IR 05000373/1989008
| ML20246C395 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1989 |
| From: | Harrison J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246C378 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-89-08, 50-373-89-8, 50-374-89-08, 50-374-89-8, NUDOCS 8905090357 | |
| Download: ML20246C395 (11) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Report Nos. 50-373/89008(DRP): 50-374/89008(DRP)
I Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 i
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL Inspection Conducted:
March 14 through April 24, 1989 Inspectors:
R. Lanksbury R. Kopriva D. Jo es
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Bh Approved By:
. Harrison, Chief Reactor Projects Section IB Date Inspection Summary Inspection on March 14 through April 24, 1989 (Reports No. 50-373/89008(DRP);
50-374/89008(DRP))
Areas Ins 3ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by resident and regional )ased inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; training; Licensee Event Reports; followup of a security eventjESF system walkdowns; and a management meeting.
Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no violations were identified. During the inspection period, there was one Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone l
call made. The ENS call was made on March 30, 1989, pertaining to problems I
with the security computer. After investigating the problem, it was determined I
that security compensatory measures were in place within the required time of the computer problem and the ENS phone call was retracted.
Both Units 1 and 2 have been running at or near full power with no major
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equipment out of servise. The licensee's attention to housekeeping is quite
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noticeable in mos' was of the plant. There are still some areas in the
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plant and some outside of tne reactor building that need additional attention.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- G. J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station
- W. R. Huntington, Services Superintendent J. C. Renwick, Production Superintendent D. S. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning J. V. Schmeltz, Assistant Superintendent, Operations P. F. Manning, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services T. A. Hammerich, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor W. E. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance J. H. Atchley, Operating Engineer W. Betourne, Quality Assurance Supervisor M. G. Santic, Master Instrument Mechanic
- W. J. Marcis, Site BWR Engineering Supervisor
- D. Carlson, Regulatory Assurance J. Borm, Quality Assurance
- Denotes personnel attending the exit interview on April 27, 1989.
Additional licensee technical and administrative personnel were contacted by the inspectors during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Open Item (374/84040-01):
Installation of additional drywell fan cooling units and drywell chiller. The licensee installed six fan coil cooling units and a 400 ton drywell chiller under Modification packages M-1-2-84-119, M-1-2-85-018, M-1-2-85-026, M-1-2-85-060 and M-1-2-87-050.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Items (373/85030-07; 374/85031-08):
Continued problems with chlorine and ammonia detector actuations as identified in LER's.
On January 18, 1989, the licensee was issued Amendment Nos. 61 and 42 revising LaSalle Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications to remove all references to the ammonia detector monitoring instrument system. The chlorine detectors were previously deleted by a Technical Specification amendment. This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (373/84014-05): Awaiting final correction to prevent freezing of control room ventilation ammonia and chlorine detection system. The licensee removed the ammonia and chlorine detection systems from the Technical Specifications by amendments to their operating license. This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (373/82032-03):
Starting air refrigerated dryers are not performing their intended function. The refrigerated dryers in the diesel generators starting air system started at the same time as the air compressors. The air compressors operated for a short time and by
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the time the refrigerated dryers were ready to perform their function the air compressors had shut down.
The licensee completed Modification M-1-1-82-160 to revise the refrigerated air dry control circuits to allow continuous operation of the dryers. This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (373/84002-17):
Thirty day reports on drywell temperature exceedances. The licensee implemented a formalized drywell temperature monitoring program / procedure (currently LTS-300-13, Revision 2) in October 1985.
The procedure requires submitting a special report when the temperature in the vicinity of environmentally qualified safety related equipment exceeds 150 degrees F.
An analysis of remaining qualified life is also required if the temperature is exceeded for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This item is closed.
(Closed)OpenItem(373/86007-05): Maintenance staff indicated some personnel errors could reasonably have been prevented by a wiring system change that would improve jumper installation and removal. The licensee changed the type of connector and/or moved the connection points to prevent inadvertent grounding of jumpers during routine surveillance.
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The initial list of work requests generated to install " banana" jacks in various panels throughout the plant have been completed; however, future installations may be requested as the need is identified. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (374/84002-06): Tube reversal on tip indexer.
Two tip channels were found to be interchanged, the cause was unknown.
One hypothesis was that they were swapped after a construction test.
Special Test Procedure LST-84-110 was written, requiring the Nuclear Engineers to verify tip tubing runs after any outage involving removal of tip tubing. This Special Test Procedure was later replaced by permanent procedure LTP-1600-33, Tip System Checkout. The inspector reviewed the Unit 2 start up test procedure which references procedure LTP-1600-33.
This item is closed.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of Unit 1 and 2 reactor, auxiliary, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions.
These tours included checking for potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
This included verification that the appropriate number of security personnel were on site; access control barriers were operational;
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protected areas were well maintained; and vital area barriers were well maintained. The inspector verified the licensee's radiological protection program was implemented in accordance with the facility policies and programs and was in compliance with regulatory requi rements.
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b.
The inspectors performed routine inspections of the control room l
during off-shift and weekend periods; these included inspections between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m..
The inspections were conducted to assess overall crew performance and, specifically, control room operator attentiveness during night shifts. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's administrative controls regarding " Conduct of Operations" and interviewed the licensee's security personnel, shift supervisors and operators to determine if shift personnel were notified of the inspectors' arrivals onsite during off-shifts.
The inspectors determined that both licensed and non-licensed operators were attentive to their duties, and that the inspectors'
arrivals on site appeared to have been unannounced. The licensee has implemented appropriate administrative controls related to the conduct of operations. These include procedures which specify fitness for duty and operator attentiveness, c.
On March 27, 1989, at 7:07 a.m. CST, on the tenth anniversary of the TMI accident, the Today Show (NBC) conducted a live interview with Mr. J. J. O'Connor, Chief, Executive Officer, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) from the LaSalle County Nuclear Station control room.
The broadcast also included an earlier interview with NRC Chairman L. W. Zech, Jr. and pro and con viewpoints on nuclear power by representatives from industry and a public interest group.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed Technical Specification required surveillance testing and verified for actual activities observed that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures. The inspectors also verified that test instrumentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished and that test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure requirements. Additionally, the inspectors ensured that the test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
LIS-NB-206 Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Low Water Level Confirmed Automatic i
Depressurization System (ADS) Permissive Calibration
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LOS-VG-M1 Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test LOS-RH-Q1 Unit 2 RHR (LPCI) and RHR Service Water Pump Inservice Test for Operational Conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
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I LIS-0G-406 Unit 2 Condense Off-Gas H Analyzer Functional Test
LIS-RD-404 Unit 2 RCIC Equi, ment Area High Temperature and High Vent i
Differential Temperature Isolation Functional Test
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LIS-RI-412 Unit 2 Reactor Vessel High Water Level RCIC Turbine Trip Functional Test
l LOS-RI-Q4 Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Cold Quick Start in Conditions 1, 2, and 3 a.
-On April 11, 1989, at approximately 9:30 a.m. CDT, the resident inspectors witnessed the licensee's performance of LOS-RI-Q4, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Cold Quick Start in Conditions 1, 2, and 3. The surveillance went well with just a few noted exceptions.
The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) room was clean, and for_the most part decontaminated. All of the instruments and equipment were well labeled. There were no fluid leaks noted on the RCIC steam turbine or pump. The operations personnel performing a preservice check on the RCIC turbine and valve lineup was relatively new in the position and consequently was not totally familiar with all the valve locations, valve positions, and instrument locations. One concern the inspector noted was that
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the operations person performing the preservice check was not using a procedure or a procedure checklist.
He did have a handwritten i
checklist combined with communications with the control room unit z'
NuclearStation.0perator(NS0). The NS0 was following procedure LOS-RI-Q4.
It would have been more appropriate for the operations person to have a checklist from the procedure or the entire procedure with him while performing the preservice checks. This appears to have been an isolated case. The resident inspector will follow this item in subsequent surveillance to determine if this issue becomes a problem.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the Limiting i
Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were j
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the j
work; and activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable. Other items considered also included verifica-tion that functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
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returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
Additionally, the inspectors verified that parts and materials used were properly certified: radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is i
assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
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a.
On March 4, 1989, at approximately 11:00 p.m. CST, the licensee was l
performing surveillance LST-89-033, Unit 1 Control Rod Drive (CRD)
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Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) Accumulator Ball Check Valve (V115)
L Test, on Unit 1.
During the test, Control Rod Drive (CRD) Hydraulic l'
Control Unit (HCU) 42-27 was found not able to maintain pressure in the accumulator following a CRD pump trip.
Review of the maintenance history for HCU 42-27 revealed that work request #73779 was written on November 30, 1987. When valve 1C11-D001-113 was opened after HCU 42-27 was charged, the valve stem shot out to the full open position which repressurized the nitrogen side of the accumulator. The work request was written to replace the valve.
On April 20, 1988, authorization was given to start work. A freeze seal was applied to the piping, the defective valve 1C11-D001-113 cut out and a new valve installed. Also, check valve IC11-D001-115 was disassembled, inspected and reassembled and the bolts for the check valve torqued. The work was completed by June 18, 1988.
On March 5,1989, work request #88050 was written in response to the failed surveillance on March 4, 1989.
Inspection of the valves
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for HCU 42-27 revealed that the charging water ball check valve 1C11-D001-115 was completely failing. The charging water check valve was flushed with no improvement noted. On March 5, 1989, the check valve was disassembled and inspected; the ball check was missing from the check valve. The valve gasket surface was cleaned, a new gasket and ball check installed, the valve was reassembled, and the_ bolts torqued.
Surveillance LST-89-036 was then performed satisfactorily on March 5,1989.
Corrective actions taken by the licensee to correct this problem include issuance of Action Item Report (AIR) #373-251-89-00051 which required the maintenance procedures to be revised to include Quality Control (QC) hold points during the reassembly of all HCU ball check valves to verify the reinsta11ation of the ball check.
b.
On April 5,1989, during the performance of LOS-CS-Q1, Secondary Containment Operability Test, one of the reactor building Ventilation System (VR) isolation (secondary containment) damper (IVR05YA) failed to closed within the 10 second time frame specified
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in the surveillance and in Technical Specification Table 3.6.5.2-1 and was declared inoperable. The damper was cycled 3 additional times and these also resulted in unsatisfactory isolation times.
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Subsequently, the damper was cycled 5 additional times with all isolation times within the specification requirement (f 10 seconds).
Damper IVR05YA was then declared operable.
The licensee hypothesized that mechanical binding at the damper or actuator was the cause of
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the initial slow closure times.
However, binding or sticking of I
the Automatic Switch Company (ASCO), model HT8316A65, solenoid j
operated valves could not be ruled out as a possible cause of the j
event.
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As a result of this event, the licensee placed damper IVR05YA on an increased surveillance frequency to insure continued operability.
The frequency was increased from monthly to weekly for the first two I
weeks, then biweekly for one month, and then returned to the normal I
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monthly schedule. The licensee also planned to inspect the damper l
at the first available opportunity which appeared to be the next refueling outage scheduled to commence on September 2, 1989. Work Request (WR) L89127 and Action Item Record (AIR) 373-200-89-03401 were initiated for this purpose.
On April 19, 1989, on the first attempt to close the IVR05YA damper per the reduced frequency testing, the damper failed to fully close and was declared inoperable. Subsequently, the damper was cycled j
two more times with each closure occurring in 5 seconds or less.
l The licensee issued WR 89255 to replace the solenoid valves. This action was completed on April 19, 1989; the dampers were retested satisfactorily and declared operable again. Since the licensee was not sure that the unsatisfactory isolation times was due to the solenoids or to some other problem, they reinitiated the increased surveillance frequency of testing to verify their continued operability.
On April 20, 1989, the inspectors observed bench testing of the removed solenoid valves. During this testing, the solenoid valves appeared to operate normally.
In order to simulate more closely the in use conditions (solenoids normally energized), the solenoid valves were left energized over night with plans to retest on-April 21.
However, on the morning of April 21, the solenoids were inadvertently de-energized. The solenoids were then re-energized and allowed to sit for approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Upon retest, the solenoid valves appeared to function normally.
The solenoid valves were then disassembled by the licensee. While signs of some minor residue was found inside of the valve body, nothing that would cause the valve to fail or stick was noted. The licensee is continuing their investigation. The completion of this investigation as well as resolution of questions provided by the inspector to the licensee over this event will be tracked as an open item (374/89008-01(DRP)).
One open item was identified in this area.
6.
Training (41400)
The inspector, through discussions with personnel, evaluated the licensee's training program for operations and maintenance personnel to determine whether the general knowledge of the individuals was sufficient for their assigned tasks.
On April 10, 1989, fifteen INP0 personnel performed a site inspection pertaining to LaSalle's licensing requalification program.
The assessment team was on site for one week.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (93702)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
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action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
The following reports of nonroutine events were reviewed by the inspectors. Based on this review it was determined that the events were of minor safety significance, did not represent program deficiencies, were properly reported, and were properly compensated for. These reports are closed:
374/88015-01 - Residual heat removal pump minimum flow bypass differential' pressure switch found out of tolerance due to setpoint drift. This is a revision to the original LER after disassembly of the SOR switch.
374/89003-01 - Engineered safety feature actuation during perform-
.ance of instrument maintenance functional tests due to personnel
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error. This is a revision to the original LER.
373/89005-01 - Main steam high flow switch out of tolerance due to setpoint drift. This is a revision to the original LER after disassembly of the SOR switch.
373/89006-00 - Snubbers not classified as safety related for surveillance.
374/89006-00 - Setpoint drift of low level confirmed automatic depressurization system permissive switch.
373/89107-00 - Potential loss of control room isolation due to the possibia failure of exhaust purge dampers in the open position without direct' indication.
373/89008-00 - Setpoint drift of reactor vessel low water vessel (Level 2) switch.
373/89009-00 - Reactor scram due to loss of main generator caused by failure of Unit 2 system auxiliary transformer lightning arrester.
373/89010-00 - Setpoint drift of low level confirmed automatic depressurization system permissive switch.
373/89011-00 - High pressure core spray system inoperable due to
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crosstying batteries to Unit 2 caused by fuel oil leak.
373/89012-00 - Reactor core isolation cooling hi steam flow isolation switch failed diaphragm.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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8.
Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
The licensee's security activities were observed by the inspectors during routine facility tours and during the inspectors' site arrivals and departures. Observations included the security personnel's performance associated with access control, security checks, and surveillance activities, and focused on the adequacy of security staffing, the security response (compensatory measures), and the security staff's attentiveness and thoroughness. The security force's performance in these areas appeared satisfactory.
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l On March 30, 1989, the resident inspectors were informed that the licensee I
was having problems with their security computer.
Compensatory measures j
were established and the computer problems resolved on March 31, 1989.
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The ENS notification was made on March 30 and was subsequently retracted when the licensee determined that the compensatory measures were timely and adequate.. A morning report was issued and is being followed by the regional security inspectors.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
9.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The operability of selected engineered safety features was confirmed by the inspectors during walkdown of the accessible portions of the following systems. The following items were considered during the walkdowns: verification that procedures match the plant drawings, equipment conditions, housekeeping, instrumentation, valve and electrical breaker lineup status (per procedure checklist), and verification that items including locks, tags, and jumpers were properly attached and identifiable. The following systems were walked l
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down this inspection period:
Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control Tank Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment System a.
On April 6-7, 1989, the resident inspector and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) resident engineer performed an Engineered Safety (LPCS) system.
Feature System walkdown of the Unit 1 Low Pressure Core Spray The objective was to independently verify the status of the LPCS system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the LPCS system to verify its operability.
The resident inspector first obtained piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) and isometric drawings of the LPCS system. This was followed by a review of the licensee's systems lesson plans, procedures, Technical Specifications and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the LPCS system.
The resident inspector and resident engineer then proceeded to the Unit I reactor building to perform the walkdown.
Items pursued during the walkdown were as follows:
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(1)
Confirm that the system line procedure matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration.
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(2) Hangers and supports were made up properly, aligned correctly, l
and not damaged.
(3) Housekeeping was adequate and appropriate levels of cleanliness were being maintained.
(4) Valves in the system did not exhibit gross packing leakage, bent stems, missing handwheels, or improper labeling.
(5) Major system components were properly labeled, lubricated, l
cooled, and no leakage exists.
(6) Verify that the instrumentation was proper'y installed, functioning and values were consistent with normal, expected values.
(7) Verify that instrument calibration dates were current.
(8) Verify that valves in the flow path were in the correct positions as required by procedure, either visual observation or remote position indication; that power, if required, was available to the valve; that valves were locked as appropriate; and that local and remote position indications were functional and indicate the same values.
(9) Verify that support systems essential to system actuation or performance (including interlocks, pump trip, cooling water, ventilation, lubrication, compressed air or gas) were opera-tional.
(10) Verify proper breaker position at local electrical boards and indications on control boards.
The walkdown encompassed all areas in the reactor building and control room for the LPCS system except for the drywell/ suppression pool. These areas were unaccessible due to the fact that the unit was operating at full power.
The licensee's painting and labeling improvement program reduced the difficulties usually encountered during inspection of areas requiring infrequent walkdowns, in that:
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Areas were brighter, making items easier to find
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Labeling was good Fluid spills would have been more noticeable
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Most areas were not contaminated
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Housekeeping was good
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As a result of the walkdown, no anomalies or discrepancies were noted. There were no fluid spills and housekeeping was good, but
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improvements could be made in the reactor building corner rooms.
There were no noticeable problems with valves, hangers, snubbers or instrumentation.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
10. Management Meeting (30703)
On March 21, 1989, the resident inspectors received a visit from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for the purpose of
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providing the resident inspectors with OSHA training and for a plant tour. OSHA personnel included the Director of Policy and selected staff personnel. Also accompanying the OSHA personnel were two NRC headquarters personnel from the.NRR, Inspection and Licensing Program Branch; the l-Chief from the Inspection and Licensing Program Development Program and
a Senior Reactor Operations Engineer from his staff. Because of the interest shown by-the licensee, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO), the LaSalle Safety Coordinator accompanied the group throughout the training session and plant tour.
This is the second nuclear site that OSHA has visited in Region III, the first being at Zion, a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) also owned by CECO.
OSHA's main reason for the site training and plant tour was to aid OSHA in properly structuring its upcoming training program for NRC inspectors.
11. Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. One open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.
12.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational contents of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprieta ry.
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