ML20093M656
| ML20093M656 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1984 |
| From: | Tramm T COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| 9307N, NUDOCS 8410230103 | |
| Download: ML20093M656 (115) | |
Text
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-f^'N- Commonwealth g / one First Natiornt Plaza.Edison Chiergo. Illinois i T' 7 Addriss Reply to: Post Offica Box 767
\ / ' Chicago, Illiriois 60690 4 October 19, 1984 L:
s R. C. DeYoung, Director Office:of.-Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 205554 r-Sub ject: Byron Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Independent Design Inspection NRC Inspection Report 50-454/83-32
' Reference (a): August 16, 1984' letter from D. L. Farrar
. c to J. G. Keppler.
?li '(b):'
October 1, 1984 letter from T. R. Tramm
'E to R. C. DeYoung.
Dear Mr. DeYoung:
5 =This letter provides additional information to address NRC-
' . questions _ raised during the review of our response to NRC's report oa their: Int ~egrated Design Inspection (IDI) and to the report of the Bechtel TIndependent Design Review (ICR). The bulk of the information needed to address these quertions was provided in reference (b).
. Attachment A to this letter contains a description of the methodology used-to address pipe whip in the jet-impingement study
,:provided in1 reference-(a).
Attachment B contains additional information on the analysis of auxiliary building flooding to address IDI Finding 2-19.
23 Attachment C contains a supplemental response to the NRC concerns identified as Item 2 in reference (b). This discussion places
. perspective on the number of IDR observations relating to FSAR
~ discrepancies with. respect to the overall IDR review effort.
, Attachment D.to this letter-contains a supplemental response to
- the NRC' concern identified as Item 15 in reference (b). This discussion L ?provides1further support for our. conclusion that FSAR control is adequate
, in spite of the several IDR observations relating to FSAR eccuracy.
Attachment E to-this letter contains revised FSAR pages to
.' resolve IDR Observation 8.47. These revisions make the FSAR consistent YU with the High' Energy'Line Break Report.
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DR DOC 0 00 454 W
G PDR {]I A :,
w b ..R. C.fDeYoung- ,2- October-19, 1984 r.
-- Please address' further questions regarding this matter to this office.
~
One-signed original and. fifteen copies of this letter'and.the
.-attachments.are provided for NRC' review.
1 Very truly yours,-
/
f/2,[pu =-,
T. R. Tramm Nuclear-Licensing Administrator-
. /I m-cc:1 J. F. Streeter,' Region III Attachments-s Y
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- 91.27N s
mj ATTACHMENT-A u _.w Pipn Whip Evnluttion Mathodology' Pipe'uhip may occur _when the thrust force from;a broken pipe Eis : sufficient: to cause'bendingg and formation of a plastic
' hinge inEthe_ pipe. .In ordercto'cause sufficient force, the break-must befin:a piping system capable of supplying sufficient ifluid to maintain a high pressure .at the break. Analyses have shown 'tdnit breaks; fed by pumpc 'and breaks with high piping flow 2
resistanceibetween the pressure source and break will not generate adequate' force to cause whip.
L'argelbore: piping. (6" diameter and greater) is restrained if located in a safety related area and shown to have a potential for whip. Whip movements _are' calculated as outlined in FSAR Section 3.6.2._ Secondary hinges and tip deflection are considered. For evaluation of_. jet impingement.cffects the worst case position between the initial position and final
. position is evaluated for a given safe shutdown component.
Small bore piping (4" and smaller) has been reviewed for re-straints on a break lyr break basis. ' Only those breaks with a potential for-whip and the possibility of affecting safe shut-
-down~ components by pipe whip impact are restrained.
The. only small bore piping breaks which could result in whip are those which are fed by a large pressure source (reactor cool-ant system, accumulator tanks, or the steam generators) . A i significantiportion _ of ~ the high energy line breaks in small lines
- can _be shown not to whip .because they are supplied by pumps or
-are flow limited due to orifices or piping flow- restrictions.
Systems.which are used only to flow into the high energy systems are provided with check valves close to - the system connection to the high energy source.
- Uhen' evaluating jet impingement effects from small line breaks, pipe whip #.s conservatively taken into consideration for those breaks which potentially do result in whip.- These are a limited number. of breaks primarily in the reactor coolant let-
.dcwn. lines (upstream of tha letdown orifices)-,- and the steam generator blowdown lines .
The pipe is assumed to' hinge at the nearest elbow sufficiently
. removed from the break. point to. develop a high moment. Because -
the~' number of cases were. limited: and the geometries relatively
=. simple, no. specific criteria was required. The path of-the jet was assumed- to terminate in the worst location with respect to the components in question consistent with the assumptions above.
Because the_ unres trained pipes are small (4-inches and less),
aJ the axial extent of the; influence of steam and two phase jets will be ' 40 inches or less -(per NUREG CR-2913) . As a result, the conservative. approach-could be utilized without adversely affecting the plant design. The movement of an unrestrained J
. pipe may be terminated by impact on a concrete structure or a' larger pipe or other component. Because of the limited influence ^f the steam and two phase jets and the geometry associated with liquid jets, sccondary hinge formation cas not found to potentially increase the number of safe shutdown components.affected in the few cases where the pipe moverc.ent was.no.t terminated by structure.
The shape and extent of the jets is directly given by the applicable jet loading document. Foc two phase and s team je to ,
of primary interest inside containment, NUREG CR-2913 fully
- describes the jet profile with graphical representations of
- the jet pressure as a function of axial and radial distance
. from the break.
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GARGENT QLUNDY !
' ENGINEERG I CHl:A30 l
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ATTACHFENT B '
BYRON /BRAIDWOOD FLOODING CLOSE-OUT PROCEDURE The completed flooding calculation (Calculation 3C8-1281-001) was transmitted to the responsible design groups (Structural, Electrical, Control and Instrumentation, HVAC) for review.
Each group reviewed the impact on their area of design.
. Structural incorporated the calculated flood levels into the Structural Final Load Check. Electrical walked down the areas containing safety related electrical componen'.s and identified
- those below the predicted flood level which could be adversely affected by flooding. In the areas of Control and Instrumenta-tion and HVAC, affected components were identified by a review of the design documents.
As anticipated, the Structural Final Load Check confirmed that flooding would affect certain block walls which had not been designed to withstand flood loads. The potential failure of these walls has been shown to not adversely affect the safe shutdown capability. Because of the combination of increased equipment loads and flood loads, the floor in one pump room was found to be potentially overstressed. Because of the
. difficulty in establishing the load at which the block wall or door would fail, additional outflow area from the room is being added. No other changes have been made.
The Project Management Division has reviewed the safety related components potentially affected by flood and documented that safe shutdown capability is mainta.ined for the postulated flood-ing events. No design changes were required as a result of this flood review.
o V
- , ' ATTACHMENT C
- " SUPPLEMENT - A BECHTEL RESPONSES TO NRC FROM MEETING OF 9/14/84 Item 2 The statement, "there is no reason to expect this to be a concern elsewhere" was used frequently in close-out of observation reports.
Bechtel should document the basis of why the use of this statement was appropriate for each observation report.
Bechtel Response:
The significance of the observations made with regard to insufficient control of the FSAR can be placed in proper perspective by considering the relative number of the concerns raised and the specific nature of the concerns. Only 7 Observations were made relative to the FSAR, and these concerned discrepancies of relatively minor significance. As listed in Appendices A-D of the Byron IDR Final Report, 364 different FSAR comitments were reviewed and found to be acceptably met by the Byron design which in turn were reflected in the 2120 individual evaluations noted in the Report. Many of these individual evaluations covered multiple design documents.
None of the seven observations made during the IDR with regard to FSAR control resulted in a safety significant issue. The observations represent relatively minor details. If these had gone undetected they would have had no impact on the ability of components to perform their intended safety function.
Because the FSAR is necessarily completed before all details are finalized, it is not unusual or unexpected for there to be some small differences with the final design.. The FSAR describes both basic comitments and the means of implementing them. In these cases, no basic comitments were changed. The Observations related only to clarifying these comitments, or to describing equally acceptable ways of implementing the commitments. The Observations in question involved 2 cases where clarification of the FSAR was appropriate and 4
5 cases wiiere the requirements were met in an equally acceptable way To that described in the FSAR.
The fact that the designs have undergone extensive reviews by the IDR and other organizations without detecting significant deficiencies in meeting commitments provides reasonable assurance that essential requirements have been met. The conditions associated with the observations noted would most likely have been detected much earlier if any of the issues had been related to a significant design parameter or function.
The small number of FSAR discrepancies noted and their conspicuous lack of significance, indicate that the Byron FSAR represents a sufficient licensing document and adequately reflects the licensing comitments and the design of the Byron plant. The IDR Observations associated with the FSAR control do not in any way constitute a
- safety significant issue.
0196C 100984C
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ATTACHMENT D
'FSAR RevisionsL Changes to'the Byron /Braidwood FSAR are generated both voluntarily tnd due to specific NRC request,s. These changes are provided by Common-acealth Edison Company,. Westinghouse, or Sargent & Lundy, and are transmitted either directly to- the S&L Licensing Project Engineer (LPE)
.or. indirectly to him through the Project Manager in accordance with S&L
- Quality Assurance Procedure GQ-3.05.
- At Commonwealth Edison's request, the S&L Licensing Project Engineer compiles the FSAR_ changes received and generates a draft FSAR Amendment.
Copies of this draft'are formally transmitted to Commonwealth Edison,
. Westinghouse, and S&L for review. Within S&L, the draft amendment is
. distributed to .the Project Manager and the lead Project Engineers in the Mechanical, Electrical and Structural Departments. Specialists are consulted or involved as required. Within Commonwealth Edison, the draft tmendment is reviewed b the engineering staffs at the Byron and Braidwood
.sitestand the' engineering and licensing staff located in the Chicago
. general office.. At Westinghouse, internal reviews are coordinated by the
.. lead licensing project engineer. Comments r ceived by the S&L LPE are resolved with the responsible engineers and the amendment is finalized.
b A file of -input for the amendment, comments, and resolved comments is -
-retained by the S&L LPE.
t
.In June 1984,- as a result of Byron IDI and IDR issues, the S&L Project Manager.-instructed' the Project Team to transmit all future FSAR changes
- generated by S&L to the LPE via a Design Information Transmittal (DIT).
.The DIT is a standard' form used in accordance with S&L Quality Assurance procedure GQ-3.17 for transmittal'of design information between Project
. ' Team members of different divisions. Use of the DIT requires the respon-sible individual to give a basis for each FSAR change by providing a calculation number, drawing number, report number, or other source
~ document reference. Also, DIT's are tracked and maintained through a formal filing system.
p 9307N
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ATTACHMENT E Revised FSAR Pages
i B/B-FSAR 3.6 PROTECTION AGAINST DYNAMIC EFFECTS. ASSOCIATED WITH THE POSTULATED RUPTURE OF PIPING Piping failures are postulated to occur in high and moderate energy fluid systems at locations defined using the criteria in-Subsection 3.6.2. This criteria is consistent with Branch ;
-Technical Position MEB 3-1. In addition to the loss of fluid from the failed system, and the direct recults of the pipe failure (i.e., pipe whip, fluid impingement, pressurization, en*ironmental effects, water spray, flooding), a functional failure of any single active component is assumed except in those cases where the piping failure is in a dual purpose, moderate energy safety system. In these cases, the single active failure is assumed in any system other than the system which initially failed. A loss of offsite power is assumed
=to occur if the piping failure results in loss of offsite power or reactor trip.
The design of the plant is such that given the above, and applying the load combinations as described in Section 3.9, the function of essential systems and components will not be damaged to the extent that safe shutdown capability is lost.
3.6.1 Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside the Containment The'following is a summary of app)icable definitions; criteria employed; potential sources and locations of piping failures; identificaiton of systems and components essential to safe plant shutdown; limits of acceptable loss of function or damage and effect on' safe shutdown; habitability of critical areas following postulated piping ruptures; and the impact of the plant design on inservice surveillance and inspection.
3.6.1.1 Design Bases 3.6.1.1.1 Definitions Throughout this section, the following definitions apply:
- a. Essential Systems and Componente Systems and components required to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power.
b .- Fluid Systems s
High and moderate energy fluid cyctoms that are subject to the postulation of piping failurea against which protection of essential systems and components is needed.
3.6-1
es y, ,
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- -#' B/B FSAR 1
- c. .'High-EnergytFluid Systems
- Fluid systems that, during normal plant conditions, L ,
'are either in operation or maintained-pressurized
'under conditions where-either or both of the following
, .are met:
I L
r- i s
'\
3.6-la
B/B-FSAR piping movement including rotational movement from static or dynamic loading. A branch connection to a main piping run is a terminal end of the branch run.
Intersections of runs of comparable size and stability are not considered terminal-ends when the piping stress analysis model includes both the run and branch piping and the-intersection is not rigidly constrained to the bul1 ding structure.
- k. Leakage Crack A theoretical opening in the piping system, the "
consequences of which are evaluated on the basis of pressure and temperature differential conditions, flooding effects, and wetting of all unprotected components within the compartment.
3.6.1.1.2 Criteria The criteria used for protection against pipe whip and the Commission!s letter.from Mr. Giambuso, dated-December 1972,.
have been met for designs inside and outside the containment respectively. By virtue of the Construction Permit date for this plant, the above is the required minimum.
Subsequent criteria, including that in the Commission's letter from Mr. O' Leary, dated July 1973, and Branch Technical positions APCSB-3-1 and MEB 3-1, have been employed to the extent possible l and pratical, given the stage of design / construction.
The required protection has been provided by optimization
-of the plant layout to minimize the number of areas affected by piping failures and to locate systems and components used for safe shutdown such that unacceptable damage would not occur. In cases where separation of systems or physical barriers provided by plant structure were not sufficient to provide protection, special protective features such as pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields were employed.
3.6.1.1.3 Identification of Systems Important to Plant Safety L
Systems important to plant safety are listed in Table 3.6-1.
For a given postulated piping failure, additional systems may be required (e.g. , Safety Injection is required for a LOCA) .
Refer to Subsection 3.6.1.3 for a more detailed discussion l of systems and components important to plant safety.
.The basin <for > defining pipe f ailure locations and the design approach to protect essential components are discussed-in l Subsection 3.6.2.
3.6-3
y- s y 'D/B-FSAR 3.6.1.2- "1scription of Design Approval I
.3.6.1.2.1,' Potential Sources and Locations of Piping / Environ-mental Effects Potential sources of' piping failures that are within or could
-affect Safety Category.I structures are listed by system in Table 3.6-2. High-energy piping boundaries are shown in Figures 3.6-1 through 3.6-12.
Locations, orientations, and size of piping failures within high/ moderate energy piping systems are postulated per the criteria given in Subsection 3.6.2.1. The dynamic effects of these_ postulated failures are accommodated b;r the methodology described in Subsections 3.6.2.2 through 3.6.2.5.
Pressure rise analyses are addressed in Subsection 3.6.1.3 Item a. There are no credible secondary missiles formed from the postulated rupture of piping.
Control room habitability is addressed in Section 6.4.
3.6.1.2.2 Impact:of Plant-Design for Postulated'Pipino Failures on Inservice Inspection There are three areas of design necessitated for protection from piping failures which may inte'rfere with Inservice Inspection as dictated by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI. ~
They are:
- a. physical separation of high/ moderate energy piping in tunnels or behind barriers,
- b. pipe whip restraints which may surround piping
._ welds to be examined, and
- c. impingement barriers which may interfere with weld examination'or~ personnel / equipment access.
Design-measures employed so that proper Inservice Inspection can be conducted are, respectively:
- a. Tunnels containinig Section III piping have been made to allow personnel / equipment access as needed.
- b. Pipe-whip restraints are of a bolted design which may be either removed from around the pipe or
, slid down the pipe, to allow access to any welds.
- c. Impingement / separation barriers are of a removable design where interference with proper Inservice Inspection is a problem.
. 3.6-4
+
B/B-FSAR 3.6.1.3 Safety Evaluation In-the design of this plant, due consideration was given to
.the effects of postulated piping breaks with respect to the limits of acceptable damage / loss of function, to assure that, even with a coincident single loss of active component, an earthquake equal to the safe shutdown earthquake, and-loss of offsite power, the remaining structures, systems, and components would be. adequate to safely shut down the plant. The following
- i. . ~is a summary'of-the: Structural, Mechanical, Instrumentation,
- = Electrical, and'HVAC items'that are deemed essential and therefore designed to remain-functional-against (1) a high energy line rupture with resulting whip, impingement, compartment pres-surization and temperature rise, wetting of compartment surfaces,fand flood.ing,.or'(2) a moderate energy through-wall leakage crack with resulting wetting ofJcompartment surfaces, and flooding,'and (3) the vibratory effects of the safe shutdown
-earthquake.
- a. Structural All Safety Category I structures, listed in Table 3.2-1, remain functional with the exception of certain concrete' block and' partition walls in the auxiliary building which have not been specifi-cally designed for loads resulting from piping failure because the failure of the wall will not cause damage to the extent that safe shutdown capability is affected. In the event walls were predicted to be loaded by postulated flooding, Jpressurization or jet impingement,'either the walls were shown to be capable of withstanding the load or the potentir1 effects of failure of the wall on safe shutdown components was assessed.
Pressurization and temperature rise studies for
. postulated breaks in all subcompartments containing normally operating high energy piping are given in Section 6.2 and Attachment A3.6 for inside
-and outside the containment,-respectively. Flooding inside and outside containment is addressed in Attachment D3.6.
- b. Mechanical .
Table 3.6-3 lists all the mechanical systems which may be used-for safe shutdown following any postulated I pipe rupture. Note that all are seismically designed s and are comprised of two full capacity, independent, l 3.6-5 i _ - . _ , _ _ _ __ ____ _
I B/B-FSAR redundant trains. In addition, many of the safety functions can be accomplished by two or more systems,
. allowing a diversity in safe shutdown procedures.
For example,-reactor coolant pump seal integrity is maintained if either seal injection flow (chemical and volume control system) or the thermal barrier cooling (component cooling system) is maintained. As another example, chemical shimming may be accomplished via the chemical and volume control system or the safety injection system.
It should also be noted that the essential systems are
& function of the postulated initiating event. For any given event, only certain portions of an essential system may be required to achieve safe shutdown, dependent upon th2 postulated conditions and coincident failures.
The plant design is such that, whenever possible, all potentially essential systems are protected against loss of function resulting from any potential break. This cannot be attained when essential systems have direct communication with the postulated rupture (e.g., auxiliary feedwater connection to main feedwater or safety injection connection to reactor coolant) . In these cases, the hydraulic design of the essential system is such that the
" escaping" flow is not large enough to degrade the essential system flow below minimum re uirements.
.Due 'to influences on reactivity, cooling capability, etc., break propagation is further limited as defined by Westinghouse (Reference 6) and shown l in Table 3.6-4. In addition, containment leakage is always limited to an acceptable level as described in Section 3.8.
Operation of the secondary side isolation valves is critical to the safety of the plant. Therefore, the piping in the isolation valve room areas is designed well within the stress levels set for postulated breaks. In addition, the boundaries of this room, consisting of the containment and a wall at the start of the main steam tunnel, are placed as close to the isolation valves as practical, to minimize the extent of piping in the area. The piping penetrations through each are designed to withstand the loadings of piping ruptures outside this area without transferring enough strain to the icolation ta]vec to render them inoperable. ReCer to Subcection 3.3.2 for a description of their dealgna.
3.6-6
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.B/B-FSAR
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+ l g' f .' :For. examples of the protection afforded. essential mechanical-components from postulated ~high energy
. -piping and.the calculations-that form the basis for design, refer to Subsection-3.6.2.
' An assessment of the impact of _~ flooding inside and'outside containment resulting from-failure
+ -
. lof:high or-moderate energy line isEincluded in
-Attachment D3.6. No potential flooding event -
-affects the ability to bring the: plant tc a: safe
- shutdown' condition.
- c. Instrumentation' LAppendix!B of Reference 7 lists the instrumentation l -'
required txi sense critical breaks and automatically
-initiate protectiveLactions to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.- In some cases,-instrumentation l is set to initiate protective measures'enly when multiple-reading is indicated from a number of redundant sensors'(e.g.,:a "2 out of 4"Llogic).
In.these situations, the break may be allowed
.tx> render a sensor or sensors -inoperable, -with the additional sensor assumed inoperable due to ,
a-single unrelated active failure,'so long as the required number of' sensors necessary to signal ,
and initiate protective measures remain. l For example in a "2'out of 4" logic, one-sensor 5 may be rendered inoperable as a consequence of i
. the break, and the. recuired minimum of "2 out of 4" ,
would remain, assuming a single active: failure in one' sensor.
~
- d. Electrical
~ Safety-related electrical components'are located, ,
to the evtent possible, in areas which will'not I be affected by high or moderate energy line breaks.
In areas such as the containment, where'some elec-trical equipment must be located near high energy systems, redundant components are well separated to prevent 1 failure of both trains from a common '
initiating event.
!3.6.2 Determination of Break Locations and Dynamic Effects
- Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Pioing Describ'ed herein -are the design bases for locating breaks ,
..andteracks in,pipinJ incido and outside of containment, the 3.6-7 I
B/B-FSAR procedures used to define the jet thrust reaction at the break
. location, the jet impingement loading-criteria, and the dynamic response models and results.
3.6.2.1 Criteria Used to Define Break and crack Location and Configuration 3.6.2.1.1 Reactor Coolant Loop! Piping
.In.any given piping system, there are a limited number'of clocations which are more susceptible to-failure by virtue y of stress or fatigue than .the remainder of the system.
-The discrete break' locations'and orientations in the reactor scoolant loop are derived on-the basis of stress and fatigue analysis. These postulated break locations and the methods that are used to determine them are described in Reference 1.
An-analysis of each individual reactor coolant loop confirms the break location defined in Reference 1. Actual seismic loads for the Byron /Braidwood site are included in the specific plant 4
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3.6-7a !
Q h i D/B-FSAll L
i of highest. stress, .as calculated by. equation (10) in Paragraph NB-3653, of ASME Section III which are separated by.a change in direction of the
- k. pipe run are selected. If the piping run has I
only one change or no change of direction, only one intermediate break is postulated. A given
! elbow or other fitting (tee, reducer, etc.) is considered as a single break location regardless of the number or types of breaks postulated 'at the fitting.
'b. ~ With the -exception of those ' portions of piping identified in Subsection 3.6.2.1.2.1.2, breaks in ASME,Section III,' Class 2 and 3 piping and sels-
.mically analyzed <and supported ANSI B31.1 piping l are postulated at the following locations in each. piping runlor branch runt
- 1. At terminal ends of the run.
- 2. At each location where the stresses under the loadings resulting from" normal and upset plant conditions and an OBE event as calculated by equations (9) and (10) in Paragraph NC-3652 of ASME Section.III . exceed 0.8 (1.2Sh+S)* a f
~
- 3. In the event that two intermediate locations cannot be determined by the stress limits described above, the two locations of highest stress as calculated by equations (9) and (10) in Paragraph NC-3652 of ASME,Section III which are separated by a change in direction of the pipe
, run shall be selected. If the piping run has only one change or no change of direction, only one intermediate break is postulated. A given elbow or other fitting (tee, reducer, etc.) chall be considered as a single break location
.regardless of the number or types of breaks postulated at the ' fitting.
- 4. As an alternate to (1) , (2), and (3) ,
intermediate locations are assumed at each location of potential high stress or fatigue such as pipe fittings, valves, flanges and attachments.
- c. Breaks in non-seismically qualified piping are postu-
> 1ated at.the following locations in each piping run or branch run:
s 3.6-9 b._____________________._.____________.________________.________._________________________________._____________.______._
D/B-FSAR
- e. Leakage cracks:in high energy ASME Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping and. seismically analyzed and suppot ted ANSI B31.1 piping are postulated at locations where the stresses under the loadings resulting fro?n normal and upset plant conditions and an OBE event as calculated by equations (9) and (10) in Paragraph NC-3652 of ASME,Section III exceed.0.4 (1.2Sh+8I a 3.6.2.1.2.1.2 Fluid System Piping in Containment Penetration Areas
- This section applies to the fluid system piping inside the isolation valve rooms, which ' includes the main steamlines 'and the f eedwater lines, starting at the inside of the containment. wall and extending to the first restraint outside the containment isolation valve.
3.6.2.1.2.1.2.1 Details of the Containment Penetration Details of the containment penetrations are discussed in Subsections 3. 8.1 and 3. 8.2.
3.6.2.1.2.1.2.2 Break Criteria
" Breaks are not postulated in the containment penetration area as defined above since the following design requirements are met:
- a. The following design stress and fatigue limits are not exceeded for ASME Code,Section III, Class 2
. piping and seismically qualified ANSI B31.1 piping:
- 1. The maximum stress ranges as calculated by the sum of Equations (9) and (10) in Paragraph NC-3652, ASME Codo,Section III, under the loadings resulting from the normal and upset
~ ~ ~
plant conditions (i.e., sustained loads, occasional loads and thermal expansion) and an OBE event do not exceed 0.8 (1. 2 Sh+SI*
a
- 2. The maximum stress, as calculated by Equation (9) in Paragraph NC-3652 under the loadings resulting from internal nressure, dead weight and a postulated piping failure of fluid systems piping' beyond these portions of piping and excluding OBE, does not exceed 1.8S h. Primary loads include those which are deflection limited by whip restraints.
- 3. Following a piping failure outside the first pipe whip restraint, the formation of a plastic hinge is not permitted in the piping between the containment. penetration and the first pipe whip restraint. Bending and torsion limiting restraints are installed, as necessary, at 3.6-10
r .
B/B-FSAR i
<1ocations selected to optimize overall piping design, to prevent formation of a plastic hinge as just noted, to protect against the impairment of the leaktight integrity of the containment, to assure isolation valve operability and to meet the stress and fatigue limits in the containment penetration area.
- b. Leakage cracks in the containment penetration area are postulated in accordance with subsection 3.6.2.1.2.1.1.
- c. The -number of circumferential and longitudinal; piping welds and branch connections are minimized as f ar as practical,
- d. The length of these portions of piping are reduced to the minimum length practical.
3.6.2.1.2.2 Moderate-Energy Fluid System Piping Inside and outside containment Through-wall leakage cracks are postulated in seismic category I moderate-energy ASME Section III, class 2 and 3 and seismically analyzed and' supported ANSI B31.1 piping located both inside .!
containment except where the maximum stress range is less than 0.4III(1.2 Section CJaMs Ss+S . In unanalyzed moderate-energy ASME 2 $n)d 3 and ANSI B31.1 piping, this exception based on stress is not taken. The cracks are postulated indi-vidually at locations that result in the maximum effects from fluid spraying and flooding, with the consequent hazards or environmental conditions developed.
3.6.2.1.2.3 Types of Breaks and Leakage cracks in Fluid System Piping 3.6.2.1.2.3.1 circumferential Pipe Breaks circumferential breaks are postulated in high-energy fluid' system piping exceeding a nominal pipe size of 1 inch, at the locations specified in Subsection 3.6.2.1.2.1.
Where break locations are selected in piping without the benefit of stress calculations, breaks are postulated nonconcurrently at the piping welds to each fitting, valve or welded attachment.
3.6. 2.1. 2.3.2 _ Longitudinal Pipe Brea ks Tha following longitudinal breaks are postulated in high-energy fluid system piping at the locations of the circumferential breaks specified in Subsection 3. 6. 2.1. 2. 3.1, 3.6-11
g - - _
U/B-FSAR- ,
- c. F is determined in accordance with Ffh0$NY"h$8fReference4forsaturatedsteam 9
and water and subcooled non-flashing water, and Figures 3.6-100, 3.6-101, and 3.6-102 for subcooled I flashing water.
- d. T = Time to F for circumferential bbEEksandisdebOb$5988Ih'dividingthedistance 6
to the first elbow from the break by the sonic speed of the significant fluid wave. The sonic wave speed (Cg ) is determined from Figure 9-29 of Reference 4.
- e. Ffinal = The larger of Fint or F ss' 3.6.2.2.2.1.4 Evaluation of Jet Impingement Effects !
Jet impingement force calculations are required only if structures or components are located near postulated high energy line breaks and it cannot be demonstrated that failure of the structure or component will not adversely affect safe shutdown capability.
The methodology used in the plant design when force calculations were found necessary is described in detail in Reference 5.
To confirm that the design approach for protection against jet impingement effects had been consistently applied throughout the design process, a thorough review of potential jet effects on nafe shutdown components was completed in August 1984. A report (Reference 7) contains the result's of this confirmatory review, and demonstrates that safe shutdown capability is not adversely affected by jet impingement. This effort utilized the most current information available as to the plant config-uration and operating conditions. Recently, improved descriptions of steam and two-phase jet behavior were also incorporated into the review (Reference 8). ,
8 i
e d
3.6-17
(.- -
i g B/B-PSAR AME!!D;4ENT 46 THIS PAGE DELETED
\
3.6-18
g L
B/B-ESAB l
3.6.2.2.2.2 Methods for the Dynamic Analysis of__ Pipe Whip y Pipe whip restraints provide clearance for thermal expansion during normal operation. If a break occurs, the restraints or anchors. nearest the break are designed to prevent unlimited movement at the point of break (pipe whip) . 'Two methods were used to analyze simplified models of' the local; region near.the
- break 'and. to calculate displacements of the pipe and restraint.
.These calculated displacements were then used to. estimate- strains
~
in the pipe and the restraint.
-An energy balance method was used to analyze carbon steel pipes since it'was found possible to use a rigid-perfectly plastic moment-rotation law for pipes of this material with acceptable accuracy. The simplified models shcwn in Figure 3.6-15 were used to represent the local region near the break and to calculate the displacement of the pipe and the restraint when cubjected to a suddenly ' applied constant force by the energy balance method.
The restraint and structure resistances were assumed rigid--
. perfectly plastic. Elastic effects increase the work done by the -
'bibwdown ' thrust. Since these effects are neglected in the rigid-g _ plastic energy balance model they were accounted for by increasing the gap between the pipe and the restraint by an empirical formula.
A finite difference model was used to analyze stainless steel pipes since it was found necessary to use a power law moment-curvature relationship for pipes of thie' material. The l simplified models shown in Figure 3.6-16 were used to represent the local region near the break and to calculate the displacement in the restraint as well as the displacements and' strains in the pipe.
. 3.6.2.2.2.2.1 'Staaes of_ Motion - Energy Palance Method All references to points and lengths in this section can be found
'in ' Figure 3.6-15.
At the start of motion the pipe is assumed fixed at point A.
Physically point A is an anchor, restraint, or elbow. In general, a hinge will fcrm at scme point B and outboard pipe segment BD will rotate.as a rigid bcdy until contact with the restraint is made at point C.
During the next stage of motion the hinge at B must move in order to satisfy the requirement that chear at a plastic hinge is zero.
At the* came . time .a . hinge vill f crm at the restraint (point C) if
- the plactic moment Mo 'ic, c
- :cecded. Initially at contact, the force exerted on the pipe by the. restraint-is R, the restraint 3.6-19
9/D-FSAR In recognition of the dynamic nature of the anticipated impact loads charpy V notch impact tests and U.T. examination of platcc loaded through their thickness were specified.
3.6.2.3.1.2 Jet Deflectors 3.6.2.3.1.2.1 tiature and Location of Jet Deflectors Jet deflectors were provided in each loop to prevent the jets emanating from the postulated longitudinal breaks at the intrados of the elbows in the hot legs at the steam generator inlets from impinging on the steam generator lower lateral supports. The deflectors, shown in Figure 3.6-22, consist of steel barrel shells tied vertically to heavy beam spanning between the steam generator column embodments .and tied horizontally to embedmonts set in the primary shield wall.
3.6.2.3.1.2.2 Design Loads The jet impingement load acting on the jet deflector was estimated according to the Henry-Fauske medel for a subcooled homogeneous nonequilibrium flow process with the deflector treated as a simple one degree of freedom oscillator.
Eccentricities of the impinging jet upon the deflector in both the radial and axial direction were postulated to reflect the uneven jet pressure distribution on the deflector bucket.
3.6.2.3.1.2.3 Design and Analysis Procedures The jet deflectors are idealized as statically determinate pinned trusses for purposes of assessing the force in the vertical and horizontal tie members. The deflector bucket was analyzed as a circular arch.
The limiting values for member stresses were derived by increasing the AISC-69 working stress limits by 50%. The elements of the deflector are still nominally elastic under these limits. The ASCE limitation on through-plate thickness stresses were adhered tc. The buckets and vertical ties are AS42 steel.
The horizontal ties and the embedments are A588 steel.
3.6.2.3.2 Pipe Whip Restraints _Inside and_outside containment This subsection applies to pipe whip restraints for all piping other than the reactor main coolant piping which connects the reactor vessel, the main coolant pumps, and the steam generators.
3.6.2.3.2.1 General Description of Pipe Whi p Festraints Pipe whip restraints are provided to protect the plant against the l effects of whipping during postulated pipe break. The desian of pipe whip restrainto iu governed not only by the pipe break blowdown thruut, but also by functional requirenents, detormation
~1 imitations, properties of whipping pipe and the capacity of the 3.6-27
D/B-FSAR tests are performed on members subjected to thorough thickness tension. l 3.6.2.3.2.7 Jet _ Impingement Shields l
Jet impingement shields on the primary loops are described l in Subsection 3.6.2.3.1.2. Additional jet impingement shields were not required because of the utilization of separation and redundancy to preclude jet impingement damage to safe shutdown systems and components an discussed in Subsection
-3.6.1.1.
3.6.2.3.3 C_r_itaria for Protection Against Po_s,tulated Pipe
. llr ea k s in Roactor Coolant System Pioino A lose of. reactor coolant accident is assumed to occur for a branch line break down to the restraint of the second normally open automatic isolation valve (Case II in Figure 3.6-23) on outgoing lines (Note: It is assumed that motion of the unsupported line containing the isolation valves could cause failure of the operators of both valves to function) and down to and including the second check valve (Case III in Figure 3.6-23) on incoming linen normally with flow. A pipe
-break beyond the rostraint or second check valve will not result in an uncontrolled loss of reactor coolant if either of the two valves in the line close. Accordingly, both of the automatic isolation valves are suitably protected and restrained as close to the valves as possible so that a pipe
. break beyond the restraint will.not jeopardize the integrity and operability of the valves. Further, periodic testing capability of the valves to perform their intended function is essential. This criterion takes credit for only one of the two valves performing its intended function. Por normally closed isointion or incoming check valves (Cases I and IV in Figure 3.6-23) a loss of reactor coolant accident is asnumed to occur for pipe breaks on the reactor side of the valve. l Branch lines connected to the Reactor Coolant System are defined as "large" for the purpose of this criteria if they have an inside diameter greater than 4 inches up to the largest connecting line, generally the pressurizer surge line. Rupture of these lines results in a rapid blowdown from the Reactor Coolant System and protection is basically provided by the accumulators and the low head safety injection pumps (residual heat removal pumps).
Branch lines connected to the Reactor Coolant System are defined as "small" if they have an inside diameter equal to or less than 4 inches. This size is such that Emergency Core Cooling System analycon uning realintic acnumptions chov that no cled dange is 3.6-30
B/D-FSAR Actual plant moments for the Byron /Braidwood Unito are also given in Tabic 3.6-7 at the design basis break locations so that tho reference fatigue analynio can be shown to be applicable for this plant. By chowing actual plant momenta to be no greater than those used in the reference analysia, it follows that the streno intensity rangen and usage factora for the Byron /Draidwood Units will be lean than those for comparable locations in the reference mode 2 By this meano it in. shown 'that there are no locations other than those identified in WCAP 8002 (0172) owhere the otreus intensity rangen and/or usage f actors for the Byron /Braidwood Unito might exceed the criteria of 2.4 S m and 0.2, rcopectively. 'Thus, the applicability of WCAP 8082 (8172) to the Byron /Braidwood Unito has been verified.
- b. Pipe whip restrainto acoociated with the main Reactor Coolant Loop are described in Subsectiono 3.6.2.3.1.1 and 5.4.14.
- c. Jet deflectors annociated with the main Reactor Coolant Loop are deccribed in Subsection 3.6.2.3.1.2.
- d. Design loading combinations and applicabloscritoria for ASME Class 1 componento and supporto are provided in Subocction 3.6.2.3.3.5. Pipo rupture loado include not only the jet thrust forces acting on the piping but also jet impingement loads on the primary equipment and cupporto.
- o. The interfaco betwoon Sargent & Lundy and Wootinghouso concerning the design of the primary equipmont sup-porto and the interaction with the primary coolant ,
loop in doacribed in Subsection 3.9.3.4.4.1.
~3.6.2.5.2 Pont'ulated Dreaks in Piping other than Poactor coolant Inop The following material portains to dynamic analyses completed for piping systema ottar than the reactor main coolant piping which connecto the reactor vooool, the main coolant pumpo, and the otoam generators.
3.6.2.5.2.1 Implomontation of Critoria for Defininq _ Pipe Bronk Locationn and conftqurations The locations and numhor of design bacia breako, including pootulated rupture orientations, for the high energy piping nyatoms are shown in Figurno 3.6-25 throuch 3.6-!9. l The above information van derived f ra:r the implet..entation of the critoria delinonted in Subnoction 3.6.2.1.
3.6-36
4 B/B-FSAR' Stress levels and usago factors (usage factors for Clasc 1 piping '.
only) for the postulated break locations are shown in Tables 3.6-11 and 3.6-12.
3.6.2.5.2.2 Implementation of criteria Dealing with Special Featuros Special protective devices in the form of pipe whip restraints sand impingement shields are designed in accordance'with Subsection 3.6.2.3.
I i Inservier inspection is discuaned in Subsection 3.6.1.2.2.
.3.6.2.5.2.3 Acceptability of Analynon Results The postulation of break and crack locations for high and !
moderato energy piping cystems and the analyses of the resulting jet thrust, impingement and pipe whip effects has conservatively identified areas where restraints, impingomont shields, or other protective measures are nooded and has yielded the conservativo design of the required protectivo devicac.
enesults of-jet thrunt and pipe whip dynamic effects are given ;
in Tables 3.6-13 and 3.6-14. ,
3.6.2.5.2.4 Design Adequacy of systems, Components, and Component Supports For each of the postulated breaks the equipment and systems necessary to mitigate the consequences of the break and to nafely a shut down the plant (i.e., all ecsontial systems and components) have been identified (Subsection 3.6.1) . The equipment and systems are protected against the consequences of each of the postulated breaks to onoure that their design-intended functions will not be impaired to unacceptable levels as a result of a
, pipe rupture or crack.
When it became necessary to rostrict the motion of a pipe which would result from a postulated break, pipe whip restraints were added to the applicablo piping nyatema, or structural barriera or walls were designed to prevent the whipping of the pipe.
Design adequacy of the pipe whip restraints is demonstrated in Tables 3.6-13 and 3.6-14. Data in the tablos was obtained through use of the critoria delineated in Subsections 3.6.2.1 through 3.6.2.3 inclusivo. ,
i The design adequacy of structural barrioro, walls, and compononts in dincunned in Section 3.0.
r l-
- 3.6-37 [
i
B/B-FSAR ,
3.6.3 References
- 1. "Pipo Breaks for the LOCA Analysis of the Westinghouco Primary Coolant Loop," WCAP-8082-P-A, January 1975 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8172-A (Non-Proprietary) , January 1975.
- 2. F. M. Bordolon, "A Comprehensive Space-Timo Dopondent l Analysis of Loss of Coolant (SATAN-IV Digital Codo)," WCAP-7263, August 1971 (Proprietary) and WCAP-7750, August 1971 (Non-Proprietary) .
- 3. " Documentation of Selected Westinghouno Structural Analysis Computer Codon," WCAP-8252, April 1974
- 4. R. T. Lahoy, Jr. and F. J. Moody, "Pipo Thrust and Jet Loads," The Thermal-llydenulien g a Boiling Water Nuclear _
Reactor, Section 9.2.3, pp. 375-409, Published by American Nuclear Society, Prepared for the Division of Technical Information United Staten Energy Research and Development Administration, 1977.
- 5. Sargent & Lundy Engineering Mnchanics Division Technical Proceduro No. 24, " Analysis of Postulated Pipo Rupture," September 1976.
- 6. Westinghouco Design Critoria 831.19, "Critoria for Pro-tection Against Dynamic Effecto Ronulting from Pipo Rupture," .
Revision 0, March 1978.
- 7. " Byron 1 - Confirmation of Design Adoquacy for Jet Impingo-mont Effectc," Commonwealth Edicon Company, August 1984.
- 8. NUREG/CR-2913, "Two-Phase Jet Londo," January 1983.
3.6-39 ,
ICV 22
@ C600 -
. Missile Barrier Anchor EL. 413'- 0"
- Indicates Postula,ted Break C605j -
mg 1RC03AB-271'2 Cold Leg (1CV10C B b~ El 393'-O'
=
ORC 37A 3) ,
(1CV10DB 3) ,
C601 C602 C603 C604 -
SUBSYSTEM 1CVO2 WS EEGu% 3 0 ' .2 'T C H A M.C,1 N G La:Nu LCOP2 .SU6SypTCM /CVo l pourusrces 6Resr:
- LocArxons- _ - - _ - -
1RB3OO
<Missle C 611 1 Barrier
. Anchor E L .413'O" 1Cv22 M1C V10C A -3)
C606 1RCO3 A A-2 71/2 Cold Leg Nozzle
- Indicates Postulated Break ( E L.39 3'- 0" r
I SUBSYSTEM 1CVO3 -
- -{1 R C 28 A -3) lC6091 C 610
/
L lC607 ]
(1 C V10DA- 3 6/B Ftsuac 3. c; - 2 6 C HARGalG we LOOP 1 Sussysian (CVo3 t
PO6iTULATEb BP1Am L.oC A 'tTo A/S
Structural Anchor -
EL.4 20' - 3 Structural bd '
Anchor
=
(1CV1 CAB 3) lC711 (1 CV10AA 3 -
Regenerative IC710 Heat Exchanger (1CV10B 3) Nozzles 1CVO3 AB -1B 1CVO3EA '1 A E L.399' -10" e indicates Postulated Break
- c. SUBSYSTEM 1CVO4 l.
-1CVO4 l
J' E L. 413'- O" 1CV22
. B/B Freuce 3.6-27 CVC s Suarysre14
)C VoL{
posrutored BeeAA (OCATI.c NG
(1 C V09 F A-3")
='l\- /1CVO9F B-3")
{ /
~ .
I C718 l -
C C717l 1C VO3AB-1B OC-VO3 AA-1A Regenerative Reganerative -
H:at Exch. Heat Exch. C719 l -
Nozzle ' 5" EL.399- Nozzle E L .399 -'10" Con'tain ment C72Ol Penetra tion P -71 1CVO9E -3") I C721 Q
, vV E L.3 7 9-0 SUBSYSTEM 1CVO5 Fwee 3 vd CKL S 4 8 5 yst e n
/ C Va.5-POS T M LATkb 0REhK Locarxows
1CV23 1RB-330 ,
Misste Barrier Anchor E L . 414'-O"
. Indicates Postulated Break OPC36A-3) :-
C614 7
/
1RC O3 AC -271/2 Cold Le,g a C616 C612 EL.393-0 C 615 L
C613 l SUBSYSTEM 1CVO6 d[4 Yrc,uw 3.G-Y!
t@er.1AL LEThowh/
Loop 3 GUESYsrens ICV 06 Postu uren BAe1K
(1 CVO1 AA 3)
(1CVO1 AB 3)
- < (1CVO1 DA 3)
. (1CVO1 DB 3) lC 722 I '-
(1CVO1CC 3)
- EL .4 01'-9'
- 1CVO3A A-1A Heat s Exchanger Nozzle- ( -m EL. 401'-9' Heat e C724 Exchanger Nozzle N - - Stre c tural 1CVO3AB-1B Anchor EL 420'-10 "
lC 723 l (1CVH8A 2 )-
=
(1CVO1 DC 3)
C725 C726
- Indicates Postulated Break C727
~
P-41 SUBSYSTEM 1CVO7 Containment E L. 391'- O ,, - Penetration
$0 Freu,ce 3.6-3:
CVCs Suss ystem
( Cv0 '7 Posrut4 mts 8AeiK
[ccAnoNS . _ .
9 I
- Indicates Postulated Break 1CV15 Structural Anchor EL;394' 3" (1CVA3C 1 b C682- C 619 (1R C15 AC 3/4] _
1 1 ,
C620 1R CO2 AC -31 f' Cross Over C683 Le Nozz1 C681 d ELh82 h ,
C618 Nozzle
[-
C622 f
[ h, Term.End (1RC14 AC > "- s '
See Detail 1-C621 D (1 CVA6A A 2]
l DETAIL 1
. )
SUBSYSTEM ICVO9 Structural *
(1C VA3 B - 2)
Anchor E'L.379'- 7" 1CV25 - -
Sh Qx6uac 3. 6 - 1 Ct/cs Suasysum
/c yot pogruaru enem
- . _ _ ._. .. . .. _ _. _ __LO C&MPM6 _-.
e Indicates Postulated Break
. 1RCO2AA 3
' Crossover Leg Nozzle
. 5EL. 58 2'- 8" 4p C623 (1 RC14 A A ~2) 1CV16 C684
' 1 C685 Structural C627
. Anchor C628 C624 E L.3 77'-9"4 C625 C626 1CVA3B 2)
V .
(1C VA3 AA 2) Structural Anchor Eg.379'- 6" 1CV11 y 1CV11A w< ~
(
. CL D= \ = CL. A g
Structural Anchor E L. 37 9'- 6" SUBSYSTEM 1CV11
\
!N ,. , -
EXCESS LET howtJ Loor 1 Sussysumt IcvII Posrut u ets acem<
- ' c outrzaas
4 i
Structural . Anchor L . 3 8 6'- O" CV24 4
( 1 C V4 3 A- 2 )
- Indicates Postulated Break SUBSYSTEM I C V12 C656 C655 C653 1RCO 2 A A-31 O Cross-Over Leg C654 E L . 3 85'-3" B/B fl.Gunw 2,6-31
[ COP F1Lt, L I N G' LOOP 1 SUBS 4S' ret.1 lCVI2. (bSTM LA-TEh
...___.._ J gEAX LocATrotJS _
Structural :
1CV24 Anchor EL.394-, 9,,
/
=
(1C V4 3 A- 2 )
!C6581 (1C V 16 AD- 2 C659l
~
lCG57 C6601 rt 1RCO2 AC -31 CROSS-OVER LEG NOZZLE E L ,3 82'- 8"
- Indicates Postulated Break SUBSYSTEM ICV 13 ,
(1C V49A- 2 )
Structural Anchor E L . 3 79'- 6" Aff' j=rc=u,2 tf 3.6-34 l 00f F1LL Lam. E Loo? 3 Stussysren lCU13 poi wtKTEb
_ _ . _ . . . _ - _ _ - . - _ . . . _ _ -. __ .bSSdK 3fC$DCW
C661 l
'l C 663 l C664l C662]
.E L. 3 8 5'- 6" 1 R C16 A D-2")
W 1RCO2AD-31" -
' EL .3911 10" Crossover Leg Coupled To 1CV13
-Missle Barrier Wall (1CV438D- 2 Containm,ent
--Penet ration P-37
. Indica tes Postulated Break SUpSYSTEM 1CVl4 els Psauae ace LCOP F1LL L1NG Loo r H suostsrem (CV t L{ fOSTulATkh
_ , . - . _-- _ MISE 86 _ L 091'IUN E _ -.
o Indicates Postulated Break
,~.
~
t L
e 1 A5AA 2) 1RCO2 AB-3 1RC01AB-29 Crossover. Leg Hot ~ Le " Structural E L'. 3 8 2'- 9" EL.393' nchor u EL 394 -3" (1RC14 AB 2 (1CVA3B 2] ,
1R C01 AC-29 9 i* Hot le C 6 91 C692 / EL.39 2" C706 -
C696 -
C705 l
=
(1 R C13 AC 2)
C695 ._
C704 C693 C703 C707 C694 (1 RC13 AB 2) C708 C702 ,
C709 C 701 .
C700 I
SUBSYSTEM 1CV 15 INd
~
Fives 36~36
. . , EXcsss L El t.owt1 L OGP S ~2 /W b 3 6'/S$1sTE%1 lCUl5' Fcs-lu u n.,
h eea.w
e 1 RCO1 A A-29 Hot leg ,
EL. 3 9 3'- 0" C629 (1RC13 AA- 2) ?
C630 ~ 1RC01AD-29 l Hot leg E L. 3 93'- 0" t.
C631
^ C633-C 632 2)
M1 R C13AD C636 C635 sty /' C634 1CV11 tural Anchor EL. 3 77'-9" St ructural A n chor -
E L. 3 86'- 0"
'* ' Indicates- P.ostulated Break 1CV25 (1 CVA3 B 2)
SUBSYSTEM 1CV16 .
- e 0
B/B F:.L a r2.C 3.':-3l 3
L KCES.$ ~ LGT bow tJ Lcces I na y suesystm ;cv g
[; ,
P O S' W V G 1: b 6 ste,\ z L 0C A T'ir n <
~
+
~.
'1CVO4
_ (1CV10 C A- 3") E L.413-0
.1 R B .312 Str u c turc Anchor Missle , '
Barrier l ,
Anchor i.
E L.413'- 0" o 1 C V45 A - 2 ")'
- I C716 }- Missle Bar rie r
-Anchor E L.413'- 0" l C712 l ,
. indicates Postulated Break H C715 l l C713j l c 714 >
i
^~
SUBSYSTEM ICV 22
.. . 2 2 Fmu>ee 2.+3g C VCs S'us s ycrem ICV 2.2 Post utNrt-h BREAK / CC/eTIcus
l t
. Indicates Postulated Break
)\
J r-
\
.c .Y C651 l (1CVB7 BA 3b -
^
(1CV B7 BB 3) ,
C650l _
1CVO3AA-1A Heat (Regen.) , ; .-
. Exchanger ' . Nozzle EL . 401'-9" C652 1CVO6 lC647]
1CVO3AB-18 C648 Heat (Regen.) , J Exchanger 5 M C649]
Nozzle 1RB-3'30
_EL . 401'-9' Missile Barrier Anchor EL.414'- O' SUBSYSTEM 1CV23 s
B/B FIE"Re 36'~
CVCS SVBSYSTan
/GV 2 3 Pasruvaeb BREAK L OCA mNS
'C 64 4l
-(1CV438 A-2 C646 (1C V434 - 2 )
p 1RC16 AB- 2 )
(1CV438 B- 2
[
S tructural C 6 41 '
N hS truc tural-Bh Anchor
~ Anchor Cro^ss Over C643 E L , 3 94'- 9" E L.3 86'- O" Leg Nozzle E L ,3 82'-8" 1CV13 1CV12
~~~
- Indicates Postulated Break e
SUBSYSTEM 1CV24 ek cz eu,x 2.c w Lob ~P FILL LXW Loo? 2 G46 "
JCvQ% SbS7u LATEh 9RsAK Lc<A Wo^15
1CVO9 Structu Anchor g E L. 37 9'- 7" 2)
(1CVA3B
- Indicates Postulated Break 1 RCO2 A D-31 (1 CVA7A A 2.) :-
. C rossover Leg Nozzle E L 3 2'- 8" C637
~
C640 ,
C728 C729 m- --
C639 C686 C638 C687
\ (1RC14 AD 3)
C689 C688 SUBSYSTEM 1CV25 d -
a,. L~ _ ;li F16uw EXCcss L GWwhJ SUBS YSTE~M LwP L{
/CV 2S' Postvet
.. .BREAg LocAncas
^^ ^- ^
A (1CV14FA 2)
.(1CV14EA 2) 1RCO1PA RC Pump ,
Nozzle E L. 39 5'-11" C668 C667 C666 C665 Indicates Postulated Break
, SUBSYSTEM ICV 34
~~
. 1CV35 1RB-36 Missile Barrier E L. 3 88'- O" s .
8[8
=zoa,w 3.c, RCf SEAL WATER 2.NJECTMI Looe I
. SU BS YSTLM IC \i3Lj.
. _-. . ppu p y W LK9qq_
.4 , s4-1RC01PB RC Pump D Nozzle lC 672 l EL.396'-$
1 C671 (1CV14GB 1/2)
C670 u
(1CV14FB 2 )
C 6~69 (1CV14EB 2)
- Indicates Postulated Break SUBSYSTEM 1CV36 .
, CV37' 1 R B-50 Missile Barrier Anchor E L. 392'- 0" r
s Ab TI 6 titte 3 . 6 - 4 3 Rcp GEAL WMDC TNJastuoM L o f' 2
.6y Ss ys Ter.1 icv 36 R
[bstutATEL
1 R C01 P.C.
RCL' Pump
- Nozzle .
E L.3 95'.- 11" (1CV14GC 1/2) 1 /
C675 ,
(1C V141 C 2)
C676 c-
\q a_
C673 C 674
- P-53 Containmen Penetratic)
E L. 387'- O' e Indicates Postulated -Break SUBSYSTEM 1CV40
~
Ble 3.s '!u f'_t. G u ic. c
@CP SEAL W.4'rGX Ito 7EcTro Al L coF 3
. G UBG V5 T.Titt \(tjqc f0STMLAT - eIA BRak
C.677 C678 1R C01PD Reactor C679 / Coolant P
E L. u mp 396 '- 0"
/ C680 (1CV14FD 2) ,
e Indicates Postulated Break
~ ~
SUBSYSTEM 1CV41 P-33 C ontainment Penetration E L. 391' - 0" kB
. Freue.s 3 6-E RCP5E,u WATOC 1N *J BCTrO d LOOP 4 G4 GSysTEsM / CWll POSTuMTEL 8 fdEA K Loc.ATacMG
J g
I lu
,\ . ,D s/
d.'\ T* K r ,A.
c=
oj 4 qa, A0"
... y t /.-
'y" p _: 4co $ gHa 1 .> o
_s @*
o ,s e 2 g a g
gM
3
'b, @ \. .
l o f
,'i .
.t.y**%
. _ q.
Ni
'. p dmm
/
4
/
[
-*{g" /g O
' ~'
j\, ;- g o "g.
r o y s
/
--1 6 .
'/\ o o 0 ,
y ,.
v-A s -
,g < s g, . i s ,o gcg e o r *[ \
3 ,,.
/ \',
tt /
o \1
< u
,' e x \ 'I
\
s 9-O \s -
- f. r 0 @ \ '
s \' i.N/ g ' ' \t \/
r Nm y
\
x ,s' \. .
1 s
,y f
\;t 3
/
- i,, g a p
'b - ? xf % < ly
- f. '5}
o ,
N e
- c
-mG-d , - - -
. s y '
e g -
/s R g/\ '{\
,[
~
\ ,
, . .n .
e g
- /.
. . s
' e
, s a S- u o ,
'5.
g S \i, .-' -
h s , . , e WI
? M r
c
% cu
. 'N #, g h ~
NOTE: ~
p'/f N
/.
ADJACENT STRUCTURES ARE cy
's. \ .,
DESIGNEO TO PROVIDE PRCTECTION AG Alt.f.T THE FULL EFFECTS OF THE PUST U:. ATED PIPE RUPTURES.
6'[.d'4( ' . -
g ,-
/
f;/'\,
N' C'74 V
A's, '
y ,
h
'Ny
/ M /
,vb
, s 'y / '
C'7S '
G72 'y + ~ -
/-
V s
.'e s N N 'e z
s P,' N, ,;) .
y'.
,, ,r ,N,.-- .-
5'
! iNa! CATES POSTULATED BREAK q
V 'k ' f k T') ~
'j,
@'"*N.K f '%g'i g/g ,
Freu,as 3.6 96 l
x @ 7 VeeuwAva. PrPrNG
~ .
Sy6TEms ,Z N / MAIN _i!
SieAm PrPc TuyWL ,
'l f0STULA TE6 BPEA n
/ oCA T.ro N 4 (SAeer 2 o+ 2')
lC055
- : Steam Generctor j Rotated View lc055 _
t
.s -
C051 _ _
l
-l C050 l(1FWO3DA 16 .
_ _p -
TContainment [arr r
\ -i C052 Penetration Wall .
C053l C0541 SUBSYSTEM 1F.WO2
. Indicates Postulated Break fB F_rsvee 2.6- 47
- . DEebWATER LOOP 1
! poswune ts sceax tocm,ws
CO61 i
EL 403.7 ' k, ,
-} Generator CO61 l Rotated View r C057 -
1FWO3DB 16)
EL. 390.O'
- . 6 ~~- '
CO56 F Missile g C059 -
CO60 hoa Containment CO58 . Penetration SUBSYSTEM- 1 FWO3 l e Indicates Postulated Break O[S i PIsac E 3. 6- 4 K Peetweren coor 2 l Posrut.xce 6 6geAn L ocnnons
/
- EL403.7' CO66l .T (1 03 % 16)
AkSteam Generator CO62
[E. 3%. O' ' Main Steam T lCO65 " Pipe' Enciesure Containment Wall Penetration Missile ,
Barrier Wall COS4 l
. CO63 l SUBSYSTEM 1FWO4 i
- Indicates Postulated Break O!6 l
FIL-uR E 3.6-%
Fess wAxa Lwe 3 foSTou u?n great Loc 4Trofas i
EL. 403.7 '
l .
(1FWO3DD 16 -
CO68l Ste'am Generator 5
Containment Penetration Ma.in Steam CO72Fl Pipe Enclosure}
Wall ',
Missile C071 J .
EL. 390.O'J er har a
lCO69 CO70l SUBSYSTEM 1FWO5
- Indicates Postulated Break
. Bla F uuat 3.s'- 50 Fee wAwa Loo p 4 Posrtames ans.u Lacerxcus
R 1
7 7 E T
0 K A
E M
R b B E I
D E -
FE s e ,
T p' e 7 A o
M run L
c U >s f
l T
S O
1 5
T-L Igt u o P
S E 6
- X s rc U o a T
A C
f 3
A PoL
- D -
/6 eR N
I E e
' Bc E1 KA u T
a%4f e r
F 6 aA E o 8.
NL
's)&
\'
's
]
5 7
O C
l G
O W
F I
M E
T S
Y S
B U
S C /W
.A 5w F[ C x\
]
t' !i \ -
7 C
C g
o
'j. l ,tlI,!
K A
1~
n E
] R a I
3 2
S 1
1 l
O B
B
=
e 8 B D t O O O E h O C C C C T D A 2 eCr
[
L U s .
T S
O - wLU / s u
r a o P
S E 2 u
x T S r.r O
T A
C I
D eA uVc c o
N /e a -
A L I
8 u n
\ a= a2itA w
R E APE 0 Ps
/ R R
I e0 G FL A
B E
L I
S
>$ S I
2 M
- ~
7 O
W F
I
]5 M E
T g S
~
C Y 5
7 B g
U W S 7 .
(9
~
]
l 9 l
A 7 1 0 -
0 -
C, -
S p'n%
H L
7
' > :m x ,=
5 r
-l> Y 2$
O 43.50 , p i COB 8}
COS7]
P 102 lAl 9
, H CO861 L CO85l s' .
5Nb (1FW87CC 6)
-7 MISSILE BARRIER ,
e INDICATES POSTULATED BF!EAK SUBSYSTEM IFWO8 B/B Fredce 3.6-53 Feehawm -Au m rey Ps m ern ,
Loo?' 3 fbswurrEb Beenn.
Lccwrzous
o
. \
t'
[C094H v YCONT AT I POINT *A*-
lCd92]
lCO93 ]
l CO91 l JCOSOl STEAM GEN.
I RC01BD-10
. LOOP 4 s
T BLDG D 6)
N
[COS9 ]
t
- N /
?
1FW87CD 6) '
3 '
BARRIER i WALL
- 1 e INDICATE S POSTUL ATED GRE AK. i SUB',YSTEM IFWO9
% Bls POINT *A* g
' Prsace 3 4- 54 Pethweren ~;%2way pg,g,,
Lcce 4 Posrt<twom 8REAK Lccnyrouh i
8p% -
w m, m
WE g ( E q9
-Es~ o n E
u
\ -
~ / ..@
d+Mj0 E
gy [5 e o<
y
- ty
~
J.4 \ /.'. /'7.,']gg f-y.
- e awj 3
o
.spfp., 3 ., } ' \/
hhE
'= +f \ j 1 vu f\ e'
'{
.h/
1, 4
/
s x
'/
o 5
\
p) ' y v s y ,@<
u 79 g o/
e
\ ,
R< cr; Q&Rhff s
- e
'fb I;s s a,
~> _ ,/,,E ,
a 4 1 's j/
- r
\ I \
{
'f N
E F Y,[,g Q, E l
9<
g l u/-w. -y E
3 e
s $
~
Yh .
r-- : ,
s*
p M .9A g
M-35 M.65
\ / '
NOTE:
h M '. I. FEECWATER LINES ARE PROTECTED N N s AGA!NST THE FULL EFFECTS OF POSTULATED MAIN STEAM PIPE RUPTURES.
2, WHERE THE PIPING IS UNRESTRA!NED,
, - v je IJ ADJACENT STRUCTURES ARE DESIGNED
,58 '
. TO171 iu s c. . c a 4 '- '
's TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST THE d, e,a ' FULL EFFEC 1S OF THE POSTULATED co '
PIPE RUPTURES.
'N '% TOOS]
- fx 7, , ;,, , ,, g
/
\ . . '
, - . E' I h s w 4 s e INDICATES POSTUL ATED BRE Ak
' ~
a h
7,f h m 3 .1
~
TOO4] g7,
- 10031 Freuce 3.6 - 5 r 1
- Too? I lYi41^l SIEAr" PlPlW 6 S YL TLDu s IN MA tm/
fSTEAnt Tuarset fcA Ty L.4 Tgg SRE4K L CC A T=cH s Olet 2 4 2) J I
1 COO 3l
. l_ COO 4 l --
Steam Generator QMSO1AA 3Q2"8 --
- Indicates Postulated Break M COO 6l s
3 .
]
EL. 386.5' 4
Containment ~
Penetration SUBSYSTEM 1MSO5 s/s
, DGvRE 3,5- b5
/d.40s E TE.4.1 (co t* 1.
' fcs.TutA T Eb BPEA k LotATro os
COO 9 ELA65.927'
~
.l C010 M
- Indicates Postulated Break
=
' (1MS01AB. -32.75)
Containment Penetro tion CO12l EL. 386. 500' .
SUBSYSTEM 1MSO6 Oh PuuRE 3. 6~ 5 7 Al&IN ETeAf,1 L o o l' 2 POSTULNrso BREA R L OCAYto/VS
4 l 016 IC015 l '
EL'. 465,9' h
C014 dC013 l t,
Steam Generator QMSO1AC 32.75b
- Indicates Postulated Break Containment Penetration
.J1 -
l
~
H C018 l EL. 3 86. 5' SUBSYSTEM IMSO7 00 pra uas 3,6 - 5 %
(h h-cy STEA in LOOL' $
PosTutArch sceA K l._ DC A TIotJ S
lCO22 CO21 1
' EL.465. 8' CO20l C019l Steam
. Gener o tor (1MSO1 AD 30.2$
~
CO241 - - '
_j ' EL . 38,6 . 5' y
Containment .
Penetration SUBSYSTEM 1MSO8
~
Of0 Prs me 3.6~ se 4
PiArnt STEA ni Loor 4 Posunm8 erwn Loca rroes L . - _ - -
Steam Generator Tube v v
- Re ac tor o Vessel .
< > a::gg Pump lC108 H V C1101 Cold -
I,e9
(-( .
(n
/G
^
/
C107 l N % _s 4 C100 l C104 l
-l' v
)
C10FJ w
C103 v
, C106 l
i -
l
- Indicates -
Postulated Break l
N h0/\/ " '
6/B l
f:~re vRE 3.6- 6O R EA c T on Caouwr Loo P 1 A0.cTuuTe o BREAK L L ourT.t.wus
}*--- Steam Generator Tube v v
- Reactor
-" Vessel
(.
) f( Pump a:afJa lC119 h V C 121 l Cold Leg
(_( [
(6 s C 118j lC111 lC 115l
'd -
C 116 l C114 v
/lX C 117
- Indicates -
Postulated Break 1
s f $ b 21-r e/a 3.6~ $ \
PTGU(22 EA C TO R. CoCLAtJ T Loof 2 Pos.TLat,ATcn SreAg tocmwas i-
l r Steam Generator Tube V v
-Reac tor 7 _f Vessel Reac tor Coolant o Pump C130}, v C132l Cold Leg }
Ll s- ( }
/ /v (b
C122 1
'C126l
'a -1 C127 l C12 5 /
v %
C128 T
- Indicates
- Postulated Sreak
- N Mhd3i p v g
\ .
EfA Frcycr 34 - t, 2 ISEACTolt COOL %iuT Loop 3 Post %Tcn 8can.< Lcarrous
r .
Steam Generator Tube v v
- Reactor g Vessel K J a ar
. Pu mp lC141 } V
' C 14 3 l Cold Leg}
(_(
/ /V (h
% lC140 l lC133 iC137 l
\ ~_-
v C138l v
/
C13 6 L %
/ '
x- C139
- Indicates -
Postulated Break
- A_0_O$ [
s v- , .
8lB I&']iN S .
~o RE'AC. Tog CcoL/ ar LeoP 4 POS Tu(Kaib APfA<- ICCATIOMA
I 1
l C149 l n ,RCS lC 14 8 M.O. Valve 4 1RC8002A lC147 j (1RC218A C144
- 8) - (' \~ (1RC 21 A A 8)
RCS- r M.O Valve C.146
- 1RC8001 A lC145 SUBSYSTEM 1RC01
- Indicates ' Postulated ' Break.
4 4
0 0
s
. Frede 3.6-64 Cc.:P 1 PostucNTch 8REAK Le>CA Twows
C15 5 l C154l RCS M.O. Valve IC153l N1RC80028 ,
' I I
8'T (1RC21 AB --(1RC 21 BB 8)
C150 -
h
' -RCS M O. Valve C152 # 1RC8001B C151 SUBSYSTEM 1RCO2
. Indicates Postulated Break h'
PTGutE 3.6~ 6.5' REACToA Ccouwr F4/hr.c Lcc P 2 fg3yLATt_u (BREA a Lo cATroAIS
gRCS E MO. Valve
- 1RC8001C
& C156f-
-{1 RC 218C 8)
C161 RCS -
M.O. Volve (
- 1RC8002C (,
IC160F - -
-IC159}- -----(1 R C 21 AC 8)
' " C158 C157 SUBSYST EM 1RCO3
. Indicate Postuloted Break -
B/B FZGuRE 3,6 -bG REAC10R. CoOLAUT /hYPAcS L oor 3 (3o S;,1 u L.h% h }SSEQi>'C LcCADDtJs
E l 4' __ _ _ _ _ . y._ _ 1 C162 l 4
RCS M.O. Valve 41RC8001D ;
g (1RC21BD 8 )-
(1RC 21 AD 8) = C167 C166 (
~
M.O. Valve 4 1RC8002D i
m C165 C164 H C163 SUBSYSTEM 1RC04'
. Indicates Postulated Break-8/B
. Fxsua e 1C-67 Rewa c a u w r si, u L OOP Lj f0.51uCATL% lSREAK Loc.ArToas
' Crossover Leg :
, Nozzle
- T. E . .
{ ,
, t_,
l --k< ]
_- . 1^
Ma ni' fold
{
~~
Cold I ! Manifold h
Leg u-- - --
L__ _ _ _ _y y y r Nozzle '
Hot Leg T E.
SUBSYSTEM 1RC10
' NOTE:
THIS IS A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION (NOT A TRUE ISOMETRIC SKETCH).
BREAKS ARE POSTULATED AT ALL SOCKET WELDS WITHIN THE ENCLOqED AREAS.
'8/6 Fmt4e5 3,6-68 REA cicR Cco L MJT s UBSthi u1 I1;Clo
('osTv. LATED BCEA v LotATrow s
= - ..
7.
I Crossover ,
Leg *
. Nozzle '
T. E . -
{ .
l -C><0 .
]
__ . . .f-Manifold -
l -
{
~~
Cold I Manif old hL____
Leg t__ ___
X X %
I Nozzle Hot Leg T. E .
SUBSYSTEM 1RC 11 NOTE .
THis IS A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION
( NOT A TRUE ' ISOMETRIC SKETCH).
BREAKS ARE POSTULATED AT ALL SOCKET WELDS WITHIN T HE ENCLOSED AREAS.
0lB SIGttrW 3.6-69 REAcTO R CodLW 7-SL(G SYSTE M /RC11 PosmTa GRm L OtATJO A/.6
r Crossover Leg :
_. N ozz le T. E . , -
}
i -=
--[>0
__ ..T
] !
I Manifold ;
{ .
Cold I j' --
M anif old Le9 t__ _ _ _ _ _
b: _
y y ' u
__ __ i __
Nozzle Hot Leg IE.
SUBSYSTEM 1RC12
-NOTE:
THIS IS A~ SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION
( NOT A TRUE ISOMETRIC SKETC H).
BREAKS ARE POSTULATED AT ALL SOC KET WELDS WITHIN THE
'ENCLOSfD AREAS.
WB FtG tuae 3 .6- 70 s
,?s 's. i c R ( cGi.Asti G L/8SysTe M /RCl2 Posruneres .ceenn L CCA Tto tJs
Crossover Leg l Nonle
} I E. .
I -{>0
.. ..r ] -
Manifold ! { .
Cold 1 l
~
Manifold L- k9 L___ ..
~
1 Nozzle Hot Leg T. E.
SUBSYSTEM 1RC13 NOTE :
THIS IS A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION (NOT A TRUE ISOMETRIC SKETCH ).
C/n
. FIGuce 3. 6- 71
,C E; c :: : :c:..u. i -
Suns ysrEm \ RcI3
('o.sTuLATE b B(51)K L OCA TL o us
SUBSYSTEM 1RC16 (1RC22AA 11/2)- (1RCO8AA 3/4>
--(1RCO3AA 27/2) 1
/
/
lC170 h
/ _ _ _
I C171 C1681 C169 C172 C173l
'C174l (1RC2OAA h)- "
(1RC22AA 1V2 )
- Indicates Postulated Break BfB lC175 rzeues 3,6~ 72 i
(1RC21AA 8) kEACTO A C CCl A M'I~
! k' SgSSYSTE M j R C16 pogrutsies BREAK l_o cA TIO A/S
k a
e r
T B J t K 3 A7A E d 7 L
(
e
)
t a 6
- O O
cRs 3 CI RGn 2 l
/
1 -
t u ,
1 s
B P o 3 n
Rmec t
A 2 s E e E r o 2
C t a B C O TrL T
R i c /U BG C YS uu 1
d A S t
ES T l
l 0 8 n I 8
1 ,
7 1
I
. F RV SC C l C
1 G f 7
' 7 1
9 C 7 !
1 I
C a
. - 7 0 )2 Y
1 7 C
)2
/
)
/4
~ ' 2 R 1
1 1
3 6 B 7 A B B 1 3 M A C O E A l C T 2 8 l S
2 O 1 R Y
C C R
8 1
(1 S R C l
- B (1 (1 l 2 U S
8 1
n C
l
_ )
4 y ) 3/
1 8 3
B B
8 A A 1 0 C 1 2 2 C C 5
R R 1
(1 (
=
7
C191 l'
3
, =
(I RC20AC /4)
- C190 -
C189 1
(IRCO8AC 74 .
I .
j C185 1
! C188
)
i C186
- C187 C 18 4 '
j -
(1 RC 22 AC IV2) '
i 3
!: Bla
. Indicates Postulated Break .
FIGuge 3.t;~74 l -
SUBSYSTEM 1RC18 ffACTOR C OO (-A NT j .
sycsys tem IRCis i FCsTutATEh B(2E4K Locarroms
(I R C 22AD 1Y2')
C193 t
( __
C194
~
. .C192
\-
(1RC20AD -74) 1 (IRC22AD 1/2)
C195 C199 i
C196 l -
,[ C198 C197 (I RCO8AD -74) $[B _
Fr6uce 3,6"75 e Indicates Postulated Break ggpcrog CoouuT SUBSYSTEM 1 RC19 .
Sy&SysTEra /RCl7 ftisTMLAT6b 8REAK LCL4Tr0N5
(1 RCO1 AA 29 )--
lC3801 H C 392 l lC 381 lC393l .
IC382 lC384 l N
lC383! (1 R H O1 AA 12 )
(1 RC 35AA 6 lC390l
-(1 SI A 4 B 8) -
--{1RCO1 AC 29) lC385 C387 l (1RC04AB 12 h'E -
lC388l lC386 "
y (1RCO5AB 6)
IC394I iC 391_ l lC395 E y - (1S IO 4 D 8)
C389 -
(1R HO1 A R 12 )-
SUBSYSTEM 1 RHO 2
- Indicates Postulated Break -
rdB CI6tmG 3.4- 76
$ESTbJAL kEA T
, ReucvAL Lco rs I /t/V B 3 Pasru unen 8Resn Loc ^,xon s
Pressurizer
[C403}
< m (1RY11 A 14 )
(1RCO1 AD 29)
(C400 C402]
C401
. . . SUBSYSTEM 1RYO5
. Indicates Postulated Break B/B Fxcuae 3.4' 77 Passcua zacR GuRGE
^
l 112 l ' O S T u t. A 1 L b
$R,g4g Lcc/)T10Ns
C433 C 432 l l C4 35; --
C 43.1_ l N N lC436l 9 C430 ;J
~ C429j Pressurizer 1 RYO1S (1 RYO18 6) e eIndicates Postulated Break J.
SUBSWTEM 1RYO6' bfb pouce s.c - 78 PREM J,t r 7.s a, .9:'tWj l ~.t N G (3cRuLAitti SRL:A R LacA notu
(.%t 2 wP D
C438 -
l C 437 f-- y C4391 3
=
(1RY18A 2)
(1RYO18 6> 3 C440 A
C441 IC443) %
C442 -
' SUBSYSTEM 1RYO6 (Cont'd.)
- Indicates Postulated Break O
Bln
=1c>uac 3, c ~ 7 5' PRESSUA.1EfiR. SPRA '/
/_.1tvi!
feci utun CREAX LocA n orJS (sA& 2of 0 4
4
/
! , RCO3AD 27 5) (1RCO18 6 iC444l '
d lJ
=
(1RY24AA 4) ,
,
- Indicates Postulated Break SUBSYSTEM 1 R YO6 ( Cont'd.)
B/s Fxc une 3 e'7%
PREG.cu RTEER $fMY LrNE b5Tt4LATGb 0$EA K l.OCATroN S
($ \lGET 3 OF 0
/
i i
i lC4451 l' 1RCO3AC 27.5) c ;
(1RYO18 ' 6 )---f ,
.J- .
i N (1RYO1AB 4}
,i (1RY 24 AB 4 )-
SUBSYSTEM 1RYO6 ( Cont'd.)
.f O[G
[:LGu RE 3.6- 78
- Indicates Postulated Breok .
PRESSv test-GR SfRAy LINE I Po.cruveres SceAx LocaTzcNs (SHEET 4 0F 4)
lC406l Pressurizer 1RYO1S t -
C4071 (1RYO 3 A A- 6") >
IC 4091 lC40BI '
i SUBSYSTEM 1RYO9
- Indicates Postulated, Break ele ihe,uce 3,6- 79 h \
SAFET/ [REL_rE F t/ALVE Lrra e s
\ ~
! . Pos rutAwh GREAx LocAvrorJs (SHEET 1 OF 4)
l
/
l C 410 }-
p lC411 l Pressurizer =
(1RYO3AB 6) 1RYO1S lC412 ]
)
-{1RYO3CB 6 ')
N C 413 l t
- Indicates Postulated Break I
SUBSYSTEM 1RYO9 (CONT'D)
O FMeE 3 C' 79 PRESSuRTSER SAFET')'/ REL.TE P \'hLVE L1nes 0ETU LA TEk 0R6h K LocATto Ns
[S HEtr 2. OF 4)
1 iC 415 ' .
(1 RY03CC 6}-
8 (1RYO3AC 6h ~Jg lC 416 j C417 C414l PRESSURIZER
_ _ _ 1RYO15 SUBSYSTEM 1RYO9 ( Cont'd )
. Indicates Postulated Break ein Frauee ac~79 WE5suR1&sq e S8 ser v/.eet=e a vnus LINES LO CA- gy cpf (GIErr 3 os4T-
(1RYO2C 3 }--
A P .L k
lC423l lC422 l gg C421 C420 (1RYO68 3) : (1RYO2B 3) g C 419 }-- .
PL k -
0 (1 RYO6 A 3)
N /
lC428l lC427 l C424 lC426 l C425 a (1RYO2 A 6)
IC418 l Pressurizer 1RYO15
. Indicates Postulated Brea,k -
l SUBSYSTEM 1RYO9 ( Cont'd )
0l2 Fzcues 3.l- 79 paessuer see
_Q F E77/ /2EL IE F I4iL VE L Iruss DSTVLAT Eb 13]?EA h LOCA Trotus (G H E.5T 4 0 F Lj)
C800 RCO1BA Steam Generator Nozzle EL.401'- 5"
. C801 C802 (1S D01CB 2)
'e Indicates Postulated Break r C803
- SUBSYSTEM 1SDOi .
PC-83 D Containment Penetration b/O E L 383'- 5 3. d~ 80 FTGURE i , GTEAnt. C i?N EPATM
! Slew:scuN Leo P .1 i SLt BSysTawt /ShoJ v Posn ucces Besan Lymoms
C 804
_\ A C805 1RC018A Steam Generator Nozzle
. EL. 408'- 8" C806 "
r 11SDO1CA 2)
-
- Indicates Postulated Break:
i C807 ,
P-82 SUBSYSTEM 1SDO2 N Containment Penetration EL. 384'- 8" WB
! s PIGuns 3.6 - 91
( bTEAlil C-E7dE/RA70Q ISLowhown loop 1
( $4GSysTE%t /Sho2
@STuG4TEh BREAg LocArra ng
9
- Indicates Postulated Break P-88 Containment Penetration
_ EL 8'- O" 1RCO1BB Steam C 811 Generator Nozzle EL.408'-8 ,
C808
\
Jf C809 (1SD01CC 2)
C810 SUBSYSTEM 1SDO3 Bb f~%u2 e 3. C- 9:2.
Git ~Ata GE7vEic ATaR
/3 Low Acw A/ Loor 2 SilB.S Ys rO1 lSho3 POSTuLATEh BREA K
_ _ _ . ._ . _ . LoM Eons _ . - - . _
.q ..
l.
I C813 )
- Indicates Postulated Break P-89 (1SD01CD 2) Cont ainment Penetration
. EL.386'- 5"
, C815 1RCO1BB Steam Generator Nozzle EL.401'- 5" C812 SUBSYSTEM 1SDO4 0 Fguee 3d-83 s STEmit G9ER A7 A le L.W'bc :V!] Lccr 2
. Sus systEh1 IShoH (bSTU VtTEh (3REAK LOCA noiss
~
(1SDO1CF 2) e PC-91 Containment Penetration
, EL. 3 83'- 6"
~
C 819
/ '%
y C 817 k C816 N J' 1RC018C
- Indicates Postulated Break [,*ne ator '
EL.401'- 5" C 818 SUBSYSTEM 1SDO5 B/B x Fx6ues 3. 6- 84 STEA r.: c56/; E724 tor 8towhevon/ Looe 3 SQ85YSTe11 f.S bo T
. (h)STw.A Teh SREA K L OCA Tro tus
(1 SDO1 C E 2) PC-90 Containment Penetration E L. 4 0 8'- 8"
. C823 1RC01BC C r St eam Generator C 821 Nozzle
\ ,
EL. 384'- 8" l C 822 C820
~
- Indicates Postulated Break-1SDO6 ele SUBSYSTEM
. FIGuAe 3 6'8E s gsni GeweeaToR BL=a c-q Loor3 S ussy crum ISho6 PCsvat^rsh BREAK.
L OC9TIONS
e
/
1 (1SD01BG 1/2) =
s EL.4 01'- 5" C824 n d C01BD Steam -
Generator Nozzle
<* Indicates Postulated Break C825
' C826 (1 SD01CG 2) ,.
4 O
SUBSYSTEM 1SD11 C827 N P-81 Containment b Penetration EL.38 6'- 6" g[g
~
{=rGuce 3.6~ g(,
s steent s e w e.m a
,GLcw L: wI4 L00P 4 SuGSys rem /Sb li PosTuvua B/2 eat LocA TIo/JS
l l
a-1
~
j C 831 ,
C830 f C829 lC828 A 4
Containment -
3x Steam
-Penetration -
Generator
'P-80 Nozzle RC01BD e ' indicates Postulated Break SUBSYSTEM 1SD12 WB PZ&uRE 3. G '6 7
.GTEAm GENEMTc4
~
Blowku:n LcoPLI suss>: ram /.sn12 OOGYUL,q'TEh j9fEAx
, i LOCAYtoNS L
~
1 I
1 Accumulator Tank
[C5051 1SI47AA 2)
/
~
./..-
(1 SIO9AA 10)--- -
1 S I18FA 2)
/
^
ORCO3AA 27.5) / f
/ Missile
\ -% "
Barrier Wall lC500 l ORC 29AA 10) l C501 l f* *:
IC 502 l I C 503 l N" =
OSIO9BA 10) lC504 OSIO5DA 6 )
oIndicates Postulated Break " ~-
l SUBSYSTEM 15101 g
~F16'<FE .16-sg i
I s
$$E77 IN7ECTIbAl l L;C P 1 l
l PDGTULAT b. GREA K.
Locs rr oN.s
(1RCO3AD 275F Accumulator
-Tank- l C518 l lC523 .
(1RC 29AD 10)-
(1 SI47AC 2) I .
5 C 521 (1SIO9AD 10) j,jr.
~ C520 M issile - C522 ier -
- ho
, (1SIO9 BD 10 )--
J
- Enlarged Area 'A'
,G gee Enlarged
' Areo 'A'
.' Y L(1SI18FD 2 )-- -
Enlarged Area'3"
\ ..
(1S LO5DD 6) gee -..
Entorged Area'B" y
[h-N ' / Missile Barrier Wall .
SUBSYSTEM 1SIO3 l
. Indicates Postulated Break 6//3, seery 1,ascTzon Lcce 2 f06Tu LA TE b BREA K LocATrows
I Accumulator Tank (C511 l (1 SI47AB 2 (1RCO3AB 275)
(1SIO9 AB 10 lC5CSI (1RC 29AB 10 )
[ !C507l (1 SI18 FB 2 }--- ,
' s 1510988 N 10)
Missi,le .
ha -
C508' Barrier e <
Wall i
3- ,
C509
,, !C 5101
~~
Enlarged Area (1SIO5DB 6)-
(1 SIO988 10 ) =
,[ ) nfarged Areo l
SUBSYSTEM 1SIO4
.-Indicotes Postuioted Break gfg
?IGut2E 3.6-90
$hfgry li '
ECMM Lcoe 3 PC.STt4LA Teh SREA K L OC A T30 MS
l l
l a
Accumulator Tank -
l C517 l (15109AC 10 f l (1SI47AC 2) _f
. Missile Barrier IC 513 l-(1RC29AC 10) __ ~~,,
l C512 i %% I C 515 l
& l C516 l (1RCO3AC 275)- .
4 l C 514 l ,
=
(1 SIO9BC 10)
(1 SIO5 DC 6)
SUBSYSTEM 1SIO9 .
- Indicates Postulated Break
. Of8 Fwee 3, 6- W
$A F E77 Th JECT 16N Locf 4 Posnurre t> BREAn (OCA T2 o NS
~
l L
l A
9 O
. o L O dI A
0 o
W 1 I . 2 r2L EE R S 1
< 9 T_
C 5A LI R
,. ' Es E}
I S R ? >
S t A I
MB A
_S 6 - TmSo
/" '
" ~ . 3 Ne x
< T 7 Ish4 gJ J
~
_l s e yEcTc e n1 S u
co T B AL sU U r FS T L
S FA
- S %
{
2 e
'0 0 gs 1 5
1 M
E T
S Y
S B
U S
l 6
2 S
1 C
l
/
- g l \
4 2
S ) )
C '
6 9
l 5 2 2 B D 5 A A c 5 1 0
I 3
C C R R 1 1
( (
V
?
i p
t
^ ^ ' -
T""
O O
r l MISSfLE BARRIER MLL ,
/,/
, Sn,-0,0i i
&7 2
E
$gD -
SUBSYSTEM 1S!!1
[CS27I .
Ics2el im C oa 4 A e >---
hRCOi AB 29 p 1
,, yf
- INDICATES POSTUL ATED BREAK c :r ,.
- c. ._ _. 2 a Fzc,uce 2 6 '/3
- "s
- SAFE 77 J N75 cTIoAl
'>t ,,
SuBsmcun Iszii
, POSTULATEb 8 REAR -
LocArxcus (
SUBSYSTEM / SIllo A
N 6 SIO5DD 6 }--
lC539l
~
IC 543 j lC540l C542 ,.
--(1SI 18 FD 2)
/
C541l
- Indicates Postulated Break B/B FIG uge 2,6- 94 S/rFE7y _TNJecr_ tog
$ M S V5 7 6 7.'1 )SI/6 Pcsruu ms efeegt L OcA Tro A/S
{$hELT 1of2)
I 1 1 1 I
I I
(1SIO5DC 6) l r __. __ __
C549
=
(1SI18FC ' 2)
C548 : ,
C547 C546 C545 ,
C544 ,
SUBSYSTEM 1SI16 (Cont'd )
e Indicates Postulated Break
~
ela FTGLIRE 3 5 " 9 '{
Q{[:gyy 3~7VIEC TION S UBSYs YEh1 IS E IG
('06TumYEb 8REA k L.ocATro ras
- -.,- . . ?_. _ _ ._
9-Y (1 SIO5 DB 6) lC555!
Indicates Postulated Break (1S118FB 2) ;-
C 554 4 N ,.
^
/
l C 5501-- V -
C553 C551 - -
C552 SUBSYSTEM 1 SI17-B/s
=uuee 2. c ~ qg SeFE7y IN 7FtT2 oN stsirsrem Isr 17 f0ST4LNmb MEsK LocATrous
($HELT 1 oF 2)
1 k
f
/
-, /= (1SIO5DA 6)
/ C 561 l '
=
(1SI18 FA 2) .
C558 C556 C557 SUBSYSTEM 1SI17 ( Cont'd )
e Indicates Postulated Break B/s Frc, ue s s +9 +~
54Fe77 JJVJetTroA1
$U86 YSTO41 ISZ17 foSTat^1e sceax
.. LPRi132 % m a
9 C533 (1SIOBJB 1/2)- 1 C532!
(1RC45AB 3)
, 1RCO3AB 271/23 SUBSYSTEM 15119 -
Indicates Postulated Break ,
B/B Fzcous 2.6- 96 S/4Fer y IAlJecTzoA/
SUSS1 sinu l 5 Z pg kOST4LATEB 8RC/K LOCA TIoM.s g e - - .4 . ,.,.---.----.,--,----,-w ,,,n,,-se-.. ,- ,-,-,.- , . . --w, --m ,n. - < - , - - -
i
^
(1R C45 AC- 3 "
(1SIO8JC-11/2 v ~u y- s IC535 IC534l
- Indicates Postulated Break 1SI20 SUBSYSTEM -
BlB V Z G U g E 3.6- 7'?
SAFET11N JECncd SMSysTEr>1 l5I20 00STuLATEb SCE/14 LocAncus
t 1RC O3 AD-271/2)
._(1RC45 AD- 3" (1 S 108 JD-11/2 %
t lX lC536 C537
- Indicates Postulat ed Break -
SUBSYSTEM 1SI22 -
Fnuce 3.c-w SAFE'T7 37VJEcrzou 6485'f3TE/11 /S I22
@o.sT Q LA TGb 0/Sb W
/_ o C4T_roAJS
t (1RC03AA 271/2)
- 1RC45AA 3)
C (1SIO8JA 11/2 ) 9 l K--
h*
lC531 l C530_
SUBSYSTEM 1SI24 e Indicates Postulated Break g
S 8
6 Bh Fxsuge 3,6- %
SAFETY .ouyecrzoA/
- S uos ysTE,u lsI 2 tt
, PCsnVaEh 0 % D:
LOCATTorJS
.x- .
o 1 N
.h P
/eS4 l f#
a o
4 oj 4
NO 3
/ s a,, -
$ 5 s
o~
N ?~
C.
J 5
i" oz
?
O g
{2 O
O$
pi c
. o 8
i
- 1 I I I ~l h W. o e, m N -
o 9 9 9 -
- a a - ;
u - - -
10 '1N310ldd300 ISnUH1 S BYRON /BR AIDWOOD ST ATIC'.5 FIN AL S AFETY AN ALYSIS REPC:-
FIGURE 3.6-45 (0 0 THRUST FORCE AS A FU:!CTIO:t CF STAG!lATI0il ENTHALPY (ho} A'O PRESSURE (Po)
O O D 1
2.0 - .
Fss= Ct PoAc ,
1.8
.~fL/D=0.2 1.6 .
Po = 2OOOpsi i.4 -
8 Po =1000 psi i i.2 -
M O
EE fL/D=l y-b I.0 8 N j" }- $0.8 a:n8 >0 $ fL/D=2 -
Egg r 2 s - _
gqo m \ 0.6 -
SFnE;g ?m s < = ;g a m 2 .
air 58" 8 1D O.4 -
fL/D=5 M F, w P
" " 51 f2 w A >0 z I fL/D=8 2003o, > O 0.2 -
~
r- 2 :: r o 33d"
-vo-
't jo .. i
""5 % _
m W 0.0 i 680 o 4 \ 200 240 260 320 3GO 400 440 480 520 5G0 600 G40 B,El a >
<- m -Fo i -
m -1 ENTilAl.PY, lio (OTll/l.0) r.-
^T n
= -< g S,
_zU (D
__m _a___ _ __-a
O O O L 1:
d 9
Po = SOURCE (STAGNATION) PRESSURE f = PIPE FRICTION FACTOR 0.01 (CARCY FACTOR) 2.0 - L/D = PIPE LENGTH TO DIAMETER RATIO ho = SOURCE (STAGNATION) ENTHALPY A = PIPE BREAK AREA l,g _ _ Po = 1000 psi
--- Po = 2000 psi ho = 221 BTU /lb '
1.6 -
\ ho = 431 1.4 -
H \
\
y 1.2
\ Fss = C T PoA
\
w 2
- u. i.o -
's s
~
> w SATURATED WATER
[g y $ o
,8 Ex 0.8 -
N s qsg > o M -
N ~~~_ "-.f s- ~~~__~~'----
r s c= z g --------
- \ I o.6 ~
s~~
S.g o > a e
== ~ -
go$ , yx ._ _ _
~~~___~ho = 431 g"mg ac a
-< 2- o.4 _
HIGHLY SUBCOOLED WATER
-< < c gggg g y O
-mo z E o.2
{ $g p
h0 2 h - 1 I I I l' US[ D '
mW 1 o.o o
1 i
1 2
1 3 4 5 6 7 8
$85 y c o -4 f L/ D -->-
dgy N m >d S g* ,9 yi (/)
ill n .
!j O' (f) i