IR 05000373/1997012

Insp Repts 50-373/97-12 & 50-374/97-12 on 970809-0919.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20199F799
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	11/17/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199F785	List: IR 05000373/1997012 ML20199F783
References
50-373-97-12, 50-374-97-12, NUDOCS 9711250017
Download: ML20199F799 (14)

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' U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

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REGIONlli

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Docket Nos.: - 50-373, 50-374'-

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License Nos.: - NPF 11, NPF-18 - ,

Report Nos.: 50-373/97012(DRP); 50 374/97012(DRP)

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Facility: . LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 i

Location: 2601 N. 21st Road Marseilles,IL 61341 Dates: August 9 - September 19,1997 Inspectors: D. Calhoun, Acting Senior Resident inspector J. Hansen, Resident inspector R. Crane, Resident inspector C. Mathews, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Approved by: Tony Vegei, Acting Chief, Reactor Projacts Branch 2

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9711250017 971117 PDR ADOCK 05000373

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- LaSalle County Station; Units 1 and 2-

- NRC Inspection Report No. 50-373/97012(DRP); 50-374/97012(DRP)

This inspection report included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of inspection conducted by the resident staff.

. . l Plant Operatio_n.Ls -

. The operations shift manage _ ment's cecision to not monitor suppression chamber water level until required by technical specif cations was not a good operating practice. The inspectors concluded that operations management had not effectively communicated expectations for timely entry into technical specification action statements for equipment projected to be inoperable beyond the allowed technical specification outage time. '

(Section 01,1)

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• - The inspectors concluded that a lack of attention to detail by maintenance personnel, poor housekeeping practices, and a lack of management oversight in the Unit 1 drywell resulted in numerous material condition and housekeeping deficiencies in the drywell.

3-The inspectors were also concemed that these items were not identified during the

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system functional performance reviews. (Section O2.1)

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. The identification of an inoperable process radiation monitor demonstrated a good questioning attitude by chemistry department personnel. Operations personnelincorrectly declared an inoperable process radiation monitor, operable. The inspectors concluded '

that deficiencies remained in the area of implementation of the out-of service program.

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(Section O2.2)

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. The inspectors concluded that a new two-man rule for entering energized cabinets was not effectively communicated to operations personnel. This new expectation was not communicated through the established processes, such as a 7 tanding or daily order.

(Section _O4.1) .

Maintenance

. The inspectors concluded that maintenance personnel demonstrated good maintenance practices and maintenance management, and engineering personnel provided good oversight of the work activities. (Section M4.1)

Enaineerina

.- Engineering personnel effectively identified incorrect primary containment valve closure

' time errors in the high energy line break analysis and calculational errors in the leak detection isolation set points for the reactor water cleanup system. (Section Ei.1)

.- The inspectors identified a deficiency with the licensee's program to review items prior to ' ~

restart. The inspectors noted that older site quality verification department findings were not screened against restart criteria. The licensee responded promptly and appropriately to this concem. -(Section E7.1)

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Report Details I

Summant of Plant Status

.- During this inspection period, Unit 1 was in Mode 4 for a forced outage and Unit 2 remained shut down for a refueling outage with all fuel removed.-

1. Operations

.01 . Conduct of Operations 01,I . Policy Reaardino implementation of Techriical Specification (TS) Limitina Condition of Operation (LCO) Action Statement Reauiremente a. Inspection Scope (71707)

P The inspectors reviewed the licensee's cornpliance with TS LCO action statement L requirements, interviewed operations personnel and senior plant management, and reviewed LaSalle Administrative Procedure (LAP)-1600-2," Conduct of Operations,"

Revision 52.

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b. Findinas and Observations

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Technical Specification 3.5.3.c required that the suppression chamber water level be monitored 3cally every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if a levelinstrumentation channel could not be restored t to operable status within 7 days. On August 13,1997, the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) declared the 0 emergency diesel generator (EDG) inoperable for a 30-day planned

- maintenance activity. The operators also declared the "A" suppression chamber channel inoperable due to the inoperable status of the O EDG. However, operations shift management did not direct operators to monitor local suppression chamber water level

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every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Although the operators were not required to monitor level for 7 days, the inspectors questioned why the monitoring was not implemented since the operations personnel knew that the channel would be inoperable beyond the 7-day period. The CRS explained that the operation department's LCO action requirement policy allowed operators to initiate TS required actions at the end of the specified period, even when it was known that the equipment would not be operable within the time requirements of the action statement.

The inspectors reviewed LAP-1600-2 and determined that the procedure requitat.

operators to complete action statement requirements prior to the end of the LCO recuirement times when reactor shutdowns were involved. However, the procedure did not provide guidance for initiating action requirements for equipment scheduled to be inoperable beyond the allowed outage time.

The inspectors dircussd this policy with plant management. The Operations Manager .

stated that action statement requirements were expected to be initiated immediately when operations shift personnel were aware that the affected equipment wculd not be returned to operable status within the applicable time requirement, On August 15,1997, the Operations Manager issued a Daily Order specifying the LCO action requirement

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l expectations. Operations personnelinitiated the once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> local suppression i chamber level reading specified in TS 3.5.3.c. j c. Conclusions l The operations shift management decision to not moritor suppression poor water level until required by TS was not a good operating practice , The inspectors concluded that operation management's expectation to immediately in$plement ection requirements for equipment scheduled to be inoperable beyond the allowed outage time was not effectivaly communicated to operations personnel.

O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Unit 1 Drvwell Deficiencies identified Durina NRC Inspection a. Inspection Scope (71707)

On September 17,1997, the inspectors toured the Unit 1 primary containment to assess the overall material condition of the drywell.

b. . Qkservations and Findinos The inspectors identified several equipment and housekeeping deficiencies in the Unit 1 primary containment. These deficiencies included potential uncontrolled abandoned equipment; missing and loose piping supports located behind cable trays; numerous pull and junction box covers with loose or missing screws; and many containment lights without protective covers in addition, the inspectors were concemed that some drywell spray nozzles were obstructed by plant equipment. The inspectors identified similar deficiencies during a Unit 1 primary containment inspection on April 10,1997, as discussed in inspection Report No. 50-373/9'7006; 50-374/97006. The inspectors were concemed that several deficiencies identified during the April and September 1997 inspections had not been identified and corrected by the licensee during the recently completed system functional performance reviews. The inspectors also noted that senior licensee management had not entered the drywellin the previous 8 months.

The licensee initiated problem identification forms and work requests to evaluate and repair the deficiencies. Pending the inspectors' review of the licensee's corrective actions and operability evaluations for the Unit 1 drywell material condition deficiencies, this issue is considered an Unresolved item (50-373/97012-01).

The inspectors also identified two personnel safety issues: an in-use ladder without a safety rallinstalled and station personnel crossing an open floor grate. The licensee took immediate actions to resolve these concerns.

c. Conclusions

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The inspectors concluded that a lack of attention to detail by maintenance personnel, poor housekeeping practices, and a lack of management oversight in the Unit 1 drywell resumed in numerous material condition and housekeeping deficiencies in the drywell not

being identified or corrected. The inspectors were also concerned that these items were not identified during the system functional performance reviews.

02.2 Lncorrect Operability Status of Residual Heat Removal Service Wajer (RHRSW) Process Badiation Monitor (PRM) ,

a. Insnection Scope (71707)

On August 20,1997, the license 9 identified that an inoperable PRM had been improperly declared operable. The inspectors interviewed operations personnel and reviewed applicable documentation including control room logs, the degraded equipment log, the licensee's lavestigation report, and piocedi.re LAP 220-4," Degraded Equipment Log,"

Revision 9.

b. Observations and Findinas On August 13,1997, operations personnel drained the 1 A RHRSW system retum line to facilitate some maintenance activities. The 1 A RHRSW PRM was de-energized and declared inoperable. However, operations personnel did not make the required entry in the degraded equipment log (DEL). On August it),1997, operations personnel authorized work request 97003945, Replace Der,raded Cable on 1 A RHRSW Effluent Monitor and made an entry in the DEL for the inoperable PRM which was placed out of service. On August 19,1997, operations personnel cleared this entry after the cable had been rdeced and declared the PRM operable. However, the 1 A RHRSW PRM was actuW .olated and de-onergized duc to other ongoing system maintenance.

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On August 20,1997, chemistry department personnelidentified that the PRM was inoparable, contrary to the operability status noted in the control room. Operations personnel then declarea 1A RHRSW PRM inoperable, made the appropriate DEL entry, and initiated a prompt ir vestigat!on.

The inspectors were concerned that configuration control mechanisms were not effective in this event. Opuations ocrsonnel did not make the initial eatry into the DEL as required by procedure and operations personnel did not recognize that the PRM could not be declared operable until ti. RHRSW retum line was filled and vented. The failure to enter inoperable equipment into the DEL as required by LAP 220-4 is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (50 373/97012 02). However, this licensee identified and corrected violation is Not being cited because the criteria delineateo in Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC's enforcement policy (NUREG 1600) were met.

c. Conclusions The identification of the inoperable monitor demonstrated a good questioning attitude by chemistry department personnel. Operations personneilneorrectly declared an inoperable process radiation monlior operable which was considered a non cited violation of site administrative procedures. The inspectors concluded that deficienc!es remained in the area of implementation of site configuration control processes, including the out-of service program

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04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Concoms with Informal Communications a. Inspection Scope (7170l}

The inspectors attended operations department shift briefings, interviewed operations

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personnel, and reviewed the following procedures:

+ LAP 200 3,' Shift Ohange," Revision 29

+ LAP 1600-1, "Special Operating Orders," Revision 6

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+ t.AP-1600 2,' Conduct of Operations,' Revision 52

+ LAP 200-4, ' Daily Orders,' Revision 3

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b. Observstions and Findinos The inspectors noted that the shift managers discussed changes in plant status and

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reviewed events with the operations crew during the operator pre shift briefings. In general, the operations pre shift briefs were professional and thorough. However, in one

' instance, management expectations were not communicated during a pre shift brief on August 15,1997. During this pre shift brief, the SM discussed an August 10,1997, event concerning an engineer who bumped into an emergency diesel generator (EDG) lockout relay while performing a wire check. The SM did not mention corrective actions which included implementing a 'wo-man rule requirement for entering energized cabinets. Just prior to the completion of the brief, a Site Quality Verification inspector questioned the SM about the two man rule for entering energized equipment. The SM stated that he was unaware of this new requirement. The operations manager, who was also present at the brief, promptlyinformed the shift members of the requirement.

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The inspectors determined that this new requirement was discussed in a memorandum from the plant manager and was not communicated to the operations personnel through the procedurally defined means of communication, specifically, Special Operating Orders and Daily Orders. The inspectors also determined that neither of these orders had been used for several months. Operations management stated that some operations personnel had inappropriately used Special Operating Orders and Daily Orders as a planning and scheduling toolin the past. Operations management reinitiated the use of the.se orders to communicate expectations.

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c. Conclusions i

The inspectors concluded that new management expectations conceming two man rule coverage for entering energized equipment were not effectively communicated to -

operations personnel.

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05 Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Reactivation of Reactor Operator License on Defueled Unit f71707)

On September 5,1997, the inspectors observed that a licensed operator had been ,

assigned to Unit 2 (under the direction of a nuclear station operator) to reactivate his l reactor operator license. The unit was defueled with most systems shutdown and no ;

l significant work was scheduled for completion. The inspectors discussed the observation with plant management. l 08 Miscellaneous Or vations issues (92901)

08.1 LClosed) Violation 50-373/374 97003-01a and 01b: Operator failure to follow EDG test l

procedures. The issue was discussed in inspection Report 50-373/97003; 50-374/97003 in Section 02.1. The inspectors verified the EDG tests were completed satisfactorily.

Procedural enhancem*nts were verified to be adequate and complete. !iigh Intensity Training reinforced the need for strict procedural adherence. This item is considered cicsed.

08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-373/374 97003-02a: inadequate acceptance criteria in shift log procedure. The inspectors verified appropriate changes to acceptance criteria were made in the shift log procedure. This item is considered closed.

08.3 (Closed) Violation 50-373/374-97003-03: Failure to stroke time test RHR si itdown cooling valve. The inspectors verified the valve was subsequently tested 85 Vsfactorily.

Management expectations related to the performance and review of surveill.nce testing were reinforced with alllicensed operators. This item is considered closed.

1. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Discrepancy identified Durina O EDG Heat Exchanaer Repairs a. Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in response to a material condition concem with the O EDG heat exchanger. The inspectors interviewed maintenance personnel and monitored rework activities.

b. Observations and Findinas On September 12,1997, during on going maintenance activities on the 0 EDG, maintenance personnel noted that an epoxy coating was on the heat exchanger flange surfaces. The licensee identified that the coating was not appropriate and that previous leak tests performed on the heat exchanger could be affected. Further investigation showt,d that the epoxy coating had been applied by the vendor in 1993 for corrosion protection. The licensee inspected the 1 A and 18 EDGs and did not identify any similar concerns. The licensee initiated an operability assessment for using the epoxy coating

on the flange surfaces. This issue is considered an Unresolved item (50 373/97012 03)

pending the inspectors review of the completed operability assessment to assess the impact of the epoxy coating on the ability of the O EDG heat exchanger to perform its design basis function.

c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's immediata corrective actions were oppropriate following identification of the epoxy coating. The licensee staff demonstrated a good questioning attitude by checking the other EDG heat exchangers for similar problems.

M1.2 Assessment of First Line Supervisors The inspectors reviewed the methodology and results of the station's assessment of first line supervisors. The licensee initiated a station wide assessment of all non operations department first line supervisors as part of the station's efforts to improve performance at the plant. The assessment began on July 14,1997, and was completed on August 26, 1997. Each of the 60 supervisors was evaluated in 7 core compotencies. Also, the licensee used individual self evaluations. The licensee's assessment revecled the following results: 47 individuals demonstrated the required competencies,9 individuals were placed into a remediation training program and 4 individuals transill0ned to outside station positions..

M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Perfon,iance M4.1 Proper Proaram Implementation Observed DuringMaintenance Activities a. Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed all or portions of selected maintenance and surveillance activities, included in this inspection was a revies, of the surveillance procedures or work requests listed and interviews with maintenance personnel, b. Observations and Findinas in general, the inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be pro'essional and thorough. The inspectors observed good radiation exposure practices, foreign material exclusion controls, an.d management oversight. Also, the inspectors determined that the maintenance suprvisor, .naintenance personnel, and system engineer were knowledgeable of the work package requirements and job status. The following work was observed:

. 1E12 F068A,1 A Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Service Water Outlet Valve.

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. Scram solenoid pilot valve diaphragm replacement.

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c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that maintenance personnel demonstrated good meintenance practices and maintenance management and engineering personnel provided good oversight of the work activities.

Ill. Enaineerina U,1 Conduct of Engineering e

E1,1 Errors in the Plah Enerav Line Break Analysis for the Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanaer Room a. jn}pection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Inillal actions associated with the discovery of engineering issues which placed th6 plant potentlCly outside its design basis. The inspectors interviewed engineering and operations personnel and reviewed applicable documentation.

b. Observations and Findinas During this period, engineering personnel identified the following engineering issues:

• On August 22,1997, engineering personnelidentified that the analysis for determining the reactor water cleanup room leak detection temperature and differential temperature set points were not conservative. The licensee determined that a 65% steam flash rate assumed in the analysis may not have been umiting in all cases. Preliminary calculations indicated that the Technical Specification trip set point would have been reached at a leeage above the design basis leakage of 25 gpm. The control room operators subsequently declared the leak detection system inoperable for both units.

. On August 27,1997, engineering personnel, identified a discrepancy with the high energy line break analysis for the reactor water cleanup system. A primary containment isolation valve closure time of 18 seconds was assumed in the analysis; however, actual closing time for these valves was about 48 seconds.

Engineering personnel determined th i the delayed closure time changed the maximum peak temperature for various rooms from 145"F to 180*F, which could adversely impact the environmental qualification of equipment located in the affected areas.

The licensee determined that under current conditions, the safety significance of these two issues was minimal. The inspectors will follow up on this during closure of the associated licensee event reports, LER 9703100 and LER 97033-00, respectively.

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Tbbentw a concluded that engineering personnel effectively identified these issues -

1. i O.M 4Halinvestigative and corrective actions were appropriately taken.

V huality Assurance in F.ngineering Activities

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p , Glanificant Site Quality Verification (SQV) Findinas Not Consistentiv Tracked As Restart items a. Insoection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions for ensuring all SQV findings were tracked as restart items. The inspectors interviewed SQV personnel and reviewed applicable documentation.

b. Observations and_Findinas On July 16,1997, SQV personnel briefed the inspectors on the results of an engineering / design control audit. During this briefing, the SQV manager informed the inspectors that auditors identified the following two SQV findings as restart items:

e inadequate control for ensuring 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were performed for a prolonged out of service.

. Station procedures did not consistently contain the surveillance requirements of Technical Specification radiation mon,toring instrumentation.

The inspectors questioned how SQV findings were tracked for restart purposes. The SQV manager was unaware of such a mechanism but stated that since January 1997, the findings were documented in problem identification forms. The inspectors noted that a separate initiative implemented in late July 1997, required problem idantification forms be screened t> gainst the established restart criteria. However, the inspectors were concemed that older SQV findings (earlier than January 1997) were not part of this population of issues to be screened prior to startup. The SQV manager acknowledged this concern and recognized that other items such as older nuclear tracking system issues were also not screened. The SOV manager created a tracking item for each department to review all open issues against the restart criteria.

c. Conclusion The inspectors identified a deficiency with the licensee's program to review items prior to restart. The inspectors noted that older SQV findings were not screened against restart criteria. The licensee responded promptly and appropriately to this concern.

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92902)

E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-373/374-97003-02.)J Lake blowdown flow instrumentation was calibrated without procedure. The inspectors verified that the instrument was subsequently calibrt,ted properly by an approved vendor. The licensee reviewed previous

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discharges to verify that limits of the discharge permit were not exceeded. The  !

Inspectors verified that design requirements appropdately stated the need for augmented >

quality control documentation. The inspectors also reviewed a General information i Notice used for training Electrical and instrumentation design engineers and found it adequate.

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VI,. Manamoment Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary -

The inspectors presented the results of these inspections to licensee management listed ,

below at an exit meeting on September 22,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee if any materials examined during ,

the ir.spection should be considered proprietary. The licensee identified none.

X3 Management Meeting Summary On August 28,1997 Regional and Nuclear Reactor Regulation management met with LaSalle station management in the Region lli Office in Lisle, IL to discuss the licensee's  !

Restart Plan and the licensee's progress toward implementation of the plan.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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• W. Subalusky, Site Vice President

• F. Dacimo, Plant General Manager

• S. Smith, Plant Manager

• R. Palmieri, System Engineering Manager J. P*lley, Restari Manager G. Helsterman, Maintenance Manager

• J. Mcdonald, Site Quality Verification (SQV)/ Safety Assessment Manager

• P. Sames, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor IEQ

• A. Stone, Acting Chief, Projects Branch 2, DRP

'D. Calhoun, Acting Senior Resident inspector

• J. Hansen, Resident inspector R. Crane, Resident inspector

• Present at exit meeting on September 22,1997.

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 Onsite Engineering IP 62703 Maintenance Observation IP 71707 Plant Operations IP 92901 Followup Operations IP 92903 Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Open 50 373/97012-01 URI Drywell walkdown deficiencies 50-373/97012-02 NCV Failure to log an inoperable process radiation monitor in the degraded equipment list as required by procedure.

50-373/97012-03 URI The licensee's evaluation on the affect of the polymer coating on the 0 EDG nange sudaces.

Closed 50-373/374 97003-01a VIO Operators failure to follow the EDG test procedure 50 373/374 97003 01b VIO Operators failure to follow the EDG test procedure 50-373/374 97003 02a VIO Inadequate acceptance criteria in shift log procedure 50 373/374-97003 02b VIO Lake blowdown flow instrumentation calibrated without procedure 50-373/374 97003-03 VIO Failure to stroke time test RHR sheldown cooling valve

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED -

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CRS ' Control Room Supervisor )

DEL Degraded Equipment Log ,

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator '-

DRP- Division of Reactor Projects .

LAP LaSalle Administrative Procedure  !

LCO- Limiting Condition for Operation  !

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

PDR NRC Public Document Room .

PRM Process Radiation Monitor. i RHR Residual Heat Removal .

SW- Service Water '

SM - Shift Manager SQV Site Qunt.ty Verification

.TS Technical Specification ,

URI Unresolved item i VIO Violation

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tovarter 17, 1997 Mr. W. T. Subalusky, Jr.

Site Vice President LaSalle County Station Commonwealth Edison Company 2001 North 21st Road Marseilles,IL 61341 SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT No. 50-373/97012(DRP); 50-374/97012(DRP)

Dear Mr. Subalusky:

On September 22,1997, the NRC completed an inspection at your LaSalle facility. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.

During this 6-week inspection period, your conduct of activities at the LaSalle facility was acceptable. Engineering personnel demonstrated a good questioning attitude in identifying problems with the high energy line break analysis for the reactor water cleanup heat exchanger room. Observed maintenance activilles were performed in accordance with procedures and were well suppor1ed by the engineering staff. However, the inadequate restoration of a process radiation monitor to service by operations personnel was another example where site configuration controls were not explicitly followed. Also, the inspectors were concemed with the effectiveness of your system functional reviews after the inspectors identified several material condition and housekeeping deficiencies in the Unit i drywell, No violations of NRC requirements were cited during this inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.700 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Sincerely,

/s/ Melvyn N. Inach Melvyn N. Leach, Chief Operator Licensing Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 License Nos. NPF 11; NPF 18 Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 50-373/97012(DRP);

50-374/97012(DRP)

See Attached Distribution DOCUMENT NAME: G:\LASA\LAS97012.DRP 12 .mi,, . .wi. 4.. ... i.ai.... i. 6 6. . c . copy s. . ..hi. i r . c.,, -ein .ei..w,. u . w...,y OFFICE Rill 6 Rlli & Rlli M NAME HillsfnY Vogel Leach WW DATE 11/;7/97 11/W97 11//7/97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY k]/t&5iGjh by

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W. Subelusky, Jr. 2-

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oc w/ encl: O. Kingsley, Nuclear' Generation Group Pmsident and Chief Nuclear Officer M. Wallace, Senior';1ce President, Corporate Services  !

E. Kraft, Vice President .

BWR Operations  :

Liaison Officer. NOC-BOD - l D. A. Sager, Vice President,-

l Generation Support D. Farrar, Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager  ;

l. Johnson, Licensing i Operations Manager Document Control Desk Licensing -

F. Dacimo, Plant General Manager  !

P. Bemes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor Richard Hubbard -

Nethen Schloss, Economist  ;

Office of the Attomey General -

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State Liaison Officer -

Chairman, Illinois Commerce l Commission Distribution:

Docket File w/enci DRP w/ encl OCFO/LFARB w/enct TSS w/enci  :

PUBLIC IE-01 w/enci DRS (2) w/enci

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A. Beach w/enct Rlli PRR w/enci Deputy RA w/ encl RAC1 (E-Mail)

Rill Enf. Coord, w/enct CAA1 (E Mail) -

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SRI LaSalle w/enci DOCDESK (E Mail)

Project Mgr., NRR w/enci

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