IR 05000373/1988025
| ML20206E210 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1988 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206E204 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-88-25, 50-374-88-24, NUDOCS 8811180009 | |
| Download: ML20206E210 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-373/88025(DRP);50-374/88024(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18
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Licensee: Comonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles IL Inspection Conducted:
September 24 through October 31, 1988 Inspectors:
R. Lanksbury R. Kopriva D. Jones Approved By:
M. A. Ring, Chief k
// 7 4 7 Reactor Projects Section 18 i
Date Inspection Sumary Inspection on September 24 through October 31, 1988 (Reports No.
50-373/88025(DRP); 50-374/88024(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; training; Licensee Event Reports; outages; security; ESF system walkdowns; emergency preparedness; spent fuel pool activities; and unit trips.
Results: Of the twelve areas inspected, no deviations were identified and one violation for which a Notice of Violation was not issued was identified.
During this inspect %n the inspectors have developed a heightened level of concern over the attentiveness of the security force (paragraph 9).
Though time during the inspection period did not permit comple*. ion of a review of the circumstances, the inspectors also are cor.cerned about the thoroughness of surveillance procedure reviews.
This particular issue is an unresolved item (paragraph 13). One violation of Technical Specifications was identified (paragraph 3.f.) but because it met all of the tests of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1., no Notice of Violation was issued.
During this inspection period a radiological spill occurred (paragraph 3.g).
The assessment of the residents and of the regional specialist that responded to the event was that the licensee responded in an excellent fashion.
However, the licensee needs to vigorously pursue radiological controls in the plant to ensure that areas and radiological supplies are kept under control and cleaned / picked up.
During this inspection period the licensee comenced a scheduled 15 week refueling / maintenance outage.
To date the planning for and the implementation of the outage appears to be going very well.
G8111G0009 891114 PDR ADOCK O*',000373 O
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J DETAILS 1.
Persons' Contacted
- G. J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station
- W. R. Huntington, Services Superintendent
- J. C. Renwick, Production Superintendent D. S. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning J. V. Schmeltz, Assistant Superintendent, Operations P. F. Manning, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services
- T. A. Hammerich, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor W. E. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance J. H. Atchley, Operating Engineer
- D. A. Brown, Quality Assurance Supervisor M. G. Santic, Master Instrument Mechanic
- W. J. Marcis, Site BWR Engineering Supervisor
- Denotes personnel attending the exit interview on November 4,1988.
Additional licensee technical and administrative personnel were contacted by the inspectors during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Violation (374/88010-01): Valving error on March 9,1988, while performing surveillance LIS-NB-404, "Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Low Low Water Level RCIC Initiation, low-Low-Low Water Level LPCS/RHR Initiation, and ADS Permissive Functional Test." The failure to follow procedures resulted in the recirculation pumps tripping, reactor core power oscillations, and a reactor scram. Corrective actions included additional training, tail gate sessions, and counseling of the individual.
The resident inspectors find these actions adequate. This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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a.
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable i
logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified
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proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of Unit 1 and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to
i observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance
requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
I The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that j
the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with i
the station security plan including the following:
the appropriate number of security personnel were on site; access control barriers
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area barriers were well maintained. The inspector verified the licensee's radiological protection program was implemented in accordance with the facility policies and programs and in compliance with regulatory requirements, b.
The inspectors performed routine inspections of the control room during off-shift and weekend peried5, lii6se included inspections between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a..m..
The inspections were conducted to assess overall crew performance and, specifically, control room operator attentiveness during night shifts.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's aJministrative controls regarding "Conduct of Operations" and interviewed the licensee's security personnel, shift supervisors and operators to determine if shift personnel were notified of the inspectors' arrivals onsite during off-shifts.
The inspectors determined that both licensed and non-licensed operators were attentive to their duties, and that the inspectors'
arrivals on site appeared to have been unannounced.
The licensee has implemented appropriate administrative controls related to the conduct of operations. These include procedures which specify fitness for duty and operator attentiveness, c.
At approximately 12:52 p.m. (CDT) on September 28, 1988, an Aux Electric Equipment Room Ventilation (VE) supply fan breaker, 303D (GE AKA 480V), on bus 136X faulted causin de-energized Motor Control Centers (MCCs)g 136X to trip, which 136X-1, -2, and -3.
136X-2 de-energized "B" RPS (Reactor Protection System) bus which resulted in Groups 1-5 PCIS (Primary Containment Isolation System)
partial isolations.
On the Group 1 isolation the main steam line drain valves closed, and on the Group 4 isolation the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) trains auto started as a result of reactor building ventilation (VR) isolations on both units.
An Equipment Operator (EO) and operator were sent to investigate the breaker.
The breaker overhead bin was blown open with scorch marks l
on it.
The breaker was then racked out and with all personnel clear 136X and the MCCs were successfully re-energized.
"B" RPS was i
placed on alternate feed and all isolations and half scrams were i
j reset.
All systems responded properly and no abnormalities were j
seen.
The Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (VE) supply fan motor was
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inspected and found ok.
It was then placed back in service after a spare breaker was placed into service.
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Electrical Maintenance inspected the breaker for the cause of the l
fault with the assistance of General Electric (GE).
The results of that inspection revealed that a piece of material that appeared to be of metalized plastic composition, and that was used as an edge protector for pulling cables in the breaker, had fallen onto the areaker causing a phase-to-phase short.
The licensee performed a cursory inspection of other safety-related breakers and found that
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the edge protectors were in place.
In addition, they are in the process of revising the surveillance procedures f or the applicable breekers to require that the edge protectors be verified to be in place and not loose. The licensee also requested that GE evaluate
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whether or not the edge protectors could be removed (since they are only there to protect the cables when they are pulled into the breaker) or if they could be glued in place.
GE has responded and indicated that either of the above options would be satisfactory.
The licensee's currer.t plans are only to implement one of these options if an edge protector is found loose during one of the surveillance inspections, d.
On October 24, 1988, the licensee reported to the Senior Resident Inspector that on October 22, 1988, a licensed Reactor Operator (RO) was found asleep in the operator's locker room by the Shift Engineer. The R0 is normally assigned to day shift (7:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.) but was called in early to work a double shif t (11:00 p.m.
Friday-3:00 p.m. Saturday) in order to provide extra coverage for Unit 2 reactor vessel defueling. Subsequently, fuel movement was delayed and did not occur during the morning shift (11:00 p.m.-7:00 a.m.).
At the time the R0 was found asleep, he had no assigned duties but was on the payroll.
The licensee's investigation of this event revealed that it has never been made clear who is responsible for monitoring the activities of extra people on shift. The licensee has issued a memo to all licensed personnel that discusses the event and describes corrective actions, including who is responsible for extra personnel, that have been implemented.
e.
On October 28, 1988, at approximately 12:20 p.m. (CDT) the licensee notified the fiRC resident inspectcrs that the site had discovered that they no longer had normal comunications capability.
The licensee had lost all comercial phone links as well as the ENS, HPN, and the NARS phone links to the site.
Per the licensee's Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) procedures they were required to declare an Unusual Event.
Further investigation revealed that the licensee ha'i radio communications with the local police, microwave comunications with their Corporate Comand Center (CCC), and two (2) pay phones on site that were operable. At 12:35 p.m. the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IONS) was contacted and informed of the Unusual Event. At 12:57 p.m. the CCC informed the site that the CCC was manned, that the NRC in Bethesda had been notified, and that the CCC was going to maintain comunications with the site via the GSEP microwave system.
At approximately 4:05 p.m. the licensee informed the resident inspectors that all of the comunication systems appeared to have i
been restored.
The licensee then terminated the GSEP Unusual Evert.
i The cause of the interrupted comunication service was determined to be that a back-hoe had dug up the telephone trunk line just a short distance from the site.
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f.
On October 17, 1988, at approximately 10:20 a.m., the licensee discosared that the Unit 1 Regular Lighting Cabinet (RLC) 110 circuit which supplies power to the Unit I drywell lights was energized. At the time this was discovered, Unit I was in Operational Condition 1.
Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.3.1 requires that in Operational Conditions 1, 2, or 3 that the A.C. circuits that supply power to all drywell lighting be de-energized. The status of this circuitry is checked daily as part of licensee procedure LOS-AA-01, "Unit Daily Surveillance, Week
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with TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.5 7.1.
TS SR 4.8.3.1 requires that this circuitry be verified to be de-energized at least
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i once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the associated circuit breakers
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are in the tripped condition.
A review of the equipmer.t attendant rounds sheets, which are used to complete LOS-AA-D1, for October 16, 1988, by the inspector revealed
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that the RLC 110 circuit breaker had been verified to be off on the i
afternoon shift (3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m.).
The licensee was not able
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to ascertain for sure why or how the circuitry had been energized.
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It was hypothesized that since the circuit breaker panel is located in an area where many of the Unit 2 outage contractor supervisors
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work, one of them may have moved the breaker to "on" to try and turn
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on other lights. The breaker was marked with a dyno-tape label that i
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stated "DRYWELL LIGHTS" but a caution to not energize any of the j
breakers without operations consent was omitted.
The failure of the
licensee to adequately control the breakers supplying A.C. power to the drywell lighting circuits is a viciation of the requirements of
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T.S. 3.8.3.1 to maintain the lights in a de-energized condition when in Operational Condition 1(373/88025-01(ORP)).
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As corrective action, the licensee immediately de-erergized the RLC 110 circuits and hung Out-0f-Service (005) tags on the breakers.
In order to prevent recurrence, the licensee took the following additional actions for both units:
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Painted red all of the switches for the A.C. circuits inside
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primary containment that are required to be de-energized per T.S. 3.8.3.1.
i Plac.ed signs on the panel doors that state the red switches
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inside the cabinet are not to be operated without the Shift Engineer's approval.
In the process of revising procedures LOP-DW-01, "Drywell Close
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Out (Af ter Outage)," and LOS-AA-D1 to require the 005 tags tc
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be hung on the red switches after an outage and to modify the i
daily verification to include a verification that the 00s tags e
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are in place, respectively.
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All onsite contractors and shift crews were notified in writing
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of the event and of the need to obtain the operating
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department's authorization to manipulate plant equipment and
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controls.
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This violation was identified by the licensee and meets the tests of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1..
Consequently, no Notice of Violation will be issued and this matter is considered closed.
g.
On October 31, 1988, at approximately 11:00 a.m. (CST), the licensee infonned the resident inspectors that there was radioactively contaminated water leaking out the side of the rodweste building within the protected area.
The inspectors, assisted by the licensee's Rad-Chem personnel, visually inspected the area and reviewed the licensee's plan for containing the spill.
The cause of the spill was that a gasket on the radwaste evaporator heating element failed, allowing contaminated sludge to flow onto the floor of the radwaste building. The floor drain in the heating element room was plugged which prevented the spill from draining properly and from being processed.
It is not known if the floor drain was plugged prior to the event or as the result of the sludge not being able to pass through the wire mesh trap in the drain. As the. floor of the heat exchanger room began to fill, the sludge spilled over a 14 inch high retaining curb and onto the remaining part of the heating element room.
The sludge eventually reached the heating element room wall and water from the sludge was seeping out a crack in the wall to the outside.
The contaminated water then ran down the side of the building, onto a concrete pad, and into a drain.
The licensee traced the drain to a connecting manway and after surveying the manway concluded that the contaminated water had not gone beyond the manway or other storm drains.
The licensee has calculated that approximately 5,000 gallons of sludge spilled into the heating element room and has estimated that approximately 10 gallons of radioactively contaminated water leaked out of the radwaste building. The licensee's corrective actions to date have been to isolate the leak at the heating element, pump down the room to prevent any more leakage out of the crack in the wall, erect a temporary enclosure around the crack on the outside of the building, and to plug the drain pipe leading to the manway and storm drains.
They will also be clearing the drain in the heat exchanger room.
The licensee's review of the event to date indicated that no evidence of any off-site release due to the contaminated water leakage occurred.
On November 1,1988, the Region III Facilities Radiation Protection Section (FRPS) sent a health physics specialist to the site to review the licensee's actions.
He and the resident inspectors found that the licensee had the event under control and had responded to the event in an excellent fashion.
FRPS will continue to followup on this event and will assess the licensee's corrective actions during a planned team inspection scheduled to start November 14, 1988.
No deviations were identified in this area. However, one violation, for which a Notice of Violation was nct issued, was identified in this area.
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I 4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed Technical Specification required surveillance testing and verified for actual activities observed that testing was
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performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that tes> instrumenta-
tion was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual
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directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management
personnel.
l The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
LIS-RD-401 Unit 2 Scram Discharge Volume Level Alarm, Rod Block and Scram Functional Test LOS-CS-Q1 Secondary Containment Damper Operability Test LOS-LP-M1 Unit 2 Low Pressure Core Spray System
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l Operability Test LIS-NR-403 Unit 2 Average Power Range Monitor Rod Block
and Scram Functional Test LIS-RD-203 Unit 2 Control Rod Drive Scram Discharge Level Calibra*fon a.
On October 15, 1988, at approximately 8:15 p.m. (CDT), the licensee
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was performing LIS-LP-202, "Unit 2 Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
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Minimum Flow Bypass Calibration," when it was determined that the Static-0-Ring (50R) differential pressure switch 2E21-N004 could not be calibrated.
The licensee declared LPCS inoperable and made the required ENS notification at 9:37 p.m. (the licensee is required to report all SOR switch failures due to previous problems and history of SOR switches at LaSalle). At the time of this event, Unit 2 was
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shutdown for a fifteen week refueling outage and Unit 1 was at
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I approximately 99% power.
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On October 17, 1988, at approximately 1:43 p.m. (CDT), the licensee was performing surveillance LES-PC-202, "Unit 2 Groups 2 and 4
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j Isolation Actuation Logic System Functional Test," when Unit 1 reactor building damper IVR04YB went closed.
The electrical
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maintenance department had just finished installing a mini-jumper
which was supposed to prevent reactor building isolations in Unit 1.
The mini-jurper fell off and the isolation was received. All
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systems functioned as expected.
The licensee then jumpered out the Unit 1 main steam tunnel high temperature and high differential
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temperature isolations. Once the licensee verified the cause of
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the isolation, the reactor building ventilation was restarted and
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I the jumpers installed to prevent the Unit 1 main steam tunnel high temperature and high differential temperature isolations were
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removed.
The licensee completed the surveillance successfully at 2:30 p.m..
The ENS notification was made at 2:55 p.m..
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Unit I was at approximately 99% power when the isolation was received.
Unit 2 was in day 3 of a fifteen week refueling /
maintenance outage.
The licensee has a program to install banana plugs at various locations throughout the plant where jumpers are often used. This program is to reduce the ar7unt of inadvertent actuations from jumpers that may fall off or may have insufficient contact.
The licensee reviewed the feasibility of installing banana plugs in panel IPDS-VRv49x3 so as to prevent future isolations of this kind.
That review resulted in the licensee writing 'cwo work requests to install banana plugs at the locations where testing is done.
This work has been scheduled and is expected to be complete by November 9, 1988.
c.
On October 25, 1988, at approximately 6:40 p.m. (CDT), the licensee made a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ENS phone notification pertaining to Unit 2 exceeding a Technical Specification requirement for the maximum allowable leakage rate at the calculated peak containment internal pressure (0.6 La) and the total leakage on a Ty the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV)pe C local leak rate test on of 100 SCFH. The exceeding i
of the 0.6 La requirement is based on the results to date of as-found data from local leak rate tests being performed.
The licensee has indicated that the as-found "A" main steamline local leak rate test indicated a leak rate of approximately 57 SCFH of leakage and the "D" as-found leak rate was approximately 42 SCFH.
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The "A" and "0" MSIVs were cycled and the leak rate for the "A" line did not change while the "0" line dropped to approximately 5.1 SCFH.
Unit 2 has been shutdown for two weeks of a fif teen (15) week refueling / maintenance outage.
The licensee is continuing to perform local leak rate tests on other containment isolation valves.
The licensee plans to repair these valves that do not pass their local leak rate tests.
d.
On October 26, 1988, at approximately 5:30 p.m. (CDT), the licensee was performing LIS-RH-203, "Unit 2 RHR Pump Minimum Flow Bypass (LPCI Mode) Calibration," when it was determined that the
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Static-0-Ring (50R) switch 2E12-N010AA could not be calibrated.
The licensee declared LPCS inoperable and nude the required ENS
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notification at 6:55 p.m.. At the time of this event, Unit 2 was 13 days into a scheduled fifteen week refueling / maintenance outage and
Unit I was at approximately 100% power.
s No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listad below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
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perfomed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine states of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Preliminary work for repairing the 2B33-F067B recirculation pump discharge valve.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Training (41400)
The inspector, through discussions with personnel, evaluated the licensee's training program for operations and maintenance personnel to detemine whether the general knowledge of the individuals was sufficient for their assigned tasks.
No violaticns or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (93702)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, imediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications, a.
The following reports of nonroutine events were reviewed by the inspectors.
Based on this review it was determined that the events were of minor safety significance, did not represent program deficiencies, were properly reported, and were properly compensated for.
These reports are closed:
373/88017-00 Spurious Amonia Detector Trip Due to Design Deficiency in the Chemcassette Tape Mechanism.
374/88010-00 Unit Shutdown Due to Automatic Depressurization System Nitrogen Backup Pressure Regulator Failure.
373/88019-00 Failure of IB Diesel Generator Output Breaker to Close Onto Bus 143 Within 13 Seconds Due to Procedural Inadequacy.
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s-9 373/88016-00 Auto Start of Control Room Ventilation Emergency Makeup Train Dt.e to Spurious Spike of the Intake Radiation Monitor.
374/88008-01 Low Pressure Core Spray and Peactor Core Isolation Cooling Inoperable Caused by Loose Connections on Cubicle Cooling r'an Feed Breaker.
374/88005-01 High Pressure Core Spray Pump Minimum Flow Bypass Differential Pressure Switch Found Below Reject Limit.
373/88020-00 Spurious Amonia Detector Trip Due to Design Deficiency in the Chemcassette Tape Mechanism.
b.
The following reports of nonroutine events involved violations of regulatory requirements. These reports are considered closed.
Event closure is being tracked by the associated violation.
374/88011-00 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Line Differential Pressure.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
Outages (71707; 61715)
The inspectors observed or reviewed the licensee and contractor activities associated with plant outages. The inspection focused on outage management progran implementation, including planning, scheduling and oversight activities.
The inspection included attendance at the planning and scheduling meetings, direct observation of selected modifications, repair or testing of safety systems or components, and the review of quality records, a.
During this inspection report period, Unit 2 continues its refueling / maintenance outage.
The uutage is scheduled to last fifteen weeks and will involve a significant amount of work.
The licensee has completed roughly 17% of the outage activities scheduled.
Some of the major activities that will take place during the outage are as follows:
1.
Refueling of the reactor 2.
Control rod drive overhaul and replacement 3.
Work on the '2A' and '28' Reactor Recirculation Pumps 4.
Work on the '2B' Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Valve (2833F0u78)
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Chemical decontamination of the reictor recirculation piping 6.
Overhaul of the main turbine 7.
Completion of 68 modifications, including the final phase of the drywell cooling modification 8.
Snubber reduction No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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9.
Security (71881)
The licensee's security activities were observed by the inspectors during routine facility tours and during the inspectors' site arrivals and depa rtu res. Observations included the security personnel's perfomance associated with access control, security checks, and surveillance activities, and focused on the adequacy of security staffing, the security response (compensatory measures), and the security staff's attentiveness and thoroughness.
The security forces' perfomance in these areas appeared satisfactory, a.
On October 14, 1988, the resident inspectors accompanied the site security administrator on a site tour. The tour included the main
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access facility, the central alam station (CAS), and the secondary alarm station (SAS).
A general tour of the protected area (double fence) was also
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conducted with emphasis on the microwave stations, the E-field
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(detection wires), gates, and current work on those systems.
b.
On October 17, 1988, during a routine backshift inspection, the inspector observed contaminated area work at the Unit 2 reactor building 740' elevation.
The observation was made through the i
7C1' elevation north-east corner floor equipment opening.
The
I inspector noted that the guard seated at the bottom of the stairs leading from the 761' elevation to the 740' elevation appeared to be having difficulty staying awake. The guard was posted at this location to prevent entry to the Unit 2 drywell (entry to the drywell was controlled through another access point).
The inspector
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moved out of view of the guard for several minutes to inspect
surrounding equipment and then returned. At that time, the guard was cbserved to have his eyes closed and to be leaning back against
the wall. The inspector continued to observe the guard and af ter
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approximately 30 seconds, the guard opened his eyes slightly and shortly thereaf ter, after apparently seeing the inspector, fully crened his eyes and stood up and moved around, all the while looking at the inspector.
The inspector proceeded to the bottom of the stairs to detemine how awake the guard was. He appeared to be fully awake at that point.
Subsequently, the inspector proceeded to the shif t leader's of fice and notified him and the site security administrator who happened to be there, of the incident.
The licensee investigated the event and subsequently teminated the guard.
The inspector has noted to the licensee that deep back-shift observations indicate that some of the security force appear to have a problem with staying alert.
No other work groups have been observed to have that problem. A likely cause 'or t51s could be the environmental conditions (i.e. wam area, continuous / monotonous sounds from operating equipment, low-activity levels, etc.) in which some of the guards work. Areas, such as where the guard noted above was stationed, in some cases tend to be small in size and thus do
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not allow the guard much room for movement.
The inspector has informed the licensee that a heightened level of concern exists in this area and that they need to review their posting and rotation prcctices for the guards to see if any improvements can be made as well as looking for other areas of improvement (i.e. more frequent radio communications, more frequent visits by other guards, more frequent managenent tours during deep back-shift, etc.). The licensee has put together an action plan, incorporating some of the above improvements, and is in the process of implementing it.
No violations or deviations were found in this area.
10.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
i The operability of selected engineered safety features was confirmed by
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the inspectors during walkdowns of the accessible portions of several systems.
The following items were included:
verification that procedures match the plant drawings, equipment conditions, housekeeping, instrumentation, valve and electrical breaker lineup status (per procedure checklist), and verification that locks, tags, jumpers, etc.
are properly attached and identifiable.
The following systems were wa'f ked down during this inspection period:
Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment Unit 2 ':tandby Liquid Control System
'0' Emergency Diesel Generator Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray System No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
11.
En,ergency Preparedness (82301)
An inspection of emergency preparedness activities was performed to assess the licensee's implementation of the energency plan and implementing procedures.
The inspection included monthly observation of emergency facilities and equipment, interviews with licensee staff, and a review of selected emergency implementing procedures.
On October 28, 1988, the inspector toured the Emergency Offsite Facility (E0F). The facility and attendant equipment appeared to be in a state of readiness.
The inspector did note that the space allocated to the NRC was not the most viable arrangenant available in that the status boards could not be directly viewed from that location (a separate room).
Therefore, in order to provide updates to offsite personnel, it would be necessary to go out of the room to view the status boards and then return to pass the information along.
The inspector talked with a site representative, who indicated that the arrangement was to be changed as the result of a recent visit by the Region to assess the EOF.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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l 12. Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86700)
On October 15, 1988, the licensee commenced a unit shutdown on Unit 2 for their planned refueling maintenance outage. On October 22, 1988, the licensee convenced defueling operations.
The licensee completed core unload, which consists of removal of seven hundred and sixty-four (764) fuel bundles, on October 27, 1988.
During the refueling / maintenance outage, the inspectors, through direct observation, witnessed both of the licensee's crews involved in the
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spent fuel handling operations.
During the observation, the inspecters verified that the correct revisions of applicable procedures were in use and questioned the operators to determine if they had satisfactory knowledge regarding normal refueling activities and operator actions for
abnormal indications possibly encountered during fuel handling.
Other items obr?rved while reviewing the refueling operations were proper spent fuel pool water level, spent fuel pool ventilation system
maintaining the reactor building at the specified negative pressure, c
and that the spent fuel pool cooling cleanup system was maintaining
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pool temperature within the designed Technical Specification limits.
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The inspectors also observed fuel movements from the control room.
l Repeat backs between the refueling personnel and the control room nuclear l
shift operator for each fuel move were good and consistent. Also in
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attendance was the nuclear engineer overseeing and verifying the fuel
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moves.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
13. Unit Trips (93702)
On October 14, 1988, in preparation for their upcoming fifteen week refueling / maintenance outage, the licensee was performing instrument j
surveillance LIS-RR-205, "Unit 2 Recirculation Pump Trip System Breaker Arc Suppression Response Time Test." During the surveillance, as the i
breakers are tripped, the recirculation pumps are supposed to trip from j
high speed and go to low speed on the low frequency motor generators.
I At approximately 11:20 a.m. (CDT), the licensee started the surveillance.
L At 11:24 a.m. as the breaker was tripped, both recirculation pumps tripped and coasted down to 0% speed.
They did not close onto the low frequency motor generator as expected. As an interim requirement
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resulting from the March 9, 1988, neutron flux oscillation event and as l
per the licensee's procedure, LOA-RR-07, "Loss of Recirculation Flow-Both i
Loops," the licensee is required to manually scram the unit.
This was
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accomplished at 11:26 a.m..
The unit was at approximately 41% power prior i
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to the manual scram.
During the tine between when the recirculation
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pumps were tripped and the manual scram, no apparent core oscillations
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were noted. At 11:28 a.m., the licensee declared the Unit 2 Reactor Core
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Isolatior Cooling (RCIC) system inoperable because the RCIC system did
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not isolete upon reactor vessel water level exceeding the reactor water level high isolation trip setpoint of 55.5 inches.
Indicated reactor water level reached 57 inches.
This appeared to be the only anomaly during the scram and scram recovery.
Subscquent calibration checks by i
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the licensee indicated the reactor vessel level high isolation trip instrumentation to be calibrated correctly.
The licensee hypothesized that the sensing point for this instrunentation may not have seen the
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same level as the control room recorders. The licensee declared RCIC operable at 8:37 p.m..
At 12:30 p.m., the licensee restarted the "A" recirculation pump to maintain reactor core circulation while the plant was being taken to cold shutdown. During the restarting of the "B" recirculation pump, it was noted that there was minimal flow indicated for that pump. After
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checking the different flow indications available, all of which were showing minimal flow, the "B" recirculatit.A oump was shut down.
Yhe licensee had been having problems with the scharge valve of the "B" recirculation pump (2833-F0678) prior to th. o'it shutdown.
Subsequently, the licensee made a drywell entry and attempted to manually close the 2833-F0678 valve.
The valve stem would only close approximately 1/3 of the way before stopping.
The licensee believes that the upstream disk of the valve has dropped into the valve body and is causing the problems
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experienced.
Further investigation will be perfonned during the outage.
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The licensee made the ENS notification at 12:47 p.m. in'11cating that they I
had manually scrammed the unit because of the loss of both recirculation
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pumps, RCIC being declared inoperable, and the problem with the minimal
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flow indication of the "B" recirculation pump.
f The licensee elected to start their outage early and does not intend to complete the required surveillance of the breakers until after the outage
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is complete.
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i During the review of the event, the inspectors were trying to ascertain the root cause of the recirculation pump trips.
The preliminary review l
revealed the cause to be inadequate procedures and procedure review.
This will be carried as an unresolved item (374/88024-01(DRP)) until i
further review of the event can be completed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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i 14. Management Meeting (30703)
On October 21, 1988 Sandia National Laboratories gave a presentation l
updating the current status of the LaSalle PRA study sponsored by the NRC.
The presentation took place at the LaSalle site. Members of the licensee's corporate staff, as well as variocs members of the NRC Headquarters staff and the Region !!! Deputy Regional Administrator and his staff attended.
Prior to the meeting, the Region !!! Deputy Regional Administrator and his staff toured portions of the facility with the residents.
15.
Unresolved items Unresulved items are matters about which more information is required
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in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, open items, deviations, or violations. An unresolved item disclosed during the
inspection is discussed in Paragraph 13.
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16.
Violations For Which A "Notice of Violation" Will Not Be Issued
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The NRC uses the Notice of Violation as a standard method for formalizing the existence of a violation of a legally binding requirement.
However, because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensees' initiatives for self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not generally issue a Notice of Violation for a violation that meets the tests of 10CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.
These tests are:
(1) the violation was identified by the licensee; (2) the violation would be categorized as Severity Level IV or V; (3) the violation was reported to the NRC, if required; (4) the violation will be ccrrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time period; and (5)
it was not a violation that could reasoncbly be expected to have becn prevented by the li:ensec's corrective action for a previous violation.
Violations of regulatory requirements identified during the inspection for which a Notice of Violation will not be issued are discussed in Paragraph 3.f.,
17.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged these findings.
The inspector also discussed the likely informational contents of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as prop rietc ry.
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