IR 05000373/1988018
| ML20207G881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1988 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207G873 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-88-18, 50-374-88-17, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-5, NUDOCS 8808240270 | |
| Download: ML20207G881 (11) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ft11SSION
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-373/88018(DRP);50-374/88017(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
June 21 through August 8, 1988 Inspectors:
R. Lanksbury R. Kopriva S. Du Pont P. Kaufman D. Jones f/f6 T Approved By:
M. A. Ring, Ch
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Reactor Projects Section 1B I D'atel Inspection Summary Inspection during the period of June 21 chrough August 8,1988 1ReportNos. 53-373/88017(DRP); No. 50-374/88018(DRP)).
Areas 1nspected:
Routine unannounced inspection conducted by resident s~
inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, Licensee Event Reports, IE Bulletins, Confimatory Action Letters and Generic Letter Followup, outages, security, ESF system walkdown, training and report review.
Results: Of the 11 areas inspected, no violations were identified. The licensee has completed their second refueling / maintenance outage on Unit 1.
The outage work was well planned and coordinated. This resulted in the
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outage being completed on schedule.
The Unit I startup went well with only minor problems bringing the unit back on line.
Toward the end of the report period some radiological concerns arose pertaining to conteminated material found outside of the reactor building but within the protected area. Regional radiological inspectors have been apprised of the prcblem, bk kbbh b y
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company G. J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station s
- W. R. Huntington, Services Superintendent
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- J. C. Renwick, Production Superintendent i
D. S. Berkman,, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning J. V. Schmeltz,-Assistant Superintendent, Operations
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P. F. Manning, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services
- T. A. Haninerich, Regulatory Assurance Surervisor J. Geiseker, Technical Staff Supervisor W. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance J. H. Atchley, Operating Engineer D. A. Brown, Quality Assurance Supervisor M. G. Santic, Master Instrument Mechanic
- C. Allen, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
J. A. Borm, Quality Assurance Inspector
- Denotes personnel attending the exit interview on August 12, 1988.
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Additional Licensee technical and administrative personnel were contacted by the inspectors during the course of the inspection.
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License? Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/84010-06):
Procedure LAP 1300-1, "Work Requests," dated December 1983, was not in agreement with Quality
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Procedure Q.P. 3-52, "Design Control for Plant Operations," in that LAP 1300-1 required the Shift Engineer instead of the Operating Engineer to identify on the work request any in-process or post-maintenance testing, and that LAP 1300-1 assigned responsibility for work request preparation to the Technical Staff Supervisor instead of the Operating
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Engineer or Assistant Superintendent of Operations as required by QP
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3-52. The inspector reviewed LAP 1300-1, revised on March 17, 1988,
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and determined that step F.3 adequately ensured that the Operating Engineer reviewed and approved the test requirements associated with
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work requests and that LAP 1300-1 meets the requirements of QP 3-51.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (374/86040-01): Hydraulic Control Unit Valve 123 j
had debris in it which allowed a control rod drive to drift. The licensee had renoved the debris from the valve and the inspector verified that the control rod drive did not demonstrate further drif ting problems during the previous operating cycle. This item is closed.
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(Closed)OpenItem(374/86046-02) and Licensee Event Report (374/87001-LL): The 2A Diesel Generator did not automatically start i
due to' a high lube oil pressure interlock with the air start motor V
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protective relays.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations (NRR)
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evaluated the design of the lube oil / air start motor protective circuitry and found the design to be adequate in that it provided protection to prevent bleed off of starting air during repeated start / failures of the diesel and that it provided assurance of meeting the required accident conditions during c loss of offsite power event.
These items are closed.
(Closed)OpenItem(374/83001-01):
Inadequate procedures for handling irradiated fuel.
Procedures for handling-irradiated fuel had not been issued, including procedures for dropped fuel bundles. This item was also documented against Unit 1 as item 373/83001-03 and closed in'
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inspection report 373/83028. The inspector verified that LOA-NB 08,
"Fuel Element Failure," and LFP-400-1, "Fuel Movements Within The Reactor And Between The Reactor And Spent Fuel Storage Pool" had been issued.
This item is closed.
(Closed)UnresolvedItems(373/85040-03and374/85041-03): Operational
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Analysis Department (OAD) personnel had not received training on station administrative procedures.
The inspector verified that during the previous two cycles of training, 0AD had received training on station
administrative procedures. These items are closed.
(Closed)OpenItems(373/85040-04and374/85041-04): OAD initiated
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Field Change Requests (FCRs) do not appear to be adequate. The inspector reviewed several FCR packages initiated by OAD and determined that they contained adequate engineering and administrative instructions for implementation of activities at LaSalle.
These items are closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Items (373/85040-01 and 374/85041-01): Documentation
of OAD training does not contain supportive evidence of the subject matter in sufficient detail to allow determination of the adequacy of
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W training. Comonwealth Edison provided instructions to all site OAD l
organizations to document training objectives and supportive details.
The inspector verified that training documentation was of sufficient
i detail to demonstrate that conducted training was adequate. These items are closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Items (373/85040-02 and 374/85041-02):,0AD is to provide a hierarchy of procedures to be used during activities conducted at LaSalle. The inspector verified that 0AD administrative instructions provide adequate guidance of site, corporate and i
department procedure hierarchy. Additionally, the inspector verified that site administrative procedures are also included in OAD procedure
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hierarchy. These items are closed.
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(Closed) Violation (373/85C19-03):
Failure to provide a procedure instructing actions to be taken to shut down the running control rod drive pump and start the idle pump during operations. The inspector verified that operating procedure LOP-RD-03, "Startup of Standby CRD
Pump in Non-Emergency Conditions" has been issued and that LOP-RD-03
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adequately addresses actions, limitations and cautions associated with
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switching running and idle CRD pumps during normal operating conditions.
This item is closed, i
(Closed)OpenItem(374/83037-04):
Replace brittle scram solenoid o-rings identified during licensee inspection per Work Request (WR)
29986. The inspector reviewed completed URs 60302 and 63099 which replaced al.1 o-rings in the Unit 2 scram solenoid valves. WR 60302 was completed on August 7,1986, and WR 63099 was corrpleted on March 6, 1987. The inspector also reviewed the test data of the
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scram solenoid valve leak test, LES-RD-01, and verified that all valves were satisfactory after replacement.
This item is closed.
i (Closed) License Condnion 2.C.(3) of License No. NPF-11, "Conduct of
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Work Activities During Fuel Load and Initial Startup," which states that the licensee shall review by comittee all Unit 1 Preoperational Testing and System Demonstration activities performed concurrently with Unit 1 initial fuel loading or with the Unit 1 Startup Test Program to assure that the activity will not affect the safe performance of the Unit 1 fuel leading or the portion of the Unit 1 Startup Program being performed. The review shall address, as a minimum, system
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interaction, span of control, staffing, security and health physics, with respect to performance of the activity concurrently with the Unit i
I fuel loading or the portion of the Unit 1 Startup Program being
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performed. The comittee for the review shall be composed of at least
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three members, knowledgeable in the above areas, and who meet the
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qualifications for professional-technical personnel specified oy section 4.4 of ANSI N18.7-1971. At least one of these three shall be
a senior member of the Assistant Superintendent of Operation's staff.
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The inspector verified by review of documents associated with procedure LAP 100-19, "Test Interface Comittee", that the preoperational testing
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and system demonstrations performed after Unit 1 fuel load were reviewed and evaluated by the Test Interf ace Comittee.
In addition, the
inspector verified that the comittees' organization met the rcquirements of the license condition and that the review addressed system interaction, i
staffing, span of control, security and health physics with respect to performance of the tests and demonstration activity concurrently with the
q Unit I fuel leading and Startup Program. This license condition is closed, i
(Closed)LicenseCondition2.C.(25).(b)ofLicenseNo.NPF-11."Fire Protection Program (Section 9.5, SER, SSER #2, SSER #3)," which states i
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that prior to initial criticality, the licensee shall install a 1-hour rated barrier on all four sides of a partially protected power cable t
pan and a general sprinkler system, both located in the diesel generator corridor.
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l The inspector verified that the NRC staff confinned, per Supplement 4 i
to the LaSalle Safety Evaluation Report (SER), NUREG 0519, that the
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additional fire protection in the diesel generator corridor had been added prior to exceeding 5 percent power as required by License Condition 2.C.(?5)(b). As such, this license condition is closed.
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(Closed) License Condition 2.C.(30).(p).(3) of License No. NPF-11.
"Improving Licensee's Emergency Preparedness," which states that prior
to exceeding 5 percent power, the licensee-shall demonstrate the state
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of offsite preparedness provides assurance that adequate protective
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measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological
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emergency. The inspector verified that the licensee was in compliance
and satisfied the license condition as stated in Supplement 4 of the
i SER. The suppletent verified that the Federal Emergency Management
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Agency's observation of the April 14, 1982 exercise resolved all
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remaining concerns and, as such, satisfied the license condition.
This license condition is closed.
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(Closed) License Condition 2.C.(5).(a) of License No. NPF-11. "Snubbers,"
which states that prior to criticality, the licensee shall submit for NRC approval a revised list of safety-related snubbers to be contained
in Table 3.7.9-1 of the Technical Specifications, to include such l
snubbers on lines 3 inches in diameter or less.
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The inspector verified that this license condition was satisfied as documentedinSupplement4(NUREG0519)totheSafetyEvaluation Report (SER). The SER supplement states that the Technical
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Specifications were revised to include the listing-of all safety related snubbers as required by License Condition 2.C.(5),a). This was accomplished by License Amendment No. 1, dated June 18, 1982.
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This licer.se condition is closed.
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j (Closed) License Condition 2.C.(30).(f) to License No. NPF-11. "Post
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Accident Sampling,' which states that prior to criticality, the licensee
shall install and test a high radiation sampling system for obtaining
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reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling under degraded core accident conditions without excessive exposure.
The inspector verified l
that Supplement 4 of the SER reviewed and documented the installation
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and acceptance of the post accident sampling capability of Unit 1.
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license condition is closed.
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(Closed)LicenseConditions2.C.(27),(a),2.C.(27),(b)and2.C.(27)(c)
J to License No. NPF-11 "Industrial Security." Condition 2.C.(27).La)
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required that all keys, locks and combinations and related equipment used to control access to protected areas and vital areas to be
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Supplement 5 to the SER verified
compliance with this condition. Condition 2.C.(27),(b) required that the issue of keys, locks, combinations and other access control devices
are controlled and issued only to those individuals who possess access
authorization.
Supplement 5 of the SER verified compliance with this condition. Condition 2.C.(27).(c) required changing of the access control devices when access authorization is withdrawn to an individual
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due to lack of trustworthiness, reliability or inadequate work perfonn-
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ance. This condition was also verified to be met by Supplement 5 to the i
SER. These license conditions are closed.
l (Closed) License Conditions 1.f. 2.b and 10 of Attachment 1 to Licensee No NPF-11. These conditions pertained to outstanding preoperational
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testing and system demonstrations to be conducted after the Unit 1 fuel load. The inspector verified that preoperational PT-SI-102 (condition
1.F) and demonstration SD-SI-101 had been perfomed by' reviewing docu-mcntation associated with the Test Interface Committee. Additionally, Supplement 4 of the SER determined that all required preoperational
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tests and system demonstrations had been completed. These license conditions are closed.
(Closed)OpenItem(373/86036-01): Review procedure and implementation of control rod drive (CRD) timing test LOS-RD-SR5 for adequacy during Unit 2 startup testing program.
The inspector reviewed procedure
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LOS-RD-SRS, "Control Rod Drive Timing," through Revision 5 and verified that the procedure contained the following statement; "speed tolerance by design is 48 seconds + 20% (with the final core loading complete).
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If adjustments are necessary, attempt to obtain speed + 10% to allow for changes in seal leakage.
(For Unit 2 only) FMCRD at 02-43 is
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exempt from this timing requirement." This item is closed.
(Closed)OpenItems(173/85021-01and374/85021-04): Correct instrument
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rack valve labeling problems. Tha inspector verified that the valve labeling was corrected and documented the Unit I review in inspection
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report 373/88004. This item is closed.
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No violation or deviations were identified in this area.
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Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
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logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the
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period from June 21 to August 8, 1988. The inspectors verified the i
operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and i
verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted
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to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards,
fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance i
j requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
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The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
In addition,
+he inspector walked down the Unit I drywell just prior to final closecut
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in preparation for startup to verify that equipnent conditions that could degrade system perfomance had been resolved, a
f The inspectors reviewed new procedures and changes to procedures that were implemented during the inspection period. The review consisted of a verification for accuracy, correctness, and compliance with regulatory requirements.
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The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
On July 4,1988, the licensee corrrnenced startup of Unit 1.- The reactor was taken critical at approximately 6:45 p.m.(CDT). Unit I was coming out of a 114 day refueling / maintenance outage. Major accomplishments during the outage include rebuilding of the 1A reactor recirculation (RR) pump, overhaul of the Unit I turbine, repair of the RR' pump discharge valve, overhaul of the centrol rod drives, and the completion j
of 79 plant modifications.
As of July 8,1988, the sumer weather has affected LaSalle Unit 2
operation by reducing generator output by about 25 MWe, Unit 1-had just come nut of an outage and had been similarly affected. This output reduction was associated with elevated cooling lake temperatures of 82 degrees, resulting from prolonged regional temperatures of greater
than 90 degrees.
Illinois river discharge and makeup from the river to the lake has been unaffected.
On July 17, 1988, at 5:00 p.m.(CDT), the Unit 1 "VC" ventilation
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Radiation Monitor failed resulting in an initiation of the "VC" emergency train to the control room.
The detector was determined to be operable and the system was returned to normal. Technical Specifications require that two of the roof intake monitors are to be operable. The licensee i
verified that the remaining three monitors were operable and returned the emergency train back to normal in the standby operation mode.
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On July 17, 1988, at approximately 6:50 p.m.(CDT), the licensee declared
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the Safety Parameter Display System (SPOS) inoperable. This resulted from the loss of the computer room ventilation system's ability to
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adequately cool the process computer. The licensee is required to l
declare the SPDS inoperable if adequate cooling cannot be returned within two hours. The high temperatures in the computer room were
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associated with the elevated temperatures in the cooling lake. The computer room temperatures were returned to normal and the SPDS declared operable at 7:00 a.m. on July 18, 1988.
At6:15a.m.(CDT) July 18, 1988, Unit i suppression pool temperature exceeded the Technical Specification (TS) limit of 100 degrees F.
The licensee entered the appropriate TS 24-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO).
The temperature of the suppression pool at 9:30 a.m. (CDT) was 100 degrees F, reduced from 102 degrees F by supprassion pool spray and 2 trains of cooling. The high suppression pool
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temperature was due to continuing high area temperature and difficulty in cooling the suppression pool because of elevated lake temperatures.
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The licensee continued cooling of the suppression pool which reduced the temperature below 100 degrees F.
The licensee then exited the LCO on July 19. Also, because of the extended elevated lake temperature
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the site had experienced a n:oderate fish kill of approximately 2000 fish in the cooling lake.
As of 3:00 p.m on August 4, 1988, the LaSalle Station cooling lake temperature was 88 degrees F and the suppression pool temperatures were 92 degrees F for Unit 1 and 94 degrees F for Unit 2.
Both units were derated slightly due to the elevated lake temperature contributing to the inability to maintain an adequate condenser vacuum at full power.
If the lake temperature does reach 90 degrees F the Had Chem department performs an analysis for thermal pollution.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703, 71710)
Station maintenance activitiu of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted i
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and -industry
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codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
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i The followirg items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
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removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
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inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
perfonned prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
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control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by
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qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;
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p radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls t
were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of i
outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety
related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
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The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Control Rod Drive Filter Change Out 1 SA01C Air Compressor Filter Change i
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
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The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical specifications for the items listed below and verified that testing
was perfomed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation
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were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components
were accomplished, that test results confonned with technical specifi-
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I cations and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by
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appropriate management personnel.
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The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
LIS-NB-418 Unit 2 Reactar Vessel Low Pressure LPCS/LPCI Injection I
Valve Permissive Functional Test.
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LIS-CM-401 Unit 2 Suppression Chamber Wide Range ar.d Narrow Range Wateir Level Functional Test.
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LOS-0G-M2 1A (2A) Diesel Generator Operability Test.
l LIS-HP-301 Unit 1 HPCS Sparger Differential Pressure _ Functional Test.
LIP-RI-605 Unit 2 RCIC Pump Minimum Flow Valve High Discharge
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Pressure Calibration.
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On July 12, 1988, at 1:40 p.m.(CDT), the licensee declared the Unit 1 i
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system inoperable because of a r,purious trip and closure of the turbine trip / throttle valve during an
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attempt to reses the turbine for standby operation following a routine
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surveillance. The trip / throttle valve was successfully reset on a second attempt, but tne licensee declared the system inoperable to
investigate the spurious trip. This placed RCIC in a 14 day limiting
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condition of operation.
Initial investigation of the cause has determined to be that the tappet in the mechanical over speed trip
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unit was worn. The Mechanical Maintenance department replaced the
tappet and tested the RCIC turbine satisfactorily.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Licensee Event Reports Followup (93702)
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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee pe sonnel, and l
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review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to
determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate
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corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent
recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical-
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i Specifications
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The following reports of nonroutine events were reviewed by the a.
inspectors. Based on this review, it was detennined that the
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events were of minor safety significance, did not represent l
j program deficiencies, were properly reported, and were properly
compensated for.
These reports a e closed.
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l 373/88014-01 Mechanical Snubber Functional Test Failures During j
Unit 2 Second Refuel Surveillance.
374/88008-00 Two Emergency Core Cooling Systems Inoperable Caused
by Loose Connections on Feed Breaker.
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373/88013 00 Spurious Arrrnonia Detector Trip Due to Failure of Front Optics Indicating lamp.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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IE Bulletin, Confirmatory Action Letter and Generic Letter Followup T92703)
t On the morning of July 8,1988, the licensee notified the NRC of the
results on their followup on IEB 8805, "Nonconforming materials _ supplied
by Piping Supplies, Inc.".
The licensee identified 129 flanges potentially affected by IEB 8805.
Six (6) flanges failed hardness testing performed in response to the IEB.
Four flanges that failed were
located on the Unit 28 diesel generator oil system, and the other two
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were on a clean condensate line to containment and a LPCS pump motor
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cooler flange.
The licensee is currently pursuing corrective measures for the six (6) flanges.
The licensee has concluded its testing of the accessible flanges identified under IEB 88-05.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
Outages (71707 - 61715)
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On July 22, 1988, at approximately 8:00 p.m. (CDT), Unit I started a
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48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> maintenance outage.
The unit was maintained between 600 and 800 psig in hot standby during the outage.
Major maintenance activities completed included balancing the main turbine, repairing a steam leak on the No. 4 Main Turbine Control Valve (MTCV), replacing a leaking Safety Relief Valve (SRV), and servicing the servo's associated with
the recirculation flow control valves.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
9.
Security (71881)
The licensee's security activities were observed by the inspectors
during routine facility tours and during the inspectors' site arrivals
and departures. Observations included the security personnel's
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performance associated with access control, security checks, and l
surveillance activities, and focused on the adequacy of security staffing, the security response (corrpensatory measures), and the i
securit'/ staff's attentiveness and thoroughness. The security forces'
perforn.a.ce in these areas appeared satisfactory.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area, 10.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The operability of selec'ed engineered safety features was confirmed
by the inspectors during walkdowns of the accessible portions of
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several systems. The following items were included:
verification that procedures match the plant drawings, equipment conditions, i
house <eeping instrumentation, valve and electrical breaker lineup
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jumpers,per procedure checklist), and verification that locks, tags, status ( etc. are properly attached and identifiable.
The following systems were walked down during this inspection period:
Unit 2 125 V DC Power Source Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control
"2A" Onergency Diesel Generator i
"2B" Emergency Diesel Generator
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No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Training (41400)
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The inspector, through discussions with personnel and c review of training records, evaluated the licensee's training program for operations and maintenance personnel to determine whether the general knowledge of the individuals was sufficient for their assigned tasks.-
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Report Review
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During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's
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Monthly Operating Report for June. The inspectors confirmed'that the infonnation provided met the requirements of Technical Specification , 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
13. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee represer tatives (denoted in Paragraph (
1) throughout the month and at the conc'.usion of the inspection period i
and surrrnarized the sc. ope and findines of the inspection activities, j
The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspectors also
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discussed the likely informational contents of the inspection report
with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during l
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The licensee did not identify any such documents or (
processes as proprietary.
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