IR 05000373/1997022

Insp Repts 50-373/97-22 & 50-374/97-22 on 971219-980123.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20202C762
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	02/05/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20202C743	List: IR 05000373/1997022 ML20202C738
References
50-373-97-22, 50-374-97-22, NUDOCS 9802130020
Download: ML20202C762 (12)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY LOMMISSION I

REGION lli Docket Nos:

50-373; 50 374

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License Nos:

NPF-11; NPF 18 Report Nos:

50-373/97022(DRP); 50-374/97022(DRP)

Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Ccmpany

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Facility:

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:

2601 N. 21st Road Marseilles,IL 61341 Dates:

December 19,1997 - January 23,1998 Inspectors:

M. Huber, Senior Resident inspector J. Hansen, Resident inspector R. Crane, Re:Mont inspector Approved by:

Kennet'i G, O'Brien, Acting Chief Reacto Projects Branch 2 -

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9002130020 980205 PDR ADOCK 05000373 i '

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EXECUTI'/E SUMMARY LaSalle County Gtation, Units 1 an0 2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50 373/97022(DRP); 50 374/97022(DRP)

This inspection report included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and

_ plant support. The report covers a six-week period of inspection conducted by the resident staff.

Operations

_ Overall, opcrations personnel were attentive to plant systems and followed plant

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procedures. However, the inspectors identified that in a few instances shift managers l

were inattentive in implementing the administrative requirements controlling shift tumover. In one instance, this resulted in the Shift Manager not being fully aware of information communicated through the Daily Orders. Also, operations department

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management were not maintaining Daily Orders as recommended by procedure.

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(Section 01.1)

Poor cleanup following maintenance activities resulted in housekeeping deficiencies, in

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addition, the inspectors concluded that insufficient attention-to-detail by non-licensed operators and an ineffective housekeeping area owner program resulted in housekeeping deficiencies in the reactor building not being identified or corrected. (Section 02.1)

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The inspectors considered the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) to be performing

well in reviewing root cause investigations and the associated corrective actions, The

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effective CARB oversight and the increasing CARB acceptance rate for root omse 1.

investigations indicated that the corrective &ction program was improving. (Section 07.1)

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r Maintenance The inspectors observed several Technical Specification surveillance tests. All tests i

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were performed in an acceptable manner with no personal performance or Technical Specificot!on conformance concems identified by the inspectors. (Section M1.1)

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Resort Details i_

Summary of Plant Status During this inspection period, the licensee mairitained Unit 1 in cold shutdown (Operational -

Condition 4) for a formed outage, and Unit 2 remained shut down for a refueling outage with all

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fuel removed from the reactor.

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l. Operations l

Conduct of Opentions 01.1 General Comments a.

In.: oction Scsosi71707F

' The inspectors evaluated operations personnel performance including monitoring control room activities such as routine tumovers and surveillances, attending shift briefings,

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reviewing shift logs and daily orders, and interviewing operators regarding plant and j_

equipment status, I

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Observation and Findinas

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I-In general, the inspectors observed that operations personnel were oognizant of plant and equipment status and performed activities in accorde%e with procedures. However, the inspectors identified three examples where the Shift Managers (SM) did not fully complete, document reviews during their shift tumovers. Step B.2.1.3.2 of LaSalle Administrative

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Procedure (LAP) 200-3, " Conduct of Operations - Shift Operations," Revision 30, Sectior,1, " Shift Relief " required the SM to complete the Shift Manager's Tumover -

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Checidist (Attachment 1A) during shift change. The inspectors identified that t% SMs did

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l not fully complete the required document reviews on the following occasions:

On December 12,1997, during control room observations and discussions with

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the SM, the inspectors identified that the SM had not reviewed the Daily Orders.

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The SM informed the inspectors that he had initialed the tumover checklist as complete but had forgotten to pcform the required review of the Daily Orders.

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The daily orders which were not reviewed by the SM were in place to reinforce i

previously established expectations for the conduct of operations, which had been

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communicated previously to operators. However, the Daily orders were not i

reviewed by the SM and the inspectors determined the SM was not familiar with i

the contents of three of the Daily Orders.

On January 12,1998, the inspectors identified that the SM had not completed the

i Shift Manager's Tumover Checklist during the shift change and had not initialed that he had reviewed the most recent Daily Order. The SM, who had completed a

_ week in operator training, stated that he had reviewed the documents but did not

- initial the required documentation. The inspector subsequently verified that the SM was familiar with the Daily order.

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On January 20,1996, the inspectors identified that the SM did not complete the

Shift Manager's Tumover Checklist during shift change. The SM indicated he had reviewed the required documentation but did out initial the respective dooments signifying that the reviews had been completed.

in each of the three examples, the SM corrected the deficiency after it was Wntified by the inspectors in addition, the three examples identified by the inspectors where the SM did not fully complete the tumover checklist were not indicative of the overall SM performance during the period. The SM completed all document reviews for the majority of the inspection period.

While discussing the licensee's use of Daily Orders with operations personnel, the inspectors identified that the Dalty Orders were not being maintained as recommended in LAP-200-5, " Conduct of Operations - Shift Records," Revision 8. Section B.1 Indicated that the Daily Orders should not be in effect for more then one week and should be rewritten weekly if in effect for more than one week. However, operations management maintained Daily Ortiers effective for several months without being rewritten weekly. The inspectors did not identify any instances where the maintenance of the Daily Orders affected communication of information to the shifts.

The failure of SMs to complete the Shill Manager's Tumover Checklist as required by LAP-200 3 is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. However, this minor violation was administrative in nature and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-373/g7022-01; 50-374/g7022-01).

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Conclusion a

f The inspectors concluded that overall, operations personnel were attentive to plant systems and followed plant procedures. However, a lack of attention-to-detail by the SMs

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resulted in the failure to complete some required tumover checklists, which was not indicative of the overall performance during the inspection period. Although the violation -

was minor, and overall, the majority of tumover checklists were completed by the SMs, it indicates that the SMs need to continue focusing on maintaining attention-to-detail. Also, operations department management did not maintain the Daily Orders as recommended by the administrative procedure, although the inspectors did not identify any adverse consequences of this failure.

O2 Engineered Safety Feature Walkdowns 02.1 Enoineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walk Downs a.

Inspection Scoos (71707)

Throughout the inspection period the inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following ESF systems:

emergency diesel generators (Units 1 and 2)

residual heat removal (Unit 1)

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high pressure core spray (HPCS) (Unit 1)

primary containment instrumentation (Unit 1)

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In addition, the inspootors reviewed LAP g0015, *8tation HousekeepingM4aterial j

Condition Program,' Revision 23, and evaluated the effectiveness of its implementation.

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Observations and Findinas

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Overall, the inspootors did not find any potential nonconformances whloh would render the equipment inoperable and material condNion appeared soceptable. The inspectors

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identiflod minor housekeeping discrepancies which were brought to the licensee's

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attention and were either corrected or an action request was initiated by the licensee to address the defloiencies. The housekeeping discrepancies primar#y consisted of debris

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from mainter.ance activities, which included scrap lumber, coiled wire, and a fire

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retardant blanket. However, a span (approximately 30 feet) of non safety-related reactor building equipment drain tank vont piping was found by the inspootors to move freely on

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its hangom. The inspectors were conoemed that, during a seismic event, the vent piping

mayimpet w wfety-related steam tunrul dampers icosted in the remotor building

raceway wk.% were la clone proximity to the vent piping. There did not appear to be an

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imtrudiate operebmty excom since the Jampers were not required to be operable while the pitmt vias in the cots shutdown condition. The licelste was evaluating the structural i

configuration of the vent piping for Units 1 and 2 as a potential restart item in accordancu with engineering re* quest (ER) No. erg 600162. The ER was scheduled for completion by

March 2,1598.

During further review of the cause for the housekeeping deficiencies, the inspootors

identified that a housekeeping area owner program had been established by the licensee i

to ensure adequate supervisory oversight of the cond;tions in spoolfically assigned plant areas. However, two area owners, interviewed by the inspectors, whose names were posted in the areas inspected, were not aware of their assigned areas. Station

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managerr,ent subsequently took action to enhance the effectiveness of the housekeeping

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area owner program by issuing a site vloegresident letter naming each area owner with

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their respective area assignment and delineating plant management expoetations for the i

area owners, la addition, operations management informed the inspootors that

management expectations were not met by the non-licensed operators, who conduct daily L

tours of the areas inspected, when they also failed to identify the housekeeping

deflaiencies.

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Conclusions

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Overall, the inspeciors did not find any potential noncenformances which would render

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inspected E8F equipment inoperable and material condition appeared acceptable.

However nor clean up following maintenance activities resuhed in housekeeping i

deficionom, lesufficient attention-to detah demonstrated by non licensed operators i

conducting rounds in the areas inspected and an ineffe"Jve housekeeping area owner

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program resulted in deficiencies not being identified or cwrected. The licensee's planned

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and immediate corrective actions were appropriate to correct the items identified.

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Quauty Assuranee in C;:.2::.x j

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L 07.1 Correallye Action Review Board (CARB)

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Jnapedian Sonne f40500)

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The inspectors observed the CARB activities on January 8,1990, and reviewed the

following documents:

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Lloonsee Event Report (LER) 50 373/g704100, " Failure to Ver../ Thermal Limits l

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Prior to Exceeding 26 Percent Power During UnN Startups Prior to 19g6 due to l

Misinterpretation of Technical Specification (TS) Requirements"

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Root Cause Report 373 230 g7 8CAQ00014. "Trond investigation into inaccurate

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Engine ?fing Change Notices Being lasued Due to inconsistent Understanding of -

Managerial Expectatiom,,' Revision 0

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LaSalle project performance indicators for Unit i restart dated January 20,1998

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Observations and Findinas t

The licensee was implementing improvements in the corrective action program to

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improve the entire progren at LaSalle Station. Overall, the number of root cause

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investigations found to be acceptable by the CARB (CARB soceptance rate) incrossed from 51 percent to 95 percent since September 1N7. -

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Personnel from the licensee's engineering department presented the results of the root --

cause investigations ark 'w corrective actions for the above listed Hems to the CARB.

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The CARB asked questions and made recommendations to improve either the root i

cause, corrective actions, or bothi n addition, the CARB provided specific questions that

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i needed to be addressed by the eng.neering department bef:ve the CARB would accept

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the conclusions and actions spoolfied in the reports. Based on the information in the

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documents and the information provided by the presenters, the CARB rejected both the

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LER and root cause report. Both the LER and the root cause report lacked the detail necessary to support the root cause and the CARB concluded that the corrective actions

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did not appear to be adequate.

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Conclusions

The CARB performed their oversight function well by ensuring that personnel were '

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performing good root cause investigations and implementing appropriate corrective i

actions for the problems identified. The lack of quality in the reports presented by the engineers te the CARB rwflected poorty on the engineering organization performance with respect to root cause investigations and corrective actions in these instances. However,

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. the increasing CARB acceptance rate and effective CARB oversight indicated that the.

comotive action program was improving at LaSalle.

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Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)

08.1 (Closed). Unresolved item (URI) 50 374/96013-01: Review of Spurious Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System isolations. The licenses was planning to modify the RWCU system to address long standing material condition and system performance deficiencies.

The planned modifications included changing the pump suction from the discharge of the RWCU heat exchangers to the inlet of the heat exchangers, in addition, the licensee was planning to repair leaking valves in the system and to address pump sealleaks. The design changes included replacing the RWCU pumps with canned pumps and replacing the leaking valves with new valves. This item is closed.

11. Maintenance M.1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments a.

InsLaction Scope (61726)

l The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillances:

l LaSalle Opercting Surveillance (LOS) RD-SR3, * Control Rod operations in

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l Plant Condition 3 or 4," Revision 13 LOS HP-Q1, 'HPCS System inservice Test," Revision 35

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LOS-HP R2, " Unit i HPCS Injection Line Flush and Testable Check Valve

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Inservice Test," Revision 6 LaSalle Technical Surveillance 500111, " Unit 1 Integrated Division lli

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Response Time Surveillance," Revision 6 b.

Observations and Findinas Operations, maintenance, and engineering personnel correctly followed procedures and demonstrated effective self checking during the performance of surveillance tests.

Control room operators derr9strated detailed knowledge of the overall tests and maintained effective control over each evolution observed by the inspectors.

The acceptance criteria in the surveillance procedures were in conformance with all TS and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report requirements. However, the inspectors identified that Step D.3 of LOS HP-Q1 provided an exemption from operations personnel declaring the HPCS pump inoperable should the pump differential pressure fall to meet the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section XI acceptance criteria when the suppression pool level was low. The inservice testing engineer determined that the exemption was not allowed by the current ASME Section XI code and initiated procedure changes to remove the exempt!on. The inspectora determined that the test exemption had not been used by the licensee in the las". two years. The licensee's completed and planned actions are adequate to correct the procedure discrepancy.

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Conclusion The surveillance tests were performed in an acceptable manner with no personnel performance or TS conformance concems identified by the inspectors.

MW Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92903,62707)

M8.1 (Closed) Inspector Follow-up item (IFI) 50-373/95010-01: Root Cause of Traversing incore Probe (TIP) Master Link Separation. On October 31,1995, the TIP drive cable failed during normal TIP operations. The licenske determined the root cause for the failure to be improper maintenance of the TIP drive units including reusa of the chain master links following maintenance. Also, the licensee determined that preventive maintenance recommended in the vendor manual was not implemented, which contributed to the failure. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and concluded they were appropriate. This item is closed.

M8.2 (Closed) URI 50 373/374 96020-02: Potential flow restriction in HPCS water leg pump minimum flow line. Operator action was required during a HPCs inservice test to prevent exceeding the HPCS water leg pump discharge piping pressure limit due to an apparent blockage in the pump minimum flow line. During subsequent maintenance on the HPCS system, the HPCS water !eg pump minimum flow line piping was disassembled and inspected by licensee personnel. However, the licensee did not find any cause for the higher than expected minimum flow line pressure. The licensee concluded that the blockage may have become dislodged during the piping disassembly. Maintenance personnel verified the piping blockage was free prior to reassembly of the piping. The

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l inspectors reviewed the licensue's assessment and found their actions adequate. The l

Inspectors also verified that subsequent inservice testing was conducted on October 6,1997, satisfactorily, in addition, the inspectors observed the water leg pump discharge pressure during HPCS testing on January 21,1998, and no abnormal pressure

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readings were noted. This item is closed.

I". Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92902)

EB.1 (Closed) URI 50-373/374 96005-05: Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR) amendment did not include a Unit 2 fuel pool rerack safety evaluation performed in support of requested license amendments, in April 1996, the licensee revised the UFSAR to accurately reflect the design basis for the spent fuel pool cooling system. The inspectors did not identify any further instances of failure to update the UFSAR in a timely msaner, in addition, the licensee had revised plant procedures to provide administrative controls to ensure licensing documents were revised as required. However, the inspectors identified other issues associated with UFSAR revisions in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-373/97020; 50-374/97020 and will review the licensee's actions in response to the issues identified in that report. This item is closed.

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s IV. Plant Support P4 Misoollaneous Emergency Preparedness issues (92700,71707)

P8.1 (Closed)IFl 50 373/374 94022-02: Plant assembly siren and subsequent plant announcement were barely audible in the service building during an annual personnel accountability drill. The inspectors verified that the licensee issued design change package No. 9700308, on November 13,1997, to correct the deficiency, installation was in progress and was scheduled for completion by January 31,1998. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions and found them to be adequate. This item is closed.

F8 Misoolleneous Fire Protection issues (92700,71707)

F8.1 (Closed) LER 50 374/95010-00: Unit 2 Fire Door 615 Left Open Due to Personnel Error.

On October 7,1995, while performing routine security rounds, a security officer found fire door 615 open. The equipment operator had inadvertently left the roll-up door separating Division I and ll equipment open after completing readings on jet pump instrumentation four hours enriier. The officer reported the fire door to the operations shift engineer who determined that a fire impairment had not been entered in the fire impairment log and a fire watch had not been established within one hour of the door being opened as required by TS 3.7.6.a. Operations personnel immediately inspected the door, found no obstructions, and closed the door.

The licensee determined that a personnel error was the root cause of the event. The i

operator understood the requirement for closing the door after taking the readings but did not self-check when leaving the area to ensure that the door was closed. Also, the licensee determined the safety consequences to be minimal as the fire protection.

afforded the affected areas was not decreased. There was no reduction in the level of protection to the area because fusible links were installed on the door opening mechanism, and were designed to allow the door to close in the event of a fire, in addition, both fire zones separated by tia door were protected by an automatic fire detection system. The inspectors concluded the corrective actions were appropriate.

The inspectors determined the failure of the licensee to initiate the lequired fire watch within one hour constituted a violation of TS 3.7.6.a. However, this non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50 374/97022-02). This item is closed.

VI. Mananoment Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the results of these inspections to licensee management listed below at an exit meeting on January 23,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee if any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. The licensee identified none.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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'F. Decimo, Site Vice President

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• T. O'Connor, Station Manager

• S. Smith, Restart Manager

• G. Poletto, Engineering Manager

• W. Riffer, Quality and Safety Assessment Manager

• G. Hel6terman, Maintenance Manager

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'J. Bailey, Business Manager D. Sanchez, Site Training Manager

• D Boone, Site Support Manager

• D. Enright, Operations Manager P. Higgins, Outage Manager

• R. Palmieri, System Engineering Manager

• N. Hightower, Health Physics Manager

• D. Rhoades, Chemistry Manager

• P. Bames, Regulatory Assurence Manager

• Present at exit meeting on January 23,1998.

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 40500 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726 Surveillance Observation IP G2707 Maintenance Observation IP 71707 Plant Operations IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 92700 Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities l

lP 92902 Followup Engineering IP 92303 Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED 993l0 50 373/374 97022-01 NCV Failure of SM to complete the Shift Managers Tumover

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Checklist 50-374/97022 02 NCV Unit 2 fire door 615 left open due to personnel error piscussed or Closed 50 374/03013-01 URI Review of spurious reactor water cleanup system isolations 50-373/95010-01 IFl Root cause of TIP master link separation 50-373/374 96020-02 URI Potential flow restriction in HPCS water leg pump minimum flow line 50-373/374 96005 05 URI UFSAR amendment did not include a Unit 2 fuel pool rerack safety evaluation performed in support of requested license amendments 50-373/374 94022-02 IFl Plant assembly siren and subsequent plant announcement was barely audible in the service building during an annual personnel accountability drill 50-374/95010-00 LER Unit 2 fire door 615 left open due to personnel error 50-374/97022-02 NCV Unit 2 fire door 615 left open due to personnel error 50-373/374 97022-01 NCV Failure of SM to complete the Shift Managers Tumover Checklist

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CAR 8 Corrective Action Review Board DRP.

Division of Reactor Projects ER Engineering Request ESF Engineered Safety Feature HPCS-High Pressure Core Spray IR

. Inspection Report IFl Inspection Follow up item I.AP LaSalle Administrative Procedure LER Lloontee Event Report LOS.

LaSalle operating Surveillance NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR.

NRC Public Document Room RWCU Reactor Water Cleanup SM Shift Manager TIP Traversing incore Probe TS Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report URI Unresolved item VIO Violation

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