ML20113G586
| ML20113G586 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1985 |
| From: | Tramm T COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 9614N, NUDOCS 8501240422 | |
| Download: ML20113G586 (44) | |
Text
.
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7 Commonwealth Edison
,! ') Ons First N;tionti Plaza. Chic go. Ilknois
( } Address Reply to: Post Ottice Box 767 ~%
( / Chicago, Illinois 60690 N January 11, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Byron Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Interim Operation of HVAC Systems NRC Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455 References (a): October 27, 1983 letter from T. R. Tramm to H. R. Denton.
(b): December 22, 1983 letter from B. J.
Youngblood to D. L. Farrar.
(c): September 28, 1984 letter from T. R. Tramm to H. R. Denton.
(d): October 19, 1983 letter from B. J.
Youngblood to D. L. Farrar.
Dear Mr. Denton:
This letter is to inform the NRC of changes to the Byron /
Braidwood ventilation systems and to our plan for interim operation of this equipment during the completion of Unit 2 construction .nd testing. NRC review of these changes is necessary to support the revision of certain Conditions of the Byron 1 operating license, NPF-23. The changes have already been discussed with the NRC Staff in a meeting on December 18, 1984.
Attachment A to this letter summarizes the results of recent tests of the Byron control room HVAC recirculation filters and air intake dampers. The recirculation filter performance testing indicates that a 90% efficiency is justified for control room dose rate calculations. We were unable, however, to demonstrate low inleakage rates through the intake dampers. New ANSI Class I bubble tight dampers will therefore be installed. This will also help compensate for the fact that the ANSI 510 testing of the auxiliary building ventilation equipment is behind schedule and those systems may not be fully operational until July 1, 1985.
8501240422 850111 >\
DR ADOCK 05000454 3 PDR l
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t H. R. Denton January 11, 1985 Attachment B to this letter contains the results of additional DBA dose calculations which account for the changes
. described above. They show that the control room operator doses during postulated accidents at 100%. power are acceptably low when the auxiliary building ventilation sysem is operational. Of course, higher doses are computed in such events without the auxiliary
' building filtration of airborne radiciodine from postulated ECCS system leakage. The conventional approach to dose assessment indicates that the onsite and offsite doses could exceed the regulatory limits by about a factor of two in such an event.
They are, however, large conservatisms and special circum-stances.which-indicate that the doses would not reach the regulatory
. limits, even if the design basis accident were to occur during the few-weeks or months-that Byron 1 will be operating at full power priornto completion-of testing on the auxiliary building ventilation system. Attachment C to this letter discusses several of the more significant conservatisms in the conventional FSAR and SER dose calculations. Those analyses are shown to be conservative by at least a factor-of 10 without consideration of the chemical state of
~the-principal radionuclides. This information, coupled with the fact that the auxiliary building ventilation system could be operated on short notice during the final testing phase, provide reasonable assurance that the Byron 1 can be operated safely.
. Attachment D to this letter contains appropriate revisions to.the Technical Specifications and License-Conditions.- We are !
available to discuss these matters further at the convenience of the NRC Staff.
- 0ne signed original and fifteen copies of this letter and the attachments are provided for NRC' review.
, Very truly yours, v T/2. 7m T.-R. Tramm
. Nuclear Licensing Administrator 1m
& J
-cc: . Byron Resident Inspector 4
Attachments
', 9614N k - _ _
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ATTAC M A PLANT STATUS Per the. agreement established at the October 11, 1984_ meeting an attempt was made to inplace leak _ test the intake dampers of the Control Room Ventilation System. These Ldampers are classified as ANSI Class II dampers. The tests were performed by the blanking-off and pressurizin attempts were unsuccessful. g Damper a sectionleakage of ductwork downstream prevented of each adequate damper. to pressurization All perform the tests.
As a result of the unsuccessful damper testing and as an attempt to reduce unfiltered Control Room inleakage to a minimum a decision was made to replace the existi desig intake dampers with ANSI Class I Bubble Tight dampers. These new dampers are
-for zero leakage per ANSI N509. The dampers will be installed in the normal operating mode intakes prior to exceeding 5% power and in the purge (smoke removal) mode intakes during the first refueling outage. Prior to the first outage the purge intakes-will be blanked-off. The bubble-tight dampers will be shop-tested and field tested for leakage.
- ANSI-N510 testing series has been performed on the Control Room Ventilation System Train.A recirculation carbon filter. This test series includes mounting frame leak, air flow capacity, air flow distribution, air-aerosol mixing and halide tests. (Housing
- leak test was not performed per the Byron /Braidwood FSAR Appendix A Exceptions to L ' Regulatory Guide 1.52). The test data is shown in Table 1.
l The mounting frame leak test and the airflow capacity test data meet the ANSI.
L criteria. The airflow distribution and the air-aerosol mixing are slightly outside of l' the acceptance ranges. The halide test was performed simultaneously on the charcoal-l l
absorbers'and the bypass ductwork and dampers. The total system bypass was'l.02%. -With ANSI-N510 as.the guideline for establishing filter efficiency we feel that_ the filter is .
-capable of performing with a 90% efficiency.
l The ANSI-N510 tests on the Train B filter are currently being performed. Similar i .. results are expected _from Train B since the design is identical to Train A. Because of the initial success with the testing of these filters it was decided to pursue the
~ completion of the testing on both trains rather than design and install the crosstie E
between the intake ducts. All filter testing is scheduled to be complete prior to exceeding the 25% power level as required by the license condition.
L The' completion of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System is currently under lL progress. All Unit 1 and common fans and ductwork are installed. Airflow. balancing and i: the filter testing per ANSI N510 is engoing. _ Based on the experience from the construction and testing of other ventilation systems at Byron the projected completion
~
data-for the Auxiliary Building System is July 1, 1985.
e 9617N E
o -
TABLE 1 Control Room Recirculation Carbon Filter Train A ANSI N510 Test' Data Mounting Frame 0.1 % 0.03%
Leak test Condition CFM Air Flow Capacity + 10% Clean 43,7'98
-Test of Design Dirty 49,079 Flow 1.25 Dirty 47,828 (51,000CFM)
AIR Flow Distribution + 20% - 34%
Test (126 Readings) if average + 24%
Velocity AIR Aerosol Mixing + 20% - 32%
-Test (126 readings) of average + 35%
concentration Halide Test 1.0% l.02%
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'- ATTAC M T B i
0FFSITE AM) CONTROL ROOM DOSES The operation of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VA) System directly affects the radiological doses both offsite and in the Control Room. Air exhausted from the
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Auxiliary Building is filtered and released to the atmosphere and can potentially leak e
into the. control room boundary through normal mode and purge mode intake dampers which j are closed during emergency operation.
The radiation levels of the air exhausted from the Auxiliary Building is directly proportional to the power level of reactor operation and the assumed ECCS equipment leak rate. The IEPA and charcoal filters in the Auxiliary Building Ventilation. System will operate to maintain radiological releases at a minimum during a loss-of-coolant accident-at high power levels. It is not necessary for these filters to operate at low power
' levels due to reduced fission products. Calculations using regulatory source terms have
. demonstrated that control room dose and offsite dose can be maintained within acceptable
-limits without the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System operable at low power levels.
- The following 1s a summary of those calculations:
l A. 'Offsite Doses
+
The Offsite Radiological Consequences of a design basis loss-of-coolant accident have been calculated using the methodology described in the EC Standard Review Plan, Section 15.6.5,-Appendices A and B.
The results of the EAB and LPZ does were given in FSAR table 15.0-11 for the as-designed station. -The meteorology of Table 15.0-13 was used.
If the VA system is not tested and certified to remove postaccident radiolodine, Appendix B of SRP 15.6.5 requires different ECCS leakages to be considered. The 4 bakages are as follows:
~ Applicant's assumption
- 3910 cc/hr or about c (FSAR Table 15.6-15a) 1 gallon / hour NRC. assumption.with VA 1 gallon / minute
, non-operable: continuous leakage, 30 days Massive leakage 50 gpm for 30 minutes at t=24 hours The resulting thyroid doses at the EAB and LPZ are as follows:
[ EAB LPZ L With Applicant's values in 16 117.5 With W C assumptions 579
'10CFR100 limit 300 300 Thus according to the NRC assumptions, the power level would be limited to 300/579 or about 52% to meet the 10CFR100 limit of 300 rem at the EAB. The LPZ dose'does not reach 300 rem even if the VA system is not in place.
B. Control Room Dose Analysis of the control room dose during a loss-of-coolant accident is discussed in Section 6.4.4.1 of, the Byron /Braidwood FSAR. This analysis takes credit for the existence of dual make-up air intakes which allows emergency air to be drawn from the least contaminated source. The plant configuration and location of the control room air intakes is shown in Figures 1.
Because the tRC has now ruled that the present design does not qualify for dual-manual status, calculations have been made for the 100'-0 distance rather than the 234'-0 distance. In addition, the factor of 4 credit taken in the original manual-dual calculation is not used in this reanalysis. The combination of distance (100' vs 234') and the factor of 4 credit results in control room doses being now about a factor of 8 higher than calculated earlier. Assumptions of this reanalysis are as follows:
- 1. Containment leakage as identified in the Byron /Braidwood FSAR;
- 2. Auxiliary Building Ventilation System inoperable.
Because the VA System is assumed inoperable, fluid leakage from the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is assumed as follows:
- 1. 1 gallon per minute (gpm) leak for 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> (continuous leakage);
- 2. 50 gpm leak for 30 minutes at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (massive leakage).
All calculations were performed per the Murphy-Campe paper. The results are shown in Figures 2, 3, ano 4. These figures present thirty day control room dose at 100%
power as a function of unfiltered inleakage and recirculation filter efficiency for-each of the three contributing source terms: containment leakage, continuous ECCS leakage, and massive ECCS leakage. Figure 5, combines the plots for the three source terms and, in addition, shows maximum allowable power level that can be i achieved without exceeding the 30 rem dose limit.
With the Auxiliary Building Ventilation system inoperable it is clear that the naximum power level of safe operation can be achieved with the highest filter efficiency and the minimum unfiltered inleakage. In the case of 10 CFM inleakage and a 90% filter efficiency, the maximum power level is 40%.
With the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System operable (assuming 90% filter efficiency) the control room dose due to ECCS leakage is reduced by a factor of 10 to account for the presence of the filter and a factor of 60 for the continuous leakage term. The " massive" leakage is also assumed not to occur. The auxiliary building source ~ term is essentially insignificant in comparison with the dose due to containment leakage. In this case the total control room dose can be determined from the plots in Figure 2. At 100% power level and with 10 CFM unfiltered inleakage, a recirculation charcoal filter efficiency of 20% is required to t
maintain the control room dose below the limit of 30 rem.
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ATTACHMENT C CONSERVATISM OF ECCS LEAKAGE ANALYSIS Section 15.6.5.6 of the Byron /Braidwood FSAR discusses the analysis of the radiological consequences of ECCS component Leakage in the Auxiliary Building.
This analysis was based on methods described in Regulatory Guide 1.4. and assumes component leakage of 2.1 gallons per hour. The results of the analysis is given in Table 15.6-16 of the FSAR.
. Considerable conservatism are is introduced into this leakage anal'ysis by assuming that elemental iodine exists in solution after release within the core. This conservatism results in radiological releases which are much larger than expected.
Attachment 2 is an analysis entitled " Iodine and Cesium Releases due to ECCS Leakage" performed by Fauske and Associates, Inc. This analysis addresses the concentration of iodine and cesium within reactor cooling water and its diffusion into the Auxiliary Building atmosphere. It generates more realistic values of the radiological release which would exist during a loss-of-coolant accident based on component leakages of 1 gpm for 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> and 50 gpm for 30 minutes. These more realistic numbers are relatively small compared to those generated by the FSAR analysis.
The Fauske analysis demonstrates that with the NRC conservatism removed, the radiological releases from the f.axiliary Building can be reduced at least by a factor of 10. This reduction in source term is equivalent to that resulting fra the operation of the Auxiliary Building filters. As a result it should be possi a to operate the reactor at 100% power with the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System inoperable without exceeding offsite and control room dose limitations of 10CFR part 100.
DC/rr 9617N.
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16WO70 West 83rd Street Burr Ridge, Illinois 60521 (312) 323-8750 IODINE AND CESIUM RELEASES DUE TO ECCS LEAKAGE Sargent & Lundy
- December,1984
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Licensing requirements for the Byron Nuclear Power Station required an
^ ' assessment of the potential leakage of iodine and cesium into the auxiliary building environment for design basis accident conditions. The leakages to be considered are 1 gpm for a 30 day period and 50 gpm over a 30 minute interval as a result of potential leaks in charging pumps, RHR pumps, etc. The re-
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leases of iodine and cesium within the core are those assumed for licensing cases, i.e. half of the core inventory of each of these radioactive elements.
For these analyses, the chemical state is considered to be iodine gas and elemental cesium as opposed to the dominant and less volatile states of cesium iodide and cesium hydroxide. Consequently, a considerable conservatism is introduced into the analysis as a result of these assumed chemical states.
The. radioactive elements are assumed to be lost from the fuel matrix and deposited within the emergency cooling water, which includes the primary system water as well as the refueling water storage tank (RWST). Considering half-of the iodine to be released from the core, about 0.06 kg/ moles of fodir.e
- (7.5 kg) would go in the solution with 1.8 x 106 kg (484,000 gallons) of
- j. water.
The questions addressed will be the concentration of fodine and cesium within the water and its removal from the water by diffusion into the circu-lating air within the cell. This is addressed for both leakage conditions.
It is recognized that elemental cesium could not be fn solution with water.~
! Therefore, evaluations are also carried out for the most likely chemical fo 7s of cesium iodide and t esium hydroxide dissolved .in the water.
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2.0 BASIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR CESIUM AND' IODINE In the initial analyses carried out in this this report, iodine and cesium will be assumed to behave as elemental species I and Cs. The vapor 2
pressures for these species are given by Iodine: InP = - 6119/T + 24.81 (2.1)
., Cesium: InP = - 8513/T + 20.35 (2. 2)'
where the pressure (P) is in Pascals and T is in degrees K. These will be used to determine the partial pressure of these elements in an aqueous solu-tion. The masses of the two elements considered are 7.5 kg of I2 and 83 kg of Cs which is typical of an equilibrium core cycle for a 1000 MWe plant. This amount is assumed to be released into 1.8 x 106 kg of water during the opera-tion of ECCS functions forming an aqueous solution of the elemental species.
The effective partial pressure of the iodine or cesium in tne aqueous solution can be estimated through Raoult's law. The expression for the partial pres-sure (PP) of a dissolved element (i) in solution is given by PP, =.Psat(T)[N.
T (2.3) where Psat(T) is the saturation pressure of the element at the solution temperature (T),' gN are the moles of iodine in the solution and_N are the T
total . moles.
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At equilibrium, the partial pressure of the dilute species in the gas phase is equal to the effective partial pressure of the species-in aqueous solution. Generally, this has been characterized as a partitioning coeffi-
- cient (H) defined as the ratio of the material concentration.in the liquid '
(Cg ) divided by the concentration in' the gas phase (C ). - x-l g
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The concentration in the gas phase can be characterized as the mass of the dilute species divided by the total gas volume, and assuming the species behaves as an ideal gas, this can be expressed as
. PP$ W $
- C =
g RT (2.5)
, where Ng is the molecular weight of ith- species, R is the universal gas constant and T is the absolute temperature. Similarly, the concentration in the liquid phase is the mass of the material in aqueous solution divided by the volume of the water as expressed by Ng h j p*
c=g t g (2.6)
W WW where N,, M, and p, are the number of moles, the molecular weight and density of water respectively. Using the Raoult's law for the effective pressure of-i the material in solution, end assuming N, = N T , the partitionir.g coefficient under equilibrium conditions can be expressed as, This predicted behavior can be compared to the measurements in the CSE experiments [1] in which elemental and particulate iodine was in,jected into a steam atmosphere along with cesium, uranium and ruthenium. The materials were accumulated in tne sumri water due to steam condensation, gravitational set-tling and direct vapor condensation. After about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the ratio of the concentration in the sump water to the concentration in the gas base remained essentially constant. This value can be compared with the prediction from Eq.
(2.7) to demonstrate the viability of using solution chemistry to evaluat'e the-effective. partial pressure of the various species in aqueous solution. Such a s.
comparison is given in Table 2.1 and is seen to be in general agreement with-the measured values, with the deviation between the experiments and predic-tions showing the material to be more tightly bound in the -solution than -
- predicted by the simple model. This is generally attributed to reactions in the water that make the iodine less volatile than the consideration of N e ,,y-y --+-,,--e.
,,-,,ag -s-+y---. ,,,.y.-%-g ,. .m,- arm.-m ,.w,,ei.=w - -.cyg, ,,,,.pi- , -+= r,.- - -ee -gw
Table 2.1 COMPARIS0N WITH CSE I0 DINE RESULTS T Time C C H H Test K Hrs. ug 1 ug 1 Experimental Predicted A-1 356 4 1.8 (-3)* 1.8 (2) 1 (5) 8.1 (4) 8 5 (-4) 1.2 (2) 2.4 (5) 8.1 (4) 12 3 (-4) 8 (1) 2.7 (5) 8.1 (4) 24 1 (-4) 4 (1) 4 (5) 8.1 (4)
A-2 358 4 7 (-2) 1.3 (4) 1.9 (5) 7.4(4) 8 4 (-2) 9 (3) 2.2(5) 7.4 (4) 12 3 (-2) 7 (3) 2.3 (5) 7.4 (4) 24 1 (-2) 4 (3) 4 (5) 7.4 (4)
A-5 396 4 1.3 (-1) 2 (4) 1.5 (5) 1.6(4) 8 7(-2) 1.3 (4) 1.9 (5) 1.6(4) 12 6 (-2) 9 (3) 1.5 (5) 1.6 (4) 24 4 (-2) 7 (3) 1.8 (5) 1.6 (4)
A-ll 395 4 1.9 (-1) 1.4 (4) 7.4 4) 1.6 (4) 8 8 (-2) 1.3 (4) . l.6 5) 1.6(4) 12 5(-2) 1.2 (4) 2.4 5) 1.6(4)
, 24 3 (-2) 1 (4) 3.3 (5) 1.6 (4)
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elemental iodine. As a result, the effective partial pressure of the species in an aqueous solution would be from simple solution chemistry. It should be remembered that in this experiment, elemental iodine was injected directly into the gas base as opposed to the postulated accident case in which material removed .frcm the fuel matrix would have the dominant chemical forms of cesium iodide.and cesium hydroxide. Therefore, the comparison with the CSE experi-ments should be viewed as a qualification of the solution chemistry approach and its conservatisms, but not an indication of the dominant chemical states.
A similar calculation can be carried out assuming that cesium could exist in solut;on, which is conservative, but not physically possible. For the CSE tests the gas phase did not contain measurable cesium vapor, but cesium hydroxide in particulate form..
With this approach to the effective vapor pressure, the driving force for diffusion of vapors from the ECCS leakage can be estimated for the conditions of interest. Since the spills onto a cubicle floor would be removed to holding tanks via floor drains, the key element of the analyses is the rate dependent process of diffusion from the liquid into the gas phase over- the time interval of interest, i.e. 30 minutes for a large spillage and- 30 days for the 1 gpm leak rate.
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3.0 RATE DEPENDENT PROCESSES The diffusion from the spilled liquid can be estimated from PP Ng /A = h 6 (3.1) where N g is the rate of moles diffused for the i _h t
species, A is the surface
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area for diffusion, D is the diffusivity in the gas phase, R is the universal gas constant, T is the absolute temperature of the liquid, PP 9 is the partial pressure of the species in aqueous solution and 6 is the diffusion boundary layer. In this calculation, the diffusion rate dependent process in the liquid phase is ignored as is the partial pressure of the species in the surrounding gas phase. Both of these make the analysis somewhat conservative, i.e. the diffusion rate will be overestimated. Table 3.1 gives the assump-tions of material quantities for core inventory, water inventory and the concentration of the iodine should complete ionization occur. Table 3.2 lists the assumptions in the FSAR analysis (90% retention by the liquid and 90%
filtration by the auxiliary building ventilation system) to estimate the quantities of iodine mass lost to the environment. This value of 0.15 g of -
iodine can be compared to the calculations resulting from evaluating the rate dependent processes.
Figure 3.1 shows an assumed configuration for a continuous leakage of 1 gpm for 30 days in which the stream would pour onto the floor and into the floor drains. As a result of the leakage, the stream can be viewed as a ~
continually resupplied column of liquid such that the concentration of the dissolved species is constant over the interval of interest. For these calculations, a diffusion boundary layer of 2 m is assumed in the gas phase, and the material pouring onto the floor is assumed to have an average velocity of .1 m/sec to account for run off on equipment and running onto the floor, t
With this velocity, the effective diameter of the stream is about I cm and l heat transfer coefficients show that the stream temperature would decrease only slightly during its resonance time in the equipment cell. Consequently, a temperature of 373*K is assumed for the water during its residence interval. '
{ . Table 3.3 lists the saturation pressure of iodine at this temperature, the l
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Table 3.1 ASSUMPTIONS Core inventory 1 - 15 kg Cs - 166 kg Released from Fuel 1 - 7.5 k g Cs - 83 kg Water inventory 64,740 f t 3 =:w 484,000 gal. -
0 1.8 x 10 kg = 10 5 kg moles Moles of I = 0.058 kg moles
-7 Concentration = 0.059 105
= 5.9 x 10 Spillage ~ 1000 gal. = 3636 kg = 202 kg moles
-4 kg moles l'
= 1.2 x 10 E
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Table 3.2 FSAR AN ALYSIS
-5 Westinghouse FSAR Analysis = 1.2 x 10 kg moles released to the auxiliary building atmosphere
-6 kg moles
= 1.2 x 10 released to the environment
= 1.5 x 10 ~4 kg
= 0.15 g E
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CONTINUOUS LEAKAGE 9
V (1 gpm)
(30 days) l Fig. 3.1 Assumed configuration for ,
continuous leakage.
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Table 3.3 CONTINUOUS LEAKAGE (1 apm for 30 days)
Assumed Surf ace Area = 0.063 m Diameter of Water Stream ~ 0.01 m interval = 2.6 x 10 6 seconds T = 373 K P;(T) = 4470 Pa
-3 p, lodine PPi (T) = 2.6 x 10
-12 N/A = 4.2 x 10 kg moles /m /sec rh g = 3.4 x 10 -11 kg/sec
-5 Ami= 8.7 x 10 kg = 0.087 g
, Cesium lodide
-13 p, Pol (T) = 2.1 x 10
= 1.2 x 10 ~19 Pa PPcl(T)
N/ A = 2 x 10
-28 kg moles /m2 /sec
-27 kg/sec Inc i = 3.3 x 10
-21 Aml= c 8.5 x 10 kg g .~
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partial pressure of the material in solution, the diffusion rate per unit area, the rate of iodine lost te the atmosphere and the total lost over the entire 30 day interval. As shown, this value is comparable to, but less than the value used for the FSAR analysis wbn the building ventilation system is credited for removing 90% of the airborne iodine. This calculation demon-strates that the solution chemistry is very effective in retaining the fission products and would not release substantial quantities to the cubicle environ-ment, even when elemental iodine is assumed as the chemical state. Table 3.3 also illustrates the influence of the chemical state by demonstrating the amount of mass lost for cesium iodide held in solution, which essentially shows only negligible quantities to be released. Obviously, the actual release would be larger than that calculated assuming cesium iodide as a result of secondary reactions in the water, but the release value would be less than that calculated assumirg elemental iodine to be in solution.
Release calculations for cesium and cesium hydroxide are listed in Table 3.4, and these are well within the tolerable levels.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the configuration for a large spillage of 50 gpm over a 30 minute interval. The assumption is that the spill rate is suffi-cient to accumulate a layer of water on the cubicle floor before it runs off into the floor drain. As a result, the surface area for diffusion is equal to the cubicle floor area and is taken to be 30 m2 in this analysis. While the surface area is larger, the time available for diffusion equals the spill time of -1800 seconds and Table 3.5 lists the assumptions and the results for assuming the chemical state is iodine and cesium iodide. The net result of assuming elemental iodine and solution is a release quantity which is approxi-mately 20% of that calculated in the FSAR and the assumption of cesium iodide results in an extremely small amount of material released. Table 3.6 provides calculations for the assumptions of elemental cesium and cesium hydroxide under the same conditions, and as shown, reveal that cesium would be tightly bound in the water regardless of the assumed chemical state. It should again be noted that elemental cesium could not be in solution with water and cesium hydroxide is the dominant chemical state.
These analyses demonstrate that the assumed spill rates do not result in '
substantial release of iodine or cesium to the cubicle environment even if the
.. ~ . . =-
.- ~
Table 3.4 CONTINU0US LEAKAGE T = 373 K
- Cesium Pc (T) = 0.084 Pa
-7 PPc (T) = 5.3 x 10 Pa N/A = 8.5 x 10 -I6 kg moles /m2 /sec rh = 7.1 x 10-15 kg/sec c
am = 1.9 x 10-8 kg e
Cesium Hydroxide
-9 PCSOH(T) = 9.1 x 10 PP Pa CSOH(T) = 5.7 x 10-I4 N/A = 9.2 x 10-23 kg moles /m2/sec m = 7.7 x 10-22 kg/sec CS0H am CS0H = 2 x 10-15 kg i
l I-
'k..
+
l.
d
+.
b
(
LARGE SPILLAGE V
A A A A l
11 V
l l . 50 gpm 30 min.
Fig. 3.2 Assumed configuration for a large spill on a cubicle floor.
p .
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Table 3.5 LARGE SPILLAGE (50 apm for 30 minutes)
RHR Pump Cubicle 20' long x 15' wide Area = 300 ft2= 30 m 2 Mechanism - Diffusion from the water pool with an 2
area of 30 m and an interval of 30 min.
T = 373 K lodine Pg(T) = 4470 Pa
= -3 p, PPg (T) 2.6 x 10
-12 2 N/A = 4.2 x 10 kg moles /m /sec
-8 S g = 1.6 x 10 kg/sec
-5 Amg = 2.9 x 10 kg = C.C29 g
-13 Pa Cesium lodide , Pcl(T) = 2.1 x 10
-I8 PPol(T) = 1.2 x 10 Pa 2
N/A = 2 x 10 -28 kg moles /m /sec m = -24 kg/sec cl 1.5 x 10 Amc l = 2.7 x 10
-21 kg
[ -
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,__,,_,_____,.m.___,_. ._, ....m--_____m_, _- _ , , , _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _
Table 3.6 LARGE SPILLAGE
. T = 373 K Cesium Pc (T) = 0.084 Pa PPc (T) = 5.3 x 10 -7 Pa
-16 kg moles /m2 f,,e s N/ A = 8.5 x 10
-12 kg/sec i S e = 3.4 x 10
-8 kg Ame = 6 x 10 ~
Cesium Hydroxide PCsOH(T) = 9.1 x 10 Pa
-14 PP CsOH(T) = 5.7 x 10 Pa
-23 l N/ A = 9.2 x 10 kg moles /m2 /sec mCsOH = 4 x 10~I8 kg/sec
= 7 x 10 -16 kg AmCsOH 4
.1
. ~
elemental form is assumed to be in aqueous solution. Several conservatisms are inherent in the analyses as carried out and these are delineated in Table 3.7. The first is that an equilibrium core cycle was assumed and this could overstate the amounts of fission product material available in the early stages of the Byron plant operation by a factor of 2 to 10. In addition, it is assumed that 50% of the iodine and cesium fission product material are re-leased from the fuel matrix, which for a design basis accident could overstate the fission products in aqueous solution by a factor of 10 to 100. The comparisons with the CSE experiments demonstrate that the partition coeffi-cient is larger than calculated by simple aqueous solution chemistry, which could potentially decrease the rates of materials lost to the environment by a factor of 2 and perhaps as much as 10. Lastly, the dominant chemical states, which is not an independent change from the partitioning coefficient listed in Item 3 decrease the release by orders of magnitude. Considering low end of the significance of these conservatisms and neglecting the dominant chemical state, the analyses are conservative by at least a factor of 60 if more realistic assessments were applied to the actual core cycle, the material released from the fuel matrix and use of an experimentally determined parti-tioning coefficient from the CSE tests. However, the analyses already show that the efficient retention of fission products in aqueous solution are equal to the releases considered in the FSAR, hence further refinement of the calculations would not appear to be warranted.
f 9
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Table 3.7 CONSERVATISMS IN THE ANALYSES Type Significance
- 1. Equilibrium Core Cycle 3 - 10
- 2. 50% 1 and Cs Released From 10 - 100 the Fuel
- 3. Neglect Partitioning Coefficient 2 - 10 for lodine
- 4. Chemical State Cal and CsOH Several Orders of Magnitude I
E
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...o'- -
4.0 REFERENCE
- 1. R. K. Hilliard and L. F. Coleman, " Natural Transport Effects on Fission Product Behavior in the Containment Systems Experiment," BNWL-1457,
. December, 1970.
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ATTACHENT D TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES
- 1. Table Notations (pg. 3/4 3-41)
' The note at the bottom of the page should be changed to read:
"* Satisfaction of Specification 3.9.12 ACTIONS are not required prior to July 1, 1985 when there is no irradiated fuel in the storage pool."
- 2. T.S. 3.7.6* (pg 3/4 7-16a) Control Room Ventilation Delete this page. It only applied until initial criticality on Cycle 1.
- 3. T.S. 3.7.7* (pg 3/4 7-19) Auxiliary Building Ventilation Change the note at the bottom of the page to read:
"*Not applicable prior to July 1, 1985."
- 4. T.S. 3.9.4* (pg 3/4 9-4) Containment Building Penetrations Delete the asterisk after 3.9.4 and the note at the bottom of the page. The note only applied until initial criticality.
- 5. T.S. 3.9.12* (pg 3/4 9-14) Fuel Handling Building Ventilation
- Delete astersik after 3.9.12 and delete note at bottom of the page.
- 6. T.S. 3.7.6* (pg 3/4 7-16) Control Room Ventilation Delete the asterisk after 3.7.6 and the note at the bottom of the page. The note only applied until initial criticality on Cycle 1.
- 7. T.S. 4.7.6 (pg. 3/4 7-17 and 7-18)
Insert surveillances 4.7.6.C.4, C.5, D.2, and H to take' credit for the recirculation filter and makeup unit in order to satisfy GDC19.
Delete the asterisk after 3) and the note at the bottom of the page. The note only applied until 5% power on Unit 1.
- 8. License Conditions 9617N
CT o a
(
- TABLE NOTATIONS
- With new fuel or irradiated fuel in the fuel storage areas or fuel building.
- Trip Setpoint is to be established such that the actual submersion cose rate would not exceed 10 mR/hr in the containment builcing. For containnient purge or vent the Setpoint value may be increased up to twice the maximum concentra-tion activity in the containment determined by the sample analysis performed prior to each release in accordance with Tamle 4.11-2 provided the value does not exceed 10% of the equivalent limits of Specification 3.11.2.1.a in accord-ance with the methodology and parameters in the 00CM.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 26 -
With less than the Minimum Channels CPERABLE requirement, coeration may continue provided the containment purge valves are maintainea closed.
ACTICN 27 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within i hour isolate tne control Room Ventilation System and initiate operation of the Control toom Make-up System. -
ACTION 28 -
Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3.4.6.1.
ACTION 29 -
With the number of OPERASLE channels one less than the Minimum
(
Channels OPERABLE regairement, ACTICN a. of Specification 3.9.12" must be satisfied. With,both channels inoperable, ;rovide an appropriate portable centinuous monitor with the sr.me Alarm Set-point in the fuel pool area with one fuel Handling Builcing .
Exhaust filter plenum in operation. Otherwise satisfy ACTION b.
of Specification 3.9.12."
l t
J~uly
- jl 1985
! " Satisfaction of Specification 3.9.12 ACTIONS are not Ftquired prior to ths
~ ~ ^ ^
F. %--^,' -
3 when there is no irradiated fuel in the storage pool.
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.s sPLANT SYS7 EMS 3 7.6 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATICN SYSTEM N /
e LIMITIN6 CONDITION FOR OPERATION J
3.7.6* One Control Room Ventilation System shall be OPERA 8Lt.
APPLICA8ILITY: 3, 4, 5, 6.
ACit0N: /
/ .
M00ts 3 and 4: ,
WiththeControlRiposVentilationSysteminoperable..restoretheinoperable system to OPERA 8LI status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUT 00WN witttin the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
/
MODE $ $ and 6: / .
a.
/ '
?
With the Control Room ventilation System inoperable suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
./
C; SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT $
4.7.6 The Control Room Ventilation Systee shall be demonstrated OPERA 4LE:
, s. that the control room air l At least once.perd2 temperature hours is Jess than by verifying or equal ta 90 *F;
- b. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the Emergency Makeup System HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates i for it'least' 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating;
! c. least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance
, on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorcer housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the Emergency Makeup System fiiter plenum by:
Applicaole only Before initial criticality on Cycle 1. ,
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PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 NON _ACCESSISLE AREA EXHAUST FILTER DLENUM VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7* Three independent non-accessible area exhaust filter plenums (50%
capacity each) shall be OPERA 8LE.
APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, anc 4.
ACTION:
With one non-accessible area exhaust filter plenum inoperable, restore the inoperable plenum to OPERA 8LE status witnin 7 days or be in at least HOT
, STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD $HUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i 4.7.7 Each non-accessible area exhaust filter plenum shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE: . .
j .,
l b/ a. At least once per 31 days on s STAGGERfD TEST BASIS by initiating, I from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that operation occurs for at least 15 minutes;
- b. At least once per 18 sonths, or (1) after any structural maintenance on the NEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communi-cating with the exhaust filter plenum by:
- 1) Verifying that the exhaust filter plenum satisfies the in place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than IX when using the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.S.a. C.S.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-ston 2, March 1978, and the flow rate is 66,900 cfm t 105 for the train and 22,300 cfm 210% per bank;
, 2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory l analysis of a ripresentative carbon sample from each bank of adsorbers of the train obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 March 1978, for methyl idodido penetration of less than 1% when tested at the temperature of 30*C and a relative humidity of 70%; .
Jubt 1, M 6 5.
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_mm i cable_.prio,
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9; r;gto/,"". 94r'My.c' "- 9,ga__-
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__ . . _ _ . . _ . , _ . . _ - - , . _ . , - _ _ . . . . , , , _ _ -._-y _ _ . _ . . _ _ .. _ _ . _ _ . . . _ . , _ _ _ _
CH)T : c ...,
REFUELING .0P! RATIONS 3/4.9.4 CONTAINNENT BUILDING 8ENETRATIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:
1
- a. The personnel hatch should have a minicum of one door closed at any one time and the equipment hatch shall be in place and held by a minimum of four bolts or the equionent hatch removed pursuant to Surveillance Requirement 4.9.4.2,
, b. A minimum of one door in the personnel emergency exit hatch is closed, and
- c. Each penetration providing direct access from tne containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:
n
- 1) Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or
- 2) Capable of being closed by an CPERx8LE automatic containment - -
purge isolation valve.
APPLICA8ILITY: Ouring CORE ALTERATION 5'Y or movement of irradiated fuel within
(- tne containment.
ACTION:
I With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or sovement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4.1 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be determined to be either in its closed / isolated condition or capable of being closed by an OPERA 8LE automatic containment purge isolation valve within 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by:
- 4. Verifying the penetrations are in their closed / isolated condition, or .
- b. Testing the containment purge isolation valves per the applicante portions of Specification 4.6.3.2.
7%;^. l;'.!!;5I; iTi-T 10 ! I'.I;I ;ii".il l'Is. 2 e
3/4-9-4 8YRON - UNIT ~1. .
. - - _ - - - _ - - , _ - - - - - - - , ,-- ,,,_ ,__ ,_~-,._ ,,- .,-. . - . . , - - - . _ , , , , . . . - . _ - ~ _ , . _ , , . , _ , . - _ , -
...-_.-_,_-.,_.m-,%, _,.. - _ , , _ , ,,__,-..-_.m. _ _ - _ .
- t 00T26 y e
REFUELING.0PERATIONS 3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST STLTER PLENUMS 1.IMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION __
3.9.12* Two independent Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Plenues shall be OPERA 4Lt.
APPLICA8ILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel is in the storage pool ACTION:
- a. With one Fuel Handling.Suifding Exhaust Filter Plenum inoperable, fuel movement within the storage pool, or crane operation with Ioads over the storage poet , may proceed provided the OPHA8Lt Fuel l Handling Suilding Exhaust Filter Plenum is capable of being powered from an CPERASLE emergency power source and is in operation and .
taking suction from at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoa?
adsorcers.
- b. With no Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Plenues OPERA 8LE, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel w'ithin the '
{; storage pool, or crane operation with loads over the storage pool, j
until at least one Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Planca is
- restored to OPERA 8LE status. -
- c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
l 4,9.12 The anovo required Fuel Handling Suilding Exhaust Filter.Plenues shall
! be demonst' rated OPERA 8Lf:
- a. At-least once per 31 days on a $7AGGERE TEST 8A$1$ by initiating, from the control recs, flow through the HIPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operatas for at least 15 minutes; l b. At least once per 18 months, or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filtar or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chwical release in any ventilation zone ecmunicating with tha systas, by: ,
. . . . _,--4 WIM-
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- v .. - - - , - - - . - . . . - - , . . , - . - - * ., ,_-._.-.,%.-...._,..,-_,,,,,....--w,,,....,_-._.-.m __ ,,.-r. - . - _ . . . _ , . _ . . . . . _ . _ - - - - - . . . , - . - - , - - - , , _ . - . - _ . - - - - _ , . -
r: mi F'eFMi'JnPEWa M GZ5%55mT270 o M ZBDUC@ b6 s atM
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P_LANT $YSTEMS 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION $Y$ FEM LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8PTwoindependentControlRoomVentilationSystemsshallbeOPERA8LE.
APPLICA8ILITY: All MODES.
MA:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:
With one Control Rocs Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERA 8LE stricus within 7 days or be in at least NOT STAN08Y within the .1 ext 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD $ HUT 00WN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
n MODES 5 and 6: -
- a. With one Control Room Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERA 8LE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaini1g OPCRA8LE Control Room ventilation System in the makeup mode.
- b. With both Control Room Ventilation Systems inoperable, or with the OPERA 8LE Control Room Ventilation System, required to be in the makeus mode by ACTION a. not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend a11' operations involving CORE' ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
SURVE!!.t,ANCE REQ _UIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each control Room ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE:
- a. that the control room air At leedt once temperature per than is less 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />
~
or equalby to verifying 90 *F;
- b. At least once per 31 days on a $7AGGERED TEST 8 ASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the Emergency Makeus System HEPA filters and charcoal adsoreers and verifying that tne system operates fcr at least.10 continuous hours with the hoaters operating;
- c. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorcer housings, or (2) following j painting, fire or ehemical release in any ventilation zone cenwnicating with the Emergency Makeup System filter plenum by: ,
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- o 8YRON - UNIT'1 3/4 7-164 . .
.00T 2 6 se4 F
PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- 1) Verifying that the cleanuo system satisfies the in place pene-tration tasting acceptance criteria of less tnan 0.05% and uses
- ' the test procedure guidanca in Regulatory Positions C.5.a.
C.S.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guice 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the' system flow rate is 6000 cfm : IC% for the Emer-gency Makeuo Systam;
- 2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a lacoratory analysis of a representative caroon samole from tne Emergency Makeup System octained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Maren 1978, meets the lacoratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175% wnen testad at a tempera-ture- of 20*C and a relative humidity of 70%; and
- 3) Verifying a systam flow rata of 6000 cfm : IC% for the Emergency Makeuo System and 51,000 cfm 210% for' the Recirculation System when tastad in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
lobh b d.1) Afte every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of Emergency Makeuo System operation by verify-
, ing sithin 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative caroon sample cotained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52,-Revision 2 March 1978, meets the Taboratory testing critaria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 Maren 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175% when tasted at a tamperature of 30*C and a relative humidity of 70%;
k A9 -> e. At least onca per 18 months by:
- 1) Verifying that the pressure dron across the combined HE?A filters and enarcoal adsorter banks is less tnan 6.0 incnes Water Gauge wnile ocerating tne Emergency Makeup System '
at a flow rata of 6000 cfm : IC%;
-f ' ,
BYRON - UNITl .3/4 7-17' .
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- c. 4) W<#yi ng 4kn4- 4ke geewcal.4,,,i Fe lf e r. Sydem sal,, fi es +h e o'n e lme e. p en e 4,s4,an a , J by p., , .s leakag e +e s 4 >k3 a e c e p 4.n ce c ed e ci., ' a r le s s _
. 4kan to % and uses he 4est p.cceekee .. ._
gwden ce & 8 eg u lm 4c ry Pos ilie.n s . g . 6. m. _
and c .c; . d o f R e3 In.4 cry . ca. il e . L.sa ,
- Revision 'L, meek I 97 e, end +h e sys4em ((awraic :
is s't000 clm t Ip % .{or /A a Recaceu le hea
. Fu Her Sys I em .
s)VuiP.03,-.u:n.st.4ys..ah.<cramA.\,thde y
I.Lo c a 4.<y an al ys is of a :e e.pces en + <d-iv e. .. c_a <W .
sa mple f r a m 4 k e. R ecsen Ie4 ion .p, I+<.c sysicm ob+ain ecl ih a eco< clan ce w .A A ep efo l ry Fo5i4, 'n L. 6. b sf Regsla k.y C,,cle I. 62, Revis an *z, l
/NeA J978,,neds.4he Icdovg4c<y 4 es4,g c t,.4 ec_03._o f R eyl a 4ery Pos i4, .n G.6, e oC .
. Rey a.kory l Gad e I . 5.1, R av,s 10., 2, m a ch l9?e
. har cr tu s O y I gods de pen elrddn of less
+Lan i % sL e, 4 54e/ 4 a 4.cmpcc 4%<e of1o c. unA a eclak,Ve 6,J,l y of70%,,,4
- . .- . . . . ._. - = :.-- _ : :+ . ;. - . . . :
- . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . - = . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - . - .
. . . = - - - - -
h49 -
of Reuceu /Ao; cl t). Attec every 71o hoss _
E,14 ec ._op e c a ti o n. by ve.c r fy:n3 w,4 kin 3\ _
. _. d. a y s af4 cc remove 1, .4Aaf a ./a.6ocaVery
.. . .ans)ysis of a <epresen4e4 e c< < lo o n sen,ple ' .
. A4caeA sh ac ec,J s n ee with ge3 8 lakry Po s,lan c.6.6 o f Rey m l4 0 <y C,, d e t. s, r,
.. . g keviS 0r. ?., /M a rc.h 197 8 inee ds lk e la bor e ktp .
. ..lesi k .ec,i ecle oC Ray lJory Po s dia- L.G.4 3
.. ... .o! A e3 s is&a ry G. cle f 52 , Akk <o , 2, A<el .
. t 978.. Soe s me44 y / s oelecle penel<ahok d '
. . _. less +L an I % w h en des ted c,4. n Jespergkre _
- l. .
. af M %.. anJ e rela.Uv e b~ ~ di6 of 76 % .-
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- c4 1
. PLANT SYS~ EMS SURVEII. LANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued)
- 2) Verifying that on a Safety Injection or Hign Radiation-Control Room Outside Air Intake test signal, the systam automatically switches into a makeuo mode of control room ventilation with flow througn the Emergency Makeup System HEPA filtars and-charcoal adsorter banks; '
3)* Verifying that the Emergency Makeuo System maintains the control room at a positive nominal pressure of greatar- than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge relative- to amoient pressure in areas adjacent to the control room area when operating an Emergency Makeup System at a flowrata of 6,000 cfm 210%;
- 4) Verifying. that the heaters dissipata 27.2 2.7 k'W when tasted in accordance with ANSI NS10-1980.
- f. After each completa or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the cleanup systam satisfies the in-place penetration testing acceotanca critaria of less than 0.05% in accorcance witn ANSI N510-1980.for a 00P test aerosol while coerating the Emergency Makeup System at a flow. rate of 5000 cfm : 10%; and i g. Aftar each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank in the Emergency Makeuo System by verifying that the cleanuo.
system satisfies the in place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance critaria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-lS80 for a halogenated hydrocarton refrigerant tast gas while .
ooerating the system at a flow rata of 6000 cfm : 10%.
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"Up to 5% power (Cycle 1), this surveillance requirement is:
- 3) Verifying that one Makeuo System maintains the control room at a positive nominal pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inen Watar Gauge relative to ancient pressure in areas adjacent to this Control Room area prior to initial criticality. However, in the interim, this system will be coerating sucn that the Control Room is maintained at a positive pressure with respect to all adjacant areas. . - ;
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LICENSE CONDITIONS I l. License Condition 2.C(18):
ANSI Class 1 Bubble Tight Dampers will be installed in the Control Room Normal Operating Mode Air Intakes prior to exceeding 5% nower. Similar type dampers will be installed in the purge mode intakes during the first refueling outage.
During the period between 5% power and the first outage the purge mode intakes will be blanked off.
- 2. Attachment I, C: " Prior to July 1, 1985, the licensee shall l complete integrated testing of the Control Room (VC), Auxiliary Building (VA), Miscellaneous Electric Room (VE, and ESF Switchgear Room (VX) ventilation systems in all modes, of operation to demonstrate that the Control Room envelope can.be maintained at a postive 1/8 inch water gauge differential pressure with respect to adjacent areas."
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