IR 05000373/1982006

IE Insp Rept 50-373/82-06 on 820104-0205.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Close Tagged Sensing Line Boundary Valve, Open Valve to LPCS Pump & Document Lifting of LPCS Pump Thermocouple Leads

ML20042B350
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	03/09/1982
From:	Knop R, Shepley S, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20042B337	List: IR 05000373/1982006 ML20042B336 ML20042B342
References
50-373-82-06, 50-373-82-6, NUDOCS 8203250237
Download: ML20042B350 (9)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY-COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-373/82-06(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-373 License No. CPPR-99 Licensee: Commonwealth' Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

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Facility Name: LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Inspection At:

LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL Inspection Conducted: January 4, 1982 through February 5, 1982 8 Ma Inspectors:

R. D. Walker b

S. E. Shepley

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R.C. Knop,f Chief dI - 7 ' ff 2-Approved By:

/4 Reactor Projects Branch 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on January 4, 1982 through February 5, 1982 (Report No.

50-373/82-06(DPRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, resident inspector, preoperational inspection.

The inspection consisted of a review of follow up on inspector identified problems, procedure problems, inspection of activities preparatory to license issuance, follow up on NRC identified problems, and a plant walk-through/ operational status review. The inspection involved a total of 221 inspector-hours onsite by.two NRC inspectors including 44 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in four areas; one item of noncompliance was identified in one area (unauthorized lifted leads and mispositioned valves - Paragraph 3).

8203250237 820309 PDR ADOCK 05000373 G

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted B. B. Stephenson, LaSalle County Station Project Manager

• R.

H. Holyoak, Station Superintendent

• R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Engineer G. J.' Diederich, Station Operating Assistant Superintendent R. D. Bishop, Administrative-and Support Services Assistant Superintendent C. W. Schroeder, Technical Staff Supervisor

• J. M. Marshall, Operating Engineer H. J.-Hentschel, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor-E.

E. Spitzner, Startup Coordinator J. M. Damron, Technical Staff Engineer W. C. Kirchhoff,. Technical Staff Engineer W. A. Stewart, Fuel Handling Foreman M. Santic, Technical Staff Engineer

• R. Clark, Quality Control Inspector The inspector also interviewed other. licensee employees including members of the technical, operating, and construction staff, as well as certain licensee contractor employees.

• Denotes persons present at management interview conducted at the close of the inspection period.

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2.

Follow Up On Inspector Identified Problems (0 pen) Unresolved-Item (373/81-00-47): Follow up on implementation of NUREG-0612 " Control of Heavy Loads".

The inspectors review of this area had originally determined that procedures needed to be modified to implement the requirements of this document.

Subsequent review of LcS911e Maintenance Procedures GM-9, NB-5, NB-7, NB-10, PC-1 and PC-2. substantiate that the requirements of this document are being met.

The item remains open pending installation of_a modification which will install the critical "L" path defined in the licensee's submittal and development of procedures which implement the use of this modification.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/81-00-06): Follow up on Section 4.4.1 of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) requirement to have the Loose Parts Detection System operational prior to power operation.

Proposed Technical Specification 4.3.7.12 requires the following to assure the Loose Parts Monitors operability:

a.

A channel check every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b.

A channel functional test every 31 days.

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c.

A channel calibration at least every 18 months.

The inspector's review has concluded that:

a.

Procedure LOS-LM-D1 provides the required channel check.

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b.

Procedure LTS-500-12 provides the required functional test.

c.

Procedure LTS-600-5 provides the required channel calibration.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/81-00-18):

Installation of debris screens on Containment Purge System as required by the SER, Section 6.2.4.

The inspector verified that these debris screens have been manufactured and installed as required.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/81-00-22): Follow up on SER, Section 6.2.6.2 requirements concerning hydrostatic testing of ECCS valves for leak testing. The inspector reviewed the procedures involved in leak testing and is assured that the requirements of the Section of the SER are being met.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/81-00-71): Requirement for implementing TMI Task Action Item I.A.1.1 Shift Technical Advisor. The inspector closed all concerns associated with this item in Inspection Report 50-373/81-40 except the requirement stated in the SER that the plant SRO return to the control room at 1 cast once every two hours to assure that he is aware of the overall plant status and any evolutions that are being carried out or are expected to be carried out by the control-room SRO.

This requirement has been subsequently modified via corre-spondence between the licensee and the Office of NRR and recent revi-sions to Procedure LAP 200-1 to incorporate the requirements defined in the correspondence.

(Closed) Unresolved Items (373/81-30-03) and (373/81-40-01): Closure of IE Circulars No. 81-11 and 81-14 respectively. The inspector deter-mined for each of these circulars that:

a.

The circular was received by licensee management.

b.

That a review for applicability was performed.

c.

For circulars that were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions have been taken or are scheduled to be taken.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/80-30-02): Closure of IE Bulletin 80-15.

This bulletin was sent to the licensee for information only. The inspector determined that the licensee took the following action with respect to this bulletin:

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a.

The bulletin was received by licensee management.

b.

A review for applicability was performed.

c.

The licensee has taken appropriate corrective actions.

(Closed) Open Item (373/81-30-09): Mechanical surveillance procedures.

The licensee has several surveillance procedures being written and the inspector has ascertained that all Technical Specification and Code Requirements are being met.

The inspector has no further concerns with this issue.

(Closed) Open Item (373/80-41-11): Shift relief turnover check sheets.

The inspector has reviewed the revised shift relief turnover check sheets against applicable requirements and standards. The inspector has no further concerns with this issue.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/81-50-01): Tagout procedure problems.

This item has become a part of noncompliance (373/82-06-01A) see paragraph 3.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/81-50-02): Lifted lead documentation problem. This item has become a part of noncompliance (373/82-06-01C)

see paragraph 3.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/81-50-03): Control rod blade guide problem. The inspector is convinced the blade guide damage resulted from a unique set of circumstances associated with construction.

The licensee has written procedure changes that will preclude re-occurrence in Unit 2.

The circumstances are such as are not normally

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met after fuel load. The inspector has no further concerns with this issue.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

3.

Procedure Problems l

a.

Tagout Procedure Problems A sensing line boundary valve was open during a construction hyro. This resulted in the spraying of water on some workers

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in the reactor vessel. The valve, 1B21 F371, was tagged out-of-l service in the closed position. Tagout procedures require the i

I check of only one person to assure the proper positioning of I

valves for tagouts. The procedure is being revised to require a second check. This event is an example of noncompliance l

(373/82-06-01A).

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Mechanical Checklist Procedure Problems A valve, 1DG 032, in the cooling water line-up to the LPCS pump was closed when the mechanical checklist, LOP-DG-08M, requires

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the valve to be open and lists the valve as " locked open".

The LPCS pump was run a total of 3.65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> without cooling water with the maximum continuous run time being 49 minutes. This contributed to the LPCS pump being run while temperatures were above the alarm limits.

(See paragraph 3.c. for related details.)

The LPCS pump has since been inspected for damage and returned to service. The procedure requires the check of only one person to assure the proper positioning of valves for mechanical check-lists. This event is an example of noncompliance (373/82-06-01B).

c.

Jumper / Lifted Lead Procedure Problems LPCS pump temperature thermocouple leads were found to have been determinated without any authorizing documentation and without the knowledge of operations department. The LPCS pump was run as much as 3.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> while temperatures were above alarm limits with 49 minutes being the maximum possible continuous run time.

The LPCS pump.has since been inspected for damage and returned to service.

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Subsequent to the LPCS event, an inspection by the licensee of the P609 panel, revealed an additional undocuaanted lifted lead and an unauthorized jumper. The licensee has committed to per-forming a 100% walkdown of all safety related electrical panels for lifted (lugged) leads and jumpers. This walkdown will be cnspleted by fuel load. This event is an example of noncompliance (373/82-06-01C).

In addition to the above, on January 20, 1982, a technician, work-ing on sensing circuits off the feedwater regulating valve (FRV)

control signal circuits, was working downstream of electronic isolators. He then worked on signal leads upstream of the isola-tors which caused a false signal to the FRV and caused it to open.

At this time, there was testing in progr'ess on the level input to

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the turbine trip logic. This caused the operator to misinterpret his level indications and as a result, the reactor vessel was overfilled and water was spilled into the drywell. All safety related electric equipment that was wetted, was meggered, checked for damage, and returned to service. The procedures are unclear as to whether the technician was allowed to work upstream of the isolators when he was supposed to work downstream. The licensee is revising the procedures to control work downstream of an isolator.

One item of noncompliance with three examples was identified in this area.

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4.

Inspection Activities Preparatory to License Issuance (Status of Licensee Procedures and Preoperational T sting Program)

L a.

Operating, Maintenance, Surveillance, Abnormal and Emergency Procedure Status l

The licensee and NRC have effectively completed their review of these procedures.

b.

Preoperational Testing Program Status The licensee has a total of 99 Preoperational Tests / Systems Demonstrations required by the FSAR for Unit 1 fuel load or low power operations of which 89 are specific to Unit 1 and the remaining 10 are specific to Unit 2.

The licensee reported that 99 of these systems have been turned over for preoperational test-ing, that 98 of these Preoperational Tests and Systems Demonstra-tions have been started, that 83 Preoperational Tests and Systems Demonstrations have been completed, and the program is 97.6% com-plete at this time. The licensee stated that final Preoperational Test or System Demonstration results for 62 tests of the 99 re-quired by the NRC are ready for NRC review, i.e.,

the entire test

is complete and the results have been reviewed and accepted by the licensee..These e2 tests are:

PT-AP-101, " Unit 1 AC Distribution" i'

FT-AR-101, " Area Radiation Monitoring Equipment" SD-CX-102, " Rod Worth Minimizer" PT-DO-101, " Unit 1 Diesel Oil System" PT-FC-101, " Fuel Pool Cooling System" SD-FC-101, " Fuel Pool Cooling System" PT-HC-101, " Reactor Building Crane" PT-HP-101, "High Pressure Core Spray System" PT-LD-101, " Leak Detection System" PT-LP-101, " Low Pressure Core Spray System" PT-NB-101, " Nuclear Boiler" PT-NR-101A, " Source Range Monitor" PT-NR-101B, " Intermediate Range Monitor" FT-NR-101C, " Power Range Neutron Monitors"

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SD-PS-101, " Process Sampling System" i

PT-PV-101, " Reactor Vessel Internals Vibration Monitoring" PT-RD-101A, " Rod Drive Control and Rod Position Indication System" PT-RD-102, " Control Rod Drive Hydraulic" PT-RI-101, " Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System" i

SD-SA-101, " Service and Instrument Air System" I

PT-SC-101, " Standby Liquid Control System" PT-VD-101, " Diesel Generator Ventilation System" PT-VJ-101, " Machine Shop Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

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System" PT-VL-101, " Laboratory, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System"

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PT-V0-101, "Off Gas Filter Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System" PT-VP-101, " Primary Containment Vent and Purge System'?

PT-VP-104, " Primary Containment Chilled Water System" PT-VY-102, " Core Standby Cooling System Equipment Ventilation" SD-WR-101, " Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System" SD-WS-101, " Service Water System" SD-WX-101, " Solid Radwaste System" SD-CD-101, " Condensate and Condensate Booster System" SD-CD-102, " Condenser and Auxiliary Equipment System" SD-CW-101, " Circulating Water and Auxiliary Equipment System" SD-CY-101, " Cycled Condensate System" SD-EH-101A, " Turbine EHC" SD-EH-101B, " Turbine Supervisory Panel" SD-FW-101, " Reactor Feedwater" SD-FW-102, "Feedwater Control System" SD-HD-101A, " Heater Drains" SD-HD-101B, " Moisture Separator / Reheater" SD-WE-101A, " Waste Collector" SD-WE-101C, " Laundry Equipment and Floor Drain Reprocessing and Disposal System" SD-WE-101E, " Equipment Floor Drains" PT-AP-201, " Unit 2 AC Distribution" PT-AP-202, " Unit 2 DC Distribution" PT-DO-201, " Unit 2 Diesel Oil System" PT-VD-201, " Unit 2 Diesel Generator Ventilation System" PT-VP-202, " Unit 2 Post LOCA Hydrogen Control System" PT-VY-201, " Unit 2 Core Standby Cooling System Equipment Cooling" PT-DG-101A, " Diesel Generator 0 & 1A" PT-DG-101B, " Diesel Generator IB" PT-FR-101, " Fuel Handling & Vessel Servicing Equipment" PT-MS-101B, "MSIV & Instrumentation" PT-MS-101C, "Mainsteam Safety Relief Valves and ADS" PT-PC-103, " Primary Containment Isolation" PT-RD-101B, " Rod Sequence Control System" SD-RT-101, " Reactor Water Cleanup" PT-VY-101, "CSCS Equipment Cooling" SD-WE-101B, " Floor Drain Reprocessing" SD-WE-101D, " Chemical Waste"

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PT-DG-201A, " Diesel Generator 2A & Auxiliaries" c.

Deficiency Status The licensee is currently listing 998 Station Operations deficien-cies and 1672 Station Construction deficiencies as outstanding items on the 99 Preoperational Tests / System Demonstrations re-quired by the licensee. The licensee has segregated these deficiencies into those that will impact fuel load and those that will not.

The licensee has reviewed approximately 2467 of these deficiencies for segregation and preliminary assessment is

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that 659 of those reviewed would need to be cleared prior to fuel load. The inspector will continue to review chis matter.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

5.

Follow Up On NRC Identified Items

i There were three items for follow up this inspection period.

(a) The inspector checked that Pacific check valves are not'used at LaSalle in any containment application.

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(b) The inspector found that Division III switchgear contains GE breakers of the type of concern as described in J.-T. Wiggins memorandum of December 16, 1981. The problem identified does

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exist at.LaSalle. The licensee is issuing a 50.55(e) report

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to that effect.

(c) The valve control module instrument drawer in the Transverse Incore Probe System is not seismically qualified at LaSalle.

The power to the ball and squib valves (which-have containment functions) are processed through this drawer, although the power to the drawer is seismically qualified. This issue is being considered by NRR for resolution.

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No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

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6.

Plant Walkthrough/ Operational Status Rcview The inspector conducted walkthroughs and reviewed the plant operations atatus including examinations of control room log books, routine patrol sheets, shift engineers log books, equipment outage logs, special oper-

ating orders, and jumper tagout logs for the period of January 4, 1982 through February 5, 1982. The inspector observed the operations status

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during three off-shifts during the same period as above. The inspector also made visual observations of.the' routine surveillance, functional,.

and preoperational tests in progress during this period. This review was conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance i

with the requirements established under 10 CFR and administrative pro-cedures. The inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that plant-

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component status and problem areas were being turned over to a relieving shift. The inspector conducted tours of Unit.1 and 2 reactor, auxiliary, i

and turbine buildings throughout the period and noted the status of l

construction and plant housekeeping / cleanliness. With respect to house-keeping / cleanliness, the inspector found conditions to be adequate during this inspection period. All items of concern and noncompliances

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that were discovered as a result of these reviews were identified in paragraph 3 and no other items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

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Management Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives'(denoted in Paragraph 1) at the con:1usion of the inspection period. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.

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