IR 05000373/1998008
| ML20217J247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217J245 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-98-08, 50-373-98-8, 50-374-98-08, 50-374-98-8, NUDOCS 9804060244 | |
| Download: ML20217J247 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil Docket Nos:
50-373;50-374 License Nos:
50-373/98008(DRS); 50-374/98008(DRS)
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
Facility:
LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 Location:
2601 N. 21st Road Marseilles,IL 61341 Dates:
March 17-19,1998 Inspectors:
James Foster, Senior Emergency Preparedness Analyst Thomas Ploski, Emergency Response Coordinator Robert Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Donald Funk Emergency Preparedness Analyst Billy Dickson, Resident inspector, Dresden Jeff Hansen, Resident inspector, LaSalle Randy Crane, Resident inspector, LaSalle Approved by:
James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
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9804060244 980401
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PDR ADOCK 05000373 G
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- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY LaSalle Nuclear Generating Station NRC Inspection Reports 50-373/98008; 50-374/98008 This inspection consisted of evaluation of the licensee's performance during the plant's biennial exercise of the Emergency Plan. It was conducted by regional emergency preparedness inspectors and resident inspector staff from LaSalle and Dresden stations. No violations of NRC requirements were identified. One Exercise Weakness was identified conceming delayed dispatch of " Urgent" priority inplant repair teams.
Plant Suocort Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise demonstrated that emergency plan implementation was effective. Licensee personnel demonstrated their abilities to implement the plan by correctly classifying scenario emergencies, notifying offsite agencies of classified events, activating emergency facilities, providing protective action recommendations when warranted, and taking accident mitigation actions. Interfacility transfers of command and control of event response were orderly and timely.
Exercise performance in the Control Room Simulator (CRS) was effective. CRS staff
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conservatively classified plant conditions using the Emergency Action Levels (EALs)in a timely manner. The initial notifications to State and local agencies were completed within the regulatory time limits but were not immediate. (P4.1.c)
The Technical Support Center (TSC) staff's responses were competent. The EALs were
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continuously reviewed to assure that the current event classification was correct.
Thresholds for potential event escalation to higher classifications were identified and communicated to the staff. The TSC staff was effective in rnaintaining awareness of the emergency response and changing plant conditions. (P4.1.c)
The overall performance of the Operational Support Center staff was adequate. All
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teams were given adequate pre-and post-dispatch briefings which emphasized the need for personal safety and maintaining low radiation exposures. The untimely dispatch of " Urgent" teams was an Exercise Weakness. Determination of SCBA qualifications for responders was weak. (P4.1.c)
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Emergency Oporations Facility (EOF) responders effectively demonstrated their
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capabilities to perform their individual duties and to function as a team. The Manager of I
Emergency Operations correctly declared a General Emergency based on the degradation of the three fission product barriers and the criteria in the Station's EALs.
An offsite protective action recommendation was communicated to State officials along with this emergency reclassification within the required time limit. (P4.1.c)
The scenario was adequately challenging, and event classifications were based on plant
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conditions rather than an abnormal radioactive release. Overall exercise control was very effective. (Section P4.1.c)
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The licensee's self-assessment was in close agreement with the NRC evaluation team's
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conclusions. (Section P4.1.c)
Event classifications were correct and timely. Offsite notifications and offsite protective
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action recommendations were also correct and timely. Inplant activities were properly prioritized. Transfers of command and control were orderly and timely. (Section P4.1.c)
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Report Details IV. Plant Support P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation P3.1 Review of Exercise Oblectives and Scenario (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the 1998 exercise objectives and scenario and determined that they acceptably exercised major elements of the licensee's onsite emergency plan. The scenario provided an adequate challenging framework to support demonstration of the
'l licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario purposely did not include a radiological release.
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P4.1 1998 Evaluated Biennial Emeraency Preoaredness Exercise a.
Insoection Scoce (82301)
On March 18,1998, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving the State of Illinois and the Incal counties of LaSalle and Grundy. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. Onsite and offsite emergency response organizations and emergency response facilities were activated.
The inspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities:
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
e Technical Support Center (TSC)
Operational Support Center (OSC)
e Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
e Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
e The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, and the overallimplementation of the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of its exercise performance, b.
Emergency Resoonse Facility Observations and Findinas b.1 Control Room Simulator (CRS)
Exercise performance in the CRS was effective. The CRS staff used effective three-way communications throughout the exercise. The Unit Supervisor and Shift Manager
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(SM) briefed the control room crew when appropriate. These crew briefings kept the crew aware of current plant conditions, but at times lacked information regarding desired goals. This could rasult in diffuse focus on mitigation strategies.
In most cases, the operators' statements and actions demonstrated a detailed understanding of plant conditions. This was especially notable during entries into emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
One exception to the above occurred after entry into General Plant Abnormal Procedure (LGA-02)" Secondary Containment Control." An "If-Then" statement directed the licensee to isolate all systems discharging into the reactor building if any of the reactor building parameters shown in tables LGA-T1 " Reactor Building Area Temperature" and LGA-T2 " Reactor Building Radiation Limits" are exceeded. During this period radiation levels in the areas around control rod drive hydraulic control unit (HCU) 31-14 were above specified limits. This was one of two areas flagged by the operators as above maximum safe limits. However, the HCU systems could have been isolated by resetting the SCRAM logic, effectively eliminating a primary containment discharge pathway into the reactor building and reducing one of two maximum safe limits exceeded. This action would have eliminated the need for the subsequent entrance into LGA-06 "ATWS Emergency Depressurization," normally regarded as a last choice measure. The licensee acceptably addressed this issue during the critique process.
Using plant conditions, the Shift Manager conservatively classified the Alert using the Emergency Action Levels (EALs). The SM staff made the declaration in a timely manner. The initial notification to the State and local agencies was completed wiin.n tho regulatory time limits. However, the Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification to the NRC concerning the Alert declaration was not made immediately following the notification of appropriate offsite officials as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.72(a)(3). Although the CRS staff had opportunity to make the notification immediately, the notification was made approximately thirty-seven minutes after notification of offsite officials, but within the required one hour timeframe. Delaying notification of the NRC immediately after notification of appropriate state and local agencies is an inspection Followup Item (IFl 50-373/98008-01; 50-374/98008-01).
The CRS staff effectively used control room instrumentation to track plant radiation levels throughout the exercice. The SM properly coordinated and oversaw control room responses in accordance with emergency plan implementing procedures.
There was a formal, verbal announcement in the CRS that the emergency response responsibilities had been turned over to the Technical Support Center (TSC). Transfer of command and control of emergency responsibilities from the Acting Station Director (SM) to the TSC's Station Director was timely. The inspectors also noted effective communications between the CRS crew and the TSC were maintained following transfer of lead responsibilities.
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b.2 Technical Suonort Center (TSC)
Overall performance in the TSC was competent. The TSC was rapidly activated following the Alert declaration. The TSC's SD accepted responsibility for classification of events, notifications, and Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) within thirty-eight minutes of the Alert declaration and twenty-eight minutes of the public address -
announcement requesting activation of the facility. The inspectors noted that the initial Alert public address announcement to plant personnel did not contain the reason for the Alert declaration, if plant personnel are not aware of the reason for an emergency-classification, they may contact the control room staff, causing undesirable distractions.
Facility briefings were good and conducted periodically by the SD. The briefings -
included current emergency conditions and priorities from all the supporting directors.
Status boards were detailed and well maintained throughout the exercise. A closed circuit monitor provided the TSC priorities status board keeper with a view of the Operational Support Center (OSC) priorities status board, which significantly enhanced maintaining the consistency of response teams and priorities between the two facilities.
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Facility habitability was effectively assured by the installed radiation monitoring system and periodic surveys conducted by a Radiation Protection Technician (RPT). The administrative and support group efficiently faxed notifications forms and distributed copies of emergency forms to the facility personnel. Also, the administrative and support _ staff did a good job by identifying and ensuring correction of the Site Area
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Emergency notification form which had not been signed by the SD prior to its transmission to the offsite authorities. This was a minor oversight, as the SD had given verbal approval for transmittal of the form.
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l The EALs were continuously reviewed during facility activation and throughout the exercise to assure that the current event classification was correct. Thresholds for potential event escalation to higher classifications were identified, posted, and communicated to the staff. The Operations, Maintenance, and Technical Directors were effective in maintaining awareness of the emergency response and changing plant conditions. Questions about current conditions were rapidly addressed.
A Shift Manager in the TSC provided significant assistance assessing operations data and supporting the facility directors. He helped by evaluating loss of power issues, identifying which busses and related equipment had been lost, and prioritizing work requests to the OSC. Procedures were well utilized by the staff throughout the exercise.
The SD was very deliberate in his preparations for assuming emergency command and control from the CRS Shift Manager. CRS personnel were requested to advise the Shift Manager when they were ready to transfer their responsibilities. The transfer of command and control from the CRS to the Corporate Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF) was effective and staff personnel were formally informed of the transfers.
Teamwork was evident throughout the exercise. The majority of TSC staff voiced comments to self-check others to avoid missing any response activities or
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communications. Internal communications appeared to be effective. Any misstatements were immediately corrected, so that no errors were communicated outside the facility. The TSC staff effectively tracked OSC team status, and voiced concem regarding the timeliness of dispatch of some " Urgent" priority OSC response teams.
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Ooerational suooort Center (OSC)
The overall performance of the OSC staff was adequate. The OSC was fully staffed and operational within 20 minutes following the Alert declaration. Maintaining the OSC as a dedicated facility greatly enhanced activation during this exercise. The exercise scenario called for a loss of offsite AC power which created a loss of lights and electrical outlets within the OSC. OSC personnel effectively worked through the resulting complications by the prompt issuing of flashlights and temporarily relocating the issuance of electronic dosimetry for OSC inplant repair teams to the TSC. Emergency lighting worked as required.
OSC participants were attentive to briefings by the OSC Director and TSC Director.
TSC briefings, which could be heard on a speaker in the OSC, enhanced OSC effectiveness.' The OSC Director's briefings were adequate but of very short duration, 30 - 60 seconds, and did not provide for an overall discussion of OSC priorities or participant feedback. Craft personnel, located in a separate room, were kept appraised of general plant conditions, such as high radiation areas and emergency classifications, by the use of a briefing board maintained by a RPT.
Status boards were maintained and were generally effective in tracking changing plant conditior.s. and the status of emergency teams. A notable exception was the timeliness i
of dispatching " Urgent" priority inplant repair teams, as noted below. All teams were given adequate pre and post dispatch briefings which emphasized the need for personal safety and maintaining low radiation exposures. Radiation Protection (RP) support for the "O" diesel generator output breaker to Bus 241Y breaker repair team was very good.
Team members showed knowledge of the use of tools and safety gear. However, the team was only partially effective in troubleshooting the breaker. The team did not perform a cubicle inspection, and OSC/TSC staff failed to recommend this inspection.
This resulted in the failure to identify and correct the breaker malfunction, and the Unit 2 diesel generator was not returned to service.
The timeliness of dispatching of some of the " Urgent" priority teams was weak. The OSC dispatched 27 inplant teams, of which five were determined to be " Urgent," the licensee's highest priority designation. This designation applies to teams responsible for lifesaving, mitigating a release to the public, mitigating core damage, or firefighting. The dispatch of such teams should be very rapid. The dispatch times of these teams ranged from an appropriate low of five minutes to an unacceptable high of 43 minutes. TSC and OSC focus on " Urgent" team dispatch was not always observed by the inspectors, and was not consistent with the licensee's stated goal of five minutes for " Urgent" team
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dispatch. The inability to consistently dispatch " Urgent" priority teams in a timely manner was an Exercise Weakness which will be tracked as an inspection Followup item (IFI) 50-373/98008-02; 50-374/98008-02.
I Other problems identified regarding the team designated " Urgent 4" were the failure to verify the status of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) qualifications and maintaining team integrity. RP personnel conducting team dispatch briefings did not verify the status of SCBA qualifications of two personnel assigned to the " Urgent 4"
team prior to dispatch. Additionally, no readily available method to verify SCBA or i
respirator qualifications was maintained in the OSC. To verify SCBA qualifications, RP l
dispatch personnel stated they would call to the RP desk and ask them to verify SCBA
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qualifications. OSC personnel stated that during a site assembly and/or evacuation they would need to physically go down to the RP desk to verify SCBA qualifications.
Demonstration of the ability to determine individuals SCBA qualifications is an inspection Followup item (IFl 50-373/98008-03; 50-374/98008-03).
j A Control Rod Drive (CRD) System Engineer and a Mechanical Maintenance Technician (MMT), did not continuously remain with the " Urgent 4" team. The CRD system engineer left the team to obtain a hard hat. The MMT reported back to the OSC by himself, stating that the team's RPT told him to return back to the OSC by retracing his ingress route. Due to the possibility of changing plant radiological conditions during an emergency, team integrity is important to personnel safety.
b.4 Emergency Ooerations Facility (EOF)
Licensee personnel at the near site EOF effectively demonstrated their capabilities to perform their individual duties and to function as a team. Their interfaces with counterparts in other response facilities were valuable.
Following the Alert declaration, security personnel reported to the building that housed the near site EOF and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) in order to establish security should a decision be made to activate these facilities. The TSC's Security Director was contacted when the EOF and JPIC were judged to be available for use.
Activation of the EOF and JPIC was ordered following the Site Area Emergency declaration per procedures. Both facilities were staffed by personnel who were pre-staged in the local area.
Staffing of the EOF was orderly, incoming personnel efficiently prepared to perform their duties while the Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) contacted his CEOF and TSC counterparts for a thorough initial briefing on degraded plant conditions, prioritized onsite response activities, and information transmitted to State officials. The MEO then gave the EOF staff a detailed initial briefing and informed them of his goal for becoming ready to assume overall command of the licensee's response.
The transfer of command of the licensee's response from the CEOF's MEO to the EOF's MEO was completed in a clear and orderly manner following a brief delay to allow
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CEOF staff to complete periodic notifications to State officials. The MEO prudently contacted a senior State official to better ensure that the official understood that the MEO now led the licensee's overall response to the emergency and to determine whether the State had any information needs or other concerns.
Counterpart communications among EOF, CEOF, and TSC responders remained frequent and effective, as were communications between senior EOF responders and their support staffs. Senior EOF staff closely monitored periodic briefings within the TSC and discussed issues, including accident mitigation priorities, the status of each Unit, and simulated onsite protective actions, with CEOF and TSC counterparts as needed.
The Assistant MEO effectively led senior EOF responders in providing detailed, concise update briefings to all EOF staff twice each hour. Feedback was solicited. Status boards were also effectively used to help keep all EOF staff consistently and accurately informed of degraded plant conditions, plant parameters relevant to potential emergency reclassification, onsite and offsite protective measures, and other response decisions.
Protective measures and reactor safety staffs were properly aggressive in attempting to identify any evidence of an abnormal release and closely monitored the status of the three fission product barriers. Two offsite radiological survey teams were deployed to detect either a monitored or an unmonitored release. Discussions were held regarding augmenting these teams with survey teams from the Braidwood Station. Reports received from the licensee's offsite survey teams were communicated to State officials by EOF staff.
The MEO correctly declared a General Emergency based on the extent of the degradation of the three fission product barriers and the criteria in the Station's EALs. A procedurally correct offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) was communicated to State officials along with this emergency reclassification within the required time limit. A correctly revised PAR was later quickly and accurately communicated to State officials following a sufficient wind direction change. The MEO's counterparts in the CEOF and TSC demonstrated proper teamwork by indicating their agreement with the General Emergency declaration and by contacting the MEO to ensure that they correctly understood the related offsite PARS.
The MEO contacted a senior State official to better ensure that the bases of all PARS were clearly understood. The MEO and appropriate EOF staff remained aware of what offsite protective actions were implemented by State and county officials for the general public as well as livestock within the Emergency Planning Zone.
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
The licensee issued three press releases before and two press releases after the activation of the near site JPIC. Four press releases focused on the current emergency classification, while the fifth addressed the activation of the near site JPIC. The press releases contained accurate and non-speculative information.
One press briefing was observed late in the exercise. Licensee and State spokespersons demonstrated good teamwork in presenting updated information to the small audience and acceptably responding to their questions.
b.5 Scenario and Exercise Control The inspectors made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and
.ealism of the scenario and to evaluate the control of the exercise. The scenario was
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considered adequately challenging, and unique in that it did not include a radioactive release. Emergency classifications were made strictly according to scenario plant conditions. A noteworthy aspect of the exercise scenario was that it postulated a General Emergency declaration and offsite PARS that were based on degraded plant conditions without also postulating an abnormal radiological release.
The inspectors determined that the scenario was appropriate to test basic emergency capabilities and demonstrate onsite and offsite exercise objectives. Overall control of the exercise was adequate. No controller prompting or major exercise control problems were identified.
b.6 Licensee Self-Critiaues The inspectors attended the license's self-critiques in the TSC, OSC, and EOF that occurred immediately after the termination of the exercise. Exercise controllers solicited
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inputs from participants in addition to providing the participants with the controllers' initial assessments of participants' performances. The inspectors concluded that these initial
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self-critiques were detailed, the exercise participants were self-critical, and the participant's and controller's comments were consistent with the NRC's observations.
The licensee's overall self-assessment was effective, and in close agreement with the NRC evaluation team's conclusions, c.
Overall Conclusions The exercise was a competent demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plans and procedures. Event classifications were correct and timely.
Offsite notifications and offsite protective action recommendations were also correct and timely. Inplant activities were properly prioritized. Transfers of command and control were ordeny and timely. The licensee's overall self-assessment was considered effective, and in close agreement with the NRC's conclusions.
Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise
demonstrated that emergency plan implementation was effective. Licensee personnel demonstrated their abilities to implement the plan by correctly classifying scenario emergencies, notifying offsite agencies of classified events, activating emergency facilities, providing protective action recommendations when warranted, and taking accident mitigation actions. Interfacility transfers of command and control of event response were orderly and timely. (P4.1.b)
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Exercise performance in the Controi Room Simulator was effective. CRS staff I
e conservatively classified plant conditions using the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in a timely manner. The initial notifications to State and local agencies were completed within the regulatory time limits, but were not immediate.
(P4.1.b.1)
The Technical Support Center staff's responses were competent. The EALs were continuously reviewed to assure that the current event classification was correct. Thresholds for potential event escalation to higher classifications were identified and communicated to the staff. The TSC staff was effective in maintaining awareness of the emergency response and changing plant conditions. (P4.1.b.2)
The overall performance of the Operational Support Center staff was adequate.
All teams were given adequate pre and post dispatch briefings v.hich emphasized the need for personal safety and maintaining low radiation exposures. The timeliness of " Urgent" team dispatch was an Exercise Weakness. Determination of SCBA qualification for responders was weak.
(P4,1.b.3)
Emergency Operations Facility responders effectively demonstrated their
capabilities to perform their individual duties and to function as a team. The j
Manager of Emergency Opetations correctly declared a General Emergency
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based on the degradation of the three fission product barriers and the criteria in the Station's Emergency Action Levels. An offsite protective action recommendation was communicated to State officials along with this emergency reclassification within the required time limit. (P4.1.b.4)
The scenario was adequately challenging, and event classifications were based e
upon plant conditions rather than an abnormal radioactive release. Overall exercise control was very effective. (P4.1.b.5)
Licensee critiques following termination of the exercise were self-critical and e
included controllers and exercise participants. The licensee's self-assessment was in close agreement with the NRC evaluation team's conclusions. (P4.1.b.6)
P8 Miscellaneous EP lssues P8.1 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-373/97006-06: 50-374/97006-06: During the 1996 emergency exercise the decision to evacuate non-essential personnel from the
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site was untimely. During this exercise, the decision to evacuate non-essential
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personnel from the site was made in a timely manner. This item is closed.
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P8.2 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-373/96006-07: 50-374/96006-07: During the 1996 emergency exercise, inadequate concern was expressed for inplant radiological conditions. During this exercise, adequata concern was demonstrated for inplant
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changing radiation levels, and inplant response team members were advised to use caution due to possibly changing radiological conditions. This item is closed.
P8.3 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-373/96006-08:50-374/96006-08: During the 1996 emergency exercise there was inadequate performance by controllers accompanying inplant teams. During this exercise, controllers accompanying inplant teams performed adequately. This item is closed.
V. Manaaement Meetings X.1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 19,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspertcre asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Bailey, Site Business Manager P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Manager C. Berry, Business Planning T. Burns, Corporate Scenario Development Supervisor E. Carrol, Regulatory Assurance J. Gieseker, Station Manager / Outage Management J. Henry, SOS / OPS N. Hightower, Health Physics Manager A. Howard, Health Physics, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator R. Jeffries, Health Physics, Emergency Preparedness Trainer C. Kelley, Lead Operations Health Physics S. Koval, Lead Technical Health Physics R. Krohn, Corporate EP Scenario Developer P. Nottingham, R. Special Projects Coordinator '
M. Pavez, Licensing RPA H. Pontius, Regulatory Assurance B. Riffer, Q & SA Manager L. Schneider, O & SA Auditor D. Stobaugh, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Supervisor D. Trager, Office Supervisor M. Vonk, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Director T. Wojtulewicz, O & SA Auditor
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NBC M. Huber, Senior Resident inspector J. R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened 50-373;374/98008-01 IFl Notification of the NRC was not immediately after State and local agencies.
50-373;374/98008-02 IFl Inadequate timeliness of " Urgent" priority response teams.
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'50-373;374/98008-03 IFl Response team not checked for SCBA qualifications.
Closed
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50-373; 374/96006-06 IFl Untimely decision to evacuate nonessential staff during 1996 exercise.
50-373;374/96006-07 IFl Inadequate concern demonstrated for inplant radiation levels in 1996 exercise.
50-373;374/96006-08 IFl inadequate performance by controllers accompanying inplant teams in 1996 exercise.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
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AC Alternating Current
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Abnormal Operating Procedure A"lW S Anticipated Transient Without Scram BWR Boiling Water Reactor CEOF-Corporate Emergency Operations Facility CFR Code of Federal Regulations Comed Commonwealth Edison.
CRD Control Rod Drive CRS Control Room Simulator DRP.
Division of Reactoi Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety.
EAL.
Emergency Action Level EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EP Emergency Preparedness ENS Emergency Notification System EOF Emergency Operations Facility
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Emergency Plan implementing Procedure ERO Emergency Response Organization FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HCU Hydraulic Control Unit IDNS lilinois Department of Nuclear Safety IFl Inspection Followup Item IL lilinois IP inspection Procedure JPIC Joint Public Information Center MEO Manager of Emergency Operations MM Mechanical Maintenance NPF Nuclear Power Facility NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
.NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OSC.
Operational Support Center PAR Protective Actioq Recommendation PDR NRC Public Document Room PWR Pressurized Water Reactor Q&SA
- Quality and Safety Assessment RP Radiation Protection RPT Radiation Protection Technician SA
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SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SD Station Director SM-Shift Manager.
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SRI Senior Resident inspector SS Shift Supervisor
.STA Shift Technical Advisor TSC Technical Support Center 15