IR 05000373/2024002
| ML24226A093 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/2024 |
| From: | Robert Ruiz NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB1 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2024002 | |
| Download: ML24226A093 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
LASALLE COUNTY STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2024002 AND 05000374/2024002
Dear David P. Rhoades:
On June 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at LaSalle County Station. On July 10, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Joseph Reda, Operations Director, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at LaSalle County Station.
August 13, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Robert Ruiz, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000373 and 05000374 License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000373 and 05000374
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000373/2024002 and 05000374/2024002
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-002-0061
Licensee:
Constellation Nuclear
Facility:
LaSalle County Station
Location:
Marseilles, IL
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2024, to June 30, 2024
Inspectors:
J. Benjamin, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Caron, Senior Physical Security Inspector
K. Fay, Senior Reactor Inspector
K. Maloney, Sr Physical Security Inspector
J. Meszaros, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Robert Ruiz, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at LaSalle County Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000373/2024002-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Severity Level IV (SL IV) non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), Limiting Conditions for Operation [LCO], for failing to meet/follow the required actions for LCO 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, and 3.3.4.1, End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation.
Specifically, operators performed surveillance testing per station procedure LOS-RP-SA4,
Turbine Stop Valve Scram and EOC-RPT Functional Test, on September 7, 2023, and found that the turbine stop valve (TSV) limit switch #4 failed to change state. This limit switch was subsequently declared inoperable and promptly replaced. The licensee later determined, after a failure analysis of the limit switch, that the switch had failed prior to the September 7, 2023, surveillance. As such, they determined that the inoperability period was greater than that allowed by the Technical Specification (TS) LCOs noted above.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000374/2023-003-00 LER 2023-003-00 for LaSalle County Station,
Unit 2, Automatic Actuation of Reactor Protection System (RPS) During Restoration from Hydrostatic Test Conditions I.
71153 Closed LER 05000373/2023-002-00 LER 2023-002-00 for LaSalle County Station,
Unit 1, Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure due to Lubricant Degradation.
71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On May 17, 2024, the unit was down powered to approximately 70 percent to perform main turbine stop valve testing and a control rod pattern exchange. Full power operation was restored on May 20, 2024, and the unit remained at or near rated thermal power for the duration of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On April 27, 2024, the unit was down powered to approximately 70 percent to perform main turbine control valve testing, scram time testing, and a control rod pattern exchange. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on the April 28, 2024, and remained at rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather during an area tornado watch issued on May 7, 2024.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)common emergency diesel generator following April 20, 2024, loss of station auxiliary transformer loaded run
- (2) Unit 2 low-pressure core spray on May 9, 2024, after planned maintenance window
- (3) Unit 2A standby liquid control system on May 24, 2024, after planned quarterly surveillance
- (4) Unit 2 high-pressure coolant injection system on May 28, 2024, during planned maintenance on Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling water system
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 5C1, turbine building, elevation 710'-6", valve aisle on May 7, 2024
- (2) Fire Zone 3H2, reactor building, elevation 694'-6", Unit 2 high-pressure core spray cubicle on May 6, 2024
- (3) Fire Zone 4E3, auxiliary building, elevation 731'-0", Unit 1 division 2 essential switchgear room on June 12, 2024
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 down power and rod pattern adjustment on April 27, 2024.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated license operator emergency core cooling system requalification training on May 14, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)
(Partial)failure of the Unit 1 1412 air circuit breaker to facilitate fast transfer from the station auxiliary transformer to the unit auxiliary transformer on April 20, 2024
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 and 2 planned Action Green on April 15 and 16, 2024, due to maintenance on service water strainer
- (2) Unit 1 planned Action Green risk due to division 3 work window on April 23, 2024
- (3) Unit 1 and 2 planned Action Green risk on May 6, 2024, during a planned division 1 maintenance work window
- (4) Unit 2 planned Action Green risk during high-pressure core spray maintenance window on May 20, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1 standby liquid control squib valve after unexpected main control room alarm on June 10, 2024
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 division 2 125 Vdc breaker closing and battery charger swap per LOP-DC-01 after alternating current (AC) feed breaker inspection on April 29, 2024
- (2) Unit 1 standby gas treatment train per LOS-VG-M1 and LOS-VG-SR2 after failed surveillance test on May 1, 2024
- (3) Unit 2 2B emergency diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger clean and inspect, coolant pressurization test, and lube oil replacement during the week of May 20, 2024
- (4) Unit 1 main steam line high flow isolation calibration per LIS-MS-102 after replacement of the 1E31-N010D pressure switch on June 3, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2 manual scram instrumentation functional testing per LOS-RP-SA3 on April 16, 2024
- (2) Unit 1 turbine stop valve scram functional testing per LOS-RP-SA4 on April 18, 2024
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)
- (1) April 24, 2024, performance indicator drill
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
===71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample 1 Partial)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee response to elevated site radiation levels.
(2)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee response to failure of the Unit 1 division 2 crosstie (ACB 1424) to close on February 24, 2023, as documented in Action Request (AR) 4557105.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Note: LER 2023-003-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Automatic Actuation of Reactor Protection System (RPS) During Restoration from Hydrostatic Test Conditions I, is included in this report for the purpose of rectifying an administrative item-closure issue whereby it was intended to have been closed in the NRCs internal item tracking system (RRPS) under Section 71153 of NRC Inspection Report 05000373/2024001 and 05000374/2024001.
Event Follow up (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the loss of the Unit 1 station auxiliary transformer and failure of division 1 fast bus transfer and licensees response on April 20, 2024.
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensees event reporting determinations to ensure it complied with reporting requirements.
(1)
(Partial)
Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000373,05000374/2023-002-00, LaSalle County Stations Units 1 & 2, Air Circuit Breaker (ACB) Mechanically Operated Contacts (MOC) Switch Failed to Actuate (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System [ADAMS] Accession No. ML23115A157). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000373/2024090; 05000374/2024090.
- (2) LER 05000373,2023-002-00, LaSalle County Stations Unit 1 Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure due to Lubricant Degradation (ADAMS Accession No. ML23338A183). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results. This LER is closed.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
92709 - Licensee Strike Contingency Plans Licensee Strike Contingency Plans
- (1) On April 1, 2024, at midnight, the contract between the National Union of Nuclear Security Officers / United Federation Law Enforcement Officers Security & Police Benevolent Association (NUNSO/United Federation LEOS PBA), who represent LaSalle security officers and Constellation, expired. In preparation for a potential strike/lockout, the NRC inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees contingency plan. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the strike/lockout staffing levels, staff training and qualifications, safety-conscious working environment, and site access in meeting operational and security requirements.
Upon expiration of the contract, the security officers continued to staff the regulatory required positions while negotiations were in progress. During the period without a contract, the NRC inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees implementation of its contingency plan. The inspectors assessed:
1. the continuity of security force operation, and 2. plant operations, minimum staffing requirements, safety-conscious working environment, and site access.
On April 26, 2024, a ratified contract between the National Union of Nuclear Security Officers / United Federation Law Enforcement Officers Security & Police Benevolent Association (NUNSO/United Federation LEOS PBA), which represents LaSalle security officers and Constellation, was reached.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000373/2024002-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Severity Level IV (SL IV) non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), Limiting Conditions for Operation [LCO], for failing to meet/follow the required actions for LCO 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, and 3.3.4.1, End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation. Specifically, operators performed surveillance testing per station procedure LOS-RP-SA4, Turbine Stop Valve Scram and EOC-RPT Functional Test, on September 7, 2023, and found that the turbine stop valve (TSV) limit switch #4 failed to change state. This limit switch was subsequently declared inoperable and promptly replaced. The licensee later determined after a failure analysis of the limit switch that the switch had failed prior to the September 7, 2023, surveillance. As such, they determined that the inoperability period was greater than that allowed by the Technical Specification (TS) LCOs noted above.
Description:
On September 7, 2023, while performing surveillance testing on LaSalle Unit 1 turbine stop valve #4 (TSV-4) per station procedure LOS-RP-SA4, Turbine Stop Valve Scram and EOC-RPT Functional Test, Relay 1C71A-K10G did not deenergize as expected. The TSV otherwise functioned normally by closing and fast closing as expected. Further investigation determined that the limit switch associated with the A2 RPS channel (i.e., 1C71-N006G) failed. The licensee declared the associated RPS channel inoperable and entered the appropriate TS LCO. They replaced the limit switch shortly after the failure and were able to declare the associated channel operable following successful post-maintenance testing. The failure of the limit switch is documented via the licensee corrective action program in AR 4701066.
The TSV limit switches are normally held in the actuated position during operation and only return to the relaxed, shelf state position upon closure of their associated stop valve. The failed limit switch was sent off for failure analysis, following replacement. The failure analysis was completed on October 18, 2023, and indicated that the cause of the failure was degraded main shaft lubricant. As a result, the switch shaft was bound in the actuated position, preventing the limit switch from returning to the shelf state. The analysis notes that the appropriate lubricant was applied to the switch and has excellent thermal and oxidative stability but also notes the presence of a steam leak approximately 4 feet from the location of the failed limit switch. The report concludes that elevated temperatures in the vicinity of the steam leak were the cause of the degraded lubricant found on the switch. The steam leak was originally identified on March 24, 2023, as documented in AR 4564633, and could not be repaired at the time. Although the exact date of limit switch failure cannot be determined, the licensee reported these conditions as firm evidence that a past inoperability condition existed prior to surveillance testing that occurred on September 7, 2023. The inoperability period was greater than allowed by TS LCO 3.3.1.1 and TS LCO 3.3.4.1 as follows:
LCO 3.3.1.1 requires that the RPS instrumentation for each function be OPERABLE, and Condition A applies when one or more required channels is inoperable. It requires that the channel or its associated trip system is placed in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. In this case, the station exceeded the completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> at the time of the September 2023 test that demonstrated limit switch failure. In addition, LCO 3.3.1.1, Condition E was not entered after the completion time of Condition A was not met, which would have required that Unit 1 thermal power be reduced to less than 25 percent within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
LCO 3.3.4.1 requires that either two channels per trip system for each end of cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) instrumentation function are OPERABLE or specific minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) limits are applied. This condition was not met.
The resident inspectors reviewed previous 2023 failures of the 1C71-N006G limit switch during TSV functional testing, as documented in ARs 4564527 and 4680831. The switch failed during TSV testing on March 24, 2023, but was successfully cycled after lubrication.
It failed again to change state during surveillance testing on May 26, 2023. The licensee replaced the limit switch after this second failure and sent it to the vendor for failure analysis. The vendor determined the switch failure was caused by a manufacturing defect that was unrelated to local TSV area temperatures. The failure of the second switch on September 7, 2023, due to degraded lubricant thus appears to be unrelated to the cause of the previous switch failures that occurred on March 24, 2023, and May 26, 2023. The resident inspectors also reviewed earlier failures of TSV limit switches caused by degraded lubricant, starting in 2004. They note licensee efforts that improved ventilation in the vicinity of both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 switches and modifications to replace all Unit 1 and Unit 2 switches in 2020 and 2019, respectively, with a switch type that is qualified for higher temperature applications.
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the defective limit switch in order to restore the impacted RPS channel to operable. In addition, the licensee performed failure analysis on the defective switch to determine the most likely cause of the failure. They also increased TSV testing frequency from 90 days to 45 days for Unit 1 until the Unit 1 outage that occurred in 2024. During that outage, the licensee made efforts to repair the identified steam leak, though they determined that additional work was necessary in the next Unit 1 outage occurring in 2026 (AR 4767563). They performed work to lessen the impact of the existing steam leak on the limit switches until the additional work on the steam leak can be completed as planned.
Corrective Action References: ARs 4701066, 4564633, 4767563, 4680831, and 4564527
Performance Assessment:
The NRC determined this violation was not reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the licensee and therefore is not a performance deficiency. Specifically, the TSV limit switch failure that occurred in September 2023 appears to be from a different cause than that which occurred in May 2023. Although temperature-related limit switch failures have occurred in the past, the licensee has taken steps to improve local airflow and thus area temperatures.
Enforcement:
Severity: Traditional Enforcement is being used to disposition this violation with no associated reactor oversight process performance deficiency, per NRC Enforcement Manual revision dated December 26, 2023, Section 3.10. The inspectors determined the severity of the violation using Section 6 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and determined this issue was a Severity Level IV (SLIV) because it most represented the examples in Section 6.1.d. The failure to meet the TS LCO was unknown to the licensee until receipt of the failure analysis, as described above.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), Limiting Conditions for Operation, states, in part, that when an LCO of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TS until the condition can be met.
LaSalle TS LCO 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, requires that the RPS instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
LaSalle TS LCO 3.3.4.1, End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation, requires that two channels per trip system for each EOC-RPT instrumentation function listed below shall be OPERABLE:
1. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure: and
2. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low
OR LaSalle TS LCO 3.2.2, MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR), limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR are made applicable.
Contrary to this, on September 7, 2023, when these LCOs were not met, the licensee failed to shut down the reactor or follow the remedial actions permitted by the TS until the condition could be met. Specifically, when the Unit 1 TSV-4 limit switch failed, the licensee did not perform remedial actions listed in TS LCOs 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.4.1.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 10, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Joseph Reda, Operations Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
LOA-TORN-001
Operating Abnormal Procedure - High Winds/Tornado
Procedures
OP-AA-108-111-
1001
Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines
Corrective Action
Documents
Safety: 1C14-F031 Binds When Operating
06/19/2015
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified - CCP: M-140, M-94 Valve Position Revision
05/09/2024
M-140
P & ID Low Pressure Core Spray (L. P. C. S.)
Drawings
M-99
Standby Liquid Control System
LOP-SC-02
Standby Operation of the Standby Liquid Control System
Procedures
LOS-SC-Q1
SBLC Pump Operability/Inservice Test and Explosive Valve
Continuity Check
Corrective Action
Documents
4.0 Critique for April 2024 U2 Load Drop
04/29/2024
LGP-3-1
LOP-RR-07
Operation of the Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System
Watch-Standing Practices
Procedures
OP-LA-101-111-
1002
LaSalle Operations Philosophy Handbook
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Crew Clock Reset on Updating Paragon
05/01/2024
Miscellaneous
Event Free Clock
Reset Form
Gap in Updating Paragon for WS Status Change
04/17/2024
Procedures
LOP-WS-02
Service Water Pump and Service Water Jockey Pump
Startup and Operation
Corrective Action
Documents
Unexpected MCR 1H13-P603-A105 SBLC SQUIB VLV
Continuity Loss
06/10/2024
Corrective Action
1E31-N010D Slow to Reset
03/13/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
RPS Fuse 2C71A-F18C Replaced per WO 5419722-01
(NOT Blown)
04/15/2024
Documents
U1 VG Upstream HEPA % Leakage High
04/30/2024
LOP-DC-01
Battery Charger Startup and Shutdown
LOS-RP-SA3
Manual Scram Instrumentation
LOS-RP-SA4
Turbine Stop Valve Scram and EOC-RPT Functional Test
LOS-VG-M1
Standby Gas Treatment System Operability and
Inservice Test
Procedures
LOS-VG-SR2
Standby Gas Treatment HEPA/Charcoal Filter Test
Perform LES-GM-109 For 1DC17E @ MCC 136X-3/B5
(1AP81E)
04/29/2024
Charcoal Filter Leak Test 1VG01S
05/01/2024
LOS-RP-SA3 U2 Rx Manual Scram Functional Att 2B
04/16/2024
LOS-RP-SA3 U2 RX Manual Scram Functional Att 2A
04/15/2024
2B EDG Fast Start
05/25/2024
LOS-RP-SA4 U-1 Turbine Stop Valves Att 1A
04/18/2024
IM LIS-MS-102 U1 Main Stm Line Hi Flow MSIV Isol Cal
06/05/2024
Work Orders
EWP-MM-Replace Upstream & Downstream HEPA Filters
on 1VG01S
05/01/2024
Miscellaneous
04/24/2024
April 24, 2024, PI Drill Scenario
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified: Discrepancies in PI Data
07/01/2024
Collecting and Reporting of NRC ROP Performance
Indicator Data
71151
Procedures
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Reactor
Coolant System (RCS) Leakage
24 Failed to Close during LOS-AP-R2
2/24/2023
Impacts to RCA and MAF Egress Monitors
03/22/2024
Follow Up to IR 04760371 Post Cross Functional Meeting
03/26/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
LLd from IR 4761202
04/18/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: Work Order Step Marked N/A Without Justification
06/11/2024
OP LOS-AP-R1 U1 Alt Power Breakers Att A, B, C, D
2/23/2022
1AP06E-1 SAT Feed to 142Y Local C/S not Functional
03/06/2022
Work Orders
EWP EM 1422 MOC Switch Contact Check & Adjustment
2/26/2023
RM - LOS-RP-SA4 1C71A-K10G Didnt De-energize as
Expected
09/07/2023
Loss of Unit 1 SAT Due to OCB 1-13 Tripped on Diff Current
04/20/2024
Loss of Division 1 Gross Gamma
04/20/2024
Loss of A MSL Rad Monitor
04/20/2024
Loss of 1B CW Pump
04/20/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
VR Isolation Dampers Shut on Loss of the SAT
04/20/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: Incorrect Details in LER
05/23/2024
Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 142Y Main Feed
ACB 1422 System AP Part 15
O
Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 142Y Unit Tie
ACB 1424 System AP Part 16
L
Drawings
Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 142Y (1AP06E)
Auxiliary Compartment System AP Part 18
P
LAS-75321
Failure Analysis of Snap Lock Limit Switch
09/29/2023
Miscellaneous
LAS-84635
Failure Analysis of a Limit Switch
10/18/2023