IR 05000373/1988017
| ML20196H576 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1988 |
| From: | Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196H546 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-88-17, 50-374-88-16, NUDOCS 8807060201 | |
| Download: ML20196H576 (18) | |
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a U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATION COMMISSION-
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REGION III
Reports No. 50-373/88017(DRSS);50-374/88016(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee:
Connonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago. IL 60690 Facility Name: LaSalle Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site,' Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted: June 14-16, 1988 Nb 6!24 87
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Inspector: Thomas Plosk
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Date Approved By:
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hief 44.7/st Emergency. Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on June 14-16, 1988 (Reports No. 50-373/88017(DRSS);
No. 50-374/88016(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection (IP 82301) of the LaSalle Station's emergency preparedness exercise, involving observations by four NRC representatives of key functions at various locations during the exercise.
Results:
No violations, deviations, deficiencies, or exercise weaknesses were identified.
Adequate corrective actions had already been completed, or were demonstrated, on the weakness and both open items identified during the 1987 exercise inspection.
8807060201 880624 PDR ADOCK 05000373
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e DETAILS
..1.
Persons Contacted a.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed R. Lanksbury, Control Room R. Kopriva, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC)
T. Ploski, TSC, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F), Security Incident G. Stoetzel, Operational Support Center (OSC), Inplant Teams, Post-Accident Sampling Team b.
Licensee Representatives N. Wandke, Assistant Vice President D. Scott, Senior Administrative Engineer W. Huntington, Services Superintendent-R. Bishop, Assistant to Vice President for BW Operations T. Gilman, Emergency Planning Supervisor M. DiPonzio, Emergency Planning Supervisor L. Aldrich, Rad Chem Supervisor R. Morley, Security Administrator K. Klotz, GSEP Coordinator C. Allen, Nuclear Licensing Staff T. Carr, Quality Assurance Staff M. Vonk, Emergency Planner J. Bowman, Emergency Planner P. Vitalis, Emergency Planner T. Markwalter, Emergency Planner R. Haight, Emergency Planner E. O'Connell, Assistant to Operating Engineer The above licensee personnel attended the June 16, 1988 exit interview.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701)
a.
(Closed) Items No.- 373/87014-01 and No. 374/87014-01:
During the
'1987 exercise, assembly and accountability of onsite personnel was not an exercise objective and was not demonstrated due to a refueling outage. A successful assembly / accountability drill was conducted later in 1987, as indicated in Inspection Reports No. 373/87036(DRSS) and No. 374/87035(DRSS).
Since a refueling outage was also in progress during the 1988 exercise, regional staff approved the licensee's proposal to conduct this annual drill separate from the 1988 exercise. This item is closed.
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s b.
(Closed) Items No. 373/87014-02 and No. 374/879014-02:
During the 1987 exercise, the licensee did not adequately demonstrate the use of the High Range Sampling System (HRSS) under simulated post-accident conditions, since scenario conditions did not require the sampling team to wear full sets of protective clothing or to use special communications equipment worn with respiratory protection equipment.
As indicated in Paragraph Sb, the HRSS team brought along appropriate protective clothing articles in the event that scenario conditions would worsen such that these items would have to be worn. However, simulated inplant radiological conditions during the 1988 exercise did not require the wearing of all the protective clothing items brought by the team.
However, the licensee conducted on HRSS drill in April 1988 that adequately addressed the concerns of this Open Item.
Records of this drill were reviewed and discussed with the drill controller.
Orill objectives that were successfully met included demonstrating the proper use of protective clothing, including respiratory protection equipment, and the simultaneous use of special communications equipment.
Records indicated that the team utilized airpacks before transferring their air hose connections to large air cylinders maintained near the HRSS room. The team members successfully demonstrated the capability to comunicate with each other, and with Control Room and Operational Support Center personnel, while wearing respiratory protection and special communications equipment. This item is closed, c.
(Closed) Weakness No. 373/87014-03 and No. 374/87014-03:
During the 1987 exercise, the HRSS team did not consistently demonstrate good contamination control practices when handling sampling equipment.
As indicated in Paragraph Sb, an inspector accompanied the HRSS team during the 1988 exercise. The team demonstrated good contamir.ation control techniques when handling the sampling equipment and samples.
This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Item No. 373/87036-01: The licensee must revise appropriate implementing procedures to accurately reflect the wording of the GSEP regarding the undelegatable responsibility for authorizing emergency worker exposures, and the limitations on seeking prior approval before making such an authorization.
Implementing Procedure LZP 1110-1 has been revised to accurately reflect the GSEP regarding the authorization of emergency worker exposures.
This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Item No. 373/87036-02:
In December 1987, the licensee committed to increase the number of trained persons for the Station Director's Communicator position from one to three by January 31, 1988.
The callout procedure (LZP 1320-1) for the onsite emergency organization has been revised to include three trained individuals for this position. Training records indicated that all three persons had been trained for the position in January 1988 prior to being added to the callout list.
This item is closed.
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3.
. General A daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) was conducted at the LaSalle County Station on June 15, 1988.
The exercise tested the licensee's capabilities to respond to an accident
. scenario resulting in a simulated release of radioactive material.
This was a partial scale exercise for the State of Illinois and a-full scale exercise'for LaSalle County, Illinois. The attachments to this report describe the licensee's Scope and Objectives and the exercise scenario.
4. -
General Observations a.
Procedures The exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the GSEP and associated implementing procedures, b.
Coordination Tha licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely.
If scenario events had been real, the licensee's actions would
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have been sufficient to allow State and local officials to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safety.
c.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued the exercise along with t
four NRC observers.
d.
Critiques The licensee held facility critiques following the exercise.
The NRC representatives discussed their preliminary findings with the licensee at the June 16 exit intarview. A public critique was also conducted on June 16, during which NRC and FEMA representative 3 summarized their preliminary evaluations of the exercise performances of the licensee, and of State and local energency resnonse organizations, respectively.
5.
Specific Observations (82301)
a.
Control koom The Shift Engineer (SE) in charge of Control Room activities promptly and correctly classified scenario events that warranted Unusual Event and Alert declarations.
Initial notifications to State and NRC officials were accurately completed within the regulatory time limits. The Unusual Event was declared for the discovery of a simulated explosive device in the Service Building.
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The SE prudently ordered the simulated assembly and accountability of all onsite personnel following that emergency declaration.
High priority was given to searching onsite assembly areas for other explosive devices before personnel would have gone to these locations.
The SE and his crew demonstrated good teamwork. Abnormal operating and emergency plan implementing procedures were effectively utilized. As the exercise progressed, Control Room personnel maintained an adequate awareness of the locations of the various inplant teams.
Several communicators arrived in the Control Room following tha Unusual Event declaration to assist the SE and his crew in maintaining communications with the onsite Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and relevant offsite support organizations.
The communicators were somewhat slow in assuming their duties.
As events progressed, they kept their calls concise and to the point. On several occasions early in the exercise the communicators neglected to say "this is a drill" during their telephone conversations. However, this caused no apparent confusion to communicators in the onsite ERFs or to the responders to the security incident that began the exercise.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
b.
Security / Fire Brigade Response to Initial Event The scenario began with the discovery of a simulated explosive device beneath a trophy case in the Service Building lobby.
The bomb supposedly detonated at 8:45 a.m., causing a small fire in the lobby but no injuries.
A security guard described the plan for keeping the lobby area clear of passersby prior to the simulated explosion. The guard and another employee indicated that they would remain outside the lobby. After the explosion, that employee went to a nearby office area to report the explosion to the Control Room. The Fire Brigade initially responded to the second floor of the Service Building where an earlier report of an explosion and dense smoke had supposedly originated. The brigade's chief realized that the source of the smoke was in the first floor lobby.
The chief and five appropriately dressed and equipped brigade members reached the lobby area within about seven minutes of being activated.
The chief adequately explained his plan for fighting the small fire and then radioed his initial damage report to the Control Room.
Brigade members also explained how they woulo search nearby areas l
in the building for any victims.
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The ::imulated small fire was supposedly extinguished within ten minutes. The chief radioed the Control Room that the fire was out and that no victims had been found.
He also made another accurate damage assessment report.
The chief then adequately described his plan for ventilating the lobby of smoke. He also sent brigade members to check the building's ventilation system and an accessible stairway.
Results of these checks were promptly reported to the Control Room.
The brigade's response efforts were completed within about thirty minutes of the simulated explosion and fire. The brigade promptly returned their equipment to its storage location.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable, c.
Operational Support Center (0SC), Inplant Teams, HRSS Team The OSC was fully operational within thirty minutes of the Alert declaration. Adequate communications links were established and maintained with the Control Room and Technical Support Center (TSC).
Frisker stations were established at both ends of the hallway near the OSC rooms.
OSC recordkeeping was very good. A dedicated coninunicator recorded each incoming message on a form which was then given to the OSC Director or OSC Supervisor for action. The communicator also maintained a key events log. Another individual maintained OSC status boards and a listing of information related to inplant teams dispatched from the facility. A third person completed a proceduralized "0SC Task Assignment" form for each team.
These forms contained information on the tasks to be performed, protective equipment needs, estimated exposures for the team, team member's current exposure status, and briefing and debriefing infonnation.
High and low range pocket dosimeters and TLDs were issued to OSC staff.
Radiation Chemistry Technicians (RCTs) who accompanied all inplant teams were also issued alarming dosimeters.
The OSC staff did not have a method for periodically obtaining Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) data from the nearby Control Room. An RCT was sent into the Control Room on several occasions to obtain current ARM data relevant to the needs of an inplant team being dispatched.
The HRSS team detoured into the Control Room after leaving the OSC to obtain current ARM data along their intended route to the HRSS room.
A three-person HRSS team adequately demonstrated their capability to collect a containment air sample and a diluted reactor coolant sample.
These samples were ready for transport to the counting
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room within about 90 and 120 minutes, respectively, from the time that the team was directed to take the sample. The chemist / procedure reader and the two valve manipulators demonstrated good teamwork and good familiarity with the procedures and sampling equipment. The team exhibited good contamination control techniques, including frequent glove changes, while they performed their tasks. Other appropriate protective clothing articles, including self-contained breathing apparatus, were brought by the team to the HRSS room.
However, simulated plant radiological conditions did not warrant the use of these protective clothing items. One team member performed radiation surveys of the room at appropriate intervals.
The team was well aware of potentially contaminated areas within the room as they performed their tasks.
Procedure LZP 1330-26 includes precautionary statements about the possibility of introducing airborne radioactivity into the HRSS room while collecting a containment air sample. However, the procedure does not require that an air sample be taken during the sample collection process.
The team had no provisions for taking an air sample within the HRSS room.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
The licensee should evaluate methods of periodically providing ARM data to the OSC.
- The licensee should revise appropriate procedures so that a dispatched HRSS team could collect a HRSS room air sample, if necessary, during post-accident sampling activities.
d.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
TSC activation by the "minimum staff," as defined in the emergency plan, began after the Unusual Event declaration.
Full staffing was ordered after the SE correctly declared an Alert for a security threat lasting over one hour. The TSC was fully operational, with the Station Director (SD) in comand and control of onsite response activities, roughly 35 minutes after the Alert declaration.
As the TSC was being staffed, the future SD received several update briefings by telephone from the SE. At about 9:40 a.m., the SE, future SD, and Operations Director made a prudent decision not to continue the simulated increase in Unit 1 power until the extent of the security threat had been better determined. The future SD gave several briefings to his incoming staff on scenario events as they prepared to perfonn their duties in an orderly and efficient manner.
The Security Director also provided several good briefings to all TSC personnel on the security force's simulated responses, and his
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views on the security threat. The SD's orderly assumption of lead emergency responsibilities was announced in the TSC and communicated to the Control Room several minutes after 10:00 a.m.
Prior to Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) activation, the SD kept the Corporate Nuclear Duty Officer adequately advised of changing plant conditions and onsite emergency response activities.
They agreed to begin activating the nearsite Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) at about 10:25 a.m. due to reports that media representatives were enroute to the Station. This was a reasonable decision, although activation of the E0F, which is in the same building as the JPIC, did not begin until after the Site Area Emergency was declared at about 10:45 a.m.
The SD and Operations Director exhibited proper concern over a somewhat elevated release rate of uncertain cause. The simulated release was within Technical Specification limits. As they performed a thorough review of potentially relevant Emergency Action levels (EALs), controllers turned off Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) terminals which had b'en added to the Control Room and TSC to e
display scenario data upon player demand.
The terminals were turned off because players had neglected to respond to an earlier alarm indication of high temperature in a computer room associated with the SPDS. With the teminals unavailable, Control Room and TSC staffs gradually reverted to verbal communications to relay plant status information.
At about 10:40 a.m., the SD learned that Unit I had scrammed over five minutes earlier and that primary containment pressure and radiation level had increased sufficiently to satisfy an EAL's criteria for a Site Area Emergency.
The SD promptly and correctly made this emergency declaration. As the cause of the elevated release rate was still uncertain and plant status infomation flow was degraded, the SD elected to issue the most conservative offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for this emergency classification per the emergency plan. This PAR was to shelter within a two mile radius of the Station and in the downwind sectors out to ten miles. The initial notification message providing this reclassificatior, and PAR was accurately transmitted within about seven minutes of the SD's declaration. The SD approved this initial notification message and all supplemental messages to the State that were transmitted by dedicated conmunicators.
Environs staff did a good job in monitoring current scenario meteorological conditions and in acquiring a weather forecast.
They noted a change in wind direction data which was sufficient to change the affectEd downwind sectors.
The SD was informed of this change. He had State officials informed using the Nuclear Accident
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Reporting System (NARS). Environs staff later briefed two field survey (environs) teams that had been formed after the Alert declaration.
The teams left the Protected Area around 11:00 a.m.
and deployed in accordance with procedures.
The SD and Security Director were well aware that a sirrulated assembly of all onsite personnel had been ordered by the SE following the Unusual Event declaration. They and the Rad Chem Director effectively interfaced to maintain a good awareness of the habitability of onsite assembly areas from radiological and security standpoints. The simulated evacuation of non-essentials was not ordered until about one hour after the General Emergency declaration due to the proper concern by TSC and E0F decisionmakers that the security threat could involve employees' vehicles in the Station's parking lots.
They did not want to place non-essentials in a potential threat situation in the parking lots that was greater than the relatively lesser danger of remaining in the onsite assembly areas. A plan was formulated by about 1:00 p.m. to bus non-essentials along an appropriate route to a suitable offsite reassembly point.
One status board was effectively utilized by TSC staff to prominently display and trend plant parameters relevant to this scenario. Another portable "plant status" status board was not well used. Although it was pre-formatted to indicate the current emergency classification and certain plant data, it we.s not updated in a timely manner.
The SD and Security Director kept the TSC staff adequately informed of scenario events, major decisions, and simulated security plan measures. Logkeeping and documentation of telephone conversations was generally good to facilitate later reconstruction of the TSC staff's actions. TSC noise levels were acceptable.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:
All status boards sbould be kept current.
Portable status boards that are found to be not very applicable to a particular situation should not remain prominently displayed in the TSC.
I e.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
l The E0F was fully operational, with the Manager of Emergency Operations (ME0) in overall command of the licensee's response l
efforts, about ninety-five minutes af ter the Site Area Emergency l
declaration.
This apparent delay was acceptable due to several l
factors.
Key TSC staff and the ME0 were involved in reclassifying the situation as a General Emergency and in formulating a correctly l
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revised PAR shortly before noon.
Several of the ME0's principal aide's departures from a nearby motel were more realistically staged to_ simulate their longer travel times from the downtown _ Chicato corporate offices. They did not arrive within the E0F until several minutes after noon. The SD and ME0 correctly concluded that TSC staff could more efficiently complete the initial offsite notifications following the 12:05 General Emergency declaration than could their E0F counterparts, several of whom were in the final stages of assuming their emergency organization positions.
Between 12:15 p.m. and 12:25 p.m., the ME0 and several E0F staff, the TSC's SD, and a remotely located representative of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety participated in an important conference call that also involved a controller who simulated the roles of NRC Regional and Headquarters decisionmakers.
During this conference call, all parties were well informed of what protective actions the State would implement.
E0F staff provided inputs regarding
_ation time estimates and forecast wind direction, while TSC r
scaff gave their latest prognoses for restoring primary and secondary containments. The call culminated with the ME0 infonning all parties that he was assuming lead responsibility for the licensee's respcnse efforts.
E0F staff were then informed of this assumption of lead responsibility and proceeded to relieve their TSC counterparts in an orderly manner.
E0F staff adequately demonstrated their capabilities to monitor plant and meteorological conditions. However, as later identified in the licensee's critique, status boards were not kept well up-to-date until after about 12:30 p.m.
The ME0 and several aides used the E0F's Public Address system to infonn E0F staff of significant infonnation and decisions.
At about 1:00 p.m., the generation of plant parameter data was stopped. E0F and TSC staffs were instructed to determine whether or not current
. site and offsite conditions warranted declaration of Recovery, r to determine what must be done before that emergency reclassificY on sould be made. The ME0 led a good teleconference discussion vol ing several of his staff and key TSC staff. Very good use e/ proceduralized Recovery Checklists was demonstrated.
The ME0 c rectly concluded that Recovery could not be declared as of 1:00
.n. A comprehensive list of items that required action in order tr declare Recovery was compiled. The ME0 and TSC's SD agreed on whi', items would be addressed by their respective staffs. At abou+ 1:30 p.m., the conference call was re-established to enable key 0F and TSC staffs to discuss the courses of actions proposed D. each item that had been identified before Recovery could be
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
6.
Scenario and Controller Actions (82301)
The licensee's scenario was submitted in accordance with the established schedule. The licensee was adequately responsive in providing several clarifications and correctives to the scenario package.
No examples of improper controller actions were identified by the inspectors.
Soon after 10:00 a.m., the scenario included a failure of air conditioning equipment serving a Station computer room. This failure would result in the loss of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) in the Control Room, TSC, and E0F.
Exercise participants did not recognize early indications of overheating problems in the computer room. As a result, at about 10:30 a.m. controllers turned off SPDS terminals that had been added to these locations to display scenario data. The terminals remained off for about 45 minutes, by which time participants had formulated a reasonable plan for investigating the air conditioning problem and had also declared a Site Area Emergency for an unrelated degradation in plant conditions. This controller action was very goed, even though it occurred at a critical period in the scenario.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
7.
Exit 'nterview (30703)
On Junt.'.6,1988, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives listed 19 Paragraph 1 to present their preliminary inspection findings.
The licentee agreed to consider the items discussed, and indicated that none were proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
A.
Exercise Objectives B.
Narrative Summary C.
Scenario Timeline
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Reviolon 1
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MIrch 9, 1988
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LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1988 GSEP EXERCISE
' /T Week of June 13, 1988
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OBJECTIVES PRIMARY OBJECTIVES:
Demonstrate the capability to implement the Commonwealth Edison-Generating Stations Emergency Plan to protect the public in the event of a major accident at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station.
Demonstrate this capability during the daytime hours to qualify as a daytime Exercise in accordance with NRC guidance.
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:
1)
Incident Assessment and Classification a.
Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions, to determine which Emergency Action Level (EAL)
has been reached, and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with GSEP procedures.
2)
Notification and Communication a.
Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite organizations within fifteen (15) minutes of declaring an
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accident classification.
b.
Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC as soon as practical but within one (1) hour of the initisl incident.
- (CR)
c.
Demonstrate the capability to contact pertinent organizations that would normally assist in an emergency, but are not participating in this Exercise (e.g., INPO Murray & Trettle, General Electric, etc.)
d.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely'
i information so that reports may be made to the Emergency News Center for Press releases.
- (EOF, JPIC)
e.
Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up information/ updates to the State and NRC in a timely and ongoing manner.
- (TSC, LOF)
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- - (Groups that are primarily concerned).
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1988 LASALLE GSEP EXERCISE
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OBJECTIVES: (cont'd)
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Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC upon request.
3)
-Radiolonical Assessment:
a.
Der 1 strate the capability co conduct in-plant radiation procection activities relative to the specific Exercise Scenario situations.
- (OSC)
b.
Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to implement proper contamination control provisions.
- (OSC)
c.
Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to implement proper Health Physics practices including exposure pre-planning and dosimetry issuance for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched from the OSC.
- (OSC)
d.
Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to track and document personnel exposures for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched from the OSC.
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- (OSC)
e.
Demonstrate the ability to calculate Offsite Dose Projections.
f.
Demonstrate the ability to make Protective Action Recommendations.
g.
Demonstrate the capability of Field Teams to conduct field radiation surveys.
h.
Demonstrate the capability to collect and analyze samples utilizing the PASS System in accordance with procedures and proper contamination control techniques and utilizing necessary equipment and communication methods.
- (OSC)
4)
Emergency Facilities:
a.
Demonstrate the capability to achieve the emergency organization and staff the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures during the daytime.
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March 9, 1988
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1988 LASALLE GSEP EXERCISE
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OBJECTIVES: (cont'd)
k b.
Demonstrate the capability to record and track major plant status and protective action recommendation information relative to changing plant exercise events using status boards.
c.
Demonstrate the capability to track and document, on status boards and logs, dispatched Operations and Maintenance Team activities and in-plant job statuses.
- (OSC)
5)
Emergency Dirertion and Control a.
Demonstrate the ability of the GSEP organization to manage and direct; a simulated emergency Exercise.
b.
Demonstrate the ability of the Directors to manage their emergency response facilities in the implementation of GSEP.
c.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and prioritize Maintenance and Operating activities during abnormal and emergency plant operation.
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6)
Offsite Agency Coordination a.
Demonstrate the capability of Ceco to coordinate the direction of the emergency response and exchange information with the State, offsite station emergency response personnel and local command centers (as applicable) via CECO liaison personnel, communicators and station personnel.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to discuss protective action recommendations with the State agencies.
- (EOF)
7)
Public Information a.
Demonstrate the ability of the JPIC Coordinator or designee to man the JPIC at all times and respond to press requests.
- (JPIC)
b.
Demonstrate the ability of CECO to coordinate and exchange event information for press conferences with the State agencies.
- (JPIC)
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1988 LASALLE GSEP EXERCISE
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OBJECTIVES: (cont'd)
c.
Demonstrate the ability to prepare timely (within 90 minutes of occurrence) accurate press releases or conferences during site and general cmergency phases.
--(JPIC)
d.
Demonstrate the ability to utilize visual aids and other resources to support the briefing information.
- (JPIC)
8)
Sbort Ranne Planning a.
Demonstrate the espability to identify the resources and requirements necessary to stabilize the plant and enter a recovery phase.
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LASALLE 1988 GSEP EXERCISE
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June 15, 1988
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NARRATIVE SUlWARY g
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
During the previous shift, power on Unit I was reduced from full power to 700 MWe for a rod pattern adjustment by the Nuclear Engineer. Following this, a return ramp to full power was initiated.
During the return ramp (at 0530), an E.A. mistakenly opened the wrong breaker causing a heater drain transient which resulted in the Reactor Recire. Pumps being down shifted to slow speed. As a. result, the Feedwater Temperature dropped 800F, The Recire. Pump downshift and subsequent up shift caused the leaking Recire. Pump Seal to begin to slowly fail. The plant was stabilized and power returned to 700 MWe by 0800. The L.D. requested an increase at 10 MWe/hr. to full power due to a red condition on the grid and other units in refueling outages. A 10 MW/hr. increase has been started.
Procedure LOP-VQ-ll (inerting the drywell) is in progress due to higher than normal oxygen content found in previous shif t's surveillance.
0800 - 0830 (PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES)
A bomb threat is received in the Control Room from inside the plant. The caller identifies a bomb placed in the Service Building set to explode at 0845.
Bomb search teams should be dispatched. A bomb is discovered chained and secured to a display case in the Service 3uilding lobby.
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0830 - 0915 L
UNUSUAL EVEPrr EAL #8C (BOMB DISCOVERED IN THE PROTECTED AREA)
Bomb explodes at 0845. Minimal damage is evident in the lobby. One entrance to the TSC is blocked by debris and a damaged ceiling. The door is jammed and not capable of being opened. A small fire and smoke is evident in the Service Building lobby and requires dispatch of the Fire Brigade (no offsite assistance).
Control Room ventilation switches over to the Emergency Make-up Train due to smoke being picked up by the ventilation system. NRC red phone is not working for initial notificaiton of the event. A backup means is used.
0915 - 1045 ALERT EAL #8I (SECURITY THREAT FOR > 60 MINS.)
Another bomb threat call is received in the Control Room signifying a bomb will go off at noon. Bomb searches should begin.
Communication Services begins eceiving phone calls on bombings at the station.
Press arrive at the station for information. A worker exiting the Reactor Building is found to be contaminated. An operating Primary Containment Chiller trips.
Corrective action is taken. At 1025, the Recire. Pump Flow Control Valve ramps full open causing a power excursion in the reactor and high local power fluxes within the core (due to incorrect rod pattern).
(
Damage to 10% of the core (gap release) occurs due to manufacturing defects in the cladding. The Recire. Pump Seal leak increases dramatically. Containment radiation begins to rise. The reactor SCRAMS on high radiation in main steam lines.
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LASALLE 1988 GSEP EXERCISE
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June 15, 1988
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NARRATIVE SUlWARY
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1045 - 1200 SITE EMERGENCY EAL #2L (CONTAINMENT RADIATION > 400 R/hr.)
When drywell purge is stopped, one of the VQ valves sticks open. An outboard MSIV remains open after the MSIV isolation with its associated inboard MSIV showing dual indication. The leaking reactor recirculation loop is isolated via jumpers to ninimize the leak. Pressure begins to build in the reactor. The Reactor Safety Relief Valve is opened to control pressure dumping highly radioactive steam to the Suppression Pool and Drywell. Radiation levels increase.
At 1150, secondary containment is lost due to a bomb on the doorway between the refueling floor and the Turbine Building roof. Aside from a hole in the wall, no excessive damage is present.
1200 - 1300 GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL #20 (CONTAINMENT lADIATION > 2000 F/hr.)
Containment radiation exceeds 2000 R/hr. No further opening of the SRV occurs. Offsite releases occur via design base leakage from containment.
1300 - 1430 RECOVERY ACTIVITIES / RESTORATION O
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LASALLE STATION 1988 GSEP EXERCISE TIME LINE,
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GROUNO UNUSUAL ALERT SITE-GENERAL" RECOVERY RULES EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY (45 MINS.)
(90 MINS.)
(75 MINS.)
(60 MINS.)
(90 MINS.)
7 w)
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T = 30 T=0 T = 30 T = 75 T = 170 T - 240 T = 300 T = 390 l
(0730)
(0800)
(0830)
(0915)
(1050)
(1200)
(1300)
(1430)
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EAL #8C EAL #81 EAL #2L EAL #20 TERMINATE SUMMARY OF EVENTS PRIOR TO T = 30 GROUND RULES DISCUSSED T = -30 UNIT 1 IS AT APPROXIMATELY 60% POWER AND RAMPING UP AT 10 fWE/HR.
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RCIC IS OUT OF SERVICE FOR WATER LEG PUMP REBUILD.
A VC/VE IS OUT OF SERVICE FOR FAN MOTOR REPLACEMENT.
ORYWELL INERTING PROCEDURE IN EFFECT TO REDUCE 02 LEVEL.
PREVIOUS HEATER ORAIN TRANSIENT CAUSED RECIRC. PUMP SEAL DMRADATION.
T = 15 BOMB THREAT RECEIVED.
T = 15 NRC RfD PHONE INOPERABLE.
T = 45 BOMB EXPLODES IN SERVICE BUILDING LOBBY.
T = 50 CONTROL ROOM VENT SYSTEM GOES TO EMERGENCY MAKE-UP OUE TO SMOKE.
T = 75 BOMB THREAT #2 RECEIVED FOR TECH STAFF AREA.
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T = f0 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CHILLER TRIPS DUE TO LOW REFRIGERANT PRESSURE.
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i = 100 CONTAMINATED PERSON EXITS REACTOR BUILDING.
T = 150 RECIRC. PUMP FLOW CONTROL VALVE RAMPS FULL OPEN. FUEL DAMAGE OCCURS.
I SCRAM OCCURS ON HIGH MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION.
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"A" OUTBOARD MSIV INDICATES OPEN, "A" INBOARD MSIV HAS DUAL INDICATION.
CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVELS INCREASE DUE TO INCREASING RECIRC. SEAL l
LEAKAGE / BREAK.
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T = 170 CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVELS INCREASE AF4VE 400 R/HR.
T = 195 PRIMRY CONTAINMENT CHILLER TRIPS.
d i = 200 LEAKING RECIRC. LOOP IS ISOLATED TO MINIMIZE LEAKAGE.
REACTOR PRESSURE BEGINS TO INCREASE.
T - 215 SRV IS OPENED. HIGHLY RA010 ACTIVE STEAM IS RELEASE 0 TO SUPPRESSION POOL /DRYWELL.
T = 230 BOMB #2 EXPLODES. LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT.
T = 240 CONTAINMENT RADIATION INCREASES ABOVE 2000 R/HR. * NOTE: THIS MAY OR MY NOT BE INTERPRETED AS A GENERAL EMERGENCY DEPENDING ON THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT.
T = 300 RECOVERY / RESTORATION
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T = 390 EXERCISE TERMINATION.
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