IR 05000373/1998022
| ML20198E935 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198E934 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-98-22, 50-374-98-22, NUDOCS 9812280005 | |
| Download: ML20198E935 (18) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli pocket Nos:
50-373,50-374 License Nos:
50-373/98022(DRP); 50-374/98022(DRP)
s Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company facility:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Loc tion:'
2601 N. 21st Road a
Marseilles,IL 61341 Dates:
October 10 - November 20,1998 In pectors:
M. Huber, Senior Resident inspector s
D. Hills, Project Engineer J. Hansen, Resident inspector R. Crane, Resident inspector C. Mathews, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Approved by:
Roger Lanksbury, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 f0 P
373 e
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EXECUTIVE St;MMARY LaSalle County Staticr, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-373/98022(DRP); 50-374/98022(DRP)
This inspection report included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period ofinspection conducted by the resident staff.
Plant Operations Plant operators demonstrated knowledge of plant status and were attentive to the main
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control room panels during routine activities. In addition, operators maintained attention to details while performing their activities. For example, in several instances the operators identified problems when removing equipment from service for planned maintenance where the planned maintenance could not be performed as described or the wrong components were identified to be removed from service. The operators promptly recognized the abnormal situations and responded appropriately.
(Section 01.1)
The licensee's completed and planned actions to provide protection to the plant from the
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adverse effects of cold weather appeared adequate. In addition, the licensee's planned and scheduled contingency actions for additional heat sources during the dual unit outage, when the normal plant heating system would be reduced in effectiveness, were appropriate. (Section O2.1)
Operators did a good job monitoring control room indications and recognized the
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operational significance of temperature anomalies associated with a failed turbine lubricating oil temperature control valve. The operators responded appropriately to mitigate the failure. After reviewing the event, the licensee identified areas where operator performance could be improved and discussed the lessons-learned with operations personnel to reinforce performance expectations. (Section 04.1)
Maintenance The licensee performed the maintenance activities observed by the inspectors in an
acceptable manner. Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of their tasks and followed procedures. Also, Unit 2 reactor building housekeeping in the vicinity of maintenance and modification activities that were in progress was acceptable and indicated an appropriate level of licensee management attention in the areas observed.
(Section M1.1)
The inspectors considered two inadequate out-of-service (OOS) requests identified by
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the licensee to be isolated instances of poor communication and inadequate attention to detail by work control personnel. The first instance involved OOS documents specifying an incorrect system orifice flange on the Unit i fuel pool demineralizer. The second instance involved an OOS on a nonsafety-related service water return valve which was intended to ensure the valve remained in position while repairing leakage from the position indicator cover. However, the associated work package directed partial
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l disassembly of the valve actuator which could have allowed the valve to change position. Actions taken by licensee management appeared appropriate. (Section M1.1)
The licensee's implementation of the 12-week work scheduling process was adequate in
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ensuring that required surveillance tests were scheduled and completed within the required frequencies and plant conditions specified in the Technical Specifications.
(Section M6.1)
Licensee management determined that further improvements were needed in the work
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control process to effectively get work done and to continue to improve material condition at LaSalle. For example, the licensee's Nuclear Oversight Organization determined that the fix-it-now team manning level was insufficient. In addition, the inspectors witnessed scheduling meetings and observed that some planners were not aware of actions needed to make an activity ready for work and did not know the status of parts necessary for the work. The licensee implemented cerrective actions to improve the work control process. (Section M6.1)
Enaineerina Operability determinations regarding potential non-conforming conditions were
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appropriately addressed by engineering personnelin a timely manner. Resolution to issues associated with the reactor water cleanup system and the reactor protection system response time testing appeared appropriate. Plant personnel were cognizant of the issues and corrective actions identified in the operability evaluations. (Section E1.1)
Plant Support The licensee's Nuclear Oversight organization identified that the quantity of radioactivity
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in liquid radioactive waste discharges from LaSalle County Station for calendar year 1997 exceeded the quantity that was projected in the Updated Final Safety Analysis i
Report. The licensee had not managed the liquid radioactive waste discharges aggressively to ensure a complete understanding of discharge restrictions and their basis. The safety-significance was minimal because the 10 CFR Part 20 limits were not exceeded. (Section R1.1)
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Report Details
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Summary of Plant Statyg During this inspection period, the licensee maintained Unit 1 at or near full rated power. Unit 2 remained shut down for a refueling outage with all fuel removed from the reactor.
l. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comrnents a.
' Insoection Scope (71707) '
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations by performing system walkdowns and observing operator performance. The inspectors reviewed several instances where operators identified problems when removing equipment from service.
b.
Observations and Findinas Overall, the licensee operated safely and performed activities in accordance with procedures. The operators identified problems with the instructions for removing equipment from service. The specifics are discussed below.
On October 30,1998, a licensed control room operator was removing the 1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) from service for routine scheduled maintenance.
The out-of-service (OOS) checklist indicated that an OOS card from a previous OOS already existed on the 1B EDG maintenance switch. The control room operator identified that the 1B EDG ready light was illuminated which indicated that the respective.
maintenance switch was not in the maintenance position as specified on the OOS checklist. The operator reported the discrepancy to his supervisor and the licensee investigated the cause of the problem. The licensee initiated an investigation to determine the extent of the condition, the cause of the error, and the corrective actions.
The licensee determined tnat the OOS program data base contained the incorrect status of the 1B EDG maintenance switch. The licensee indicated that the data base error was an isolated incident. The inspectors did not identify any additional data base errors.
On October 28,1998, a non-licensed operator was removing the Unit i fuel pool demineralizer system from service to support bolt replacement on a system orifice flange. When the operator was removing the equipment form service, he determined that the OOS documentation was created for a different orifice flange than the one specified for the work being performed. The operator informed his supervisor and operators subsequently removed the incorrect OOS and placed the equipment in its
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original configuration. The licensee initiated an investigation to determine the cause for the incorrect OOS. The licensee determined that the communication between the work analyst and the OOS writers had not been detailed enough. Specifically, after personnel submitted the OOS request, the corresponding work request (WR) had been revised to repair a different orifice. Appropriate personnel were not adequately informed of this change.
On November 17,1998, an operator was reviewing a WR associated with the repair of a nonsafety-related service water return valve position indicator cover which was leaking.
The operator determined that the planned maintenance included disassembly of the valve operator. However, the OOS was intended to ensure that the valve remained in position while the work on the valve position indicator cover was performed.
Disassembly of the valve operator (to repair the leak) would allow the valve to move in response to forces generated by system flow; and therefore, the OOS would not preclude the valve from moving during the maintenanen in response to the discovery of the inadequate OOS, the licensee canceled the initia! JS checklist and initiated a new OOS request. The new OOS required the flow to be isolated prior to performing work.
Furthermore, the licensee was conducting an investigation to determine the cause of the inadequate OOS request and to develop adequate corrective actions.
Operator response to the failure of a temperature control valve is also discussed in Section 04.1 of this report.
c.
Conclusions Plant operators demonstrated knowledge of plant status and were attentive to the main control room panels during routine activities. In addition, operators maintained attention to details while performing their activities. For example, in several instances the k
operators identified problems when removing equipment from service for planr'ed maintenance where the planned maintenance could not be performed as described or the wrong components were identified to be removed from service. The operators promptly recognized the abnormal situations and responded appropriately.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Cold Weather Preparations a.
Insoection Scope (71714)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for protecting plant systems from the effects of cold weather. The inspectors reviewed LaSalle Operating Surveillance (LOS)-ZZ-A2, " Preparation for Winter / Summer Operation," Revision 17 and other applicable licensee documentation. Also, the inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel, and conducted plant system walkdowns.
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Observations and Findinas Operations department management had assigned an operator oversight of cold weather preparations. Operations personnel completed LOS-ZZ-A2 and satisfactorily operated the station heating system. While performing the surveillance test procedure, the licensee identified minor problems, such as an out-of-tolerance temperature setpoint on a makeup water tank. The operators appropriately initiated action requests which documented the problems and scheduled the work necessary to repair items prior to the onset of cold weather. Engineers evaluated air sparging of the circulating water intake structure, which had been performed the previous winter to limit frazzle ice, and determined that the air sparger would not be required. The inspectors reviewed the i
evaluation and did not identify any problems.
i Also, plant personnel identified additional heating requirements necessary to support the Unit 1 surveillance testing outage which was scheduled for December 1998. The licensee developed and scheduled contingent actions to ensure plant heating would be maintained during the dual unit outage.
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Conclusions
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The licensee's completed and planned actions for cold weather protection appeared adequate. In addition, the licensee's planned and scheduled contingent actions for additional heat sources during the dual unit outage were appropriate.
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Operator Knowledge and Performance (71707)
O4.1 Operator Resoonse to Eauioment Malfunctions a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
l The inspectors reviewed the plant operators' response to a turbine lubricating oil (TLO)
temperature control valve failure.
b.
Observations and Findinas On October 28,1998, a licensed Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) identified temperature
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oscillations of the TLO system. The operator was monitoring the control room indications, including TLO, and identified that the TLO temperature, initially at approximately 114 degrees Fahrenheit (F), was becoming erratic. The operator reported the erratic TLO temperature to the Unit Supervisor, who subsequently directed an equipment operator (EO) to take manual control of the TLO controller. The EO and the NSO together attempted to control the TLO temperature with the control valve but were unable to do so and requested additional assistance from other operators.
Additional operators were able to stabilize the TLO temperature by adjusting the bypass valves for the TLO control valve.
The operators also recognized the potentialimpact of the decreasing TLO temperature on the turbine driven reactor feedwater pumps (TDRFP) and monitored the feedwater
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pump operation. Changes to the TLO temperature could affect the feedwater control system because the TDRFP control system used the same oil. The changes to the TLO temperature did result in minor changes in the feedwater control system, but did not result in any reactor water level anomalies.
i The licensee investigated the cause for the TLO temperature control valve failure and determined that the controller had failed. The licensee subsequently initiated repairs for the TLO controller.'
The response to the erratic TLO indication by the control room operator was generally
good. The operator recognized the erratic operation of the controller before any control i
room alarms, such as the TLO high temperature alarm, actuated. In addition, a member of the licensee's Nuclear Safety Review Board indicated that the control room and local operators used good three-way communications.
However, the licensee identified human performance issues where lessons could be learned for improving operator performance. For example, the licensee identified problems with the initial response to the controller failure. The control room supervisor initially dispatched only one local operator to manipulate the controller and operators were focused on the shift briefing instead of the TLO temperature control problem.
Considering the potential impacts of the controller failure on the feedwater system, the licensee concluded that the operators should have been more practice in involving other operators to assist in addressing the failure. Also, the EO was not proficient with the TLO valve controller and over-adjusted the controllar which caused a TLO temperature decrease. Although no adverse plant transients resulted, the licensee addressed the issues with operators to improve the operations department performance.
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Conclu$ ons i
Oparators did a good job monitoring control room indications and recognized the operational significance of temperature anomalies associated with a failed turbine lubricating oil temperature control valve. The operators responded appropriately to mitigate the failure. After reviewing the event, the licensee identified areas where operator performance could be improved and discussed the lessons-learned with operations personnel to reinforce performance expectations.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
08.1 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-373/374-96020-01: In NRC Inspection Report 50-373/374-96020, the NRC identified examples where plant personnel failed to follow procedure. To address the violations, the licensee implemented several corrective actions.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had completed the corrective actions to address the violations including:
The licensee reviewed maintenance and operation department procedures
associated with breaker operation to ensure that the procedures contained
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appropriate instructions to secure switchgear door fasteners. The inspectors verified that the licensee revised deficient procedures.
The licensee labeled the fire protection deluge station test valves and revised
LOS-FP-M4, " Fire Protection and Sprinkler and Deluge system Valve Lineup and
Alarm Check."
The licensee counseled the operator to ensure procedural requirements were
followed and included this event in the ongoing effort to improve human performance. The licensee's expectations regarding human performance were conveyed to plant personnel during several all hands meetings conducted early in 1997. These expectations included adhering to procedures, using the self-checking program, maintcining a questioning attitude, and demanding resolution of issues. This action was also applicable to the other violation i
examples discussed in this section.
The licensee deleted blanket work requests within the power block and
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generated pre-approved work requests for door maintenance which contained all door activities allowed to be performed. Also, the licensee revised LaSalle Administrative Procedure (LAP)-1100-13,"High Radiation Area Door Surveillance and Alarm Response" to ensure workers initiated a fire impairment for fire-related barriers prior to commencing work.
This violation is closed.
08.2 (Closed) VIO 50-373/374-97011-02: Failure to evaluate unanchored equipment in a timely manner and failure to perform all required procedure steps.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions implemented to address the subject violation which included:
The licensee developed LAP-100-56, " Equipment / Parts Storage in Plant Areas
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Containing Safety-Related Equipment," Revision 0, to control the use of temporary and permanent equipment in safety-related areas. The licensee provided training to plant personnel to identify, recognize, and avoid creating seismic concems in the plant.
The licensee provided additional guidance to plant workers on the use of
procedures which required steps in a proceduf e be performed unless the procedure provided some specific guidance, such as conditional logic, a limitation, or a caution that specifically allowed the steps be marked as not applicable.
This violation is closed.
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P 08.3 (Closed) Nuclear Generation Group (NGG) 1. Action Steo 6: Finalize NGG procedure governing the indicator process and implement new performance indicators.
The inspectors previously conducted a review of this licensee initiative in accordance
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with the NRC's action plan to verify implementation of selected action steps from Commonwealth Edison's St<ategic Reform initiatives. Documentation of this review is contained in the meeting minutes for the September 14,1998, public meeting between the NRC's Commonwealth Edison Oversight Panel and the licensee. The inspectors left this verification open because the licensee's procedure had not yet been finalized and
Issued. The inspectors subsequently verified that Guide BO-01, " Nuclear Generation Group Performance Monitoring and Management," Revision 0, was issued on August 29,1998.
This verification is closed.
i ll. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1,1 General Maintenance
a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance activities.
Unit 2 reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system demolition, WR No. 970080285
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Unit 2 steam relief valve replacement, WR No. 980086105 01
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Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) water jeg pump refurbishment
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in addition, the inspectors reviewed other documentation associated with two inadequate OOS requests written by personnel in the work control department.
b.
Observations and Findinas in general, the inspectors found the areas in the vicinity of work activities in the Unit 2 reactor building to be neat and free of debris. Work packages were available to the maintenance personnel and in use at all activities observed. Also, maintenance personnel performing the work were knowledgeable of the tasks and governing procedures.
In Section O1.1 of this report, the inspectors discussed the circumstances surrounding two instances of inadequate OOS requests initiated by work control personnel.
Specifically, in the first instance, an incorrect orifice was identified in an OOS request and resulted in an OOS being initiated to isolate the incorrect component. In the second instance, an OOS request was submitted to prevent actuation of a non-essential service
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water valve. However, the work package instructions would have allowed the valve to move during maintenance.
In the first instance, the licensee determined that the incorrect orifice in the OOS request was a result of inadequate communication between the work analyst and the OOS writer. The work analyst initiated an OOS request to cancel the original OOS req';ast and provided comments in the electronic work control system (EWCS)
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specifying the need to revise the OOS. However, the licensee determined that revisions to an OOS must be communicated directly to an OOS writer to be effective Work control management discussed this expectation with all work planners at a communication meeting.
l in the second instance, the work analyst did not consider the impact of the steps in the work package involving disassembly of a portion of the valve actuator which resulted in
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the incorrect OOS request. The work package had been initially completed in 1996 and
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was approved in January 1997. The initial review by the lnspectors indicated that the event was e, isolated case of inattention-to-detail by the work control personnel. Since the original 1996 work package and OOS request had been submitted, the licensee had undergone an extended plant shutdown to address numerous issues including the control of maintenance activities. Actions taken during that shutdown appeared adequate to address issues involving the quality of work packages.
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Conclusions The licensee performed the maintenance activities observed by the inspectors in an acceptable manner. Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of their tasks and followed procedures. Also, housekeeping in the Unit 2 reactor building in the vicinity of maintenance and modification activities in progress was acceptable and indlcated an appropriate level of licensee management attention in the areas observed. The inspectors considered each of two inadequate OOS requests to be isolated instances of poor communication and inadequate attention to detail by work control personnel.
Actions taken by licensee management appeared appropriate.
M6 Maintenance Organization and Administration M6.1 Implementation of 12-Week Rollina Schedule a.
Inspection Scope (62707. 61726)
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The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensee's 12-week work scheduling process by observing various maintenance screening, planning, and scheduling meetings, and reviewing maintenance tasks that the licensee performed as scheduled using the 12-week scheduling process. In addition, the inspectors interviewed management and supervisory persont cl responsible for developing and executing the 12-week work schedule.
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b.
ObseIvajions and FindirKLs The inspectors did not identify any instances of inadequate scheduling of Technical Specification surveillance tests or failing to meet any licensee requirements due to ineffective implementation of the licensee's 12-week work schedule. However, the inspectors did observe instances where participants during scheduling meetings were not prepared to participate in the meeting. Specifically, maintenance planners scheduled several maintenance activities but additional planning was necessary before performing the work. The planners had indicated in the licensee's EWCS that the activity was not ready to work. However, the planner at the scheduling meeting did not know the specific actions which were necessary to make the activity ready to work. In addition, the inspectors observed two instances in which none of the meeting participants knew the status of the parts necessary to perform the maintenance activity.
The inspectors discussed the observations with the supervisor of the work week managers who indicated the level of participant preparedness did not meet his j
expectations. The supentisor indicated that he planned to improve the performance of
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meeting participants by increasing management attention and providing coaching to personnel not meeting expectations.
During the review of various surveillance test activities associated with ongoing work, the inspectors found that the licensee did not maintain current the matrix which cross-referenced Technical Specification surveillance test requirements with the respective surveillance test instructions. Specifically, the matrix referenced incorrect plant surveillance test instructions for the monthly automatic depressurization (ADS) system testng. However, there were no consequences to the incorrect reference to the surveillance test instructions. The inspectors subsequently verified that the licensee performed the required Technical Specification surveillance tests and that the surveillance test frequencies scheduled in the EWCS were correct.
Licensee management identified that the 12-week work control process at LaSalle needed continued attention to improve station personnel's ability to get work done anJ continue to improve the material condition at LaSalle. For example, the licensee's Nuclear Oversight staff identified that the fix-it-now (FIN) team manning levels impacted the station 12-week work schedule by not maintaining sufficient resources to complete the goal of performing 70 percent of the A, B1, and 82 emergent work requests. The licensee subsequently initiated actions to address Nuclear Oversight's concerns and other problems associated with the work control process. The percentage of emergent work completed by the FIN team improved late in the inspection period and the licensee
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continued to initiate additional actions to improve the 12-week work control process.
c.
Conclusions The licensee's implementation of the 12-week work control process was adequate in ensuring that required surveillance tests were scheduled and completed within the required frequencies and plant conditions specified in the Technical Specifications.
However, licensee management determined that further improvements were needed in the work control process to effectively get work done and to continue to improve material condition at LaSalle. For example, the licensee's Nuclear Oversight Organization determined that the fix-it-now team manning level was insufficient. In
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addition, the inspectors' witnessed scheduling meetings and observed that some planners were not aware of actions needed to make an activity ready for work and did not know the status of parts necessary for the work. The licensee implemented
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~ corrective actions to improve the work control process.
Ill. Enaineerina E1
' Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Operability Determination Reviews
a.
Insoection Scooe (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the following documents:
- Operability Evaluation (OE) 98037 regarding the adequacy of RWCU piping
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OE 98038 regarding RWCU Class 1 and Class 3 piping analysis.
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OE 98039 regarding reactor protection system (RPS) response time tests.
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LaSalle Technical Specification Surveillance Test Requirements 4.3.1.3 and
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors verified that the documentation of the operability evaluations met the licensee's administrative reauirements and that the assumptions used to develop the y
operability determinations were valid. In each case, the licensee was in compliance with the Technical Specification requirements..Also, engineering personnel supported operations by completing the operability evaluations in a timely manner.
The inspectors discussed the OEs with operations and system engineering personnel.
Operators were cognizant of the issuec and corrective actions resulting from the evaluations. No compensatory actions were required to address the nonconforming conditions.
c.
Conclusions The operability determinations regarding the RWCU system issues and the reactor protection system response time testing were appropriate and completed by engineering per onnelin a timely manner. Operations personnel were cognizant of the issues and corrective actions identified in the OEs.
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Inspector Followuo item (IFI) 50-373/374-97020-04: Incorrect RWCU system drawing contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
The inspectors identified that RWCU system drawings contained in the UFSAR differed from the actual plant configuration. The UFSAR drawings showed that the RWCU pump suction was directly from the recirculation system, upstream of the RWCU system heat exchangers. The actual plant configuration was with the pump suction downstream of the system heat exchangers. The licensee conducted a root cause determination and concluded that the most likely cause was the use of the wrong revision of the drawing to update the UFSAR when the drawing changes were performed. To prevent recurrence, the licensee assigned a corrective action program item to engineering contractor personnel to determine actions necessary to ensure that the controlled drawings would be used when making similar UFSAR drawing changes. In addition, the licensee assigned corrective actions to design engineering and to regulatory assurance to ensure processes were in place for adequate review of design changes prior to submittal of an update to the UFSAR. All corrective actions were scheduled to be completed by February 24,1999. This item is closed.
IV. Plant Suonort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Discrepancy Between UFSAR and Liould Radioactive Waste Discharoe Quantities a.
Insoection Scope (7175Q1 The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding liquid radioactive waste discharges which exceeded the UFSAR projections. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, Chapter 11, " Liquid Waste Management Systems," and other licensee documents.
b.
Observations and Findinas On October 4,1998, the licensee's Nuclear Oversight organization identified that the
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quantity of radioactivity in liquid radioactive waste discharges from LaSalle Station for calendar year 1997 exceeded the quantity that was projected in the UFSAR. The
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licensee was reviewing the historical discharge data and determined that the cumulative total exceeded that specified in the UFSAR. However, no limits established in 10 CFR Part 20 were exceeded.
Prior to the dual-unit extended shutdown which began in September 1996, liquid radioactive waste discharges projected in the UFSAR were not needed at LaSalle, although the plant was designed to discharge radioactive waste as necessary within allowable limits. Liquid radioactive waste discharges were performed by the licensee on an as-needed basis during 1997. When the water storage capacity at the station was
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I exceeded, the licensee discharged the excess water. Each discharge was controlled by procedures and evaluated to ensure that the amount of radioactivity discharged would not exceed the iO CFR Part 20 limits. However, the licensee did not control the cumulative release quantity and did not assess the cumulative impact.
The licensee was evaluating the cause for the release in excess of the values projected in the UFSAR, which will be reviewed by the inspectors when the evaluation is completed. In addition, the inspectors cont;nued to review the plant's discharge procedures and the design basis for the liquid radioactive waste discharge system. The inspectors review of the licensee's evaluation and the design basis of the discharge system is an IFl (50-373/98022-01; 50-374/98022-01).
c.
Conclusions The licensee's Nuclear Oversight organization identified that the quantity of radioactivity in liquid radicactive waste discharges from LaSalle County Station for calendar year 1997 exceeded the quantity that vias projected in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The licensee had not managed the liquid radioactive waste discharges aggressively to ensure a complete understanding of discharge restrictions and their basis. The safety-significance was minimal because the 10 CFR Part 20 limits were not exceeded.
R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lasues R8.1 f. Closed) VIO 50-373/374-97020-06: Failure to post contaminated drain trough.
On November 30,1997, the inspectors identified that operations personnel were venting the contaminated control rod drive system piping into a drain trough which was not labeled as potentially contaminated. The licensee surveyed the drain trough and found it contaminated, then properly posted the control rod drive system high point vent drain trough as being contaminated. In addition, the licensee conducted a review of plant systems and identified other troughs which were potentially contaminated but not identified as such using appropriate methods such as signs. The licensee subsequently identified the drain troughs using the appropriate methods. In addition, the licensee discussed the event with radiation protection technicians and operators in their respective weekly communication meetings. Also, to prevent recurrence of the event, the licensee revised radiological protection procedures to include an enhanced discussion of areas which have the potential to become contaminated and the proper methods for identifying the areas. This item is closed.
V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the results of these inspections to licensee management listed below at an axit meeting on November 20,1998. The licensee acknowledged the
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findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee if any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. The licensee identified none.
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I PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l
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- F. Dacimo, Site Vice President
- T. O'Connor, Station Manager
' G. Campbell, Unit 1 Engineering Manager
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- T. Dobbs, Unit 2 Restart Manger
- W. Riffer, Nuclear Oversight
- G. Heisterman, Unit 1 Maintenance Manager
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D. Farr, Unit.1 Operations Manager
P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Manager
.R. Palmieri, System Engineering Manager
- J.~ Pollock, Engineering Program Supervisor
- E. Connell, Design Engineering Supervisor
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- G. Putt, Work Control Manager
. N. Hightower, Unit 2 Radiation Protection Manager
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- Present at exit meeting on November 20,1998.
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 Onsite Engineering
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IP 61726 Surveillance Observation l
IP 62707 Maintenance Observation
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IP 71707 Plant Operations IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 71714 Cold Weather Preparations IP 92901 Followup - Plant Operations IP 92903 Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-373/374-98022-01 IFl Liquid radioactivity discharged exceeds projected levels in the UFSAR.
Closed 50-373/374-96020-01 VIO Several examples of plant personnel failing to follow procedurri.
50-373/374-97011-02 VIO Failure to evaluate unanchored equipment in a timely marcier and failure to perform all required procedure steps.
50-373/374-97020-04 IFl Incorrect RWCU system drawing contained in the
'UFSAR.
50-373/374-97020-06 VIO Failure to post contaminated drain trough.
Discussed None
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED g
ADS Automatic Depressurization System DRP:
Division of Reactor Projects
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DRS Division of Reactor Safety EDG
' Emergency Diesel Generator j
EO Equipment Operator
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- ER Engineering Request
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EWCS Electronic Work Control System
'F Fahrenheit
' FIN Fix-It-Now
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IDNS Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety.
IFl inspection Follow-up Item IR
Inspection Report
,
LAP.
LaSalle Administrative Procedure
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LOS
LaSalle Operating Surveillance
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NGG
Nuclear Generation Group
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NRC.
~ Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
NSO
Nuclear Station Operator
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Operability Evaluation
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Out of Service
, NRC Public Document Room
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TDRFP
- Turbine Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump
Turbine Lubricating Oil
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Violation
Work Request
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