IR 05000373/2023003
| ML23312A325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/2023 |
| From: | Robert Ruiz NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB1 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation |
| References | |
| IR 2023001 | |
| Download: ML23312A325 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
LASALLE COUNTY STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2023003; 05000374/2023003 AND 07200070/2023001
Dear David Rhoades:
On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at LaSalle County Station. On October 11, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with John VanFleet, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at LaSalle County Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at LaSalle County Station.
November 9, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Robert Ruiz, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000373; 05000374; 07200070 License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000373; 05000374; 07200070
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000373/2023003; 05000374/2023003; 07200070/2023001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-003-0053; I-2023-001-0107
Licensee:
Constellation Nuclear
Facility:
LaSalle County Station
Location:
Marseilles, IL
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2023 to September 30, 2023
Inspectors:
J. Benjamin, Senior Resident Inspector
N. Cuevas, Resident Inspector
G. Edwards, Senior Enforcement Specialist
J. Meszaros, Resident Inspector
N. Shah, Senior Project Engineer
P. Smagacz, Resident Inspector
R. Zuffa, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Approved By:
Robert Ruiz, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at LaSalle County Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Verify That Received Equipment Conformed with Procurement Documents,
Resulting in an Internal Fire and LaSalle Unit 2 Manual Scram Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000374/2023003-02 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71153 The inspectors identified a self-revealed Green finding for the licensees failure to assure that purchased equipment conformed to procurement documents in accordance with site procedure SM-AA-101, Warehouse Operations. Specifically, the licensee received and applied a thermal joint compound on bolted connections found in the Unit 2 isophase bus duct enclosure. An electric joint compound that would have increased conductivity at these connections should have instead been used. The issue resulted in a fire on the 735 elevation of the turbine building, where the isophase bus duct is located, and a manual scram of the Unit 2 reactor.
Failure to Ensure 'A' Train Main Control Room Ventilation Return Fan Breaker Instantaneous Trip Setpoint Set to Design Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000373,05000374/2023003-03 Open/Closed
[H.7] -
Documentation 71153 The inspectors identified a self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to ensure adequate test control prior to placing the 'A' train main control room control room ventilation system (VC) and auxiliary electric room ventilation system (VE) return fan (0VE02CA) breaker into service on May 5, 2021. As a result of the performance deficiency, the VC/VE 'A' train was declared inoperable on multiple occasions due to the 0VE02CA return fan breaker instantaneous current trip setpoint set below the design requirements.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000373,05000374/20 23003-01 Continuous Basket Shim Design Change for HI-STORM 100 60855 Open
LER 05000374/2022-003-02 LER 2022-003-02 for LaSalle County Station,
Unit 2, Manual Scram due to lsophase Bus Duct Fire Followed by 2A RPS Normal Power Supply Trip 71153 Closed LER 05000373/2023-001-00 LER 2023-001-00 for LaSalle County Station,
Unit 1, Low Pressure Core Spray Inoperable due to Minimum Flow Valve Flow Pressure Switch Failure 71153 Closed LER 05000373,05000374/20 22-003-00 LER 2022-003-00 for LaSalle County Station,
Units 1 and 2, Main Control Room and Auxiliary Electric Room HVAC Declared Inoperable Due to Multiple Component Failures 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 7, 2023, the unit was down powered to approximately 63 percent for planned control rod pattern adjustment, feed pump turbine maintenance and main turbine stop valve testing. The unit returned to full power on September 8, 2023, and operated at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 16, 2023, the unit down powered to approximately 80 percent for a planned control rod pattern adjustment. The unit returned to full power on September 8, 2023, and operated at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's overall winter readiness preparations.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 low pressure core spray system on August 8, 2023
- (2) Unit common 'B' train control room ventilation and cooling (VC/VE) system during
'A' VC/VE planned unavailability on September 26, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 8B2, "Diesel Generator Building, Elevation 710'-0," Unit 2 Division 2 Standby Diesel-Generator Room," and Fire Zone 8B4, "Diesel Generator Building, 710'-0" Elevation, U2 Division 2 Diesel Day Tank Room," on August 2, 2023
- (2) Fire Zone 4D2, "Aux. Bldg., 749'-0" Elev., U2 Cable Spreading Room," and Fire Zone 4D4, "Aux. Bldg., 749'-0" Elev., U2 Electrical Equipment Room," on August 31, 2023
- (3) Fire Zone 7B1, "Diesel Generator Building, Elevation 710'-0", Unit 1 HPCS Standby Diesel-Generator Room," and Fire Zone 7B4, "Diesel Generator Building, 710'-0" Elevation, U1 HPCS Diesel Day Tank Room," on September 28, 2023
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a planned Unit 1 down power to 85 percent on September 7, 2023, for rod pattern adjustment and to take a turbine driven reactor feed pump offline for maintenance.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the conduct of licensed operators during simulator training on July 11, 2023.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance associated with the 2A emergency diesel generator starting air motors inline oiler as a result of an observed failure to educt oil into the starting motors on May 15, 2023.
- (2) Unit 1 low-pressure core spray pump minimum flow valve, switch 1E21-N004, on August 29, 2023
- (3) The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance associated with the common 'B' diesel fire pump as a result of coolant relief valve lifting during a scheduled monthly run-on August 4, 2023.
- (4) The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance on 1A emergency diesel generator on September 6, 2023.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)emergent maintenance required for the 'B' diesel fire pump starting on August 4, 2023 (Work Order [WO] 5389569)
(2)emergent maintenance requiring swap of the Unit 2B reactor protection system from the MG set feed to alternate feed on September 14, 2023 (3)planned Action Green risk associated with Unit 1 high-pressure core spray (HPCS)and division 3 emergency diesel generator work window September 18 - 21, 2023, and planned reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) surveillance on September 21, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Action Request (AR) 4692276 "Unit 1 Division 3 ECCS [emergency core cooling system] Equipment Cooler as Found Low Flow"
- (2) Unit 2B diesel generator operability determination due to room ventilation supply filter high differential pressure on September 29, 2023 (3)2A residual heat removal (RHR) pump operability determination due to seal leakage on August 29, 2023
- (4) Unit 2 RCIC operability after American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)testing of system check valves was not completed as described in AR 4704224
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (10 Samples)
- (1) PMT of the weld repair on the 2B RT regenerative heat exchanger as described in WO 5374387
- (2) PMT of the Unit 1 main control room gross gamma radiation monitor 1RIT-CM011 following power supply replacement as described in WO 5383393
- (3) Unit 2A RHR suppression spray isolation valve 2E12-F027A testing following breaker maintenance on August 8, 2023 (4)1A diesel generator testing following maintenance window on September 21, 2023 (5)1A diesel generator cooling water pump PMT following breaker replacement on August 8, 2023
- (6) PMT of the turbine stop valve #4, channel 'A' relay after limit switch replacement as described in WO 5370581
- (7) Unit 1 HPCS room cooler testing following maintenance on September 21, 2023 (8)1B diesel generator testing following maintenance window on September 21, 2023
- (9) Unit common 0B VC and VE system following maintenance on September 27, 2023 (10)post-maintenance calibration of 1LT-FC165 "Unit 1 Primary Level Transmitter for the Spent Fuel Pool," in accordance with WO 1796617 on September 28, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)1B diesel generator testing on July 24, 2023
- (2) Unit 1 quarterly scram time testing on September 8, 2023
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2A RHR system in-service testing on August 9, 2023
- (2) Work Orders 5363218 and 5380636, "0 (common) DG Cooling Water Pump In-service Test," on August 7, 2023
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) FLEX diesel generator 0FF01KB triennial functional test per LOS-FSG-SR1 on September 22, 2023
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
(1)emergency preparedness exercise on August 15, 2023, in the control room simulator and technical support center
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
& Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling, and securing the following radioactive materials:
(1)sea-van container located adjacent to the interim radiological waste storage facility (2)waste barrels located in the radiological waste facility
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
- (1) ALPS unit (2)resin processing equipment
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste:
- (1) ALPS charcoal (2)dry activated waste smears (3)spent resin tank
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive shipment LW-23-005, "Dewatered Spent Resin, LSA-II."
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) LM-23-017; Laundry Shipment; LSA-II
- (2) LW-22-024; Spent Resin; Type B(U)
- (3) LW-23-003; Dewatered Spent Resin; LSA-II
- (4) LW-23-019; Dry Activated Waste (DAW); LSA-II
- (5) LW-23-030; Spent Resin; LSA-II
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (September 1, 2022, through July 31, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (September 1, 2022, through July 31, 2023)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) September 1, 2022, through July 31, 2023 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) September 1, 2022, through July 31, 2023
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) AR 4524567, "U2 Manually Scrammed due to fire in U2 Gen Bus Ducts," as associated with root cause report "Unit 2 Manually Scrammed Due to a Fire in the Isophase Bus Duct"
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
(1)nonemergent work backlog list
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000374/2022-003-02 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, "Manual Scram Due to Isophase Bus Duct Fire Followed By 2A RPS Normal Power Supply Trip,"
(Agencywide Documents Access and Management System [ADAMS] Accession No. ML23167A076). The inspectors reviewed the updated LER submittal. The previous LER submittal was reviewed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report
===05000373/2023001 and 05000374/2023001. The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153.
This LER is closed.
- (2) LER 05000373/2023-001-00, "Low Pressure Core Spray Inoperable Due to Minimum Flow Valve Pressure Switch Failure," (ADAMS Accession No. ML23167A071). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements. This LER is closed.
- (3) LER 05000373/2022-003-00; 05000373/2022-003-01; 05000373/2022-003-02, "Main Control Room and Auxiliary Electric Room HVAC Declared Inoperable Due to Multiple Component Failures," (ADAMS Accession No. ML22362A013. The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is closed.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 60855 - Operation of an ISFSI Operation Of an ISFSI===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) cask loading activities from July 10 through July 14, 2023. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities during the loading of Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) No. 811:
- fuel selection and fuel loading
- heavy load movement of transfer cask and multipurpose canister into stack-up configuration
- drying and backfill evolutions
- closure welding and non-destructive weld evaluations
- stack-up and download of the MPC from the transfer cask into the storage cask
- radiological field surveys The inspectors performed walkdowns of the ISFSI pad, which also included performing independent radiation surveys and walkdowns of the ISFSI haul path.
The inspectors evaluated the following:
- spent fuel selected for loading into dry cask storage during this loading campaign
- selected corrective action program documents
- selected 72.48 screenings
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unresolved Item (Open)
Continuous Basket Shim Design Change for HI-STORM 100 URI 05000373,05000374/2023003-01 60855
Description:
The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) related to design changes on the dry storage system multi-purpose canisters (MPC) utilized by the licensee. On February 17, 2021, Holtec International, the supplier of the HI-STORM 100 dry storage system for LaSalle County Station, performed Engineering Change Orders (ECO) 5014-320 and 1021-153; and 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation 1502. These evaluations performed a design change to introduce a new MPC basket design to the HI-STORM 100 dry storage system, designated as the continuous basket shim (CBS) variant.
On September 12, 2023, the NRC issued Inspection Report 07201014/2022-201 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23145A175) to Holtec International, identifying three apparent violations associated with design change. The apparent violations, related to 10 CFR 72.48 and 10 CFR 72.146 requirements, are for Holtec's apparent failure to provide adequate bases that the CBS variant did not require a license amendment; apparent failure to ensure the change did not result in a departure from the method of evaluations described in the Final Safety Analysis Report; and apparent failure to establish design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design.
On June 2, 2023, the licensee adopted Holtec's CBS ECO/72.48 through the licensee's 72.48 program, #159, and subsequently loaded the MPC-68M-CBS canisters from July 10, 2023 to July 31, 2023.
General licensees are responsible to ensure that each cask they use conforms to the terms, conditions, and specifications of a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) or an amended CoC listed in 10 CFR 72.214 and regulatory requirements in 10 CFR Part 72.
Accordingly, pending determination of the final enforcement action to Holtec International associated with the design change, it may be determined that LaSalle County Station's loading of the dry storage system did not meet regulatory requirements.
Planned Closure Actions: The licensee's performance related to the adoption and use of the MPC-68M-CBS canister is unresolved at this time as the NRC has not made a final determination for the apparent violations documented in Inspection Report 07201014/2022-201. The Inspectors can evaluate the licensee's compliance with regulatory requirements associated with loading of MPC baskets with the CBS variant once a final determination is made.
Licensee Actions: The licensee's loading of the CBS fuel basket MPC-68M-CBS assumes the risk of potentially being in violation of regulatory requirements pending the outcome of the NRC enforcement actions involving Holtec.
The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program and initiated actions to review the results of the NRC's final determination and determine if changes are needed to station documents.
Corrective Action References: AR 4683011; "Potential NRC Concern Regarding HOLTEC DCS System," June 6, 2023 Failure to Verify That Received Equipment Conformed with Procurement Documents, Resulting in an Internal Fire and LaSalle Unit 2 Manual Scram Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000374/2023003-02 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71153 The inspectors identified a self-revealed Green finding for the licensees failure to assure that purchased equipment conformed to procurement documents in accordance with site procedure SM-AA-101, Warehouse Operations. Specifically, the licensee received and applied a thermal joint compound on bolted connections found in the Unit 2 isophase bus duct enclosure. An electric joint compound that would have increased conductivity at these connections should have instead been used. The issue resulted in a fire on the 735 elevation of the turbine building, where the isophase bus duct is located, and a manual scram of the Unit 2 reactor.
Description:
The isophase bus at LaSalle County Generating Station (LCGS) consists of three aluminum buses, one per phase, that connect the output of the main generator to several station transformers. Portions of the isophase bus can be found in the turbine building, on the 735 elevation of the building. The isophase bus is cooled by forced air within three separate enclosures surrounding each of the bus phases. The configuration including both the aluminum buses and their associated enclosures is called the isophase bus duct (IPBD).
Segments of the bus phases are connected by braided copper flexible links that allow for thermal expansion. Similar laminated copper shunt connections within the enclosures provide the same purpose. A retractable cover with a sealing neoprene gasket is placed over the shunts so that both the shunts and flexible links can be accessed for inspection and maintenance.
On September 26, 2022, smoke was reported in the 735 elevation of the LCGS turbine building. Members of the licensee fire brigade identified that the Unit 2 A-phase IPBD enclosure cover was on fire. Operations personnel scrammed Unit 2 as a result; concurrently the fire was extinguished by the fire brigade using a fire extinguisher. The inspectors reviewed the licensees event root cause report. They noted that the identified cause of the event was use of an incorrect joint compound applied at the bolted connection surfaces associated with the enclosure shunts.
The root cause report noted that the incorrect compound was applied during a maintenance activity on the Unit 2 IPBD in February 2021. The maintenance activity required that both shunt and flexible link connections be removed, cleaned, and reinstalled. The associated instructions required that an electric joint compound be applied to contact surfaces of the enclosure shunt bolted connections to increase the conductivity at these connections.
Instead, a thermal joint compound was found to be applied, which had the effect of increasing the resistance at these connections. These localized areas of increased resistance resulted in thermal hot spots, inadvertent rerouting of current flow through IPBD connections, and mechanical failure of shunt connections and IPBD structural members. Eventually, the neoprene gasket on the retractable cover ignited, causing the observed fire.
The root cause report notes that the incorrect thermal joint compound was provided by a vendor even though the correct electrical joint compound was requested in an associated purchase order. The incorrect joint compound was then received and accepted into storage at LCGS. Reference AR 4558801 further identifies that the purchase order requested a specific manufacturers electrical joint compound. A material handler did not identify upon receipt that a different manufacturers thermal joint compound was supplied. The material handler also did not identify that part numbers on the purchase order and on the received compound did not match. The inspectors reviewed the material receipt and inspection procedure in effect at the time of compound procurement, Procedure SM-AA-102, Warehouse Operations. It requires that a material handler perform an inspection of a part at the time of receipt and verify that associated identification and markings conform with the associated purchase order. Extent of condition review included in the licensee root cause report identified that the incorrect thermal joint compound was also used during maintenance activities on the Unit 1 IPBD.
Corrective Actions: During the last Unit 2 refueling outage in February 2023, the licensee replaced bolted enclosure shunts and bus flexible links with welded flexible connections. This eliminated the need for periodic maintenance on the shunts and the need for application of a joint compound on bolted connections. The licensee will also replace Unit 1 shunts and links during the upcoming February 2024 refueling outage. In the meantime, an adverse condition monitoring plan was implemented to monitor Unit 1 IPBD temperatures on a shiftly basis. The licensee also removed the thermal joint compound from the supply system and performed an extent of condition review to evaluate other uses of the incorrect joint compound within the plant.
Corrective Action References: AR 4524567 and AR 4558801
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to assure that purchased equipment, specifically a joint compound for application on IPBD enclosure shunt connections, conformed to procurement documents in accordance with site procedure SM-AA-101, Warehouse Operations, was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and is therefore, a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, use of the incorrect joint compound on Unit 2 bolted shunt connections in the IPBD bus duct enclosure directly resulted in a fire at the 735 elevation of the turbine building and a manual scram of the Unit 2 reactor on September 26, 2022.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors answered no to the questions included in Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions. The finding was thus screened as having very low safety significance (Green)because the internal fire did not result in the loss of mitigating equipment relied upon to transition the plant to a stable shutdown condition.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow the requirements included in site procedure SM-AA-101, Warehouse Operations, which required that purchased equipment conform to procurement documents upon receipt. As a result, the incorrect joint compound was received at LCGS and used on the Unit 2 IPBD enclosure shunts.
Enforcement:
inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
Failure to Ensure 'A' Train Main Control Room Ventilation Return Fan Breaker Instantaneous Trip Setpoint Set to Design Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000373,05000374/2023003-03 Open/Closed
[H.7] -
Documentation 71153 The inspectors identified a self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to ensure adequate test control prior to placing the 'A' train main control room control room ventilation system (VC) and auxiliary electric room ventilation system (VE) return fan (0VE02CA)breaker into service on May 5, 2021. As a result of the performance deficiency, the VC/VE
'A' train was declared inoperable on multiple occasions due to the 0VE02CA return fan breaker instantaneous current trip setpoint set below the design requirements.
Description:
During the week of May 20, 2022, the licensee was performing planned maintenance on the VC/VE 'B' train and entered the applicable Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) action statements 3.7.4 A.1and 3.7.5 A.1. Following the VC/VE 'B' train work post-maintenance test (PMT), the licensee determined that additional repairs were required. When swapping from the in-service VC/VE 'B' train back to the standby VC/VE A train, the breaker for the VC/VE 'A' train return fan, 0VE02CA, tripped. The licensee reattempted to start the fan, which resulted in a second failure to start. The licensee entered a 12-hour shutdown Technical Specification LCO action statement requirement for both inoperable VC/VE trains. The licensees electrical maintenance department performed troubleshooting and did not identify the actual cause of the trip. Operators used an abnormal operating procedure to reset all targets for the fan and successfully started the return fan and declared the VC/VE 'A' train operable. The licensee reported the event in License Event Report (LER) 05000373/2022-003-02.
In parallel to the VC/VE 'A' train return fan breaker troubleshooting, the repairs were completed on the VC/VE 'B' train, which required another train swap for PMT. The VC/VE
'B' train was then placed in service and the VC/VE 'A' train was placed in standby. A filter was left in service for the VC/VE 'B' train to ensure any foreign material was captured after the maintenance window. Therefore, the licensee remained in a 30-day Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 action statement.
On May 23, 2022, another swap was to be performed from VC/VE 'B' train to the VC/VE
'A' train to remove the filter. During the train swap, return fan, 0VE02CA, tripped and operations declared VC/VE 'A' train inoperable and entered the associated Technical Specification LCOs. Concurrently, the filter was removed from VC/VE 'B' train and operations restored 'B' train operability. The licensees electrical maintenance department performed troubleshooting, successfully started the fan, and operations declared the VC/VE
'B' train operable.
The licensee performed a root cause to determine the reason the 0VE02CA breaker had tripped on multiple occasions. The licensee determined that the return fan breaker instantaneous current trip setting was set to its minimum allowable which was outside of the acceptable design range specification. Trip testing of the breaker found that the breaker tripped at approximately 501 amps. The inrush current with the breaker installed upon fan start was found to be 824 amps, and the fan would remain running as expected if the instantaneous trip setting was set to the correct setpoint of 875 amps. Vendor testing documentation did not specify that the breaker was tested at the required trip set point of 875 amps and rather only tested the breaker within the range of 490 amps to 1470 amps. License engineering change and work order documents did not contain test control measures to ensure the 0VE02CA return fan breaker was set and tested to the correct instantaneous trip setting.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program and corrected the issue by ensuring the 0VE02CA breaker instantaneous current trip was set to a value within the design specifications.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report 4533751, Work Order 5297341, Engineering Request Change 456436.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors identified that the failure to ensure the 0VE02CA return fan breaker instantaneous trip current setting was set and tested to the correct design setpoint prior to installation on May 5, 2021, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure this breaker was tested in a manner that verified this design specification prior to placing it in service.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to ensure that 0VE02CA return fan breaker instantaneous current trip setpoint was set correctly resulted in multiple unplanned occasions of VC/VE 'A' train inoperability.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that Barrier Integrity cornerstones were affected. Using Exhibit 3 - Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, section D, Control Room Auxiliary, Reactor, or Spent Fuel Pool Building, the inspectors determined that the finding screened to green because the performance deficiency did not represent a degradation of the barrier function against radiological, smoke, or a toxic atmosphere. The performance deficiency was limited to the 'A' VC/VE train.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.7 - Documentation: The organization creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was indicative of recent performance based upon the May 5, 2021, installation date and assigned the cross-cutting aspect H.7, Documentation. The licensee did not create and maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date documentation to ensure that the 0VE02CA return fan breaker was installed with the correct instantaneous trip setting.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, a test program shall include, as appropriate, proof tests prior to installation, preoperational tests, and operational tests during nuclear power plant or fuel reprocessing plant operation, of structures, systems, and components (SSCs).
Contrary to the above, from May 5, 2021 to May 23, 2022, the licensees test program failed to include appropriate proof tests prior to installation or preoperational tests of SSCs.
Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that breaker 0VE02CA (a safety-related component)instantaneous trip setting had been set and tested to within the design specifications.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 11, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to John VanFleet, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 14, 2023, the inspectors presented the ISFSI cask loading inspection results to John VanFleet, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 11, 2023, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to John VanFleet, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Issue with Reactor Building Overhead Crane Aux Hook
11/18/2021
Reactor Building Overhead Crane Issues
2/30/2021
U1 Refuel Bridge Fails Mono-Hoist Surveillance
01/26/2022
Issues Identified on Walkdown of ISFSI Pad
06/07/2022
RX Bldg Overhead Crane Broken
06/07/2022
ISFSI Haul Path Concrete Degraded
10/10/2022
ISFSI Pad Concrete Degraded
05/05/2022
ISFSI BI-ANNUAL WALKDOWN COMPLETED
10/14/2022
ISFSI ANNUAL WALKDOWN COMPLETED
10/14/2022
Walkdown Identifies Issues with Unit 2 Refuel Bridge
01/19/2023
ISFSI Bi-Annual Walkdown Completed 04/12/2023
04/12/2023
Hi-Storm 405 Position 51 Hole in Bottom Screen
05/02/2023
Potential NRC Concern Regarding HOLTEC DCS System
06/06/2023
23 Dry Cask Storage Cask 1 Lessons Learned
06/13/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
FHD Skid Tripped on High Pressure Switch Tripped
06/27/2023
NRC Identified Water Jacket Plug Leaking
07/13/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified Missing Attachment from Work Order
07/13/2023
Engineering
Changes
Spent Fuel Casks for the 2023 Loading Campaign (LaSalle) -
2.48-155
Procedure LFP-800-70 72.48 Screening
2.48-157
Procedure OU-AA-630-102 72.48 Screening
2.48-159
Spent Fuel Casks for the 2023 Loading Campaign (LaSalle) -
LaSalle Fuel Selection Packages for the 2023 ISFSI
Campaign - ISFSI
Miscellaneous
NF220791
LaSalle 2023 SFLC Cask Loading Requirements
Memorandum - ISFSI
03/03/2023
NDE Reports
919508-811
Report of Nondestructive Examination
07/11/2023
60855
Procedures
GQP-9.2
High Temperature Liquid Penetrant Examination and
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Acceptance Standards For Welds, Base Materials and
Cladding (50° - 350°F)
LFP-800-69
HI-TRAC Movement Within The Reactor Building
LFP-800-70
HI-TRAC Loading Operations
MSLT-MPC-
EXELON-MW
Helium Mass Spectrometer Leak Test Procedure Multipurpose
Canister
214-03
Dry Cask Storage / ISFSI Inspection Surveillance Program
OU-MW-671-200
MPC Processing Forced Helium Dehydration (FHD) for BWRs
Radiation Surveys 2022-179955
ISFSI Pad
10/21/2022
Self-Assessments
NOSA-LAS-22-03
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Audit Report
06/30/2022
Annual Reactor Building Crane Inspection
2/08/2022
Dry Cask Storage HI-STORM Lift Bracket Inspection
10/27/2022
Dry Cask Storage Lift Yoke Assembly Inspection
10/27/2022
Work Orders
Crane, Beam & Hoist Monthly Inspection
05/15/2023
Drawings
M-94
P & ID Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
LOP-LP-01E
Unit 1 Low Pressure Core Spray Electrical Checklist
Miscellaneous
LOP-LP-01M
Unit 1 Low Pressure Core Spray Mechanical Checklist
Procedures
LOP-LP-02
Preparation for Standby Operation of Low-Pressure Core
Spray System
Corrective Action
Documents
2FP147 Viking Deluge Valve Does Not Pass Flow
2/17/2022
NRC IDENTIFIED - 2FP207 Small Packing Leak
08/02/2023
NRC Identified Pre-Fire Plan Symbol Discrepancy
08/03/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified: Rust on 749' Aux Building
09/05/2023
FZ 4D2
Aux. Bldg. 749'-0" Elev. U2 Cable Spreading Room
FZ 4D4
Aux. Bldg. 749'-0" Elev. U2 electrical Equipment Room
FZ 7B1
DG. Bldg. 710'-0" Elev. U1 HPCS Diesel-Generator Room
FZ 7B4
DG. Bldg. 710'-0" Elev. U1 HPCS Diesel Day Tank Room
FZ 8B2
DG Bldg. 710'-0" Elev. U2 Division 2 Standby Diesel
Generator Room
005
Fire Plans
FZ 8B4
DG Bldg. 710'-0" Elev. U2 Division 2 Diesel Day Tank Room
Procedures
Pre-Fire Plan Manual
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
4.0 Critique for U1 September Load Drop
09/10/2023
Miscellaneous
23 OBE 3
LaSalle County Station LORT Dynamic Simulator Scenario
Guide
06/14/2023
Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices
Watch-Standing Practices
Procedures
Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
013
NRC ID'D Observation on DG Air Start Oiler
04/15/2015
AR 4011747-04
Unexpected Alarm "LPCS Pump Injection Flow Hi" and
Inadvertent Closing of the Min-Flow Valve
06/22/2017
(a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan
(Monitoring) Goal Setting Template
09/15/2017
(a)(1) Determination Template
01/31/2019
2A B/D Starting Air Motors Inline Oiler not Working
05/15/2023
PCRAs to Check Air Start Oilers Function After DG Start
06/22/2023
0FP01KB B DFP Coolant Tank Relief Valve Excessively
Lifting
08/04/2023
Suspected Blown Head Gasket on 0FP01KB, 0B Diesel Fire
Pump
08/05/2023
0B Diesel Fire Pump Will Not Be Restored in 7 Days
08/10/2023
0FP01KB Issues after Head Gasket Replacement
08/15/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Engine Coolant Leaking into the Oil on B DFP
08/17/2023
LAS-31230
Failure Analysis of a Pressure Switch for LaSalle Station
07/20/2017
Miscellaneous
LAS-N/AE15-
1411
Focused Troubleshooting Plan for B DFP Coolant
08/16/2023
LMS-DG-01
Main Emergency Diesel Unit Surveillances
LOP-DG-02
Diesel Generator Startup and Operation
Procedures
LOS-DG-M2
1A(2A) Diesel Generator Operability Test
110
Perform 2A Diesel Generator Inspection per LMS-DG-01
09/22/2016
Perform 2B Diesel Generator Inspection per LMS-DG-01
07/26/2016
Perform Diesel Generator Inspection Per LMS-DG-01
LPCS DP Switch 1E21-N004 Malfunctioned
04/17/2023
Work Orders
EWP MM 2A Diesel 2DG16MB Oiler Needs Repaired
05/17/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
MM 2B DG East Side Air Start Mtr Low Oil Entrained on Start
05/25/2023
MM Remove/Reinstall for Offsite Maint. B Diesel Fire Engine
08/23/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Increase in Vibration Trend on 2C71-S001B Flywheel Bearing
09/12/2023
LOP-RP-04
RPS Bus B Transfer
LOS-RI-Q5
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Pump
Operability, Valve Inservice Tests in Modes 1,2,3, and Cold
Quick Start
Integrated Risk Management
Procedures
On-Line Work Control Process
CSCS Cooling Water System "Road Map" Calculation
005B
VY02A Cooler Thermal Performance Model
001
Calculations
VD-3A
HPCS Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System
2B DG Room Ventilation Supply Filter D/P High
07/24/2023
Unit 1 Div 3 VY Cooler as Found Low Flow
07/24/2023
2A RHR Potential Seal Leak
08/08/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
LOS-RI-Q5 Att 2A Complete with Portions UNSAT
09/22/2023
Drawings
M-87, Sheet 1
P&ID Core Standby Cooling System Equipment Cooling Water
System
BT
Engineering
Changes
Evaluation of Reduced Cooling Water Flow to 1VY02A
07/24/2023
Condition Monitoring Plan - CM-05
05/08/2018
IST-LAS-PLAN
Inservice Testing Program Plan Fourth Ten-Year Interval
Miscellaneous
J-0155
Electro-Motive (EMD) - Diesel Generator Stationary Power /
645E4 Engine Manual, Parts, and Tools Catalogs
2/13/1998
J-0057
Vendor Technical Manual - INGERSOLL-RAND RESIDUAL
HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) PUMPS
Procedures
MA-AA-716-010-
1104
Mechanical Seal Leakage Evaluation and Reporting
LRA LOS-DG-SR7, Att. D, 1VY02A DP Test
11/25/2020
LOS-DG-SR7 Acceptance Criteria not Met
05/27/2021
Work Orders
VY-SR1 2VY02A Air Side Flow Test HPCS Pump Rm
06/24/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
LRA LOS-DG-SR7, Att. D, 1VY02A DP Test
11/21/2022
Analysis of Emergency Diesel Generator Technical
Specification Voltage and Frequency Range and Tolerances
Calculations
Flex Diesel Generators Loading Calculation
0DG009 Manual Declutch Lever Failure
2/03/2020
RM-Rod 38-11 No Position 46 During Rod Cycling
04/16/2022
Div 1 Gross Gamma 1RIT-CM011 Issue
05/09/2023
08/07/2023
As-Found '0' DG Cooler Flow Outside Procedural Limit
08/07/2023
1FI-DG031 Flow Gauge Very Difficult to Read
08/08/2023
Uni1 1 Div 1 Gross Gamma Monitor Power Supply Failure
08/16/2023
P/S for U1 Div 1 Gross Gamma Rad Monitor Not Like for Like
08/25/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
RM - LOS-RP-SA4 1C71A-K10G Didn't De-energize as
Expected
09/07/2023
Drawings
M-87, Sheet 2
P&ID Core Standby Cooling System Equipment Cooling Water
System
BL
Establish Revised Acceptance Criteria for Quarterly "Group A"
IST Pump Test for Pump 0DG01P
Engineering
Changes
Thermal Margin of 0/1/2DG01A Standby DG Heat Exchangers
with Reduced Cooling Water Flow
2/10/2017
CC-LA-118-1001
Site Implementation of Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies
(FLEX) and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Program
LIS-CM-106A
Unit 1 Post Accident Monitoring (Div 1) Containment Gross
Gamma Radiation Monitor Calibration
LOA-FSG-002
Flex Electrical Strategy
LOA-FSG-011
FLEX Beyond Design Basis External Event Guidance
LOS-CM-M1
Monthly Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Channel Check
LOS-DG-M1
Diesel Generator Operability Test
LOS-DG-M3
1B(2B) DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY TEST
2
LOS-DG-Q1
Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Inservice Test
LOS-DG-SR5
DG Cooling Water System Flow Test
LOS-DG-SR7
Division 3 Cooling Water System Test
Procedures
LOS-FSG-SR1
FLEX Equipment Surveillance
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
LOS-RH-Q1
Unit 2 A RHR System Operability and Inservice Test
LOS-VG-M1
Standby Gas Treatment System Operability and Inservice Test
Preventive Maintenance of GE Type AK-25 Circuit Breakers
Spent Fuel Pool Level Replace Level Transmitter
09/28/2023
OP PMT: 0VE05YA: Damper Cycles as Required
09/27/2023
OP PMT: Breaker Closes and Carries Load 0VC01CA Supply
Fan
09/26/2023
OPS PMT: A VC EMU Train No Door Leaks During Operation
09/27/2023
OP PMT 'A' VE Chiller Contingency Repairs
09/27/2023
2E12F027A A RHR SUP CHBR SPRAY ISOL LOS-RH-Q1
ATT 2A
08/08/2023
09/26/2023
Perform 1B Diesel Generator Inspection per LMS-DG-01
07/14/2023
OP PMT Functional, Check for Leaks
09/18/2023
Flex Generator 0FF01KB Performance Test
09/19/2023
EWP MM Perform Cooler Cleaning on 1VY02A
09/18/2023
OP PMT: 0VE04CA Runs SAT
09/27/2023
LOS-DG-Q1 0 DG Cooling Water Pump Inservice Test
08/08/2023
Scram Times/10% of Rods/Every 120 Days of Oper(>800
PSI)/PMT, W: L01-LOS-RD-SR12
09/11/2023
LOS-RP-Q2 U-1 Turbine Stop Valves Att 1A
09/08/2023
Work Orders
LOS-DG-M3 1B DG FAST START
09/18/2023
Weld Repair on Nozzle to Pipe Joint on Top 2B RT Reg HX
07/05/2023
Cubicle Inspection and Swap with Refurbished Breaker
LOS-DG-M1 0 DG Idle Start Att 0-IDLE
08/08/2023
Work Orders
U1 Div 1 Post LOCA Gross Gamma Rad PPC Indication is
Erratic
08/28/2023
LAS-EP-2023-OYE-MCR-OTHER
08/17/2023
LAS-EP-2023-OYE-OSC-OTHER
08/17/2023
LAS-EP-2023-OYE-Drill Control
08/17/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
LaSalle EP 2023 Off-Year Exercise - TSC Performance
08/18/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID-Structural Integrity Question for TSC
08/17/2023
Miscellaneous
LaSalle Off Year
Exercise Drill
Package
LaSalle Off Year Exercise Drill Package
08/15/2023
Operating Stations Emergency Preparedness Process
Description
Emergency Classification and Protective Action
Recommendations
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) / Emergency
Response Facility (ERF) Activation and Operation
Procedures
Notifications
Issues with Vendor Transport for Emergent Rad Shipment
11/16/2021
Low Level Waste Parts not Shipped with Equipment
06/22/2022
Safety - Shipping Loading Area Outside Bldg 20 West
08/16/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Shepherd Calibrator Unsecured
10/17/2022
CFR 61 Waste
Stream Analysis
01/22/2022
CFR 61 Waste
Stream Analysis
Spent Resin
09/22/2022
Waste Stream Review and Scaling Factor Determining Report;
ALPS Charcoal
2/03/2021
Miscellaneous
Byproduct Active Source Inventory
05/23/2023
Procedures
CFR PART 37 MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAM
Surveying Radioactive Material Shipments
Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments
Inspection and Loading of Radioactive Material Shipments
Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes
Self-Assessments
Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material
Handling, Storage, and Transportation
23
LM-23-017
Shipping Papers; Laundry Shipment
2/10/2023
LW-22-024
Shipping Paper; Spent Resin
06/15/2022
LW-23-003
Shipping Papers; Dewatered Spent Resin
01/17/2023
LW-23-005
Dewatered Spent Resin; LSA-II
08/08/2023
LW-23-019
Shipping Papers; Dry Activated Waste (DAW)
01/30/2023
Shipping Records
LW-23-030
Shipping Papers; Spent Resin
07/19/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
MSPI Reporting Review By NRC
09/27/2023
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Reactor
Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity
various
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Occupational
Exposure Control Effectiveness
various
Miscellaneous
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - RETS/ODCM
Radiological Effluent Occurrences
various
Reactor Oversight Program Mitigating System Performance
Index Basis Document (High Pressure Core Spray, Residual
Heat Removal and Emergency AC Power)
71151
Procedures
EA-AA-6001047
Mitigating Systems Performance Index Basis Document
Unit 2 Manually Scrammed Due to a Fire in the Isophase Bus
Duct
09/26/2022
Engineering Trend in pDM Issues
10/05/2022
CAT ID#814606 Incorrect Compound (Thermal vs. Electrical)
03/02/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Root Cause
Report
Unit 2 Manually Scrammed Due to a Fire in the Isophase Bus
Duct
04/21/2023
Procedures
MA-AA-716-230-
1003
Thermography Program Guide
Work Orders
Thermal Anomalies Identified U2 Iso-Phase Bus (IR
04302051)
03/01/2021
Engineering
Changes
KM CUBICLE REPLACEMENT FOR UNIT 1 - ONLINE 2014
2/20/2019
License Event
Report (LER)
05000373/2022-
003-02
Supplement to Main Control Room and Auxiliary Electric
Room HVAC Declared Inoperable Due to Multiple Component
Failures
2/28/2022
Miscellaneous
Licensee Event
Report
05000374/2022-
003-02
Manual Scram due to Isophase Bus Duct Fire Followed by a
2A RPS Normal Power Supply Trip
06/16/2023
OVC02CA KLNOCKNER MOELLER MCC 1AP78E-C6
CUBICLE REPLACEMENT
06/28/2016
Work Orders
EWP-EM Inspect BKR/CUB 1AP80E-B5
10/31/2022