Letter Sequence Request |
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Administration
- Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting
Results
Other: ML20076E880, ML20079M106, ML20080E109, ML20100G880, ML20100G888, ML20100H212, ML20112G667, ML20127J807, ML20135B301, ML20135D754, ML20137H372, ML20137S741, ML20141P181, ML20154K144, ML20197C598, ML20197G513, ML20205C845, ML20206B459, ML20207K470, ML20211P495, ML20215E408, ML20215G100, ML20235G758
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MONTHYEARML20076E8801983-05-17017 May 1983 Responds to NRC 830413 Order Re Environ Qualification of safety-related Electrical Equipment,Per 10CFR50.49.Environ Qualification Records Audit Will Be Completed by 831231 Project stage: Other ML20080E1091983-08-15015 August 1983 Provides Followup to Util Re Environ Qualification of safety-related Electrical Equipment. Justification for Continued Operation W/Components Not Fully Qualified Provided Project stage: Other ML20079M1061984-01-0909 January 1984 Advises NRC Re Status of Three Commitments Made in Util Concerning Environ Qualification of safety-related Electrical Equipment.Valve Actuators Tested & Successfully Passed HELB Tests Project stage: Other ML20100G8881984-09-11011 September 1984 Four-Minute Isolation of Postulated Steam Line Breaks at Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Project stage: Other ML20112G6671984-12-27027 December 1984 Informs of Efforts to Environmentally Qualify Certain post-accident Monitoring Equipment Per 10CFR50.49.Equipment Identified in Reg Guide 1.97 & Existing in Harsh Environ Will Be Qualified by 850331 Project stage: Other ML20108A2121985-02-0404 February 1985 Informs of Receipt of Generic Ltr 84-24 on 850121 & Request for Addl Info on Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipment on 850128.Responses to Both Ltrs Will Be Provided by 850328 Project stage: Request ML20100H2121985-03-25025 March 1985 Forwards Response to NRC 841227 Order Re Certification of Compliance w/10CFR50.49 (Generic Ltr 84-24).Util Previously Submitted Ltrs Re Environ Qualification of safety-related Equipment in Response to IE Bulletin 79-01B Project stage: Other ML20100G8801985-03-28028 March 1985 Forwards Addl Info Re Environ Qualification Program. Response to NRC 850128 Concerns & Summary of Completion Schedule for Outstanding Items Encl Project stage: Other ML20237L1731985-03-29029 March 1985 Notification of 850403 Meeting W/Util in Bethesda,Md to Discuss Equipment Qualification Project stage: Meeting ML20127J8071985-06-11011 June 1985 Maintains Util Position of Full Compliance w/10CFR50.49 in Response to Eh Johnson 850611 Inquiry Re Environ Qualifications of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety. Responses to Each Concern Presented in Encl Project stage: Other ML20237L1551985-06-25025 June 1985 Submits Daily Highlight.Notifies of 850702 Meeting W/Util in Bethesda,Md to Discuss State of Compliance of Plant W/ Equipment Qualification Rule 10CFR50.49 Project stage: Meeting ML20132B9171985-07-11011 July 1985 Discusses Resolution of Technical Issues of Aging & Operability Times Per 850702 Meeting Re Environ Qualification Program.Hold on Reactor Power to 15% Proposed as Initial Limitation Project stage: Meeting ML20132F0721985-07-19019 July 1985 Safety Evaluation Documenting Deficiencies in Licensee Program for Environ Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety.Licensee Response to Generic Ltr 84-24 Inadequate.However,Operation at 15% Power Authorized Project stage: Approval ML20132F0231985-07-19019 July 1985 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re Environ Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety & Authorizes Interim Operation in dry-out Mode at Max 15% of Rated Power,Based on Listed Conditions,Until Technical Review Completed Project stage: Approval ML20134M0161985-08-20020 August 1985 Submits Discussion of Technical Issues Re Environ Qualification Program Raised During Meetings W/Nrc.Aging & Operability Time Program Operator Response Time,Temp Profiles & Shutdown Cooling Paths & Equipment Evaluated Project stage: Meeting ML20135B3011985-08-30030 August 1985 Forwards Justification to Operate Facility at Reduced Power Level.Requests That NRC Provide Concurrence for Facility to Be Operated at 8% Power Level for Period of Time Not to Exceed 45 Days.Operation Does Not Pose Undue Safety Risk Project stage: Other ML20135D7541985-08-30030 August 1985 Advises That Rev of Emergency Procedures Committed to in Deferred to Coincide W/Final Environ Qualification Program Documentation.Procedure Revs at This Time Will Cause More Confusion than Clarity for Operators Project stage: Other ML20205C8451985-09-10010 September 1985 Forwards Info Supporting 850830 Request to Operate at 8% Power to Facilitate Core Dryout for 45 Days,Per 850826,0903 & 04 Telcons.Moisture Removal Needed to Maintain Conditions Prescribed in FSAR & Tech Specs Project stage: Other ML20205C4811985-09-11011 September 1985 Provides Commitment That Operating Procedures & Operator Training Described in Providing Addl Info in Support of Request to Operate at Up to 8% Power Will Be Complete Prior to Withdrawal of Control Rods Project stage: Withdrawal ML20137S7411985-09-23023 September 1985 Forwards Addl Calculations,Clarifying Util Re Predicted Fuel/Pcrv Liner Temps Resulting from Design Basis Event from 8% Power & Subsequent Reactor Cooling Utilizing Liner Cooling Sys.Calculations Confirm Original Position Project stage: Other ML20137H3721985-11-26026 November 1985 Memorandum & Order Granting Extension of 851130 Deadline for Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipment to 860531 & Approving Proposal to Allow Operation w/35% Reactor Power Limit During Interim.Served on 851127 Project stage: Other ML20151N7211985-12-27027 December 1985 Forwards Response to 851105 Request for Addl Info Needed to Determine If Environ Qualification Program Complies W/ Requirements of 10CFR50.49.Sys Description & Temp Profiles Used in Environ Qualification Program Also Encl Project stage: Request ML20141P1811986-01-29029 January 1986 Rev 00 to Justification/Analysis:Environ Qualification of Square D Pressure & Temp Switches Project stage: Other ML20141M8081986-02-14014 February 1986 Advises That DBAs Re Permanent Loss of Forced Circulation & Rapid Depressurization of Reactor Vessel Must Be Addressed in Equipment Qualification Program.Util Cooperation W/Program Mods Confirmed During 851029 Meeting Project stage: Meeting ML20154K1441986-02-28028 February 1986 Forwards Addl Info Re Environ Qualification,Per 851105 Request.Encl Info for Three Line Break Scenarios in Reactor Bldg Will Allow Independent Verification of Temp Profiles Obtained from Ga Technologies Using Computer Programs Project stage: Other ML20142A0441986-03-12012 March 1986 Summary of 860221 Onsite Meeting W/Util,Inel,D Benedetto Assoc,S&W,Tenera,Ned & NPD Re Equipment Qualification Program & Steam Line Rupture Detection & Isolation Sys Project stage: Meeting ML20141P1771986-03-14014 March 1986 Summary of 860130 Meeting W/Util,Inel,Tenera & Sargent & Lundy Re Equipment Qualification (EQ) Program.List of Attendees,Test Profiles & Review of Sample EQ Package Encl Project stage: Meeting ML20205S2591986-04-10010 April 1986 Summary of 860326 Site Meeting W/Util,Dibenedetto Assoc,Inc, Sandia & Sargent & Lundy Re Status of Qualifications of 10CFR50.49 Cables & Maint Records History Review.Viewgraphs & Attendees List Encl Project stage: Meeting ML20204A3181986-05-0101 May 1986 Provides Status Summary of Environ Qualification Program. Addl Details on Program Contained in 860501 Draft Environ Qualification Submittal.Major Equipment Replacements Listed Project stage: Draft Other ML20197G5131986-05-12012 May 1986 Requests Concurrence Re Inclusion of DBA in Environ Qualification Program Per Berkow .Util Will Not Environmentally Qualify Electric Equipment to Mitigate DBA-1 & DBA-2 Since Equipment Not Exposed to Harsh Environ Project stage: Other ML20198H4561986-05-27027 May 1986 Summary of 860505 Meeting W/Util Re Status of Equipment Qualification Program.Considerable Work Remains Before Approval of Full Power Operation Can Be Granted.Staff Recommended Util Continue to Complete Program Project stage: Meeting ML20205S2341986-06-0101 June 1986 Summary of 860502 Meeting W/Util & Inel in Bethesda,Md Re Equipment Qualification Program Problem Areas.Attendees List & Supporting Documentation Encl Project stage: Meeting ML20206R6241986-06-20020 June 1986 Forwards Environ Qualification Submittal Re Activities to Assure Compliance w/10CFR50.49 & Incorporating Comments on Draft 860502 Submittal.Evaluations Will Be Available for Review Before Request for Release to Full Power Project stage: Draft Request ML20203B6181986-07-15015 July 1986 Summary of 860613 Meeting W/Util in Bethesda,Md Re Status of Plant Equipment Qualification Program.List of Attendees, Environ Qualification of Plant Safe Shutdown Cable & Cable Qualification Binders Encl Project stage: Meeting ML20204H6531986-07-31031 July 1986 Responds to 860724 Request for Documentation Re Use of Thermal Lag Analysis in Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipment in Plant.Thermal Analysis Will Be Performed Per Rev 3 to CENPD-255-A Project stage: Request ML20206P5971986-08-15015 August 1986 Summary of 860724 Meeting W/Util,Inel,Wyle Labs,Sargent & Lundy & Tenera in Bethesda,Md Re Util Draft Documentation to Justify Qualification of safety-related Cabling at Plant. List of Attendees Encl ML20197C5631986-10-30030 October 1986 Forwards Draft FATE-86-117, Review of Convection Heat Transfer Coefficients Utilized in Fort St Vrain Main Steam Line Break Analyses, Technical Evaluation Rept (Ter).Ter Addresses Details Used in Temp Profile Calculations Project stage: Draft Approval IR 05000267/19860251986-10-30030 October 1986 Insp Rept 50-267/86-25 on 860816-0930.Violations Noted: Failure to Follow Procedures,To Review Mod Control Procedures & to Sufficiently Document Design Verification Project stage: Request ML20197C5981986-10-31031 October 1986 Review of Convection Heat Transfer Coefficients Utilized in Fort St Vrain Main Steam Line Break Analyses, Technical Evaluation Rept Project stage: Other ML20214Q0951986-11-25025 November 1986 Summary of 861027 Meeting W/Util to Discuss Schedule for Ie/Nrr Insp of Equipment Qualification Program.Attendance List & Viewgraphs Encl Project stage: Meeting ML20214U7071986-12-0202 December 1986 Summary of 861120 Meeting W/Util,Ornl,Ga Technologies & Eg&G Re Temp Profiles for Equipment Qualification.List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Encl Project stage: Meeting ML20215E4081986-12-12012 December 1986 Forwards Analyses of Three Steam Line Break Scenarios for Reactor Bldg & Three Scenarios for Turbine Bldg Using Convective Heat Transfer Coefficient of 1.0,per NRC 861120 Request Project stage: Other ML20215G1001986-12-19019 December 1986 Forwards Second Formal Submittal Re Turbine Bldg Temp Profiles Resulting from Steam Line Breaks,Per 861120 Request.Composite Temp Profile Curves Originally Submitted as Basis for Environ Qualification Program Appropriate Project stage: Other ML20207K4701986-12-31031 December 1986 Final Review of Convection Heat Transfer Coefficients Utilized in Fort St Vrain Main Steam Line Break Analysis, Technical Evaluation Rept Project stage: Other ML20207K4021987-01-0202 January 1987 Forwards Final FATE-86-117, Review of Convection Heat Transfer Coefficient Utilized in Fort St Vrain Main Steam Line Break Analysis, Technical Evaluation Rept,For Info Project stage: Approval ML20207Q4431987-01-16016 January 1987 Confirms 870126-30 Equipment Qualification Insp,Per 870113 Meeting at Region IV Ofcs.Mgt Entrance Meeting Scheduled for 870126 at Site Visitors Ctr & Exit Meeting Tentatively Scheduled for 870130 at Plant Site Project stage: Meeting ML20210P5241987-01-29029 January 1987 Forwards Draft Evaluation of Confinement Environ Temps Following High Energy Line Breaks Proposed for Fort St Vrain Environ Qualification Program, Technical Evaluation Rept,In Response to Util 861212 & 19 Submittals Project stage: Draft Other ML20210P6451987-01-31031 January 1987 Draft Evaluation of Confinement Environ Temps Following High Energy Line Breaks Proposed for Fort St Vrain Environ Qualification Program, Technical Evaluation Rept Project stage: Draft Other ML20211P4951987-02-25025 February 1987 Informs of Present Status & Plans Re Completion of Environ Qualification Program,Per Open Items Identified During 870130 Site Insp.Program & Implementing Procedures to Assure Environ Qualification in Place.Status of Open Items Encl Project stage: Other ML20212J2931987-02-26026 February 1987 Forwards Amend 50 to License DPR-34 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Changes Tech Specs Re Steam Line Rupture Detection/ Isolation Sys Project stage: Approval 1986-11-25
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20205G8771999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Copy of Cover Page from Fort St-Vrain Welding Manual,Which Had Been Listed as Encl on Page 4 of 990325 Reply to EA 98-081.Cover Page Had Been Inadvertently Left Out with Original Reply ML20197H8811998-12-0101 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Change to Fsv ISFSI Physical Protection Plan in Which Commitment Is Made to Provide Feature to Security Posture for Facility ML20236R9191998-07-20020 July 1998 Ltr Contract:Mod 4 to Task Order 27, Task Area No 4 of Basic Contract - Fort St Vrain Insp Under Contract NRC-02-95-003 ML20199H8141997-11-21021 November 1997 Responds to Requesting Clarification as to Whether Increase in Tritium & Iron-55 Contamination Limits That Were Approved for Plant Apply to All Licensees ML20198K1931997-10-10010 October 1997 Provides Supplemental Info in Support of Util Proposed Rev to Physical Security Plan for Plant Plant Isfsi.Plan Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) & 10CFR73.21 ML20198H5601997-09-16016 September 1997 Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Documents Listed in App a Being Released in Entirety ML20141F3521997-05-14014 May 1997 Forwards Proposed Issue 4 of Physical Security Plan for Fort St Vrain ISFSI for Review & Approval.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) ML20141C8611997-05-0909 May 1997 Informs of Approval of Fsv Final Survey Rept & Effluent Pathway Survey Plan & Supporting Analysis ML20141K9881997-05-0505 May 1997 Forwards Amend 89 to License DPR-34 & Supporting Safety Evaluation.Amend Designates All Elements of Approved Decommissioning Plan as License Termination Plan ML20138G2701997-04-28028 April 1997 Provides Response to NRC Comments Re Proposed Sampling & Survey Plan for Fsv Effluent Pathway.Response Documents Fsv Liquid Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Are Acceptable for Release for Unrestricted Use IAW Draft NUREG/CR-5849 ML20148D4651997-04-24024 April 1997 Forwards Revised Interim Ltr Rept Which Describes Procedures & Results of Confirmatory Survey of Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas at Fsv Station NUREG/CR-5849, Requests That Licensee Provide Evidence That Average Contamination Levels in Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Meet Averaging Criteria in Draft NUREG/CR-58491997-04-23023 April 1997 Requests That Licensee Provide Evidence That Average Contamination Levels in Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Meet Averaging Criteria in Draft NUREG/CR-5849 ML20138B0511997-04-22022 April 1997 Forwards Copy of Proposed Amend to Fsv NPDES Permit, Wastewater Discharge Permit CO-0001121 Requested to Support Repowering Activities,Iaw Section 3.2.d of Fsv Non-Radiological Ts,App B to License DPR-34 ML20140E1061997-04-10010 April 1997 Forwards Confirmatory Survey of Group Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas for Fsv Nuclear Station,Platteville,Co ML20137S4481997-04-0808 April 1997 Informs That Decommissioning Activities at Fsv Are Complete & NRC Issued Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w) in .Property Damage Insurance Policy Is Maintaned to Protect Fsv balance-of-plant Assets ML20137S0821997-04-0707 April 1997 Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/97-01 on 970310-11.No Violations Noted ML20137S1691997-04-0707 April 1997 Fifth Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Documents Listed in App K ML20137S5421997-04-0707 April 1997 Forwards Final Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Affecting Decommissioning of Fort St Vrain Nuclear Station ML20148D5951997-04-0404 April 1997 Forwards Confirmatory Survey for Fsv Nuclear Station, Psc,Platteville,Co, Final Rept ML20137R6921997-04-0404 April 1997 Informs of Approval for Request for Addl 45 Days to Remedy Deficiencies Identified in NRC Re Financial Assurance Mechanism for Fsv Decommissioning Costs ML20137J8051997-03-31031 March 1997 Third Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Records in App F Encl & Will Be Available in Pdr.App G & H Records Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemptions 5 & 7) ML20148D5811997-03-26026 March 1997 Forwards Confirmatory Survey Plan for Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas at Fsv Nuclear Station, Covered in Final Survey Rept,Vol 6 ML20137G7361997-03-25025 March 1997 Requests Addl Time for Util to Respond to NRC Comments in Re Financial Assurance Mechanism for Fort St Vrain Decommissioning Costs ML20137G9521997-03-24024 March 1997 Forwards Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept for Period 961201-970228 Re Changes,Tests & Experiments for Fort St Vrain Decommissioning ML20137H1131997-03-24024 March 1997 Second Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Documents Listed in App D.Documents Also Available in Pdr.Documents Listed in App E Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemption 6) ML20137C0181997-03-18018 March 1997 Documents That No Personnel Has Received Radiation Exposure at Fsv in 1997 or at Any Time Subsequent to ML20137C0061997-03-18018 March 1997 Documents That There Have Been No Activities Involving Release of Radioactive Matls from Fsv Nuclear Station That Potentially Could Have Affected Environ,Subsequent to Previous Radiological Envion Operating Rept ML20136G1201997-03-11011 March 1997 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan- Dec 1996 & Jan-Mar 1997. All Effluent Releases Completed as of 960703.Repts on Activities After 960703 Reflect Disposal of Solid Waste ML20136B1331997-02-28028 February 1997 First Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Documents Listed in App a Already Available in Pdr.Forwards App B Documents.App C Documents Being Withheld in Entirety (Ref FOIA Exemption 5) ML20135D7891997-02-27027 February 1997 Forwards Responses to Comments Re Fort St Vrain Final Survey Rept ML20135D9531997-02-27027 February 1997 Forwards Copy of Amend to Util Npdes,Wastewater Discharge Permit CO-0001121,which Clarifies That Monitoring of Farm Pond Outlet Required When Industrial Wastewater Being Discharged Through Upstream Goosequill Ditch ML20135A8711997-02-14014 February 1997 Requests That Encl Deficiencies Identified in Financial Assurance Mechanism for Fort St Vrain Decommissioning Cost Be Addressed within 45 Days ML20134D1551997-01-31031 January 1997 Forwards Util Responses to NRC Comments Provided in NRC Ltr Re Sampling & Survey Plan Used for Final Radiological Survey of Liquid Effluent Pathway at Ft St Vrain ML20134C8481997-01-30030 January 1997 Forwards Draft Confirmatory Survey Rept for Fsv Nuclear Station,Psc,Platteville,Co Providing Info on Essap Activities on 960930-1003 ML20133L4961997-01-0707 January 1997 Forwards Comments That Need to Be Resolved Before Final Approval of Util Submittal Entitled, Proposed Sampling & Survey Plan for Effluent Pathway,Ft St Vrain Final Survey Program ML20133E0481997-01-0202 January 1997 Forwards Comments to Fsv Nuclear Station, Decommissioning Project Final Survey Rept (Volumes 4-11), for Consideration ML20132G0421996-12-23023 December 1996 Forwards Insp Rept 50-267/96-05 on 961203-05.No Violations Noted ML20132F2841996-12-19019 December 1996 Forwards Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Affecting Decommissioning of Plant,Covering Period of 960901-1130 ML20133A8591996-12-16016 December 1996 Forwards Original & Copy Transcripts of Public Hearing,Held on 961203 in Platteville,Co Re Decommissioning & License Termination of Util Ft Saint Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20133N0011996-12-0404 December 1996 Recommends That NRC Require License to Modify Submission of Unexecuted Draft Trust Agreement Remaining Decommissioning Costs for Ft St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station in Listed Ways ML20135B3861996-11-25025 November 1996 Informs That NRC Reviewed Util 961114 Submittal (P-96096) Entitled, Fort St Vrain Final Emergency Response Plan, & Meets Requirements of 10CFR50.54(q) ML20135A5861996-11-25025 November 1996 Submits Suppl Info Re Annual Environ Rept for 1995 Operation of Fsv ISFSI ML20135A6361996-11-20020 November 1996 Submits Copy of Describing Discharge Practices for Groundwater Seeping Into Fsv'S Reactor Building Sump ML20134L4721996-11-14014 November 1996 Notifies NRC That Util Adopted Fsv ISFSI Emergency Response Plan to Direct Emergency Response for Radiological Accidents Occuring at Site,Until 10CFR50 License Is Terminated ML20134F4351996-10-30030 October 1996 Forwards Sections 1,2,6 & 8 from Survey Packages F0015, F0039 & F0126 & Sections 1,2 & 6 from Survey Package F0115 to Support on-site NRC Insp ML20134G5991996-10-30030 October 1996 Forwards Volumes 1-12 to Final Survey Rept for Groups A,B,C Rev 1,D Rev 1,E,F Rev 1 & G-J for NRC Approval in Support of Forthcoming Request for Termination of Fsv 10CFR50 License ML20133D7691996-10-22022 October 1996 Forwards Preliminary Rept Re Orise Support of NRC License Insp at Fsv on 960930-1003 ML20136B1411996-10-15015 October 1996 FOIA Request for Documents Re NOV Addressed to Scientific Ecology Group Re NRC Insp Rept 50-267/94-03 & OI Investigation Repts 4-94-010 & 4-95-015 ML20128M6181996-10-0404 October 1996 Forwards Ltr from PSC to Co Dept of Public Health & Environ Describing Monitoring Practices at Plant ML20128G8041996-10-0101 October 1996 Forwards Fsv Decommissioning Fire Protection Plan Update 1999-03-26
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20205G8771999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Copy of Cover Page from Fort St-Vrain Welding Manual,Which Had Been Listed as Encl on Page 4 of 990325 Reply to EA 98-081.Cover Page Had Been Inadvertently Left Out with Original Reply ML20197H8811998-12-0101 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Change to Fsv ISFSI Physical Protection Plan in Which Commitment Is Made to Provide Feature to Security Posture for Facility ML20198K1931997-10-10010 October 1997 Provides Supplemental Info in Support of Util Proposed Rev to Physical Security Plan for Plant Plant Isfsi.Plan Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) & 10CFR73.21 ML20141F3521997-05-14014 May 1997 Forwards Proposed Issue 4 of Physical Security Plan for Fort St Vrain ISFSI for Review & Approval.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) ML20138G2701997-04-28028 April 1997 Provides Response to NRC Comments Re Proposed Sampling & Survey Plan for Fsv Effluent Pathway.Response Documents Fsv Liquid Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Are Acceptable for Release for Unrestricted Use IAW Draft NUREG/CR-5849 ML20148D4651997-04-24024 April 1997 Forwards Revised Interim Ltr Rept Which Describes Procedures & Results of Confirmatory Survey of Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas at Fsv Station ML20138B0511997-04-22022 April 1997 Forwards Copy of Proposed Amend to Fsv NPDES Permit, Wastewater Discharge Permit CO-0001121 Requested to Support Repowering Activities,Iaw Section 3.2.d of Fsv Non-Radiological Ts,App B to License DPR-34 ML20140E1061997-04-10010 April 1997 Forwards Confirmatory Survey of Group Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas for Fsv Nuclear Station,Platteville,Co ML20137S4481997-04-0808 April 1997 Informs That Decommissioning Activities at Fsv Are Complete & NRC Issued Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w) in .Property Damage Insurance Policy Is Maintaned to Protect Fsv balance-of-plant Assets ML20137S5421997-04-0707 April 1997 Forwards Final Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Affecting Decommissioning of Fort St Vrain Nuclear Station ML20148D5951997-04-0404 April 1997 Forwards Confirmatory Survey for Fsv Nuclear Station, Psc,Platteville,Co, Final Rept ML20148D5811997-03-26026 March 1997 Forwards Confirmatory Survey Plan for Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas at Fsv Nuclear Station, Covered in Final Survey Rept,Vol 6 ML20137G7361997-03-25025 March 1997 Requests Addl Time for Util to Respond to NRC Comments in Re Financial Assurance Mechanism for Fort St Vrain Decommissioning Costs ML20137G9521997-03-24024 March 1997 Forwards Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept for Period 961201-970228 Re Changes,Tests & Experiments for Fort St Vrain Decommissioning ML20137C0061997-03-18018 March 1997 Documents That There Have Been No Activities Involving Release of Radioactive Matls from Fsv Nuclear Station That Potentially Could Have Affected Environ,Subsequent to Previous Radiological Envion Operating Rept ML20137C0181997-03-18018 March 1997 Documents That No Personnel Has Received Radiation Exposure at Fsv in 1997 or at Any Time Subsequent to ML20136G1201997-03-11011 March 1997 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan- Dec 1996 & Jan-Mar 1997. All Effluent Releases Completed as of 960703.Repts on Activities After 960703 Reflect Disposal of Solid Waste ML20135D7891997-02-27027 February 1997 Forwards Responses to Comments Re Fort St Vrain Final Survey Rept ML20135D9531997-02-27027 February 1997 Forwards Copy of Amend to Util Npdes,Wastewater Discharge Permit CO-0001121,which Clarifies That Monitoring of Farm Pond Outlet Required When Industrial Wastewater Being Discharged Through Upstream Goosequill Ditch ML20134D1551997-01-31031 January 1997 Forwards Util Responses to NRC Comments Provided in NRC Ltr Re Sampling & Survey Plan Used for Final Radiological Survey of Liquid Effluent Pathway at Ft St Vrain ML20134C8481997-01-30030 January 1997 Forwards Draft Confirmatory Survey Rept for Fsv Nuclear Station,Psc,Platteville,Co Providing Info on Essap Activities on 960930-1003 ML20133E0481997-01-0202 January 1997 Forwards Comments to Fsv Nuclear Station, Decommissioning Project Final Survey Rept (Volumes 4-11), for Consideration ML20132F2841996-12-19019 December 1996 Forwards Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Affecting Decommissioning of Plant,Covering Period of 960901-1130 ML20133A8591996-12-16016 December 1996 Forwards Original & Copy Transcripts of Public Hearing,Held on 961203 in Platteville,Co Re Decommissioning & License Termination of Util Ft Saint Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20133N0011996-12-0404 December 1996 Recommends That NRC Require License to Modify Submission of Unexecuted Draft Trust Agreement Remaining Decommissioning Costs for Ft St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station in Listed Ways ML20135A5861996-11-25025 November 1996 Submits Suppl Info Re Annual Environ Rept for 1995 Operation of Fsv ISFSI ML20135A6361996-11-20020 November 1996 Submits Copy of Describing Discharge Practices for Groundwater Seeping Into Fsv'S Reactor Building Sump ML20134L4721996-11-14014 November 1996 Notifies NRC That Util Adopted Fsv ISFSI Emergency Response Plan to Direct Emergency Response for Radiological Accidents Occuring at Site,Until 10CFR50 License Is Terminated ML20134F4351996-10-30030 October 1996 Forwards Sections 1,2,6 & 8 from Survey Packages F0015, F0039 & F0126 & Sections 1,2 & 6 from Survey Package F0115 to Support on-site NRC Insp ML20134G5991996-10-30030 October 1996 Forwards Volumes 1-12 to Final Survey Rept for Groups A,B,C Rev 1,D Rev 1,E,F Rev 1 & G-J for NRC Approval in Support of Forthcoming Request for Termination of Fsv 10CFR50 License ML20133D7691996-10-22022 October 1996 Forwards Preliminary Rept Re Orise Support of NRC License Insp at Fsv on 960930-1003 ML20136B1411996-10-15015 October 1996 FOIA Request for Documents Re NOV Addressed to Scientific Ecology Group Re NRC Insp Rept 50-267/94-03 & OI Investigation Repts 4-94-010 & 4-95-015 ML20128M6181996-10-0404 October 1996 Forwards Ltr from PSC to Co Dept of Public Health & Environ Describing Monitoring Practices at Plant ML20128G8041996-10-0101 October 1996 Forwards Fsv Decommissioning Fire Protection Plan Update ML20128G0481996-09-30030 September 1996 Submits Rev to Psco Definitions of Contents of Documentation Packages Re Fsv Final Survey Project ML20129C0421996-09-20020 September 1996 Forwards Quarterly Submittal of 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes, Tests & Experiments for Facility Decommissioning,Covering Period of 960601-0831 ML20133D7601996-09-16016 September 1996 Forwards Confirmatory Survey Plan for Fsv Nuclear Station Decommissioning Project,First Final Survey Rept Submittal- Vols 1-5.NRC Comments Incorporated.Spending Plan Attached ML20117P0711996-09-13013 September 1996 Describes Util Plans to Remove Bldg 28 from Plant Facility ML20129A4431996-09-11011 September 1996 Describes Util Plans for Demonstrating That Liquid Effluent Pathway & Surrounding Open Land Areas Satisfy 10 Mrem/Yr Criteria Provided in Plant Final Survey Plan ML20117K5291996-09-0404 September 1996 Provides Notification That Util Will Be Revising Financial Assurance Mechanism That Will Be Used to Cover Remaining Costs of Decommissioning Plant ML20117C7281996-08-22022 August 1996 Discusses Impact of Final Decommissioning Rule & Requests NRC Concurrence That Requirements to Submit & Obtain Approval of License Termination Plan Have Been Satisfied ML20116P3431996-08-16016 August 1996 Describes Actions to Remove Structures & Equipment Items from Fort St Vrain Facility for NRC Info.Requests That NRC Advise Util of Wishes to Perform Confirmatory Survey of Any Parts of New Fuel Storage Building Before 960903 ML20133D7551996-08-14014 August 1996 Provides Environ Survey & Site Assessment Program'S (Essap) Comments Re Review of Fsv Nuclear Station Decommissioning Project Final Survey Rept ML20116M0771996-08-14014 August 1996 Provides Suppl Response to Re Insp Rept 50-267/96-01 in Jan 1996 Re NRC Concerns About Fsv Final Survey Program.Specifically,Bias in Instrumentation Response Overestimating Amount of Contamination Present ML20116M1841996-08-13013 August 1996 Forwards Util Responses to NRC Comments in Re Use of in-situ Gamma Spectroscopy to Measure Exposure Rates During Plant Final Survey.Approval to Use in-situ Gamma Spectroscopic instrument,Microspec-2,requested ML20116K0061996-08-0909 August 1996 Submits Fort St Vrain Nuclear Station Decommissioning Project Final Survey Rept ML20116M1241996-08-0808 August 1996 Responds to NRC Bulletin 96-004, Chemical,Galvanic,Or Other Reactions in Spent Fuel Storage & Transportation. Informs That Modular Vault Dry Storage Sys Is Not Susceptible to Problems Addressed in Bulletin ML20116F3611996-08-0202 August 1996 Submits Revised Documentation for Fort St Vrain Final Survey Program ML20116F8141996-08-0202 August 1996 Informs of Util Intent to Modify Fort St Vrain Control Room,Which Will Make Certain Final Survey Locations Unavailable for Further Review.Final Survey Efforts Are Complete ML20116A4511996-07-19019 July 1996 Requests NRC Approval of Proposed Method to Fsv Final Survey Plan to Determine Exposure Rates in Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel 1999-03-26
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059H9471990-09-14014 September 1990 Forwards Rev to Proposed Physical Security Plan,Per .Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20064A6841990-09-14014 September 1990 Notifies That Ms Frazier License OP-5608-1 Terminated Effective 900906,per 10CFR50.74 ML20059K2091990-09-14014 September 1990 Requests That Dj Trumblee Reactor Operator License Be Terminated,Effective 900912 ML20059L5831990-09-14014 September 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-34,changing Tech Spec Design Features Section to Remove CRD & Orifice Assemblies from Core Regions Defueled in Support of Plant Closure Activities ML20059D3231990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data Rept for Plant ML20058N5661990-08-0808 August 1990 Requests Exemption from 10CFR50.54(w)(1) Requirements for Min Property Insurance Coverage ML20058L8031990-08-0303 August 1990 Forwards GA-C18103, Fort St Vrain Cycle 3 Core Performance, Per Request for Addl Info Re Proposed Amend to Tech Spec Which Would Allow Util to Complete Defueling of Facility ML20058M1931990-07-31031 July 1990 Advises of Termination of Kj Einig Reactor Operator License, Effective 900727 ML20056A1791990-07-30030 July 1990 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/90-07.Corrective Actions:Electrical & Mechanical Craft Personnel Assigned to Planning & Scheduling Organization ML20055H8091990-07-23023 July 1990 Forwards Addl Info in Support of 900622 SAR for Isfsi. Proprietary SAR Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20056A1711990-07-20020 July 1990 Discusses Decommissioning Funding for Plant.Util Revised Decommissioning Financial Plan,Based on Safstor,Currently in Effect & Funds Will Be Accumulated Per Plan Provisions ML20055H6571990-07-20020 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. No Rosemount Model 1153 or 1154 Transmitters Presently in Use at Plant ML20058P6891990-07-20020 July 1990 Forwards Security Plan for Proposed ISFSI for NRC Review,Per 900622 & 0412 Ltrs.Plan Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20055G8601990-07-20020 July 1990 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/90-07.Corrective Actions:Site Mgt Recognized Applicability of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(vi) Re Previous Day Notification & Immediately Notified NRC ML20055H2811990-07-20020 July 1990 Forwards Rev 4 to Updated Fire Protection Plan ML20055G7061990-07-20020 July 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-34,revising Tech Spec 6.1 to Remove Equipment to Support Plant Closure ML20059D1361990-07-13013 July 1990 Applies for Exemption from Payment of Annual Fees for FY90, Per 10CFR171 ML20055E0401990-07-0303 July 1990 Forwards Issue 3 to FPOR-18, Fire Protection Operability Requirements, as Result of Rev 3 to Facility Fire Protection Plan ML20055E0331990-07-0202 July 1990 Informs of Plans to Remove B Helium Circulator from Plant Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel in Mannner Similar to Previous Circulator Maint Outages.Requests Timely Ack of NRC Concurrence W/Undertaking ML20055E9171990-06-29029 June 1990 Resubmits Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept Jul-Dec 1989, as Result of Omitted Tables ML20044A8281990-06-29029 June 1990 Notifies of Termination of Wj Ashmore,License SOP-43244 & Requests That Reactor Operator License Be Terminated Effective 900620,per 10CFR50.74 ML20055D3931990-06-29029 June 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 90-04,requesting Info on Status of Generic Safety Issues.W/O Encl ML20055D1591990-06-22022 June 1990 Forwards Proposed Change to Updated Fsar,App B Re Use of Controls Other than Change Notice Sys to Implement Mods Such as Cutting & Capping of Piping,In Order to Obtain Positive Equipment Isolation ML20043J0581990-06-15015 June 1990 Forwards Proposed Issue 5 to Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Defueling Emergency Response Plan, Deleting Offsite Emergency Response Capabilities,Per Util 890816 Defueling SAR & NUREG-0654 ML20043D3291990-05-25025 May 1990 Forwards Response to NRC 900330 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/90-04.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20055D2051990-05-25025 May 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/90-06. Corrective Actions:Extensive Training on Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures Will Be Provided to Operating Crews Beginning in May 1990 ML20043C8981990-05-25025 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900427 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/90-05.Corrective Actions:Mgt Will Continue to Stress Requirement for Procedural Compliance on Ongoing Basis ML20043B3691990-05-22022 May 1990 Describes Util Current Plans for Removal of Certain Plant Equipment Items.Components to Be Removed Have No Required Nor Useful Function During Planned or Postulated Remaining Defueling or Shutdown Conditions ML20043A9491990-05-11011 May 1990 Forwards Issue 59 to AOP-K-1, Environ Disturbances - Earthquake. ML20042F9771990-05-0404 May 1990 Forwards Assessment of Possible Sources of Water in Plant Core,Means of Detecting Water in Pcrv & Effects of Water Ingress on Reactivity,For Info ML20042F9011990-05-0101 May 1990 Forwards Conceptual Plan & Cost Estimates for Early Dismantlement of Fort St Vrain Pcrv, Per NRC 900315 Request ML20042E8911990-04-27027 April 1990 Requests 30-day Extension to 900529 to Submit Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/90-04 ML20042F3111990-04-26026 April 1990 Forwards Application to Amend License DPR-34,providing Tech Spec Changes Needed to Complete Defueling ML20012D4711990-03-19019 March 1990 Requests Approval of Encl Exemption Request Allowing Util to Accumulate Decommissioning Funds Beyond Termination of Operations ML20012B7541990-03-0707 March 1990 Informs of Electronic Transfer of Fees on 900307 for Invoice IO547 ML20011F4691990-02-22022 February 1990 Responds to NRC 900116 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-23.Violation Re Fire Doors 13 & 9 Between 480-volt Ac Switchgear Room & Bldg 10 Propped Open on 891129 Disputed.Improved Communications Underway ML20006E7821990-02-15015 February 1990 Forwards Responses to 891004 Questions Re Decommissioning Financial Plan ML20011E8941990-02-0707 February 1990 Responds to 890719 NRC Bulletin 89-002 Re safety-related Anchor/Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves.Licensee Reviewed Plant Data Base & Design Documents & Concludes That No Anchor/Darling Model S350W Valves Installed at Plant ML20011E7861990-02-0707 February 1990 Forwards Overview of Evaluation on Compliance W/Environ Qualification Regulation (10CFR50.49) During Defueling of Facility.During Defueling,Pcrv Will Be Maintained at Nearly Atmospheric Pressures & Rapid Depressurization Not Possible ML20011E5031990-02-0606 February 1990 Notifies of Termination of Ma Rhoton Employment W/Util, Effective 900206 ML20006D6621990-02-0606 February 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-13, Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment. Currently Established Preventive Maint & Tech Spec Surveillance Activities on HXs Remaining in Svc Will Continue ML20006B2091990-01-26026 January 1990 Forwards Fire Operability Requirements 3 & 14,Issues 3 & 4, Respectively,To Fire Protection Program Plan,Section FP.6.1. Changes Cover Halon Sys & Basis & Records Ctr Halon Sys ML20006B7791990-01-25025 January 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-34,changing Section 7.1 of Tech Specs.Specifically,Senior Vice President,Nuclear Operations Revised to Vice President, Nuclear Operations & Nuclear Training Manager Revised ML20006A5001990-01-19019 January 1990 Notifies of Util Intent to Bore 10 Concrete Core Drills Into Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel Barrel Section at Various Elevations Found Necessary for Decommissioning Planning.Drillings Wil Begin on 900205.Assessment Encl ML20006A5041990-01-19019 January 1990 Responds to NRC 891218 Ltr Re Weaknesses Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/89-22.Corrective Actions:During Power Operations Three Licensed Reactor Operators Will Be Present in Control & Short in Emergency Public Address Sys Repaired ML20005G5001990-01-12012 January 1990 Forwards Approved Proposed Change to NPDES Permit to Use Halocide Product for Microbiological Control in Smaller Cooling Tower ML19354D8581990-01-0505 January 1990 Forwards Safety Assessment of Proposed Changes to Fire Protection Program Plan,Per P Erickson Request.Changes Cover Acceptance Criteria for Shutdown Cooling Following Fire & New Fire Protection Cooldown Trains 1 & 2 ML20005F5531990-01-0303 January 1990 Certifies That Util Has Implemented fitness-for-duty Program Meeting 10CFR26 Requirements ML20005D8921989-12-21021 December 1989 Forwards Proposed Change to Plant NPDES Permit ML19354D7441989-12-0808 December 1989 Requests Relief from Requirements of Generic Ltr 89-10 Re motor-operated Valves Since Plant Permanently Shut Down Since 890818 & Defueling Initiated on 891127 1990-09-14
[Table view] |
Text
PUBLIG SERVIGE COMPANY OF GOLOllADO P. O. BOX 840
- DENVER. COLORADO 80201 a.r. wnxsa PRESCENT December 27, 1985 Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 P-85499 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Mr. H.N. Berkow, Project Director Standardization and Special Pro.iects Directorate Docket No. 50-267 SilBJECT: Fort St. Vrain Equipment Qualification
REFERENCE:
- 1) NRC Letter Dated November 5, 1985, Butcher to Lee, (G-85452)
Dear Mr. Berkow:
Reference 1) submitted requests for additional information needed by the NRC staff to determine if the Fort St. Vrain (FSV) Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program is in compliance with 10CFR50.49. Attachment 1 to this letter provides responses to those requests. Attachment 2 to this letter provides the System Description. Attachment 3 presents the temperature profiles used in the FSV EQ Program.
The Technical Specification changes and Safety Evaluation associated with the SLRDIS will be submitted in the near future under a separate cover letter, P-85456. If you have any questions on this subject, please contact Mr. M.H. Holmes at (303) 480-6960.
Very truly yours, Ei60103OO99 B51227 PDR ADOCK 05000267
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2~Y W b P PDR R.F. Walker, President RFW/FWT:pa f
Attachments i f, j
P-85499 LIST OF ATTACHMENTS AND
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION FOR OPERATION FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF FSV EQ PROGRAM
- ATTACHMENT 1 - PSC RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ATTACHMENT 2 - STEAM LINE RUPTURE DETECTION / ISOLATION SYSTEM (SLRDIS)
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ATTACHMENT 3 - TEMPERATURE PROFILE
SUMMARY
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P-85499
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION FOR THE M0dE OF OPERATION FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF FSV EQ PROGRAM The following is a sunmary of PSC's intentions with regard to the mode of operation of Fort St. Vrain (FSV) up to 100% power after completion of the FSV EQ program.
In the event of a high energy line break (HELB) and the resulting actuation of the Steam Line Rupture Detection Isolation System (SLRDIS), the fire water forced circulation mode of reactor shutdown will be utilized. At the completion of the FSV EQ program, all electrical equipment, instruments and valves required to perform this will be fully qualified according to 10CFR50.49 guidelines.
In the safe shutdown mode, forced circulation is accomplished by supplying fire water to drive at least one helium circulator pelton water drive and to one steam generator economizer / evaporator / super heater (EES) or reheat section te remove the decay heat. This mode of safe shutdown is in accordance with the current licensing basis as described in the FSV FSAR, Section 1.4.5.
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P-85499 The following major systems are used to accomplish safe shutdown using forced circulation:
- Reserve shutdown system
- Fuel storage facility cooling
- Helium circulator bearing water
- Helium circulator pelton drive
- Helium circulator brake and seal
- Steam generator EES section
- Steam generator reheat section
- Piping systems to provide cooling water to the steam generators
- Circulating water make-up
- Service water
- Fire water pumps
- Liner cooling system
- Control room HVAC
- Instrument air
_ Hydraulic power to valves
- Standby diesel generators The required portions of the above systems with the exception of the helium circulator brake and seal system are currently classified as safe shutdown.
In addition to the above systems, the equipment required for the new SLRDIS system will be qualified along with the reactor building louver system.
The louvers are not specifically required for the design basis events as part of the FSV EQ program but the system will be qualified to maintain building integrity. All of the components in these systems that are
P-85499 l l
i required to operate are included on FSV's EQ Master Equipment List and will be environmentally qualified.
Actuation of the SLRDIS System brings the plant into a loss of forced circulation (LOFC) situation. Based on the analysis presented in FSAR section 14.4.2.2, restoration of forced circulation cooling to the core can be delayed up to 1 1/2 hours with no fuel failure. Depending upon the nature of the design basis event which results in a harsh environment, plant operators will re-establish forced circulation utilizing all available equipment in accordance with plant procedures. Assuming all non-qualified equipment fails, forced circulation cooling will be established utilizing safe shutdown cooling equipment per Section 1.4.5. of the FSAR.
In order to initiate forced circulation with fire water, certain manual-actions are required. Based on latest building temperature profiles, the operator can gain access to the plant within I hour (protective clothing may be required). As described in a letter P-85460, dated December 10, 1985 from Walker to Berkow, PSC has obtained cool suits which permit access to the building under harsh environment condition. The necessary manual actions will be identified and documented in appropriate procedures. A walkdown will be made to physically locate valves or equipment which require manual actior. as well as to verify that the operator can perform the manual action within the specified time frame.
ATTACHMENT 1 to P-85499
Attachment 1 to P-85499 EQ BRANCH REQUEST NO. 1 Provide a description of the aging studies being performed and any interaction between equipment degradation and harsh environment accident conditions. (i.e., clarify the following statements: "The accelerated aging that occurs during the 4 minute isolation is very much different from that which occurs during a faster isolation time."
"These lower temperature profiles will have a favorable impact in the areas of aging.")
PSC RESPONSE FSV is committed to qualifying as a minimum all safe-shutdown equipment >
to IE Bulletin 79-018. IE 79-01B specifically does not call for the establishment of qualified life by means of an accelerated aging program. Aging is addressed by analysis in conjunction with established material properties, relevant manufacturers data and testing performed on similar equipment.
The aging studies are summarized as follows:
a) Using regression line data and the Arrhenius Method, the end-of-life for age susceptible materials at ambient temperatures is calculated.
Attachment 1 to P-85499 b) The thermal degradation that occurs during the high energy line break accident (HELB) and the post accident operability time is converted to an equivalent aging time at ambient temperatures.
c) The equivalent aging time calculated in b) is subtracted from the end-or-life determined in a), resulting in the replacement interval for the age susceptible material.
This approach is being utilized for all equipment being qualified to the requirements of the D0R Guidelines.
PSC believes there has been a misunderstanding regarding the terminology we have used in the past to describe our qualification efforts. We realize that typically aging refers to the process by which equipment is brought to its end of life state prior to HELB testing. By our use of the term
" aging" we did not wish to infer that we were in any manner utilizing our existing DBE tests to account for the aging that occurs prior to the accident.
Since. aging is a process of degradation due to thermal effects, we have in the past referred to all thermal degradation as " aging." The increased rate of degradation that occurs due to the HELB has in the past been referred to as " accelerated aging."
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Attachment 1 to P-85499 With this in mind, the two statements may be clarified.
"The accelerated aging that occurs during the 4 minute isolation is very much different from that which occurs during a faster isolation time."
The faster isolation time will result in a less severe accident profile since the shorter isolation time will yield smaller amounts of heat generated in the form of steam. Thus, the peak accident temperature will be less, and the subsequent bulk building temperature will return to ambient room temperature at a faster rate than it would for a 4 minute isolation time. By converting the different accident profiles to an equivalent aging time using the Arrhenius Methodology, it can be demonstrated that the faster isolation time results in a lower amount of thermal stress.
"These lower temperature profiles will have a favorable impact in the areas of aging."
The lower accident temperature profiles will have a favorable impact in regard to HELB qualification since the HELB test profiles contain a much higher degree of temperature margin versus the actual plant requirements.
Attachment 1 to P-85499 EQ BRANCH REQUEST NO. 2 Provide a description of the operability studies being performed, specifically how operability is being demonstrated when test duration is less than required equipment post-accident operating time.
PSC RESPONSE Qualification testing performed by the nuclear industry for operability during the accident simulation typically does not reflect real time vs.
temperature profiles but rather accelerates the test conditions at elevated temperatures to a shorter than actual duration. A thermal equivalency analysis is then performed to verify tested conditions envelope plant requirements. In addition, operability of the equipment is verified to ensure the equipment performs its required safety functions.
A similar approach is being utilized fo the FSV EQ program. The following summarizes this approach:
- 1) The post accident operability time has conservatively been assumed to be 30 days for all safe shutdown equipment.
- 2) The plant accident profile is compared with the test profile to ensure that the peak accident temperature including margin, is enveloped by the test profile.
Attachment 1 to P-85499
- 3) Using the Arrhenius methodology, the ec>ivalent thermal degradation that occurs during the post-peak accident profile is compared with the thermal degradation occurring during the same time period of the test profile.
- 4) Material properties are reviewed to ensure that no known phase changes occur in the temperature ranges in which the Arrhenius methodology is being used.
This approach of evaluating operability times will be performed for two separate scenarios: complete offset ruptures resulting in the highest peak temperatures, and fractional line breaks which result in lower peak temperatures for an extended time. PSC does not believe it is reasonable to assume simultaneous small and large line breaks, therefore, the two scenarios have not been enveloped by a single curve for operability time evaluation.
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Attachment 1 to P-85499 EQ BRANCH REQUEST NO. 3 Provide sample files (at least 3) which demonstrate how the above are being factored into the FSV EQ program.
PSC RESPONSE PSC has previously submitted three (3) sample qualification packages to the Equipment Qualification Branch for staff review. NRC comments will be considered in preparation of FSV's files. Three updated files will be submitted under a separate cover letter when they are complete. PSC suggests a future meeting to discuss these files. As PSC proceeds with the FSV EQ program, we would suggest that additional files be forwarded for your review so that any probke areas can be identified early in the program.
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- Attachment 1 to P-85499 EQ BRANCH REQUEST NO. 4 Provide assurance that the equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49 is being qualified to the most limiting environment resulting from a spectrum of break sizes.
PSC RESPONSE Attachment 3 to this letter describes the spectrum of break sizes analyzed in the FSV EQ Program. As stated in Attachment 3, the temperature profiles used for equipment qualification will represent the most limiting environment.
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Attachment 1 to P-85499 EQ BRANCH REQUEST N0. 5 Provide assurance that equipment accessibility is possible within the required time frame in the most limiting environment resulting from a spectrum cf break sizes.
PSC RESPONSE Attachment 3 to this letter describes the spectrum of break sizes analyzed in the FSV EQ Program. As stated in Attachment 3, the temperature profiles used to demonstrate equipment accessibility do represent the most limiting environment. As discussed in the recent PSC letter P-85460, human access can be accomplished when temperatures reach levels equal to the maximum temperatures achieved at one hour following the steam line breaks analyzed in Attachment 3 to this letter. Using the cool suits already purchased by PSC and described in P-85460, access into hot, moist areas with temperatures in the 180 degree Fahrenheit range is possible with the assistance of Scott Air-Pak breathing apparatus.
4 - -
Attachment I to P-85499 EQ BRANCH RE0UEST N0. 6 Provide assurance that all design basis events. as defined in 10 CFR 50.49, have been considered in the determination of harsh environments.
PSC RESPONSE PSC hereby provides assurance of the confirmation as documented in PSC response to NRC concern No. 8 (PSC letter P-85112, dated March 28, 1985, Warembourg to Johnson) that all design basis events have been considered in determination of harsh environments per 10 CFR 50.49.
Supplemental to those identified in the above response, the maximum credible accident (MCA) has also been considered. The MCA, as discussed in FSAR Section 14.8, is the result of a multiple failure involving the helium purificatioq system regeneration piping. New analyses performed by GA Technologies, Inc. using the CONTEMPT-G code result in an-average reactor building temperature rise of about 4 degrees Fahrenheit above the analyzed ambient temperature. This is not considered to be a harsh environment.
A rapid depressurization of the PCRV (Design Basis Accident No. 2) analyzed in FSAR Section 14.11, is the result of a sudden failure of both the primary and secondary closures of a PCRV penetration.
Although the resultant peak building temperatures are higher than the peak average building temperature from the steam line rupture, the heat O
Attachment 1 to P-85499 transfer coefficient of helium is much lower than that of steam.
Because the duration of the DBA #2 accident is very short (typically 2 minutes),the equipment surface temperatures are less than those experienced for a steam line rupture. Therefore, the harsh environment to which the equipment will be qualified is bounded by the high energy line breaks.
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Attachment 1 to P-85499 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH REQUEST NO. 1 Provide a detailed description of the steam line rupture detection and isolation system (SLRDIS). This discussion should include the systems design basis including its capability to assure environments within acceptable limits following steam line breaks concurrent with a single failure.
4 PSC RESPONSE Please refer to Attachment 2 for the Steam Line Rupture Detection / Isolation System (SLRDIS) System Description.
The detection / trip system has been designed to meet the single failure requirements of IEEE 379-1977. It will be able to withstand a single failure and still provide its trip function.
During the generation of the steam line rupture temperature curves, a single active failure of a valve operator was assumed and is factored into the curves. Please refer to Attachment 3.
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Attachment 1 to P-85499 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH REQUEST NO. 2 Confirm that previous pipe break analyses have addressed equipment qualification concerns for failures in systems other than the steam lines, e.g., main feedwater. Verify that these analyses have addressed protection from flooding.
PSC RESPONSE As discussed in Attachment 3 to this letter, the pipe break analyses and resulting temperature profiles did address failures in systems other than steam lines.
Flooding caused by a line rupture is being analyzed separately for all cases. The analysis for the reactor building concludes that no flooding problem exists since the sump is large enough to contain any postulated leak. Required electrical equipment located in the sump is being moved. The turbine building sump however is not large enough and overflow would result. This is a result of an estimated 51,200 gallons being released during the first 6 minutes of a condensate line rupture with a continuing flow of approximately 6400 gpm after that. The service water sump return pumps are also assumed to fail since they are not qualified, adding another 5000 gpm maximum to the building. This combined flow results in overflow of the sump in about 10 minutes.
Attachment 1 to P-85499 The turbine building is basically an open building, and an estimated 1000 gpm would leak from the building with all the doors closed. FSAR Section I.6.1 lists the allowable flood level in the turbine building to be 11 inches. This level would be reached in about 13 minutes after the condenser pit overflowed.
Within this total elapsed time of 23 minutes from the initiation of the leak until the allowable flood level is reached, an operator could open a door to avoid flooding of the building. Specifically, the east double doors could be easily accessed from outside the building and the doors swing outward. This 6 foot wide flow area would easily prevent flooding of the building. Also, the resulting building temperature due to a condensate rupture does not exceed 200 degrees Fahrenheit thus it is highly unlikely that the service water return pumps would fail, thus greatly reducing the inflow to the building.
Attachment I to P-85499 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH REQUEST NO. 3 Provide the results of an analysis of a spectrum of postulated breaks in the main steam, and hot and cold reheat lines in the turbine and reactor buildings. Include the resulting temperature profiles.
Confirm that small breaks, i.e., those less than a full double ended break can be detected and isolated by the SLRDIS prior to exceeding the equipment qualification envelope or unacceptably preventing access for required manual actions to achieve shutdown.
In addition, provide response to the attached information request sheet in order to permit us to perform an independent calculation to verify your temperature profiles.
PSC RESPONSE
~ Attachment 3 to this letter provides the analysis results resulting from a spectrum of steam line break sizes. Attachment 3 identifies the steam line break sizes which the SLRDIS will detect and isolate and includes the composite temperature profiles. These composite profiles will be used in the FSV EQ Program to demonstrate equipment qualification and access required for manual actions to achieve shutdown. See the previous response to the EQ Branch Request No. 5 for a discussion of building access.
1 Attachment 1 to P-85499 To permit independent calculations of temperature profiles, PSC has selected a large break scenario and a small break scenario for the reactor building which yield the peak temperatures overall and the maximum temperature at one hour. The large break scenario which gives the peak overall temperature for the turbine building was also selected. The requested information for those three scenarios is being assembled and will be forwarded under a separate cover letter in the near future.
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Attachment I to P-85499 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH REQUEST NO. 4 Provide information on the capability of the SLRDIS temperature sensors to adequately detect elevated temperatures in the areas of concern.
Verify that the sensitivity of these sensors is sufficient to provide proper indication / actuation in the event of localized temperature effects following steam line breaks.
Include any available manufacturer's test data and/or performance A
information on similar detectors in comparable applications.
PSC RESPONSE The thermistor cable temperature sensors are coaxial in design. A 20 AWG nickel center conductor is surrounded by a powder ceramic semi-conductor material which is then covered by an Inconel jacket. The outside diameter of the cable is .09" and weighs 6 grams per linear foot. The small mass of the cable enables it to respond quickly to changes in temperature. The thermistor material has the characteristic of exponentially decreasing resistance with higher temperature (negative coefficient of resistance). It is this change of resistance between the center conductor and the outside sheath that is monitored by the control panel. A change in temperature can be monitored anywhere along the length of the cable. The thermistor cable can withstand temperature extremes from -50 degrees Fahrenheit to 2000
Attachment 1 to P-85499 degrees Fahrenheit. Because the primary parameter is resistance, the coaxial thermistor cable is able to monitor open circuit, short circuit, pre-selected temperatures and rate-of-rise.
Being all solid state, the sensors have only two failure modes - open circuit and short circuit. These conditions can be caused only by mechanical damage and are minimized by proper mounting. These two failure modes are continually monitored by the control panel. The thermistor cable has been exposed to radiation levels as high as 150 megarads, with no degradation in performance. This represents a radiation dose level many orders of magnitude higher than the design basis of Fort St. Vrain. The thermistor cable can continue to monitor temperature levels after generating pre-alarm and alarm signals and is the only thermistor type sensor approved by the Factory Mutual Research Corporation for fire protection.
The coaxial-type thermistor sensors have been specified and utilized in numerous applications such as on reactor coolant pumps and charcoal filters in nuclear power plants. Other'uses include power cable trays, coal conveyers, cooling towers, power transformers and offshore oil platforms.
Over 39 domestic nuclear plants and 10 foreign nuclear plants are utilizing the thermistor cable as sensing elements in their fire detection and deluge control systems. The Comanche Peak Station is using the thermistor cable inside containment for heat detection below Attachment 1 to P-85499 cable tray level. At the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, coaxial thermistor cable is used to monitor the temperature of the Hot Leg involved in Reactor Water Level System.
The sensors and control equipment have been tested and certified to meet IEEE Standards 323 and 344. The vendor's Quality Assurance program complies with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.
The SLRDIS system control panel is d.esigned to ' pre-alarm' at 160 degrees Fahrenheit (analysis value) and ' alarm' (send tripping signal) at 210 degrees Fahrenheit (analysis value). The control panel is programmed to respond to the corresponding equivalent resistances of these temperatures.
The thermistor cable temperature sensors change resistance, as previously stated, inversely and exponentially to temperature change.
The detection panel generates a signal to the logic panel when the prcgrammed level of resistance is recognized. Because of the exponential curve of resistance versus temperature, the detection panel is very selective, i.e., the elevated temperature to be detected presents a resistance much less in value than a temperature reading relatively close in magnitude. 150 degrees Fahrenheit for example presents a resistance of 115,000 ohms while 200 degrees Fahrenheit presents 30,000 ohms, and 300 degrees Fahrenheit equals 3500 ohms.
A test is currently being documented by Factory Mutual Research Corporation (FMRC) on the response time of the thermistor cable to Attachment 1 to P-85499 rapidly changing elevated temperatures. The FMRC plunge tests are recognized as one~of the most accurate methods of determining thermal response. The tests were conducted on December 10, 1985 at Norwood, Massachusettes. The test measured the resistance versus time response for nine combinations of gas temperature and velocity and will produce data for the environment specified at Fort St. Vrain. The preliminary statement from the vendor is that the results are satisfactory.
It should be noted that the temperature environment for a steam line rupture at Fort St. Vrain assumes a Bulk Temperature Model. The reactor building and turbine building will therefore see uniform temperature environments. No ' localized temperature effects' are considered. This means that the entire length of thermistor cable is assumed to sense the Farre temperature. Inasmuch as certain thermistor cables are closer to higher energy steam lines than others and that unequal heating will occur along the cable, the actual response of the cables will probably be faster than the simulated test.results would indicate.
A combined 40 year accelerated aging and 20 megarad radiation exposure test shows little difference between the initial and final readings of resistance versus temperature on the thermistor cable. Heating and cooling does not affect the sensor's 1% repeatability.
Attachment 1 to P-85499 Available Manufacturer's Test data includes the following:
- 1) Resistance vs Temperature curve of the 9090-13 thermistor cable (50' lengths used at Fort St. Vrain) Dwg. No. 280023 Rev. A
- 2) Sensor Center Conductor to Case Resistance vs Temperature -
Initial and Final Curves after Accelerated Aging & Radiation Tests
- 3) Functional Test of Alison Control Panel After Seismic Test -
dated 11/18/85
- 4) Equipment Qualification Package Manufacturer's Test data still to be received:
- 1) Seismic Test of Control Rack & Sensor Assemblies performed by Wyle Labs,11/9/85. (witnessed by PSC - all tests passed)
- 2) Response Time Test of Thermistor Cable performed by Factor Mutual Research Corporation, 12/10/85 Comparable Application Data:
- 1) Qualification Test Report of 9090-13 Sensor Assembly (Doc.
NO. ETR101), dated 2/7/84 for Application at Davis-Besse
6 Attachment I to P-85499 The above information is available for review at your request. The results for the response time test (item #2 above) will be submitted to the NRC staff when it is received, t
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ATTACHMENT 2 to P-85499
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