad will run three (3) consecutive i times in each publication, starting in January 1987 46te140440-861201 R PT21 EMVA AuTovATic saaiNatsa coapoa4 TION OF AMEalCA A FIGGiE sNTERN AflONAL CoupANv m 1

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Mary Wegner December 1,1986 ,

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• The campaign is being administered by the Quality Assurance Department. If you have any questions on the program, please direct them to me.

Very truly yours, c )I v Hr. John J. Gullo, Jr.

Manager, Quality Assurance cc: ASCOA-Cleveland Model C File Mercury Check File NRC File i Writer's File F

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GENERAL OFFICES CDRPORATION OF AMERICA POST OFFICE 80X 180 1000 E AST EDGERTON RO AD CLEVELAN D, OHIO 44147 PHONE: 216-526-9900 TELEX: 098-5406 November 5, 1986 IMPORTANT: PLEASE FORWARD THIS LETTER TO THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN YOUR FACILITIES.

SUBJECT:

Model C Deluge & Pre-Action Valves and Mercury Check Devices Fire Protection Systems utilizing the Model C valve have experienced two distinct operational conditions, which we are bringing to your attention.

IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE THESE CONDITIONS MAY PREVENT YOUR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM OPERATING.

The first condition was announced in our lotter to you dated December 12, 1985. That letter warned that under certain situations the 6" Model C valve clapper stuck to the latch, preventing ths flow of water.

The second condition experienced relates to mercury check devices.

The following is: the nature of the condition; an explanation on how to identify whether your system is affected; and the required course of action.

6" MODEL C VALVES NATURE OF THE CONDITION Several years ago, we discovered certain 6" Model C valves that failed to trip properly under full flow trip testing conditions. The valve clapper stuck to the latch preventing the flow of water.

As stated in our December 12, 1985 letter, the condition was encountered in the 6" Model C valves, only. Initially wo decided to include the 2 1/2" Model C valves in our corrrective action program, due to the sinilarity of design. Additional information received since December 1985, has demonstrated that the condition does not occur in the 21/2" Model C valves. Thus no corrective acti"n is necessary for the 21/2" Model C valves. The lubrication of the 2 1/2" Model C valves mentioned in the December 12, 1985 letter, is no longer necessary.

AUTOWAflC' SPRIN*LER COAPOAATION OF AMERICA A FIGGit INTERNATION AL COMPANY S

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The 6" Model C valve does require further action. The reason for the 4

clapper latch assembly sticking to the clapper is related to a

! metallurgical phenomenon known as cold welding. Similiar metals, pressed together under high pressures for long periods of time, have a tendency to partially fuse together. Under certain situations, the geometry of the 6" Model C valve does not provide enough force on opening to disengage these two surfaces.

HOW TO IDENTIFY WHETHER YOUR SYSTEM IS AFFECTED The 6" Model C valves are installed in Rate-of-Rise Sprinkler Systems and in Pilot Head Sprinkler Systems. The systems are further subdivided into Deluge Sprinkler Systems, Pre-Action Sprinkler Systems or Foam-Water Deluge Sprinkler Systems.

The valves and systems are also identified as " Deluge", "Suprotex",

"Suprotex-Deluge", " Pre-Action"; or "Suprotex-Pre-Action". In Foam-Water l

Deluge Systems. both the water deluge valve and the foam deluge valve may be a 6" Model C valve.

The 6" Model C valve has been installed by Grinnell under the name "Multitrol" and by Rockwood under the name "Dualguard".

Each valve is identified by a serial number stamped into the front edge of the upper flange and by the lettering "Model C" cast in raised letters on the back of the valve body. ,

i Serial numbers for the affected 6" Model C valves are S6.024 thru 312.365. l

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It is possible that a 6" Model C valve with a serial number other than l

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S6,024 thru S12,365 may have been repaired with a bronze clapper latch assembly and/or a bronze latch arm.

If it is suspected that the clapper latch assembly and/or the latch arm has been replaced, or if the serial number can not be found, a visual i

check of the clapper latch assembly and the latch are should be made. If the clapper latch assembly and/or the latch am is made of bronze, your 6" Model C valve is affected.

TO REPEAT, the 2 1/2" Model C valve is NOT affected.

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REQUIRED COURSE OF ACTION There are two solutions that will alleviate the condition. We have determined that the application of the molybdenum disulfide lubricant, 813MS, as stated in our December 12, 1985 notification letter is a viable solution to the latching condition. The clapper latch assembly and the clapper should be inspected and lubricated at least annually. Since fire protection systems should be inspected at least annually, the lubrication can be performed during routine inspections. The lubricant may be obtained from " Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America, at no charge through December 31, 1987 In lieu of the lubrication alternative, you may choose to retrofit your valves with a new clapper latch assembly and latch arm. " Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America will provide the necessary parts to retrofit your 6" Model C valve at no charge.

The choice between the two solutions is yours.

There are two types of 6" Model C valves, open drain and sealed drain.

Refer to catalog page G-14 included in this letter to determine, by visual inspection, what type of valve you have.

The steps to follow for ordering the new parts or the lubricant is outlined as follows:

1. If the 6" Model C valve la in the serial number range S6,024 thru S12,365, or it upon visual inspection, you determine that the valve has a bronze clapper latch assembly and latch arm, then determine what type of 6" Model C valve you have: open or sealed drain, (see G 14 attached).

2. Complete one attached order form for each 6" Model C valve that you have and include with it a no-charge purchase order.

3 Send the purchase order, (including the filled out order form),

to:

' Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America 1000 E. Edgerton Road Cleveland, Ohio 44147 Attention: Quality Assurance

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4 MERCURY CHECK DEVICE l NATURE OF THE CONDITION

.Tne mercury check device is a component of most Rate-of-Rise Sprinkler Systems. The mercury check device is made up of two solded plastic parts

, which are bonded together. A number of these mercury check devices have  !

developed a leak in the bond area. This could allow air to escape from the device.. This condition may take years to develop, if at all. To be safe, all existing plastic mercury check devices should be replaced. j HOW TO IDENTIFY WHETHER YOUR SYSTEM IS AFFECTED The mercury check device is located inside a mercury check cabinet, sectional alarm mercury check enclosure or the release enclosing box,.

4 which is mounted on a Model C valve. Do JLQI attempt to open the cabinet,

enclosure or box. The fire protection system in which mercury check

devices are incorporated is called a Rate-of-Rise Sprinkler System. It 3'

may also be know as a Deluge Sprinkler System,- Suprotex Sprinkler System, Pre-Action Sprinkler System, Suprotex-Deluge Sprinkler System, or a j 'Suprotex-Pre-Action Sprinkler System. The mercury check devices are--

generally .D91 used in Pilot Head Deluge or Pre-Action Sprinkler Systems.

The devices may have also been installed by Grinnell with valves under the name "Multitrol" or by Rockwood with valves under the name "Dualguard".

The mercury check devices are also used in conjunction with the following

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America Rate-of-Rise equipment:

Model 93 Electric Control; Model 131-200 Supervised Mechanical Control Release; Model 138 Booster Unit; Pneumatically Released Pilot Valves; and 9

Sectional Alaras (consisting of Sectional Alara Mercury Check Enclosure 1 and Model 93 Electric Control). .

Fire protection systems that utilize the mercury check device can be identified by referring to the enclosed 3 page " System and. Device Identification Sheets".

j Mercury check devices were also used in the actuation setup for Carbon Dioxide systems, Dry Chemical systems and other special application equipment manufactured by other companies, such as Ansul, Cheaetron (Cardox and Safety First), Norris, American La7rance and Rockwood.

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_ _ . , _ _. _ . . _ - ~ . - . - - - - _ . _ _ - - _ , - _ - _ - - - . - _ , - . _- ---- - .--... - - -. -

REQUIRED COURSE OF ACTION All plastic mercury check devices manufactured after January 1,1967 kust be replaced. We also recommend replacement of older plastic mercury check devices because they may ultimately deteriorate with age.

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America will provide replacement mercury check devices and mercury, for all mercury check devices manufactured after January 1,1967, at no charge.

The replacement device is easily identified because it is mechanically sealed with bolts and a red gasket, between the top and the body.

The steps to follow fcr ordering the new parts is outlined as follows:

1. Determine the number of 1/8" copper tubes that connect to the header bar in the Header Bar Cabinet. This can be done by refering to the enclosed instruction sheet entitled, How to Determine the Number of Mercury Checks Required.

2. Complete one attached order form for each piece of equipment that you have that utilizes a mercury check device and include with it a no-charge purchase order.

3 Send the purchase order, (including the filled out order form),

to:

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America 1000 E. Edgerton Road Cleveland, Ohio 44147 Attention: Quality Assurance If you are having trouble identifying the type of fire protection system you have, whether or not your equipment is affected by this notification, or if you need assistance of any kind, please feel free to call

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America, at 1-800-ASCOA US, (in Ohio:

1-800-228-0595), or (216) 526-9900.

1

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Fire protection systems and component maintenance require specialized knowledge. A competent technician should be utilized. Neither the system nor its components should be tampered with by inexperienced personnel. We strongly recommend that these changes be made by a qualified fire protection service technician.

l Very truly yours, l " Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America a Division of Figgie International Inc.

No Mr. John J. Gullo, Jr.

Manager, Quality Assurance l

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GENERAL OFFICES

!. C 0 R P O R A T I O N OF AMERICA POST OFFICE BOX 180 1000 E AST EOGERTON R0 A0 C LEV E L AN O. 0 H10 44147 PHONE: 216-526-9900 ORDER FORM TELEX: 098 5406 6" MODEL C VALVE REPLACEMENT PARTS and MERCURY CHECK DEVICES Shipping information:

Contact at your facility: Name Telephone Your Purchase Order Number:

6" MODEL C VALVE Serial Number: Valve Body Cast Date:

Check One: Open Drain: Sealed Drain:

Do you wish a supply of lubricant? Yes No Do you wish replacenent parts? Yes No MERCURY CHECK DEVICE Description of the item that the mercury check device actuates:

21/2" Model C Valve: Serial No.: Valve Body Cast Date:

6" Model C Valve: Serial No. Valvo Body Cast Date:

Model 93 Electric Control: Serial Number:

Model 131-200 Release: Serial Number:

Model 138 Booster Unit: Serial Number:

Other: Serial Number:

Number of 1/8" tubes into header bar:

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THE 2h" AND 6" DELUGE VALVES- ARE USED IN THE " RATE-OF-p RISE" SYSTEMS KNOWN AS DELUGE, PRE-ACTION, SUPROTEX, AND P)

& SUPROTEX-DELUGE; ALSO KNOWN AS "MULTITROL" WHEN INSTALLED I BY GRINNELL AND "DUALGUARD" WHEN INSTALLED BY ROCKWOOD s 124.g99 SPRINKLER COMPANY.

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SYSTEM AND DEVICE IDENTIFICATION SNEET

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FRONT VIEW REAR VIEW PILOT HE AD DELUGE SYSTEM THE PIL0T HEAD DELUGE SYSTEM GENERALLY DOES NOT UTILIZE MERCURY CHECKS.

THE PILOT HEAD SYSTEM CAN BE IDENTIFIED BY THE 1/2" PIPE ' PILOT LINE' THAT IS ATTACHED TO THE BACK 0F THE RELEASE ENCLOSING B0X.

SK3954 PAGE 3 0F 3

HOW TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF X L W AIR SWITCH MERCURY CHECKS O REQUIRED f

I I II HEADER BAR CABINET MAN PROTECTIVE STEEL n O n 7"8'"G

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A D.'s k C h 1/8" COPPER TUBING

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d. 'M IJ 6-HOLE HEADER BAR AND CABINET In order to determine the number of Mercury Checks required, open the Header Bar Cabinet (See " SYSTEM AND DEVICE IDENTIFICATION SHEETS") and count the number of 1/8" copper tubing coming from the H.A.D.'s and connected to the right side (in most cases) of the Header Bar at the lettered (A, B, C, etc.) connections only.

Disregard connections identified as MAN and 80X.

In tne above illustration of a 6-hole Header Bar and Cabinet, the number of Mercury Checks required would be three (3). Standard Header Bars are made in 6 ,10 ,14 ,

Id , and 22-hole configurations.

NOTE: When advising us of the number of Mercury Checks required, give us the number of Mercury Checks per Header Bar Cabinet. For example, if you nave a 6" Deluge Valve with a Header Bar Cabinet containing 3 connections and a Model 138 Booster with a Header Bar Cabinet containing 7 connections, report 3 and 7; not 10.

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IMPORTANTNOTICEI .

.. TO OWNERS OF . w .. .

I MODEL C DELUGE & PRE-ACTION VALVES, l BOTH PNEUMATICALLY AND 'T

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-g ELECTRICALLY OPERATED, AND OTHER i EQUIPMENT USING MERCURY ' j CIIECK DEVICES MANUFACTURED! BY

" AUTOMATIC" SPRINKLER CORPORATION '

OF AMERICA. ,

PLEASE CONIACT US PROMPTLY!

Ongcing research and development work on our Deluge and that we must call to your attention. ,

a ve Under fire situation mayhelp your NOTlocatingcperate.

the valves.This condition can be corrected. But first we need The Mcdel C Va?ves rnay bear one of several tradenames:

,MULTITROL by " Automatic" Sprinkler. by Grinne!!,00RAGUARDbyb Rockwood, or SUPROTEX The condition can also exist with other " Automatic".:equipment .,, .

Centrol Releases, and Pneumatic. Released ,

2. -* -

Pilot Va exist with equipment of other companies where Mercury Checks -

inc!ude CO2 systems. Ory Chemical appli-systems, and othe Safety First), Norris American LaFrance, and Rockwood.c This equipment may be found protecting a variety of hazards -

both ordinary and extra hazards. It is essential that you contact us if you think you may have any such equipment installed at your property.

" Automatic" has a total commitment to your safety. We need to hear from you promptly. So please call us at:

-9 1-800-ASCOA-US!

(in Ohio: 1-800-228-0595) or write to:

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America -

1000 East Edgerton Road Cleveland. OH 44147 Attn: Cuality Assurance dh ' Q' . . . u7

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l VERMONT YANKEE  !

NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION i

., AD 5. Box 169. Ferry Road. Brattleboro, VT 05301 FVY 86-105

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)y ENGINEERING OFFICE d

1671 WORCESTER ROAD FRAMINGHAM. MASSACHUSETTS 01701 TELEPHONE 617 aF2-4100 November 10, 1986 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection & Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attn: Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator

References:

a) License No. OPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)

Subject:

Notification of Potential Existence of a Design Defect in Accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 21, Section 21, we are hereby notifying you that we have obtained information indicating that a design defect may exist with respect to Limitorque Motor Operators manufactured prior to 1975.

Enclosure I to this letter documents the details of this evaluation.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

Very truly yours, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION A44* - W Warren P. Murphy Vice President and Manager of Operations

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ENCLOSURE I COMPANY INFORMING Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation THE COMMISSION RD 5, Box 160 Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 FACILITY Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation PO Box 157 Governor Hunt Road Vernon, Vermont 05354 COMPONENT Limitorque Operator Spring Packs FIRM SUPPLYING Limitorque Corporation COMPONENTS Lynchburg, Virginia NATURE OF DEFECT During the 1985-86 outage, as part of Vermont YarPee's ongoing MOV Reliability Program, extensive inspections and overhauls were performed on approximately 40 motor operators. These operators were rebuilt utilizing the most current technical manuals and with the assistance of a Limitorque Field Engineer. During the rebuilding, the actuators were repacked with new less viscous NEBULA-EP-0 grease which is recommended for use in nuclear containments by Limitorque Technical Manuals.

On June 4, 1986, Vermont Yankee experienced a motor burnout on MOV 2-438.

The conditions surrounding this event were reported to the Commission in LER 86-12, Rev. 1, dated August 22, 1986. As a result of this burnout, Vermont Yankee and Limitorque performed an investigation which concluded that, due to the unique orientation, the new less viscous EP-0 grease had leaked from the operator housing into the spring pack area creating a hydraulic lock condition, subsequently restricting the torque switch operation and, therefore, burning up the electric motor. This is the first motor burnout of this type identified by Vermont Yankee.

DATE OF INCIDENT The motor burnout of MOV 2-43B occurred on June 4, 1986. The Potential Part 21 Report Evaluation was initiated on June 25, 1986.

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS Vermont Yankee has approximately 80 safety-related valves in service.

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,e p e Enclosure I Page 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION i

After the initial discovery of the failed operator, the manufacturer was contacted. Limitorque indicated that this problem had been identified some years ago and they had developed a retrofit kit to correct the problem. No evidence could be found by either Vermont Yankee or Limitorque documenting that i this information was ever disseminated to the industry. Limitorque has also been unable to reproduce this type of failure in their own test facilities, however does acknowledge the potential of it to happen.

The retrofit kits were installed on all 32 safety-related and 8 non safety-related operators which had the new less viscous EP-0 grease installed during the 1985-86 outage. This included all operators in the drywell (11) and all opera-tors in the steam tunnel (7). The kits are designed to allow a flow path to prevent trapping grease in the spring pack and therefore eliminate the possibi-lity of a hydraulic lockup.

Vermont Yankee will take the required actions to ensure that the hydraulic 7 lockuo kit modifications will be installed on all remaining safety-related motor operators prior to the installation of any new grease and no later.than the end of'the 1987 refuel outage.

RELATED ADVICE Our evaluation has determined that a significant safety hazard does not t

exist at Vermont Yankee since we have taken appropriate corrective actions on all valves which utilize the less viscous EP-O grease. However, Limitorque appears not to have given notification to other utilities of the possible need to retrofit pre-1975 valves, even though they have made an internal modification i

in their newer valves to eliminate the grease lock condition. Therefore, this Part 21 is being submitted to forewarn other plants of this potential problem.

It is recommended that utilities review this information for applicability-to their locations, i

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