IR 05000373/1982028
| ML20055A496 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1982 |
| From: | Guldemond W, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055A492 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-82-28, NUDOCS 8207190076 | |
| Download: ML20055A496 (4) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-373/82-28(DPRP)
j Docket No. 50-373 License No. NPF-11 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL Inspection Conducted: May 3-28, 1982
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.jhzxa3L y/74J Inspectors:
W. G. Guldemon f$ Yt t
h N /94d R. D. Walker g
g?s q%2h Approved By:
R. D. Walker, Chief fhziteSl$kI78'2 Reactor Projects 6'
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Section 1C Inspection Summary i
Inspection on May 3-28, 1982 (Report No. 50-373/82-28(DPRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection. The inspection consisted of operational safety verification, followup of licensee event reports, review of plant operations and independent inspection effort.
The inspection involved a total of 90 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC in-
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spectors including 10 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the four areas examined, no items of noncompliance were identi-fled in three areas; one item of noncompliance was identified in the other area (Paragraph 2: Failure to Implement Fire Protection Requirements).
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4 8207190076 820701 DR ADOCK 05000373 PDR
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted:
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- B. B. Stephenson, Project Manager
- R. H. Holyoak, Station Superintendent G. J. Diederich, Station Operating Assistant Superintendent-
- R. D. Bishop, Administrative & Support Services Assistant Superintendent J. M. Marcha11, Operating Engineer T. Borzym, Security Administrator J. Renwick, Technical Staff. Supervisor i
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees lacluding members of the construction, quality assurance, technical and operating staff.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview of June 7, 1982.
2.
Operational Safety Verification
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The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of May 1982. Tours of both reactor. buildings and turbine build-ings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive-vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in ac-
cordance with the station security plan.
During a routine plant tour on May 11, 1982, the inspectors made the following observations. Two open paint cans were stored behind the Unit 2. control boards which are located in the common Unit 1/ Unit 2 i
control room. While there was evidence that painting had been in pro-gress, the open cans were left unattended for over two hours. Numerous
cigarette butts were observed inside the Unit 2 control boards located I
in the common Unit 1/ Unit 2 control room despite postings prohibiting-
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smoking inside the control boards.
In one instance, one of the butts was allowed to burn out on a plank lying inside the control board. Two doors just outside the control room, labelled as fire doors had their latches
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taped in such a manner as to prevent the doors from shutting securely.
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Similar deficiencies documented in IE Inspection Report 50-373782-12,
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dated March 25, 1982 resulted in a Severity Level IV violatier. (Supple-ment II). The licensee's corrective actions documented in an April 123,
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1982 letter from Mr. L. O. De1 George to Mr. J. G. Keppler, consisted of correcting specific deficiencies, instructing station personnel on pro-per use of flammable liquids, and a memorandum from the Project Manager
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to all site personnel reminding them that Unit 1 was to be approaching l
an operating status and that operations were to be conducted with that in mind.
Based on the May 11, 1982 observations, the corrective action taken was inadequate to preclude recurrence of the problem.
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The May 11, 1982 observations constitute an item of noncompliance as
they are contrary to Commonwealth Edison Company Quality Assurance Pro-gram, Regulatory Guides 1.38 and 1.39, ANSI 45.2.2, and Technical Specification 3/4.7.6.
(373/82-28-01)
On May 20, 1982, a fire occurred in the Unit 2 Reactor Building in the vicinity of the Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment System. The fire was
apparently caused by a short circuit in an energized welding machine.
The welding machine was not in use at the time the fire occurred.
Damage was limited to the welding machine and the cart it was on.
The fire
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was extinguished by the station fire brigade and no off-site assistance was required.
It was noted that the fire siren could not be heard in
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the Service Building in the vicinity of the inspector's office.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
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On May 6, 1982, the inspector was informed by the licensee that an automatic isolation of the Unit 1 shutdown cooling system had occurred during system testing.
It was believed that the pressure surge in the system caused by starting one of the RHR pumps was causing the high flow isolation instrument to trip. This instrument, when tripped, causes the shutdown cooling suction isolation valve to close.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the isolation was being triggered by one of the two D/P transmitters associated with high flow l
isolation. The transmitter causing the isolation was experiencing a transient differential pressure an order of magnitude larger than the redundant transmitter.
It was also determined that the affected trans-mitter was installed such that the sensing lines were reversed.
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In response to these items, the licensee undertook to reverse the sensing lines on the affected D/P cell and to install flow restrictors on the sensing lines to reduce the transient D/P. The licensee also committed to review similar transmitter installations to determine if the reversed
sensing lines represented an isolated occurrence or if other installa-tions were similarly affected.
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On May 21, 1982, the licensee informed the inspector that the sensing
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lines on the Unit 1 Low Pressure Core Spray System injection valve D/P switch were found reversed. Actions were taken to restore the system to its proper configuration. As this was the second such con-figuration to be discovered, the licensee agreed to review all safety related system D/P cell configurations.
For those installations which had not been verified properly by either direct testing or walkdown, either a test or a walkdown would be performed prior to initial criti-cality. This item remains open (82-28-02).
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
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operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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3.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to deter-mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with
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technical specifications.
Number Title 50-373/82-003/03L-0 Inoperable Smoke Detector 50-373/82-005/03L-0 Inoperable Control Room HVAC Train
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50-373/82-009/03L-0 Excessive Hysteresis In Reactor Vessel Level Scram Switch 4.
Review of Plant Operations On May 21, 1982, the inspector observed a site assembly drill. Two
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observations were made. First, it took excessive time to process on-i site personnel into the assembly area while maintaining accountability.
Second, the assembly siren could not be heard in the vicinity of the inspector's office in the Service Building. With respect to the first item, the licensee is expanding his accountability facilities to facil-itate processing personnel. With respect to the second item, the
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licensee is pursuing upgrading Service Building siren equipment.
(82-28-03)
5.
Independent Inspection Effort On May 11, 1982, the inspector monitored the cold hydrostatic test performed on the reactor pressure vessel. The test was conducted in g
accordance with an approved procedure and the results were acceptable.
The only discrepancy noted related to a temporary procedure change
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made immediately prior to test performance. The licensee decided to change the test pressure shortly before performing the hydrostatic test.
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This necessitated several procedure changes to jumper reactor protec-tion signals.
In one instance, the procedural change did not require
the jumpers to be removed upon test completion. The inspector brought this item to the attention of the cognizant Test Engineer and it was
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corrected.
6.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspec-tion period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings.
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